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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates and compares two versions of neutral monism, one developed 
by William James and the other by Bertrand Russell. Both argued against 
Cartesianism in favour of a "subjectless given" as the basic stuff which constitutes 
both mind and matter. My evaluation will demonstrate that James’s and Russell's 
supposedly neutral entities are not neutral as their exponents claim because they 
fail to satisfy important criteria set for a theory to be genuinely neutral.
There are two fundamental elements within my discussion of the neutral entities. 
Firstly, I shall demonstrate that although James's initial repudiation of dualistic 
epistemology of subject and object, knower and known, led him to avoid 
metaphysical dualism of mental and physical, in Cartesian sense, by committing 
him to the view that there is one kind of entity called "experience", his final 
analysis admitted an internal distinction within the supposedly simple neutral 
entities. I shall call this covert dualism.
Accepting James’s radical empiricism as an archetype, Russell’s early 
commitment to neutral monism led him to assert three distinctive kinds of entities, 
sensation (neutral), image (subjective) and unperceived (objective), and was 
therefore not complete as that of James. In order to bring his theory in line with 
James, Russell, in his mature version, entirely repudiated the dualistic view of 
perception which, following Moore, he accepted, to reject idealism. Russell 
declared percept as the neutral entity, which is both mental and material at once. 
But by re-introducing epistemological dualism, as James did, Russell admitted that 
a percept is not simple but complete bundle o f compresent qualities and relations. 
1 shall argue that like James’ his theory also collapses into covert dualism.
Secondly, I shall argue that to produce a genuinely explanatory theory of neutral 
entities James and Russell exploited science to  justify their theories. In course of 
their analysis they produced various arguments which has been considered as 
circular. An attempt will be made to show that the apparent circularity of their 
analysis is really part of a sophisticated programme, now known as bootstrapping. 
The notion of a bootstrap strategy has recently been developed in philosophy of 
science, and suggests a way in which the same evidence can be used to generate 
both a general and specific hypothesis.
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapters one, two and four are largely 
exegetical and chronological, and discuss the development of neutral monism 
especially in James and Russell’s philosophy together with the general 
characteristics of the theory as distinguished from other theories explaining mind 
and matter. Chapters three, five and six critically analyse James’s and Russell’s 
versions respectively to show their theories collapse into covert dualism. In 
chapter seven we argue that the alleged circularities in their theory are non- 
viscious and their employment of a bootstrap strategy introduced a profound 
innovation in epistemology.
1INTRODUCTION
Aims of the Thesis.
The thesis is a comparative study o f William James’s and Bertrand Russell's theory of 
neutral monism. The thesis has four main objectives. My primary aim is to look at the 
philosophical situation in which Russell found himself, and to see how he reacted to 
and adapted James’s views, which he found interesting and promising. The interest is 
therefore in the intellectual coherence and the philosophical success of Russell’s 
programme to develop and incorporate James’s views into his own philosophical 
programme. James’s influence on Russell was quite complex partly because it 
occurred at a time when Russell was, for quite independent reasons, radically 
changing his views on mind and other issues.
This evaluative task is carried out to see the effort of both James and Russell in their 
disassociating from dualistic epistemological positions of knower and known, subject 
and object for a more profound metaphysical monism of neutral entities. My second 
objective is interpretative. In order to expose the simplicity of the theory for its better 
understanding my aims are twofold. First I will isolate neutral monism from other 
theories explaining mind and matter in order to show what James and Russell aimed 
to achieve. One of the points I shall highlight is that neutral monism takes as its task 
the resolution of the problems which remained unresolved by those other theories. 
Second 1 will outline the main characteristics and aims of the theory in order to argue 
that the exponents of the theory intended to prove that neutral monism is a more 
logical and economical way of approaching the problem of mind and body. A full 
exposition of James’s and Russell’s theory will be provided to evaluate their success 
in providing a theory of truly neutral entities.
My third objective is concerned with the critical examination of the versions of 
James’s and Russell’s theory. I shall therefore argue that both the versions failed to 
meet the criteria set for a theory to be truly neutral. Instead they collapse into 
disguised form of dualism. 1 call this covert dualism. |In Chapter 1, sectionl .2.3, I 
have distinguished between Cartesian dualism and covert dualism. In short, if a 
supposedly neutral entity consisted of elements which were mental or were physical 
then we have covert dualism. In contrast the Cartesian dualist accepts two distinct
Introduction
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types of substances, mental and physical, as the foundation of two separate 
ontologies | .
Nevertheless, I shall demonstrate that both James and Russell quite successfully 
avoided psychophysical dualism in Cartesian style. They were neither phenomenalist 
nor physicalist, as their critics argued, in their explanation of mind and body in terms 
of neutral entities. I shall list three basic types of phenomenalism in order to identify, 
especially, Russell’s early commitment to neutral monism as a type of "quasi- 
phenomenalism".
In order to show that neutral monism is more plausible then physicalism, I shall 
briefly highlight the main tenets of physicalism and their shortcomings. This will 
show that the identity hypothesis initiated by Russell does not make neutral monism 
into physicalism, rather it resolved most of the problems which the physicalist failed.
Since neutral monism is a non-reductive theory, a brief comparison will be made to 
the modern non-reductive theory proposed by Donald Davidson. The theory is called 
"anomalous monism". Davidson, in his philosophy of mind, aimed to reconcile the 
physical basis of mental life. He agreed that each mental event is identical with a 
physical event but maintained that mental events do not involve the kind of general 
laws that govern physical phenomena. In considering events as mental we adopt a 
different perspective, with different principles of organization, from that of the 
perspective of physical sciences. My demonstration, however, will show that non- 
reductive materialism is not stable and therefore pushed anomalous monism in an 
explicit form of dualism.
Finally, I shall try to demonstrate two things. Firstly, I shall show that if we consider 
James’s theory a model, Russell's early commitment to neutral monism left three 
distinctive kinds of neutral entities in his philosophy. Russell struggled to bring his 
theory in line with that of James. My analysis will show that in his mature version, 
Russell accepted a theory of perception which argued that in perception there is no 
distinction between the knower, the subject, and the known, the object. In this early 
version Russell thought that he had done with these distinctions, which left, beside 
sensations, the neutral entities, the images, the subjective entities, and the 
unpcrceived, the physical entities. His final version admits of a single kind of entity 
called a percept, and hence Russell could close the gap between his theory and that of 
James, by arguing that a neutral entity can be physical and mental, both at once.
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Secondly, I shall demonstrate that James and Russell were the early pioneer of the 
scientific epistemology. Through their scientific knowledge they tried to bring a 
completeness in their versions of neutral monism. James entered neutral monism 
through psychology and Russell through physics. Though James was an 
introspectionist psychologist, he was a forerunner of physiological psychology. The 
laboratory experiments and the functions of the central nervous system illuminated the 
mind-body problem both in his psychology and philosophy. Russell gave priority to 
both physics and physiology in his investigation of mind and matter. Both argued 
against and criticised Descartes, British empiricism expounded by Locke, Berkeley 
and Hume, and the transcendental metaphysics of Kant. Both James and Russell tried 
to bring a radical change and give a satisfactory basis to mind and matter. Their 
answer was "neutral monism", which if proven scientifically would disperse the 
dilemma long faced by mind-body theorists. In order to make his thesis more radical 
James oscillated between introspection and physiology. He drew analogy between the 
stream of consciousness revealed through introspection and the physiological 
discovery of the process of central nervous system which runs as a sort of stream. He 
laid much emphasis on the subjective element and relied on introspection. He also 
resorted to much hypothesizing. Physiology was used simply to facilitate the 
understanding of mind as it appeared to introspection. Russell, in his initial 
development of the thesis, missed the real crunch of James’s argument. It is in his 
later theory he returned to James.
Both James and Russell rely upon different sources of evidence and postulate a variety 
of representational systems within the theory. They implicitly employ a version of 
bootstrap strategy. This strategy has been only recently identified in the philosophy of 
science, which suggests a way in which the same evidence can be used to generate 
both a general hypothesis and a specific hypothesis. I shall render the bootstrapping 
arguments explicit before showing how James’s and Russell’s use of it avoided 
visciously circular arguments.
It is essential to note that this thesis is by no means an attempt to evaluate the 
bootstrap strategy as practised by the modem mind-body theorists. Since my concern 
is the historical success of Russell’s and James’s version of neutral monism I shall 
confine my discussion to their arguments.
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Structure Of The Thesis.
The thesis is in eight chapters. Chapter one deals with the historical background 
against which the general ontological question of "what there is" has given rise to the 
very different theories: dualism, materialism, idealism and neutral monism. Among 
these four principal theories neutral monism developed in the thinking of late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century philosophers who revolted against the 
dualistic interpretation of mind and matter and the subsequent one-sided treatment of 
this by the materialist and the idealist. Though Mach was the initiator of the theory, it 
was independently developed and popularised first by James and then by Russell. In 
order to understand the aims and the basic characteristics of neutral monism an 
attempt is made to isolate it from major alternative theories along with their 
inadequacies. A historical exegesis is included to give a background to our 
understanding of the versions of neutral monism in James and Russell. James’s 
commitment to radical empiricism was enhanced by his reading of Mach’s anti- 
atomistic physics and Darwin’s biology. A brief outline will be made to underline the 
general influence of science in his philosophical development. Since Russell’s early 
commitment to idealism, and his emancipation by Moore from it, led him to the 
acceptance of a plural universe of neutral entities, a brief chronology of his pre- 
neutral monistic philosophical beliefs will be included to produce a better insight into 
his theory.
In the second chapter an effort will be made to sketch the development of James’s 
version of neutral monism. It will particularly high light James’s transition from his 
acceptance of the existence of consciousness as against mechanical explanation to the 
ultimate rejection of consciousness, "a name of a nonentity, and has no right to a 
place among first principles". An enquiry will begin with a brief exposition of 
James’s reason for the rejection of dualism, associationinsm and transcendentalism. 
This will lead us to his argument for the acceptance of the world of pure experience, 
in which he committed to the view that reality and the field of neutral plural facts are 
one and the same. Before committing himself to dualism and then to neutral monism, 
James accepted a view called "phenomenism". His theory of neutral monism is, in 
fact, the mature version of phenomenism. This will lead us to critically assess his 
theory of neutral monism in chapter three, where an argument will be made to assert 
that although James avoided metaphysical dualism of mind and matter, in Cartesian 
style, his theory collapses into a disguised form of dualism called coven dualism.
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Chapter Three is a philosophical critique of James’s theory of neutral entities. 1 shall 
try to show that although he partly answered Hume on the question of causal relations 
he could not shed the Cartesian legacy. In his analysis the "ego" became the "passing 
thought" which retrospects the preceding experience and gives meaning to it. He 
failed to detach himself completely from his psychology and his theory of 
phenomenism. James’s metaphysical aspiration led him to say several times how, as 
he sees it, his position differed from dualism; but what he said, on close inspection, 
so far from convincing one that his position was not dualistic, make it more apparent 
that, covertly, it is. In my critical estimation 1 shall isolate eight points to reveal how 
James in his over enthusiastic analysis of experience admitted internal distinctions 
within the supposedly neutral entities.
The formative phase of Russell’s philosophy constitutes the main theme of the chapter 
four. Russell was familiar with the thesis of neutral monism during 19121. In his The 
Problems o f Philosophy he made an effort to close the gap between physics and 
perception. But by adhering to the relational theory of sensation (in which a subject is 
aware of an object) Russell could only produce a theory which could be called "barely 
dualistic". In his critique of neutral monism in 1913, especially of James, he held that 
neutral monism failed for several reasons; the problem with James’s account of 
knowledge was one he gave prominence. It was in 1919 Russell was persuaded of the 
rightness of James’s theory and therefore abandoned dualism in favour of neutral 
monism. The critics argued that instead of producing a theory of neutral monism 
Russell committed himself to phenomenalism. I shall however argue that, in between 
1914 and 1919, by accepting unperceived entities (sensibilia— the physical entities in 
disguise), Russell produced a theory which is at best be called "quasi­
phenomenalism". It was in 1921 Russell officially accepted the theory of neutral 
monism.
In chapter five 1 shall discuss Russell’s theory of neutral entities. As a neutral monist 
he rejected Brentano’s and Meinong’s analysis that there are three elements involved 
in the thought of an object ( the act, the content, and the object). Instead Russell 
abolished the distinction between "sense-data" and "sensations", with the assertion 
that the subject is a "gratuitous assumption", and not empirically discoverable. He
1. Russell wrote a Review of James's Essays in Radical Empiricism which was published in October, 
1912. On 28 July 1912 Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell: "Yesterday I did a review of W. James 
for Mind (a more serious matter than reviewing for the Nation)’ . See, The Collected Papers o f 
Bertrand Russell, vol. 6, 1992, p. 298.
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accepted sensations as neutral entities but argued that they are not enough to explain 
mind, which requires "images", and matter, which requires sensibilia. Though he 
accepted behaviourism in his explanation of the theory Russell retained introspection 
as a source of knowledge. He committed himself to three types of neutral entities and 
was not thoroughgoing as that of James, who argued for experiences as the only 
neutral entities. It was in his later philosophy Russell used a single expression, 
percept, as a neutral entity. This chapter will focus on the analysis of the neutral 
entities and how Russell struggled to bring his theory in line with neutral monism. In 
critically assessing Russell's position I shall demonstrate that "sensation" and 
"percept" are interchangeagle in his philosophy. In further analysis 1 shall prove that 
both sensation and percept are covertly dualistic.
Chapter six will consist of three sections. The first section will be of Russell’s theory 
of logical construction, restricted only to his application of the theory in order to 
explain mind and matter in terms of neutral entities. The analysis will reveal two 
distinct uses of construction: epistemological, i.e. to explain how physics is 
knowable, and ontological, i.e ., the entities which are constituents are genuine entities 
and the constructs are "logical fictions". It is the second use of the construction which 
explains the theory of mind and matter in terms of neutral entities. The theory of 
matter will follow next. The second section will be a detailed analysis of Russell’s 
theory of mind. This will follow how Russell initiated a change in his theory of 
perception to close the gap between his version of neutral monism and that of James'. 
Russell completely abandoned dualistic theory of perception as a result the distinctions 
between "images" and "sensations" lost their epistemological importance. But, as a 
consequence of the abandonment of "sense-data", such words as "awareness", 
"acquaintance” and "experience" had to be re-defined. With the re-interpretation of 
"the evidence of senses" Russell had to re-introduce the duality in sensation, hence 
making his theory covertly dualistic. In section three a comparison will be made 
between Russell’s theory of neutral monism and physicalism, especially "anomalous 
monism" to assert that the identity hypothesis proposed by Russell is of a "rigid" 
identity of entities and is quite compatible with the thesis of neutral monism and 
therefore is clearly distinguished from physicalist theory. A further claim will be 
made that James’s analysis o f  mental may suggest the flexibility and fluidity of 
psychological laws but is certainly not "anomalous" as is Davdison’s explanation of 
the mental.
Introduction
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In chapter seven an attempt will he made to show that the alleged circularities in 
James’s and Russell’s arguments, in explaining their versions of neutral monism, is 
not fatal as they appeared to be so. The circularity is a part of bootstrapping which 
has been regarded by scientific realists as a tool for deriving both specific and general 
views from the same initial evidence. Since the problem of the relation between 
evidence and hypothesis raises the entire issue of realism, 1 will distinguish between 
metaphysical realism and scientific realism in order to show that by following a 
bootstrap strategy one can avoid circularity in one’s arguments and hence render them 
non-viscious.
In the final chapter 1 shall summarise the findings of my arguments.
The bibliography will consist of the relevant works first o f James and then of Russell. 
This will follow with the other works by different authors, and will be listed in an 
alphabetical order.
8CHAPTER 1
Neutral Monism: An Intellectual and Chronological Context.
|T |he decomposition of the perception of the world into chaotic 
"sense-data* is a result of a late state of scientific analysis. We learn 
to know things and their properties, and some of us I earn later on that 
they are composed of sense-data. No conscious effort is necessary to 
do this composition by thinking. It has happened to us in childhixxl 
unconsciously and automatically.
|Max Bom, "Reflections of a Physicist", p. 123|.
1.1. Introduction,
1.1.1 The Ontological Question.
The perennial question of whether there is any distinction between mind and matter 
and, if so, in what relation a human mind stands to a human body culminated in the 
mind and body problem. It was Descartes, who took this as his problem and tried to 
give a rational reply basing his arguments both on scientific world view and initial 
moral and religious teachings. Well-known as Cartesianism, the mind-body dualism 
was the direct outcome o f his basic monistic stance that God is the one and eternal 
substance.
Though secondary, mind and body are two separate substances created by God, but 
neither of them are reducible to the other. Matter is characterized as the extended 
substance in space, by virtue of which it has length, breadth, height and a definite 
position in space. Mind, as opposed to matter, is distinctively characterized by 
thought and is devoid of extension, therefore leaving it with no shape, size or 
location.
This ontological problem has not only provoked metaphysical uncertainty, it also had 
created epistemological chaos. Metaphysically the problems are concerned with the 
status of matter and mind in relation to what there is. The epistemological problems 
are concerned with the plausibility of that prerequisite upon which psychology and 
physics depends.
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Apart from dualism the ontological question concerning "what is there?" has given 
rise to different theories: materialism, idealism and neutral monism. Of these four 
principal theories neutral monism developed in the thinking of the 20th century 
philosophers, who revolted against the dualistic interpretation of mind and matter and 
the subsequent one-sided treatment of this by materialist and idealist philosophers. 
The supposed triumph of neutral monism lies in the claim that consciousness is not the 
name of anything. As James, in his Essays in Radical Empiricism says, it is 
diaphanous and is disappearing altogether from philosophy. Hence the neutral monists 
thought to gain the upperhand by putting the last nail in the coffin of the Cartesian 
interpretation of mind and matter.
Since the turn of nineteenth century Anglo-Saxon philosophy had witnessed large 
changes in the explanation of the external world. The question of the epistemic 
certainty of the given has been the central concern.
The twentieth century movement in philosophy was directed against the dominant 
idealism of the last century. The movement carried out a realist reaction against such 
idealist claims that material object cannot exist independently of mind. In order to 
preserve the common sense world, i.e. the independent reality of physical objects, the 
realist, i.e. Moore, Russell, James, attempted to show that in perception we obtain 
knowledge of external physical objects either directly or by means of "sense-data". 
First Moore and then Russell -- following Brentano and his pupil Meinong — argued 
that the idealists failed to understand the distinction between the act and the object of 
the act. In becoming a neutral monist Russell followed James and abandoned the 
realist distinction between the act and the object. He merged the former in the latter.
During the first third of this century an opposite trend has been observed in the 
development of science particularly in physics. Severe difficulties in making realist 
interpretations of time and space separately (after Einstein’s work on relativity) and 
similar difficulties in realistically interpreting fundamental particles (Bohr and 
Heisenberg), saw the re-introduction of idealistic arguments in physics and, in 
particular, the re-introduction of the active role of consciousness in perceptual acts. 
The physical reality of a common-sense object, such as a table, was analysed away by 
saying that what we call a table is in fact ideal qualities of hardness, smoothness, 
brownness etc.
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Contrary changes occurred in the field of psychology, when J.B. Watson, in 1912, 
launched his famous behaviourists movement. Watson denied the existence of 
introspective mental states such as thoughts, emotions and beliefs. According to 
behaviourism all actions, whether voluntary or involuntary, are in fact publicly 
observable and thus there is no such thing as mental event. B.F. Skinner, a radical 
behaviourist, affirmed this by saying "thinking is simply behaving", hence making 
psychology a materialist study.
These changes in the field of physics and psychology were exploited by the neutral 
monists. Among them are Ernst Mach, William James, Bertrand Russell and new 
realists, like Perry and Holt. They independently carried out an elaborate programme, 
specifically designed, to combat the crisis resulting from the attempt to reconcile 
physics and psychology with Cartesianism, and to make the previously metaphysical 
entities accessible.
1.1.2 The Building Blocks o f Psychology and Physics.
In order to evaluate the success of neutral monism 1 wish to briefly outline the major 
alternative theories to neutral monism and their difficulties before turning to consider 
the neutral monists’ own account.
1.1.2.1. Dualism.
The first systematic ontological argument was given by Descartes. Obsessed by the 
criterion of certainty Descartes defined substance as "everything in which there 
resides immediately, as in a subject, or by means of which there exists anything that 
we perceive i.e any property, quality or attribute of which we have a real idea is 
called a Substance">. Based on such a notion of substance, Descartes divides reality 
into two distinct realms; mind, known by its essential attribute thought, and matter, 
known by extension.
Hence Descartes had no problem in explaining physics and psychology by these two 
distinct substances, irreducible to each other. Even then Descartes failed to give an 
empirical account of mind and matter. The knowledge of matter and mind is through 
their attributes, but what are mind and matter apart from their attributes? He further 
complicated the situation by bringing in the notion of causal interaction between the
1. Descartes, R., Philosophical Works, vol. II, p. 53.
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two substances. As we know physical laws are enough to explain physics, therefore 
why do we need psychological laws to explain the movement of sentient objects? For 
example, two material bodies having similar characteristics can act upon each other 
when, for instance, a force is applied. Force is a physical phenomenon. Physical 
phenomena can act on a physical body. One can know how a material object behaves 
under certain physical conditions. But if physical laws are capable o f explaining 
mental events then why should the mind be regarded as spiritual, i.e. non physical.?
Similarly if psychological laws are enough to explain mental happenings then why are 
physical laws needed. But modem physics regularly describes events with no 
extension, namely point interaction with differential equation. These have been 
considered as physical particles, whereas Cartesian mind is nonmaterial. This point 
has been exploited by the materialists and, more appropriately physicalists.
Influenced by two Cartesian dicta: (i) the criterion of certainty and (ii) the 
epistemological question " how do I know...?" - two monist schools tried to give a 
rational explanation of physics and psychology. They are idealism and materialism.
1.1.2.2. Materialism,
The thrust of the materialist argument, concerning mind and body, is based on 
physical processes. The materialists that mental events can have no meaning on their 
own and that what we call mental events are actually physical events. This form of 
materialism is known as physicalism.
Physicalism, popularly known as identity theory, was presented by J.J.C . Smart, 
D.M. Armstrong and H. Feigl, amongst others. They claim, in general, that whilst 
there may be connotative difference between mentalistic and physicalistic expressions, 
empirically they denote one and the same physical phenomenon. To put the argument 
in its simplest form, the identity theorists claim that mental events are identical with 
brain events.
When we speak of an identity statement, e.g., "a=b" we usually mean that the "a" is 
identical with "b" what follow from identity is all the properties of "a" are possessed 
by "b". Again when we say "Hesperus= Phosphorus" we mean that whatever is 
Hesperus is also Phosphorus; that is, "a" (the morning star) is identical with "b" (the 
evening star). It is because both have the same reference and they refer to one and the
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same planet. We may substitute planet for Hesperus = Phosphorus, saying "Planet 
Venus = Planet Venus". Here both the denoting expressions not only refer to the same 
object but also have the same meaning.
On the basis of such interpretation of identity the materialists tried to give a 
"reductive" analysis of mind and body by claiming that mental states are in fact 
physical states of the brain. More precisely, each type of mental state corresponds, 
and is identical with, some type state of brain or central nervous system. What 
follows from this is that mentalistic and physicalistic terms do not refer to two 
different things or events, rather they describe the same things or events. The identity 
theorists claim that this identity between physical state and mental state is empirical 
and not logical. Though they describe the same event they are not synonymous.
The question of synonymy is one of the major factors of identity. When we say "a" is 
identical with "b", we mean "a" with all its properties (a, a2 a3 .... a j ,  if any, is
identical with all the properties of "b" (b, b2 b3 __  bn). But if any one of the
properties in each group is not identical with the other we can say that "a" is similar 
to "b" and not identical. It is in the essence of any reductivist theory to show that 
what is reduced is neither less and no more than the latter.
The identity theorists countered the claim of synonymous by saying that the identity 
between mental and bodily events is not "meaning identity", i.e. an identity between 
two synonymous general nouns. The identity, they claim, is neither logical nor 
necessary but rather contingent and empirical.
The main thrust of their argument lies in a scientific world view, i.e. the explanatory 
power of neurophysiology and physics as the ultimate. One may argue that reduction 
between two physical process is possible. Let us say that pain, a physical event is 
identical with the firing o f a C-fiber, a brain event. The objection raised is what about 
the "raw feel" of the pain, i.e. "what it is like to be in pain", to adopt Nagel’s2 
formulation.
The physicalists (especially Smart) tried to answer this by saying that the so called 
mental concepts such as "feel" or "sensations" are in fact not committed to either 
mind or body. They are simply "topic-neutral". Such states of "feeling pain", "seeing 
colour" etc. arise within the organism due to a given stimulus and are simply a typical
2. Nagel, T., 'What is il like to be a Bat?'.
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kind of behaviour. Therefore there is no "inner" mental sensation but simply certain 
behaviour pattern like peeling, scratching, itching etc.
Regarding contingent identity a more serious programme was launched by Saul 
Kripke (Naming and Necessity). Based on the Leibniz’s law of the identity o f 
indiscernible, Kripke argues that identity statements are essentially rigid and 
necessary. He introduced the term "rigid designator" to say that such an expression 
denotes the same thing in all possible worlds and that the object is a necessary 
existent. The term "necessary" means that it is true in all possible worlds and could 
not be false. Kripke contrasts this with "contingent" by which he means that it is true 
but not necessary.
Let us represent symbolically a particular "pain" sensation and a corresponding "brain 
state", i.e. the C-fiber stimulation, as P and C respectively. For Kripke pain P is a 
name; and if something is a pain it is essentially so, therefore it is a rigid designator. 
Thus, according to Kripke, the identity of pain with the stimulation of C-fiber, if true, 
must be necessary.
David Lewis, in his paper "Mad Pain and Martian Pain", maintained and defended 
the thesis that the identity between pain and certain neural state is contingent and 
therefore such identity is possible between objects. According to Lewis, pain is a 
matter of contingency because it depends on what causes what. Therefore all our 
concepts and ordinary names of mental states are "non-rigid" and "contingent".
Against this, Kripke argues that to prove contingency on the basis of "causal role", 
"amounts to the view that the very pain I now have could have existed without being a 
mental state at all." (p. 147).
A simple argument proposed against identity theory is that if mental events can be 
reduced to physical events then why and how can a subject report about his mental 
occurrence without having the slightest knowledge about physical occurrence of the 
brain? Such explanation is carried out by another monistic school called idealism.
As far as physical events are concerned materialism, in its different forms, gives 
highly plausible arguments. But in respect of mind, their difficulty lies in the over­
simplification of not giving an account of first person feelings.
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1.1.2.3. Idealism.
Idealism, also known as immaterialism, claims that matter has no independent reality. 
Rather, the claim is that reality is centred in the mind; and that colours, shapes, etc., 
which were thought to belong to independent material objects are actually the sensible 
qualities which cannot exist without being perceived. Berkeley gave this immaterialist 
thesis an epistemological ground. Hence his famous dictum "esse-est-percipii".
Based on this Berkeley argued that what we immediately perceive are sensations and 
ideas and that the esse or essence of physical objects is percipi or to be perceived. 
Therefore physical objects are simply the sensations and ideas o f one’s perception. 
Such a claim is made on the grounds that sense experience is basic and indubitable.
But the contention that physical objects are simply sensations and ideas of one’s 
perception would reduce this thesis into sheer solipsism, which holds that nothing 
exists outside one’s own mind. Berkeley was aware of this problem and in order to 
avoid solipsism, he appealed to a supreme perceiver there by making the existence of 
a material object consist in the continuous, never-ending, perception of God.
The plausibility of Berkley’s argument is based on theological view about the sense- 
perception of God. But Berkeley failed to distinguish between two kinds of order in 
experience They are (i) the causal order which connects events together, in the 
external world, in order to explain physical objects or physical changes of certain 
kinds, and (ii) the causal order which connects different percepts in our minds and 
leads us to form the notion that they are all perceptions of the same individual thing. 
But since we do not find such a notion his theory remains implausible.
1.2.1 The Aims.
Neutral monism has two basic aims which are inter related. The fundamental aim of 
the theory is to provide an empirical sub-stratum to underpin physics and psychology. 
The neutral monist rejects the view that the "stuff" of the neutral monists is a kind of 
hidden unperceivable Din^-un sich or Spencerian Unknowable. This rejection is not 
new in the history of philosophy. Hume had rejected it long before neutral monism. It 
is said that Berkeley had a theory of mind similar to the neutral monists. But the
1.2 .
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uniqueness of the neutral monists’ "stuff" lies in the fact that what is given in 
perception neither belongs to physics nor to psychology. Hence ontologically they 
tried to disperse dualism and close the gap between mind and matter. 
Epistemologically they tried to show that the basic elements which equally belong to 
physics and to psychology are transparent and one can have access to them.
According to Russell "Science is accustomed to the conception of "data""3. For 
instance in physics a datum consists of the position of a speck of light on a scale. One 
may argue that this datum of physics means a physical light on a physical scale. The 
neutral monists explain the situation in the following way. What we call physical scale 
and physical light are arrived at by inference from what is given. What is given is a 
variegated visual field, one part of which is brighter than the other parts. Hence a 
datum is something associated with one observer. This is because what we call the 
"same" physical object looks different from different points of view, and therefore 
presents different datum to different observers. When a number of people look at a 
table from different points of view, the projective properties of the table will be more 
or less same for all of them. It is the metrical properties which are different.
From such notions one can arrive at a publicly perceivable object by inference without 
postulating any kind of unperceivable substance. Hence the entities of the neutral 
monist are never things which are not potentially, phenomenally present.
Such consideration may suggest that neutral monism is in fact phenomenalism in 
disguise. At least in some respect both share certain characteristics. First they are both 
concerned to produce an account of what is phenomenally given. Secondly, they are 
also concerned with the epistemic foundation, thus identifying human knowledge with 
experience. But the term experience is somewhat ambiguous, it may refer to ideas, 
impressions or perceptions. When a neutral monist and phenomenalist refer to 
experience they mean perception. This point is shared by the sense-data philosophers.4 
Both neutral monism and phenomenalism regard sense-data to be the building blocks 
of phenomena.
Despite the common characteristics shared by them, they differ in certain other 
respects. Phenomenalism explains physics on the basis of appearances presented to the 
senses.* But physics demands continuity, where continuity is incompatible with
3. 'The Philosophical Analysis of Matter" 11925|, first published in Collected Papers, vol. 9 p. 278
4. Cf. Yolton, Metaphysical Analysis, London, 1969, p. 49.
5. Cf.,"The Philosophical Analysis of Matter", p. 281.
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phenomenalism. For instance, the theory of light is concerned with what happens 
where there are no sense-organs unlike the phenomenalists who are strictly confined 
to the senses. Apart from observed occurrences, physics requires the possibility of 
inferring unobserved occurrences in places where there are no sense-organs. Neutral 
monism departs from phenomenalism by postulating unobserved occurrences just like 
observed occurrences except that no observer is aware of them. Such occurrences are 
inferred from laws, and neither have been nor will be directly verified or falsified.
1.2.2. The Characteristics.
Any theory of neutral monism must consist of three parts:6
(i) A theory of neutral stuff must tell us about the nature of neutral entities.
(ii) A theory of matter must tell us what kind of relations which, when they hold 
between a set of neutral entities, constitute that set as a material object. It should also 
explain how the material object is constituted out of the neutral stuff by virtue of these 
relations.
(iii) A theory of mind must tell us what kind of relations are those which, when they 
hold between a set of neutral entities, constitute that set as a mind or a mental 
phenomenon. It must show how mental phenomena are constituted by these relations 
out o f the neutral entities.
These three parts constitute the basis of the neutral monist theories. There may be 
different versions of neutral monism depending on the distinctive answers they 
provide to these parts.
Keeping in view the difficulties faced by the dualists, materialists and the idealists, 
neutral monism begins by analysing the notion of substance as "stuff" through 
particulars. The reason for this is that the traditional notion of a substance, as what 
exists in its own right or independently raises certain difficulties.7 For instance 
Descartes, like Locke, took substance to be the substrate of what underlies accidents 
or properties, but did not emphasize its distinction from them so much that it became 
unknowable. We can only know something by describing it, i.e. giving its properties.
6. Stace. "Russell’s Neutral Monism", in The Philosophy o f Bertrand Russell, p. 354.
7. See, Lacey, A Dictionary O f Philosophy, p. 210.
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which is impossible if it itself has none. What makes us think that attributes belong to 
something which is prior to attributes? If substance is a mere inference from attributes 
then why do we need to emphasize the importance of it? Again, if we accept the 
traditional notion of substance we fail to understand how substance is related to 
attribute. Perhaps substance is just correlated attributes? But what relation relates the 
attributes? etc.
According to the neutral monist the substitution of the concept of "stuff" instead of 
"substance" increases the understanding of the relation of matter and mind to the stuff 
of the world. The stuff o f the world is described as "simply the collection of 
particulars" (Collected Papers, vol. 9, p. 282). A particular is that which can occur in 
any kind of fact.
One of the issues which led to neutral monism is the question of permanence. The 
Cartesian notion of substance was based on the notion of indestructibility, and 
therefore permanence was thought to be the characteristic of reality. The neutral 
monists rejected the notion o f permanence as a logical necessity. According to them 
the quasi-permanence of an object is simply an empirical consideration. The data out 
of which a material object, say a table, is constituted are transient. The table, 
constituted out of data, is simply an inference. We can explain this in another way. 
|¡hid., p. 2831. A song which lasts for, say three minutes is constituted out of series 
of notes, which are brief events. Collectively the notes lasts as long as the song, and 
the song is not a separate entity. Similarly the singer is not a single person with 
changing states. Like the song, a singer can be conceived as a series of particulars 
rather than a single particular.
These data which constitute the song and the singer are neither mental nor material 
but neutral. As James would say, a datum "tends to get counted twice over... figuring 
in one context as an object or fields of objects, in another as a state of mind" (Essays 
in Radical Empiricism, p. 10 |..
According to the neutral monists these data are the building blocks of psychology and 
physics. These data are fundamentally identical, but the difference is simply the 
emphasis given to them by physics or by psychology. Hence a brief visual event may 
equally belong to the psychology of vision as to astronomy.
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1.2.3 Neutrality vs. Covert Dualism.
From the preceding analysis it clear that according to the neutral monists the neutral 
stuff, or the bits of it which may be called neutral entities considered by themselves 
are neither mental nor physical. It is by virtue of its external relations that a group of 
entities will constitute either a mind or a piece of matter. Neutrality is neither an 
essence nor an attribute of the neutral stuff, which is otherwise composed. For 
example1' out of a given set of dominoes one may make either a square or a rectangle. 
There is a difference between a square and a rectangle, but the stuff of which each is 
made is the same, namely the dominoes. The difference lies in the spatial relation 
between the dominoes in either set.
The neutral stuff would fail to he neutral if it consisted of elements which were 
mental or physical, i.e. not neutral. The aim of the neutral monist programme is to 
construct both mental and physical entities through external relations between neutral 
simples. If the neutral stuff includes both mental and physical qualities or elements 
then it should be considered dualism in the Cartesian sense, i.e Substance Dualism8 9 or 
Dualism of Incompatibles10 1.
If a simple neutral entity used in construction needs a complex structure composed of 
elements or qualities and internal relations as a part then it has inner duplicity. We 
should then consider the construction of the mental or physical entity as Covert. If the 
covert elements are themselves mental or physical then we have Covert Dualism.
According to the neutral monist there should not he any inner duplicity within the 
neutral "datum". The subject and the object, the mental and the physical are simply 
due to temporary purposes or special references. If there is any intrinsic relations or 
parts within the datum it fails to be neutral and hence collapses into Covert Dualism. 
|See sections 3.2, 3.4, 5.1, 5.6, 6 .6 ,|.
Covert dualism is a distinctive kind of dualism and should not be confused with 
property dualism. According to property dualism" there is no substance beyond the 
physical brain which has a special set of non-physical properties. There are different
8. Cf. Stace, p. 353.
9. Cf. Churchland, P.M., Mailer And consciousness, pp. 7-10.
10. Cf. Broad. The Mind And lls place In Nature, p. 610.
11. Cf. ibid., pp. 10-13.
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essence nor an attribute of the neutral stuff, which is otherwise composed. For 
example8 out of a given set of dominoes one may make either a square or a rectangle. 
There is a difference between a square and a rectangle, but the stuff of which each is 
made is the same, namely the dominoes. The difference lies in the spatial relation 
between the dominoes in either set.
The neutral stuff would fail to be neutral if it consisted of elements which were 
mental or physical, i.e. not neutral. The aim of the neutral monist programme is to 
construct both mental and physical entities through external relations between neutral 
simples. If the neutral stuff includes both mental and physical qualities or elements 
then it should be considered dualism in the Cartesian sense, i.e Substance Dualism9 or 
Dualism of Incompatibles10 I.
If a simple neutral entity used in construction needs a complex structure composed of 
elements or qualities and internal relations as a part then it has inner duplicity. We 
should then consider the construction of the mental or physical entity as Covert. If the 
covert elements are themselves mental or physical then we have Covert Dualism.
According to the neutral monist there should not be any inner duplicity within the 
neutral "datum". The subject and the object, the mental and the physical are simply 
due to temporary purposes or special references. If there is any intrinsic relations or 
parts within the datum it fails to be neutral and hence collapses into Covert Dualism. 
[See sections 3.2, 3.4, 5.1, 5.6, 6.6,].
Covert dualism is a distinctive kind of dualism and should not be confused with 
property dualism. According to property dualism" there is no substance beyond the 
physical brain which has a special set of non-physical properties. There are different
8. Cf. Stace, p. 353.
9. Cf. Churchland, P.M., Matter And consciousness, pp. 7-10.
10. Cf. Broad, The Mind And Its place In Nature, p. 610.
II . Cf. ibid., pp. 10-13.
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versions of property dualism: epiphenomenalism, interactionist property dualism, 
elemental-property dualism.
The dualism with which I shall accuse Russell and James is a covert manifestation of 
that which C.D. Broad in his The Mind called "Dualism of Compatibles" (p. 609). 
According to Broad Dualism of Compatibles can take four different forms (p. 642): 
(a) the possession of mentality may entail that of materiality, but not conversely; (b) 
the possession of materiality may entail that of mentality, but not conversely; (c) the 
possession of either may entail that of other; and (d) the possession of one may entail 
neither the possession nor the absence of the other. Covert dualism can be identified 
with the fourth alternative (d) of Broads analysis. |Cf. section 3.3). Mentality and 
materiality in the form of elements or qualities can be implicitly introduced as the 
composite part of the datum in order to provide an illusory basis for the construction 
of materiality or mentality. As a result the subject-object and the mental-physical 
distinctions occur within the datum not as a result of the construction via external 
relations.
This is an ontological issue, not epistemological. It is a matter of the construction of a 
mental and physical entities from a fundamentally, and purely, neutral ontology. The 
programme is an ontological one.
Of course, both Russell and James required the programme to be epistemologically 
viable. And in doing so, I will argue, they imported elements into the ontology which 
were not neutral. This is the origins of the error I identify as Covert Dualism.
The confusion which has arisen in many critiques and commentaries is however, a 
failure to appreciate the sophistication of the ontological construction. This issue is 
identified, analysed and addressed in the chapter on "bootstrapping". |Chap. 7.3.3|
1.3 Historical Genesis.
Introduction.
The desire to reject both epistemological and ontological dualism has a long history 
which at least dates back to the time of Berkeley. Pitcher, in his Berkeley, argued that 
Berkeley himself had a "secret doctrine of the mind" which amounts to neutral 
monism. It was at the end of the nineteenth century that a systematic discussion was
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carried out by Ernst Mach, Analysis o f Sensations( 1886), R. Avenarious, Critique o f 
Pure Experience^ 1888-90), and The Human Concept o f  the World(\89\), K. Pearson, 
The Grammar o f Science( 1892), and J. Petzoldt, Introduction to the Philosophy o f  
Pure Experience (Leipzig, 1900-1904, in 2 volumes).
Mach and his followers worked not only to avoid the difficulties of dualism but were 
also hostile to representative realism and the unperceived causes of things-in- 
themselves. At the turn of the twentieth century their views were radically carried 
forward by James, The New Realists and Russell. The twentieth century neutral 
monists independently agreed with their predecessors. But Mach and his followers 
were all positivists12, whereas James and Russell were not.
The word "neutral" was coined by H.M. Sheffer13 and was used neither by Mach nor 
James. The name "Neutral Monism" was first used by Russell to identify the theories 
of Mach, James and the New Realists in his critique in 1913. Later Russell used the 
name for his own theory.
Since Mach was the immediate precursor of neutral monism and because it was his 
theory which inspired the twentieth century neutral monists I will not discuss his 
immediate nineteenth century contemporaries. But it is worth mentioning that, the 
notable most amongst his contemporaries, Richard Avenarious, (the founder of 
empiriocriticism) developed an interesting epistemological thesis. According to this 
the task of philosophy is to develop a "natural concept of the world" based on "pure 
experience". He emphasised that such a coherent world view requires a positivistic 
restriction to that which is directly given by pure perception. Such consideration 
would lead to the elimination of all metaphysical elements which one, through 
introjection, imports into experience in the act of knowing. As we discuss Mach we 
will see that he stressed that science had the purpose of saving mental effort. His 
theory of "economy of thought" is Mach’s main point of contact with Avenarius.This 
idea is independently developed and set forth by Mach in his book The Analysis o f 
Sensations.
12. Cf.. Passmore, A Hundred Years o f Philosophy, p. 109.
13. See, E.B. Holt, The Concept o f  Consciousness, Preface, p. xiv.
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1.3.1. Mach.
Mach, the originator of neutral monism, presented his thesis in The Analysis o f 
Sensations. R.B. Perry, who called it "Ernst Mach’s little book", regarded it as 
"among the classics of modem realism".14
Mach, a physicist and a philosopher, believed in the "economy of thought" which 
became the important tool for his philosophy and physics. In his "The Economical 
Nature of Physics", 1882, he argued that the aim of science is to furnish precise and 
economical descriptions of phenomena. The description of the observable facts rests 
on the claim that the external world can be found out through sense experience, which 
is the only sound basis for communication. To an indifferent observer the world is 
revealed as complex and chaotic. But what we encounter, on closer inspection, is that 
the same colour, the same shape, the same quality belongs to a variety of different 
objects. These particular colours, shapes etc. are the simple constituents present in 
one’s visual field. Mach called them "elements" which belongs to various classes and 
are immediately known through the five senses. In his The Science o f  Mechanics, 
1883, Mach writes:
Nature is composed of sensations as its elements... Sensations are 
not signs of things; but on the contrary, a thing is a thought-symbol 
for a compound sensation of relative fixedness. Properly speaking 
the world is not composed of "things" as its elements, but of 
colours, and tones, pressures, spaces, times, in short what we 
ordinarily call individual sensations. |P . 579].
According to Mach the whole operation is a mere affair of economy. This view 
became the working hypothesis of his The Analysis o f  Sensations. There he argued 
that what is "given" is subjectless, because what is accessible by me is also accessible 
to others who have sensations, for example, when they look at a red apple. These 
elements, like colours, shapes etc., given in sensations are the basic constituents of 
the world.
According to Mach, what we call matter and mind bodies and egos are simply 
complexes constitued out of very basic "evanescent" element, i.e. the visible, the 
audible, the tangible, \lbid., p. 5|. The visible is analysed into colours and forms. 
The complexes are disintegrated into elements, i.e. into their ultimate component 
parts which are unable to subdivide any further. On the basis of this Mach declared:
14. Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 310.
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Things, body, matter, are nothing apart from the combination of the 
elements,- the colors, sounds, and so forth....|Pp. 6-7|.
Mach admitted that relative permanency (ibid. , pp. 2-3) is manifested by certain 
complexes of colours, sounds, textures etc. which are functionally connected in space 
and time. According to Mach the world that we encounter in our observation is 
complex and unorganized flux. Careful observation reveals that there are common 
qualities in different single thing. Objects may differ from one another but they have 
the same colour, the same texture and so on. There are a variety possible combination 
of elements between objects which lead us to give "special names". Mach said 
"absolute permanent such complexes are not" (p. 2).
Mach explained that this "sum-total of permanency, and the preponderance of its 
importance" as contrasted with the changeable element impel us to "the partly 
instinctive, partly voluntary and conscious economy of mental presentation and 
designation. .. That which is presented in a single image acquires a single 
designation, a single name" (p. 3). In order to explain this regarding bodies he wrote:
My table is now brightly, now dimly lighted. Its temperature varies.
It may be repaired, polished, and replaced part by part. But, for me, 
it remains the table at which I daily write. | Ibid., p. 2 |.
Similarly the "ego" or "I", the complex of memories, moods, and feelings, joined to 
a particular body exhibits itself as relatively permanent. The apparent permanency of 
the ego is due to its continuity and slowness of its changes. | Ibid., p. 3|
It is the economy o f thought that led Mach to atomism.15 According to Mach the 
complexes disintegrate into elements, i.e. into their "ultimate component parts", and 
are unable to subdivide any further. This view is interpreted by his critics to mean 
that Mach was an atomist. L. Laudan in his Science and Hypothesis argued that in 
fact Mach was a leading opponent of atomic and molecular theories in physics, 
because atoms cannot be grasped by our senses. According to Mach:
Atoms cannot be perceived by the senses; like all substances, they 
are things of thought. \The Science o f Mechanics, pp. 588-589|.
Hamilton pointed out that Mach’s atomism consists:
15. Hamilton. Andy, "Ernst Mach And The Elimination Of Subjectivity", p. 120; also see Alexander, 
P., Sensationalism and Scientific Explanation, p. 7.
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(i) in his opposition to, not to say paranoia about, entities construed 
as things-in-themselves as opposed to mere complexes of sensations; 
and (ii) in his rejection of the idea that the sensations possess any 
internal relation to a subject. |P . 121],
The elements are the atoms of sensation and are of a unique, single and neutral 
nature. They are known to us through sense experience and are therefore depend on 
our senses. Mach argued that if we consider from one point of view they are simply 
sensations. It is not possible to distinguish between, say, the red colour rose and the 
sensation which one has when one looks ate the rose. From this Mach concluded that 
"the world consists only of our sensations" (The Analysis o f  Sensations, p. 12).
These elements can figure in different groups and complexes, which are functionally 
dependent on one another. Mach said;
[I|t is only in the connection and relation in question, only in their 
functional dependence, that the elements are sensations. In another 
functional relation they are the same time physical objects. \The 
Analysis o f Sensations, p. 16]
The passage indicates how Mach was committed to neutral monism. It is the 
functional relation of the elements which determines whether certain arrangements are 
psychical phenomena or physical objects. |When we discuss James we shall see that 
like Mach he also emphasised on functional dependence, to James the distinction 
between the physical and the mental arise out of special purposes]. As such the 
elements are neither physical nor mental and therefore neutral. To put it in Mach’s 
words:
|T |he great gulf between physical and psychological research 
persists only when we acquiesce in our habitual stereotyped 
conceptions. | Ibid., p. 17],
He argued that a colour can figure as both a physical and a psychological object. A 
colour, say green, is a physical object when we consider its dependence upon its 
luminous source, upon other colours, upon temperatures, upon space etc. The same 
colour, green, is a psychological object when we consider its dependence upon the 
retina. (See p. 17; cf. Hamilton, op. cit.).
If treated in this way the gulf between bodies and sensations, between what is without 
and what is within, between the material world and the spiritual world is evaporated.
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According to Mach various "pseudo-problems" arise out of the relation of bodies to 
the ego. But bodies and egos are complexes of basic stuff which do not denote 
different elements.
Mach explained the various complexes of elements by the following letters. Those 
evanescent elements constituting a physical body are denoted by "ABC..."; the 
complex known as the body of a subject is denoted by "KLM..."; and the ego 
composed of volitions, memory images etc. are denoted by "aby...". These letters 
simply denote different orders which are functional. Basically there is only one sort of 
elements or stuff as neutral monism prefer to call them. \The Analysis o f Sensations, 
pp. 8-91.
Mach in his scientific ventures and the explanation of mind and body in terms of 
neutral elements (entities) accepted the Cartesian dictum of certainty. Like Hume he 
strived for an empiricist form of search but believed that one cannot be mistaken 
about one’s own sensations. He diverged altogether from Berkeley, who assumed 
metaphysical and spiritual causes of sense-data due to his religious upbringing. Mach 
confined himself to the phenomena and laid emphasis on the immediate data of 
sensations using them as building blocks in constituting complexes. He denied that 
sensations, "the given" are subjective and was critical about solipsism. Mach says:
|T)he philosopher who is a solipsist seems to be like the man who 
gave up turning round because whatever he saw was always in front 
of him. |The Analysis o f  Sensations, p. 359|.
Mach avoided solipsism by an empiricist device, the argument from analogy. |¡bid., 
pp. 33ff.J. It is through one’s own overt behaviour that one can compare the overt 
behaviour of others and infer that similar sensations are experienced.
From Mach’s view it follows that since the world consists only of our sensations 
every branch of science studies sensations and their relations. The difference between 
them lies in the direction of investigation. Suppose a particular colour, say, red may 
be a physical object and also a psychical phenomenon. If the colour red is considered 
in relation to light sources and other colours, then it is a physical object as studied in 
physics. If the same is colour considered in relation to the retina and optic nerves etc., 
then it is a sensation as studied in psychology. Otherwise the sensation "red" is a 
neutral element which can figure in any scientific investigation; therefore deriving 
different names. Mach arrived at neutral monism through physics. It is clear that his
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attempt to provide a conception of unified science led him to the theory of neutral 
monism which was then carefully picked up by both James and Russell.
1.3.2. Jam es.16
Being a psychologist, unlike Mach, James arrived at neutral monism through 
psychology. He presented his views in eight important essays which are collected in 
the posthumous book Essays in Radical Empiricism.
There are various opinion regarding the influence of Mach on James's development of 
his theory of neutral monism. Since James does not mention Mach in any of his 
articles, Russell thinks that James reached his conclusions independently. According 
to Passmore, James who was looking for a "juicier" philosophy must have learnt 
much from Mach.17
James met Mach during the academic year 1882-83. Perry points out that following 
this meeting James maintained a sympathetic contact with Mach for many years. 
Moreover both Mach and James attached themselves to the British empirical tradition 
and were not deterred by academic barriers from importing philosophy into science 
and science into philosophy.'8 Perry said:
From Mach James had learned something of what he knew about the 
history of science, and he had readily accepted his view of the 
biological and economic function of scientific concepts. \The 
Thought and Character o f William James, vol. 2, p. 463]19.
In January 1884 Mach wrote to James to say that he would soon send a copy of The 
Analysis o f  Sensations and would be glad if a considerable part of it commanded his 
assent. |Perry, vol. 1, p. 588|. In a letter to Stumpf, in 1886, James wrote "1 am 
thirsty to read it" (Perry, vol. 2, p. 65).
It was in 1904 that James developed his theory of neutral monism in "Does 
"Consciousness" Exist?". He sent this to Th. Flournoy who commented in a letter to 
James:
16. Since I will be devoting two chapters to Janies, here 1 will confine myself on Mach's influence on 
him and the general influence of science in his philosophical development.
17. Passmore, op. cit., p. 109.
18. Perry, Thought and Character o f  William James, vol. 1, p. 587.
19. James depended for the history of physics on Kurd Lasswitz and Mach's The Science o f  Mechanics. 
See Perry vol. 1, p. 491, footnote.
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Is there a real and essential difference between your "pure 
experience" and the Empfindung of Mach, the phenomene of 
Renouvier, etc..? It seems to me not...... [ Perry, vol. 2, p. 389|.
Perry observed that the representations of Renouvier were intrinsically bipolar, being 
both subjective (as representative) and objective (as represented). In his 
"phenomenism" James had been in agreement.20
Perry further observed that to Mach "sensations" were elements common to both 
minds and bodies and hence belonged to neither exclusively. He said,
"|b|ut they were far from composing in themselves that field or 
reality which James found in pure experience." ( vol. 2, p. 389).
According to Mach the study of these elements, i.e. sensations, might lead to a 
science which would embrace both physical and the psychical. To this passage James 
attached the query, "Can this mean "pure experience"?" Here James also regarded 
Mach’s view "a step in the right direction."(Perry, vol. 2, p. 389).
But James had an opposite response to Mach’s theory as well. While describing 
Mach’s theory Perry says:
Thus we find him defining the domain of psychology as the 
dependence of the sensations or elements on the central nervous 
system. "Decidedly not," remarked James |comment on his copy of 
Mach’s Analyse der Empfindungen]-- for this could mean the 
reduction of psychology, through psychophysics, to physics; while 
for James psychology had its own categories, scientifically as 
authoritative as those of physics and metaphysically more 
fundamental, [vol. 2, pp. 389-90].
We shall see later that in the hands of James neutral monism developed as a non­
reductionist theory. The neutral entities belonged equally to psychology and physics. 
The same arrangements of neutral entities can be viewed as an object of physics and a 
phenomenon of perception. Apart from the arrangements the entities are neutral. If 
neutral entities belonged to physics and physics explained all other sciences in terms 
of these entities then the theory would not be counted as neutral. It will become a sort 
of physicalist theory of which Russell was accused. |See Chapter Six). This answers
20. I discuss James's thesis of "Phenomenism” in chapter two. There 1 will show how his interpretation 
turns out to be covertly dualistic a fault from which James never recovers.
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Myers' query as to why like Mach and Russell, James did not attempt to 
accommodate sensations into an all-embracing framework of physics.21
What ever influence of Mach is present there is no doubt about James’s originality in 
developing his thesis of neutral entities. Perry points out that in 1882-1883, the year 
James got acquainted with Mach, "he was evidently trying to formulate a 
"phenomenistic" philosophy which might serve as the basis for his psychology."(vol. 
2, p. 73). There is no doubt that James laid down the foundation of neutral monism in 
his Principles,22 In his psychology James was somehow forced to assume the dualism 
of subject and object. But he argued against Hume’s psychological atomism, Locke’s 
representational realism, Kant’s transcendentalism and Bradley’s absolutism to arrive 
at a more profound metaphysical system which he kept in "reserve".23
James was aware of the scientific breakthrough of his time. He did not lay emphasis 
on any particular science through which philosophy is approached. Perry writes about 
the close philosophical agreement between James the biologist, Mach the physicist and 
Bergson24 the mathematician. ( vol. 1, p. 468, footnote). He further states that James, 
in his youth, had been under the influence of naturalist school, which substituted the 
findings of science for those of the traditional metaphysics. While discussing any 
metaphysical problem he found the writings o f this school ready at hand.
James’s knowledge of physics was developed especially from Mach’s critique of 
traditional mechanics. Mach’s antiatomism was perhaps one of the reasons for James 
rejection of "pure experience" as atomic.25 He argued against Hume’s psychic 
atomism. Pure experiences are not chopped up in bits, as James says, rather they are 
externally related and have flow like a stream.
James’s biology was in fact Darwinian. Perry writes:
James’s conception of the a priori factors in human knowledge was 
an application of the Darwinian notion of spontaneous or accidental 
variation. |vol. 1, p. 470|.
21. Myers, G.E., William James, p. 569, note 22.
22. In Chapter Two a brief discussion on this point will be carried out.
23. Chapter Two will mainly deal with James's transition from psychology to metaphysics and his 
rejection of sensationalism, associationism, transcendentalism and absolutism.
24. In Chapter Three I will briefly discuss Bergson’s influence on James.
25. In Chapter Three I shall argue that despite his antiatomistic attitude James viewed "pure 
experience" as atomic, using such words as "bit", "portion", to describe the neutral entities.
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Though James believed in continuity, he did not follow Darwin in this respect. James 
argued that there is no gap; nature never makes leaps. James in his radical empiricism 
proposed the notion of a "conjunctive relation". According to this conjunctive relation 
the world is experienced as continuous, where variety of connection runs through all 
the experiences that compose it, and are ever-changing.
It was James's biological knowledge that led him to chose the path of empiricism. 
Perry writes:
¡A) scientific theory was for James essentially a hypothesis, owing 
its cognitive merit not to its intrinsic form but to its ulterior 
verification in terms of perceptual experience. | vol. 1, p. 4681
Beside Mach and Darwin, James read and frequently mentioned Karl Pearson, W. 
Ostwald, and H. Poincre. James benefited from them their pragmatic interpretation of 
their technique. His knowledge of science became the basis of his radical empiricism. 
There James argued about the empirical adequacy of the neutral entities which 
explained both mind and matter. His theory became the foothold for the twentieth 
century neutral monists.
1.3.3. The New Realists.
The new realists owed their theory of neutral monism to Mach and James. At the turn 
of the twentieth century the movement called new realism arose especially to oppose 
the idealist doctrine which generally held that whatever existed is mind dependent. It 
was in 1912, after the publication of The New Realism, that the movement came into 
forefront. The book was jointly produced by six new realists E.B. Holt, W.T. 
Marvin, W.P. Montague, R.B. Perry, W.B. Pitkin, and E.G. Spaulding.
The aim of the six new realists was to produce a complete philosophy that would play 
an important role in human thought. Despite their agreement on certain philosophical 
issues, such as the dependence of philosophy on logic, their defence of the validity of 
analysis against idealism, their vital agreement that relations are external, and that the 
thought and object are same, i.e. epistemological monism, they disagreed on certain 
ontological explanations.
The new realists unanimously proposed epistemological monism and ontological 
pluralism. Influenced by James and Moore, they agreed that, epistemologically, the
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content of consciousness was objective because it consisted of objects in the real and 
external world. Hence thought and object are numerically the same. Ontologically, 
apart from selective power, they believed in certain constitutive role of consciousness. 
Those elements of the object not found in consciousness would give a constitutive 
power to consciousness.
This became a controversial issue among the six collaborators. They took two 
principal positions. Montague called them the left and the right wings of New 
Realism. They are Neutral Monism, developed by Holt and Perry, and Platonic 
Realism developed by Montague.
Under the influence of Mach, James, and Nunn, both Perry and Holt developed 
neutral monism, but this was eventually abandoned. Perry’s theory is found mostly in 
Present Philosophical Tendencies( 1912), and Holt’s in The Concept o f  
Consciousness(1914).
The New Realist took their start from the theory of consciousness of William James. 
Both Perry and Holt were impressed by James’ idea of "pure experience", which has 
no inner "duplicity" of such distinctions as "object" and "subject", or "knower" and 
"known" or "mental" and "physical”. The purity of experience is such that it is 
simply "neutral" or "subjectless". The classification of different arrangements of pure 
experience into thing and thought are the result of special purposes.
According to James the neutral entities were pure experience. Influenced by 
developments in mathematics and symbolic logic, Holt and Perry found neutral 
entities in the mathematical-logical realm of "being". They do not exist in any place. 
They exist only in the logical sense, as either a class or members of a class. The 
entities belonging to this realm have no definition and identity, and are therefore 
neutral. In other words "Being", a neutral stuff, connotes nothing but denotes 
everything.
Perry in his Present Philosophical Tendencies" carried out an elaborate discussion on 
his theory of neutral monism in the chapter "A Realistic Theory of Mind". He began 
his analysis by pointing out that,
"the content of my mind exhibit no generic character. I find the 
quality "blue", but this 1 ascribe also to the book which lies before 
me on the table; I find "hardness", but this 1 ascribe also to the 
physical adamant; or I find number, which my neighbour finds also
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in his mind. In other words, the elements of the introspective 
manifold are in themselves neither peculiarly mental nor 
mine; they are neutral and interchangeable. \Present Phi 
Tendencies, p. 2771.
In other words they pre-eminently independent of consciousness. Only with respect to 
their grouping and interrelations the elements of mental content exhibit any 
"peculiarity". Perry further argued that the independent object can be related to 
consciousness or mind, but not be dependent on that relationship for its existence.
In explaining his theory Perry argued that the so-called "relational theory of 
consciousness" has contributed to the fact that mental content is distinguished not by 
stuff or elements, but by the way these elements are composed. Perry discussed the 
criticism made by F.J.E. Woodbridge against James conception of "knowing". 
According to James when "one thing means or represents another... it becomes 
conscious (ibid., p. 278). This is critically assessed by Woodbridge. He, in his "The 
Nature of Consciousness", argued that this relation can scarcely be generic relation of 
consciousness, because the terms between which it holds are already "experienced".
As to this Perry argued that James’s views contribute only a "preliminary induction”. 
Though they "afford unmistakable evidence of a special and important grouping of 
objects" they "do not reveal the principle which defines the group" (ibid., p. 278).
In order to solve the relational problem Perry argued that we can analyse the nature of 
mental action in terms of general observation. Accordingly he said that mental action 
is a property of the physical organism. Perry quoted MacDougal where he argued.
"the nervous processes o f the spinal cord... consist in the 
transmission of physical impulses through channels of great 
complexity from the sensory to... the motor nerves, |which 
explains! all physical processes are accompanied by nervous 
processes of this chapter" [ Pp. 298-299).
Following this Perry declared that "elements become mental content when reacted to 
in the specific manner characteristic o f  the central nervous system" (p. 199).
Perry also discussed Bergson’s theory of mind presented in Matter and Memory. 
Perry argued that Bergson’s theory o f  mind was not thoroughgoing because it is 
restricted to perception. But he emphasised Bergson’s point- "the essentially 
teleological character of mental action". Bergson argued:
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Conscious perception does not compass the whole of matter, since it 
consists, in as far as it is conscious, in separation, or "discernment" 
of that which, in matter, interests our various needs." |Perry, p. 
300|.
Perry agreed that the physiological account of the mind can be supplemented by the 
action of the nervous system which exhibits "the control of interest? He explained that 
mind, as it appears in nature and society, consists primarily of interested behaviour. 
Accordingly he said:
|C|ontent of mind must be defined as that portion of the surrounding 
environment which is taken account of by the organism in serving 
its interests; the nervous system, physiologically regarded, being the 
mechanism which is employed. | Present Philosophical Tendencies, 
p. 300|.
A Similar view is maintained by Holt. His anti-idealism ruled out panpsychism, i.e. 
that the objects have the character of consciousness. James argued that consciousness 
was an external relation between a sentient organism and its object. This view was 
considered as the doctrine of dualism of mental and physical substance. Holt replaced 
this dualism with neutral monism. He wrote::
|T|he contents of our minds are not "mental" in their nature, these 
contents are all neutral entities, are all of such stuff as logical and 
mathematical manifolds are made of. Complex aggregates are of the 
substance of their simpler components; not the reverse. \The 
Concept o f Consciousness, p. 114|
The entities which constitute mind are independent of consciousness. The same thing 
could be said about matter:
The elements of physical world are neutral entities— propositions 
and terms— with no residual substance to be called "Matter". \Ibid., 
p. 1311.
Thus according to Holt the members of the two classes, matter and mind, consist of 
simpler entities. "These entities do not have a substance, they are a class." |Holt, p. 
135|. The class not only includes mathematical and logical concepts, but also 
everything of "our familiar old universe". They are all possible and actual, real and 
unreal objects of thought. All sensations, primary and secondary qualities, terms and 
propositions form the neutral "timeless and changeless entities and therefore subsists 
in the all-inclusive universe of being".|¡hid., pp. 135ff|.
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Holt regarded the physiological response of the nervous system as the true mechanism 
of understanding mind. According to Holt the body has a mind because the body 
selectively describes one, as compass describes a circle. He laid emphasis on 
physiological psychology and said that "the nervous response it is which selects and 
defines the content o f consciousness" {ibid., p. 338). He concluded that "... 
physiological psychology,... must claim to be the true and authoritative science of the 
soul.''! The Concept o f Consciousness, p. 338|.
We find that both Perry and Holt took radical views in describing mind. Although 
they began their analysis keeping in view James’s philosophy, they disagreed with 
James on the vital analysis of consciousness. [See Chapter Two. An elaborate 
discussion is carried out on James’s theory of consciousness!. Perry and Holt took 
extreme behaviourist approach for which Passmore considered the Holt-Perry version 
of the theory is "an out-radicalising of James’s radical empiricism”26.
I have mentioned earlier that both Perry and Holt abandoned neutral monism Perry 
admitted that error and other nonveridical experiences were cases of "mis-taking" 
entities for something other than what they are. Although he abandoned it, he 
continued to describe his philosophy as "neutralism".
Similarly Holt confessed that his book on neutral monism turned out to be an "absurd 
hocus-pocus". This is because at the time he did not know the true locus o f these 
timeless entities. Despite his lifelong objectivist-subjectivist osscillations. Holt was 
committed to a objectivist position. In his last published writing he argued that mind 
and cognition are not mental but physical. It is a matter of nerves and muscles. He 
argued that the active self is the physical body, and what we call a self, ego, or 
knower does not exist.
Russell, in 1913, wrote a critique on neutral monism. There he pointed out several 
shortcomings in Mach’s, James' and the new realists’ theory which made it not truly 
neutral.
26. Passmore, op. cil. , p. 263.
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1.3.4. Russell.-7
Russell was fortunate in his predecessors. Since neutral monism had been subjected to 
much criticism he was aware of most of the shortcomings of the theory. Long before 
his acceptance of neutral monism Russell himself was a severe critic of the theory. 
[See Chapter Four], Before his adoption of neutral monism, Russell in 1912 
undertook an attempt to close the gap between mind and matter. He admitted in My 
Philosophical Development, that he failed because he had accepted matter as it 
appears in physics which left an "uncomfortable gulf between physics and perception" 
(p. 78). Russell was aware of James’s theory but did not readily agree with him. It is 
important to highlight some o f the major changes in his philosophy which led him to 
neutral monism in 1921. This will make clear his philosophical position prior to our 
tracing the development o f his neutral monism in chapter four.
When Russell "plunged with the whole-hearted delight into the fantastic world of 
philosophy "(ibid., p. 29), he came under the influence of Kantian and Hegelian 
idealism. Believing in the Kantian interpretation of geometry, he wrote his 
dissertation The Foundations o f  Geometry, which he later thought "somewhat 
foolish". Accepting the Hegelian dialectic, Russell wrote a paper "On the Relations of 
Number and Quantity", and regarded it "an unadulterated Hegel". He later reacted 
saying, "it seems to me now nothing but unmitigated rubbish". \Ihid., p. 32). In his 
early philosophical ventures Russell was so obsessed by Hegel’s views that he aimed 
at constructing a complete dialectic of the sciences, which would end up with the 
proof that all reality was mental.
The turning point came in 1898 when Moore led the way in rejecting idealism. 
Russell was impressed by Moore’s doctrine that facts are in general independent of 
experience. With little encouragement Russell threw over Hegel and was delighted to 
believe in "the bizarre multiplicity of the world" [Portraits from Memory, p. 40). In 
his revolt against Hegel he came to think of the universe as "more like a heap of shot 
than a pot of treacle".
This revolt against Hegel led him to revise his views on relations while working on 
The Philosophy o f Leibniz, published in 1900. He discarded "the doctrine of internal 
relations", which Bradley had distiled out of the philosophy of Hegel, and accepted
27. I will be devoting three chapters to Russell. Here I will produce a chronology of his philosophical 
beliefs "discarded and retained" (Portraits form Memory, p. 40) prior to his acceptance of the theory of 
neutral monism partly in 1921 and completely in 1948.
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"the doctrine of external relations" and pluralism which is hound up with it. 
According to Russell the doctrine of internal relations held that every relation between 
two terms expresses intrinsic properties of the two terms and the property of the 
whole which the two compose. But this doctrine cannot explain "asymmetrical" 
relations which are essential in most parts of mathematics. Asymmetrical relations are 
those relations which, if they hold between A and B, do not hold between B and A. 
For example, if A is earlier than B, then B is not earlier than A. Russell's 
emancipation from idealism made him rejoice in the new philosophy, a philosophy 
which admitted externality of relations, plurality of things, the correspondence theory 
of truth, and the world revealed by observation and not by complicated arguments. He 
felt it as a great liberation, as if he had "escaped from a hot-house on to a wind-swept 
headland". \My Philosophical Development, p. 48|. Russell entered a full universe, a 
"Platonic heaven", and believed in a world of universals.
Russell thus prepared a universe of eternal and unchanging entities, conducive for his 
mathematical logic. In his world, numbers, points of space, general properties, 
physical objects had an independent existence. It was Moore who pushed him towards 
Platonic realism and also Russell’s desire to believe in the truth of mathematics.
In 1900 he met Peano and became aware of the importance of logical reform for the 
philosophy o f mathematics. With the help of Whitehead he devoted the next twelve 
years applying the technique of mathematical logic to philosophy, which he thought 
the correct scientific approach. He gratefully accepted from Whitehead the Principle 
of Occam’s Razor, "the supreme maxim of scientific philosophizing". This gave 
Russell a more clean-shaven picture of reality. During this period (1900-1913) 
Russell, jointly with Whitehead, wrote Principia Mathemcuica, in three volumes. In 
1902 he finished writing The Principles o f  Mathematics, published in 1903, which 
became the "immature draft" for his subsequent work. The primary aim of the 
Principia was to show that all pure mathematics follows from purely logical premisses 
and uses only concepts definable in logical terms.
Russell’s success during this period was also enhanced by the outcome of his two 
important logical doctrines. They are the Theory o f  Types and the Theory o f 
Descriptions. It was a contradiction in the theory of class which gave rise to the 
theory of types. When Frege heard about the discovery his instant reaction was that 
the whole foundation of mathematics had been undermined. Russell declared not all
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classes are members of themselves. The problem is well illustrated by difficulties with 
the assertion of Epimenides the Cretan, "AH Cretans are always liars".
The theory of descriptions, called "a paradigm of philosophy" by F.P. Ramsey, was 
designed to reveal the underlying logical form of denoting phrases containing 
descriptions. Here Russell was reacting against Meinongian ontology which argued 
that we can speak about "the golden mountain", "the round square", in such a way 
that it is possible to make true propositions of which these are the subjects. Hence 
they must have some sort of existence Russell reacted to such a bizarre sense of 
reality by proposing a solution in his article "On Denoting" (Mind, 1905) and then 
developed in his theory of descriptions (Introduction To Mathematical Philosophy, 
1919). According to Russell the expressions of the form "the so-and-so" do not 
function as names. Though they are meaningful, they do not refer to any entity which 
they mean. According to Russell a proper name, such as "Scot", is a simple and 
complete symbol because it designates an individual directly. Whereas definite 
descriptions, such as "the author of Waverley", is a complex incomplete symbol and 
not a proper name. It designate an individual directly and has no meaning in isolation. 
Though they derive their meaning in a particular context with other symbols yet what 
they are supposed to refer to are not really constituents of propositions. Russell 
claimed that with the help of his theory statements containing a definite descriptions 
can be restated in such a way that the same thing is said without the appearance of 
definite descriptions. He maintained that when the statement is correctly analysed, the 
description disappears, and hence the thought of naming an object whose existence it 
is denying does not arise. This work brought into realisation that thought cannot be 
discussed independently of a language system. Braithwaite regarded it as the essence 
of the "revolution in philosophy" associated with name of Wittgenstein. "If 
Wittgenstein was the Robespierre of this revolution, it was Russell who set fire to the 
Bastille."28
The changes between 1898-1912 puts Russell in a better situation to accept neutral 
monism. His rejection of idealism and the acceptance of a plural universe with 
external relations are a step forward to neutral monism. As we shall see later, the 
neutral monists in general accept a plural universe of neutral entities which constitute 
both mind and matter. Neutral entities are plural non-mental and therefore have no 
intrinsic relation. After "rigours of symbolic deduction" and analytic technique, the
28. Braithwaite, R.B., "Bertrand Russell as Philosopher of Science", p. 129.
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fundamental method of his philosophy, and mathematics, we observe a clear linguistic 
turn in Russell's philosophy.
Russell considered the domain of empirical knowledge with his The Problems o f  
Philosophy (1912), which he referred as his "shilling shocker"29. After 1900 when 
Russell was working on the foundations of mathematics he had accepted Moore’s 
dualism an adequate basis for the non-selfcontradictory character of mathematics. In 
1912 he remained a dualist, and believed that mind and matter, and universals and 
particulars, are ultimate. I have regarded his 1912 position as the first phase o f his 
neutral monism. This and the two phases (1914 and 1921-1927) leading to a mature 
theory of neutral monism will be discussed in chapters four, five and six. Here 1 will 
briefly discuss his move and subsequent changes which ultimately culminates into 
neutral monism.
In 1912, Russell who was concerned about knowledge of physical objects and access 
to it, therefore distinguished between knowledge by acquaintance (of sense-data) and 
knowledge by description (of physical objects). Knowledge of physical objects is by 
inference from knowledge by acquaintance. This explanation left the residue of 
dualism because he was under the shadow of Meinong and accepted that in sensation 
there are three elements, namely act, content and objects. Moreover he accepted 
Moore’s distinction between "sensation" and "sense-datum". It was under such 
influence he wrote a critique on neutral monism in 1913.
To transform the ideas of The Problems in 1914 Russell applied two of his supreme 
methodological principles of scientific philosophising. They are the successive 
application o f "Occam’s Razor", that entities are not to be multiplied beyond 
necessity, and "Logical Construction", according to which wherever possible logical 
constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. With such methodological 
principles, in Our Knowledge o f  the External World (1914), Russell soon got rid of 
the idea that physical objects are the causes of sense-data. He also accepted the 
phenomenalist approach for the verifiability of physics. Physical objects are constructs 
from sense-data, not inferences from them. Against phenomenalists he maintained the 
reality of unperceived events, the sensibilia. He reduces sensibilia into "ideal" 
elements and defines them in terms of actual elements, i.e. sense-data. Similar views 
are also expressed in" The Relation of Sense-data to Physics" (1914) and "The 
Ultimate Constituents of Matter" (1915). But here Russell became less directly
29. See, Broad. C.D.. "Some Personal Impressions o f Russell as a philosopher", p. 105.
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concerned about epistemology. He accepted the metaphysical hypothesis that 
sensibilia and sense-data had the same metaphysical status and were the ultimate 
constituents of matter. He justified his claim by the principle of continuity. Russell 
also maintained the dualism between sense-data and sensations, the latter being the 
mental particulars as the ultimate constituent of mind.
The actual transformation from dualism to neutral monism came when he laid down 
the foundation of his version of neutral monism in his The Philosophy o f Logical 
Atomism. The fully-fledged theory was produced in 1921 in his The Analysis o f  Mind. 
Russell attempted to give an account of the mental via neutral stuff, the wholly 
empirical entities. He accepted James's account that, in perception, there is no 
distinction into acts of consciousness and their non-mental objects. But his account of 
the mental required "images", which were wholly subjective, and his account of 
matter required unsensed "sensibilia", which were wholly physical. This left 
incompleteness in his version of neutral monism. The fact is he never completely 
abandoned the dualistic theory of perception. As a result his theory turned out to be 
dualistic in Cartesian style.
Russell’s desperate attempt to save neutral monism from this incompleteness came in 
1927 with the publications of The Analysis o f  Matter, and An Outline o f Philosophy. 
Influenced by Einstein and Whitehead, Russell was committed to the ontology of 
events. Here he restated most of his previous arguments. He exploited science in his 
favour. These works of Russell's are "scientific philosophising" in the field of 
epistemology. |Braithwaite, p. 130|.
It is in his later philosophy. Human Knowledge (1948) Russell returned to James. By 
effecting a change in his theory of perception he said that the dualism in perception 
between the act and the object had been completely abandoned following the 
leadership of James. As a result he arrived at a single expression in naming the 
neutral entities. The terms "sensations" and "images" lost their epistemological 
importance and became a technical name in the physiological explanations.
In order to attain a theoretical completeness in his version of neutral monism it had 
been alleged that Russell (also James) fall into a number of circular arguments. This 
apparent circularity of Russell’s analysis is really part of a sophisticated programme, 
now known as Bootstrapping. It was Clark Glymour who initiated this
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epistemological breakthrough. By employing the bootstrap strategy, he says, we can 
ground both our knowledge of the general and of specific facts upon the same 
evidence. I shall discuss this in chapter seven.
1.4. Conclusion.
The purpose of this chapter was to enhance our understanding of neutral monism 
together with its characteristics, which distinguishes it from other theories explaining 
mind and matter. This was followed with a brief discussion of the major alternative 
theories along with their inadequacies, which neutral monists took as their task to 
furnish more plausible answers. A historical exegesis is included to give a background 
to our understanding of the different versions of neutral monism in James and Russell. 
In the next chapter 1 will discuss how James embraced neutral monism by rejecting 
dualism which he had accepted as the working hypothesis for his The Principles o f 
Psychology.
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Chapter 2
Dualism. Phenomenism, and Neutral Monism:
James’s Transition from Psychology to Metaphysics. A Theory of Radical
Empiricism.
"In all important transactions of life we have to take a leap in the 
dark__  If we decide to leave the riddles unanswered, that is a
choice. ”
'Doubt itself is a decision of the widest practical reach."
[William James, The Will To Believe|.
Introduction
This chapter will he mainly expository. It will trace James’s transition from his 
acceptance of the existence o f consciousness as against mechanical explanation to 
the ultimate rejection of consciousness; "a name of a nonentity, and has no right 
to a place among first principles." |"Does "Consciousness" Exist?", p. 3 |. An 
enquiry will begin with a brief exposition of James’s reason for the rejection of 
dualism, associationism and transcendentalism. This will lead us to his argument 
for the acceptance of the world of pure experience, in which he committed to the 
view that reality and the field of neutral plural facts are one and the same. Before 
committing himself to dualism and then to neutral monism, James accepted a view 
called "phenomenism". His theory of neutral monism is, in fact, the mature 
version of phenomenism. This will lead us in chapter three to assess critically his 
theory of neutral monism where an argument will be made to assert that although 
James avoided metaphysical dualism of mind and matter, in Cartesian style, his 
theory collapses into a disguised form of dualism called covert dualism.*
This chapter will consist of three sections. In the first section I will discuss his 
theory of consciousness along with its characteristics which James held as a 
psychologist. The second section is concerned with his repudiation of the dualistic 
epistemological positions of knower and known, subject and object, inner and 
outer. The rejection of these dualisms led James to discard consciousness as an 
entity and therefore to commit himself to metaphysical monism of neutral entities. 
The final section will consist o f James’s analysis of neutral entities.
I. See section 1.2.3.
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Section A.
2.1. The Place of Consciousness in his Psychology.
Introduction.
James, at heart a metaphysician, began his career as a psychologist. As a 
psychologist he had a twofold interest. First to repudiate the automaton theory 
which regards consciousness as a mere "epiphenomenon". This led him to accept 
Cartesian dualism in its restricted form. Secondly, to establish the thesis that 
consciousness is "efficacious" and "selective". In consequence his second interest 
led him to criticize certain metaphysical doctrines such as dualism, associationism 
and transcendentalism.
Apart from these two basic interests as a psychologist, James had a profound 
metaphysical interest which he kept in "reserve" (Principles, vol. 1, p. 220). That 
metaphysical interest was his ultimate repudiation of consciousness as an entity in 
Cartesian style. He was quite familiar with the thesis that "consciousness does not 
exist" many years before he came to such conclusion. In his Principle, he wrote: 
"The only exception I know of is M.J. Souriau, in his important article in the 
Revue Philosophique, vol. XXII. p. 449. Mr. Souriau’s conclusion is "que la 
conscience n’existe pas" (p. 472)." |Ibid., p. 305|. He regarded the article 
"important", and partly accepted it. This is one of the reason for his acceptance of 
Cartesianism in its restricted form. In his Principle tacitly laid down the 
foundation of metaphysical monism which he later called "radical empiricism". 
One can feel this in his silent clamour in the doctrine of "The Stream of 
Thought", "The Consciousness of Self" and the subsequent outcry in "The Sense 
of Sameness". James said:
The only class of thoughts which can with any show of 
plausibility be said to resemble their objects are sensations. The 
stuff of which all our other thoughts are composed is symbolic, 
and a thought attests its pertinency to a topic by simply 
terminating, sooner or later, in a sensation which resembles the 
latter.2
In his chapter on "The consciousness of Self" James exploited his knowledge of 
neurophysiology in explaining what he meant by self. A devout introspectionist
2. Ibid., p. 471.
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James explained the so called "Self of selves" in terms pf "cephalic motions" the 
portions of innermost activity of which one is directly aware of. He went on to 
say:
"it would follow that our entire feeling o f  spiritual activity, or 
what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling o f  bodily 
activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked” 
(Principles, vol. 1, pp. 301-302).
This ultimately forms the basis of his "ulterior metaphysical inquiry" (ibid., p.
304).
Whatever his "ulterior" motive had been he was constantly tom apart by the 
parallel tension caused in being both a psychologist and a philosopher. As such, 
James glided from what can be called a reluctant dualist position to a prospective 
monism of "open universe" which however he failed to retain because he never 
reallocated the tricky activity of selection other than to consciousness.
Before we embark on the main discussion, it is essential to say few words about 
the early developments in the field of psychology and its impact on James’s work. 
Psychology, a branch of philosophy until the nineteenth century, was an empirical 
study of mind. It was greatly influenced by the associationists theories of mind 
introduced by Hume and consequently developed by David Hartley, James Mill 
and John Stuart Mill. The associationist theory was founded on Hume’s claim that 
our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives 
any real connection among distinct existences. These distinct existences or so 
called ideas, form bundles according to certain laws. The members of the bundles 
have relations of resemblance and cause and effect between them. These are not 
real relations and hence no real unity characterizes mind. This view was criticised 
by Kant, who rejected the associationists’ claim that mind could be explained in 
terms of ideas aroused from experience and systematized according to laws of 
association. As a result a new wave grasped psychology. By the end of the 
nineteenth century a proper scientific treatment was given to psychology. The first 
psychological laboratory was opened by Wundt in Germany in 1879. The method 
of introspection was introduced by which an individual can be aware of his own 
mental states and conditions. The associationist theory lost its charm. Its further 
decline came when the English biologist Darwin produced a theory of evolution 
on the basis of natural selection, part of which attempted to show how mentality 
functions in experience.
James On Neutral Monism. 4 2
These two trends influenced James. He became both a "functionalist" and an 
"introspectionist". In psychology functionalism is an account stating that anything 
whatsoever can be understood as being no more and no less than precisely that 
which makes the differences in experience which its presence makes.3 As a 
functionalist his major concern was what mentality does in experience. In the first 
chapter of his Principles James said,
"the pursuance o f  future ends and the choice o f means fo r  their 
attainment are thus the mark and criterion o f the presence o f  
mentality in a phenomenon." |Vol. 1, p. 8|.
As an introspectionist, James proved that consciousness is no mystery. By looking 
into oneself, one can experience the various activities of mind. In other words one 
is directly aware of the inward flow of consciousness.
2.2 Rejection of Dualism. Associationism and Transcendentalism.
In the Principles James allowed himself the conveniences of dualism for two 
reasons. First against the mechanical denial of consciousness, James insisted that 
consciousness though not creative, is active. Consciousness can work upon the 
data presented to it by selecting what is right in a particular situation. Secondly, as 
an initial guide line in writing his text on psychology. James knew that it would be 
a disaster to take a negative view against the common-sense belief in the division 
of mind and matter, as separate entities. Moreover he was against the automaton 
theory which reduces men to "pure material machines" where "feeling is a mere 
collateral product of our nervous process,..." |"Are We Automata?", p. 38|. This 
theory reduces mind to a mere epiphenomenon, i.e. quoting Hodgson James said, 
"an inert spectator, a sort of "foam, aura, or melody"... whose furtherance would 
be alike powerless over the occurrences themselves." |Principles, vol. 1, p. 129|.
The problem with the epiphenomenalism is its treatment of the concept of 
"causality" as one way traffic. It ignores the fact that if "mind" cannot cause 
"brain", how can "brain" cause "mind"? This was exploited by James, who 
argued:
As actions of a certain degree of complexity are brought about 
by mere mechanism, why not actions of a still greater degree of
3. Urmson, J.O., The Concise Encyclopaedia o f  Western Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 195.
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complexity he the result of a more refined mechanism? | Ibid., p. 
129|.
The only difference between the "conscious" and "unconscious" acts, according to 
James, is that the former occurs in the cerebral hemispheres, i.e. the nerve 
centres.
James cashed his belief in Cartesianism in terms of "causal principle", carelessly 
handled by the materialist. He held that even if our ideas of causal efficacy are 
inadequate, one cannot deny that ideas and feelings have such efficacy, and 
influence our behaviour. However naive it may sound, James felt that one must 
accept the view that in psychological discourse, feelings are causes and their 
effects must be furtherances and checkings of internal cerebral motions. There is 
no doubt that the commonsense language is perfectly compatible with the language 
of physiology. Hence James declared:
|T |he automaton theory... is an unwarrantable impertinence in
the present state of psychology. |Ibid., p. 1381.
James’s dualism, expounded in his Principle, is a mixture of Cartesianism and 
Darwinism. The Cartesian Cogito ergo sum appealed to him, yet James’s 
indulgence was restricted only to its active element, hence he rejected the presence 
of "I", which Ryle rediculed as the "dogma of the Ghost in the machine"4. James 
used the term "efficacy" to explain the active role of consciousness, i.e. the 
process of some sort of thinking going on. Undoubtedly one can understand 
"efficacy" in the light of Cartesianism. The activity is not simply "reflexive" but 
also "performative", i.e. the element o f intention is also present. James resolved 
the dilemma by accepting Darwin’s theory of the origin o f species by means of 
natural selection. James wrote:
Darwin has made us understand so much about animal and 
vegetable forms, and how in particular the psychologists by the 
deep insight they have been acquiring into the nervous system 
and the brain, have to a great extent banished the mystery which 
used to hang about the action of the mind, and constituted a new 
psychology which explodes and renders obsolete the old views of 
mental action— all based on a priori speculation and 
metaphysics. |"The Brain and the Mind", in Perry TCWJ, vol., 
2, pp. 28-29|.
4. Ryle, G ., The Concept oj Mind.
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By accepting Darwinism, James reasoned that consciousness is present, as 
complex, in developed organisms. Consciousness came about because of its 
efficacy, which took the form of a selective agency. One might assume that by 
accepting Cartesianism and Darwinism in order to explain his theory of mind, 
James was guilty of eclecticism. But this would be a total misjudgment because his 
theory of consciousness is highly original, and succeeded in removing the 
mysterious veil that psychic elements are atomic and are bundled together by 
certain laws which are not real. Instead, James has shown that how one can feel 
the inner flow of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life. The "mystery of 
synthesis" was resolved by the said "felt relation".
In whatever way it is present, whether lowest sphere of sense, or in the highest of 
intellect, James argued, consciousness always chooses one out of several materials 
present to it, and tries to emphasize it by suppressing the rest. One may question 
why consciousness is simply influence rather than control? In this case James 
called on his neurophysiological knowledge. He could make the mentalist happy 
by regarding mind as a causal agency. But one cannot deny the changes that occur 
in consciousness if a part of the brain is destroyed.
James’s theory of consciousness was criticised partly because he based his theory 
simply on popular belief and also perhaps, partly on inadequate scientific 
evidence. The Cartesian supposition that physical events are caused by mental 
events goes against a fundamental principle of the physical sciences, namely, that 
causes o f physical changes are other entirely physical events.' Moreover the 
application of Natural Selection to mental, intellectual, and cultural phenomena is 
by no means universally accepted and raises well recognized difficulties.
Being a monist at heart, James knew that whatever the reasons for his acceptance 
of dualism may be, its ultimate acceptance "pending metaphysical reconstructions 
not yet successfully achieved" | Principles, vol. 1, p. 144; "Automata", p. 61].
The most important of his psychological theories was his doctrine of the stream o f  
thought. This doctrine not only dissolved the initial duality between the substantial 
soul and consciousness simply into consciousness; it also implied the rejection of 
associationism and most importantly formed a basis for the transition to radical 
empiricism. 5
5. Cf., Smith and Jones, The Philosophy o f  Mind, 1987, p. 58.
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James argued that the substantial soul explains nothing, whereas its successive 
thoughts are the only intelligible and verifiable things about it. He says "The first 
fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some sort goes on." 
|Principles, vol. 1, p. 224). James justified his use of the word "thinking", by 
saying that such a view "gives to consciousness an aspect of streamlike continuity" 
(TCWJ, vol. 1, p. 77), unlike the associationists and the transcendentalists, who 
believes in psychic atomism, i.e. that mental life is composed of various shapes of 
separate entities called ideas, which are glued together to form compound ideas. 
James argued that consciousness is not chopped up in bits, nor can it be described 
by such words as "chain" or "train".6 As such, he rejected the explanations of 
both Hume and Kant. James regarded thought to be overflowing, and that what is 
given is complex and not simple units analysahle into simple constituents. Hume 
believed in simple sensations, (which do not exist) that could be made complex by 
combining atomic sensations or made simple by analysing the complex. Kant, on 
the other hand, left the unity of so-called simple sensations to the transcendental 
ego. Against such views James holds that the stream of thought, the empirically 
given complex, presents the self empirically, and contains among its aspects or 
phases all those functions and distinctions which were previously thought to 
require a "soul" or a "transcendental ego".7
James maintained that the unity of the stream of consciousness is empirically 
given. There is no evidential support for the idea that we have the pure atomic 
ideas of, for example red and green. The fact to be known is the sequence of 
green-to-red and their contrast. Arguing against purely elementary feelings, James 
explained that what is given in the stream of consciousness is the feeling of pure 
red in the first segment. This is followed by a second segment, a feeling of green 
following the red and is contrasted with it. The stream contains the qualities-of- 
relations and the qualities of absolute; and hence "involve no new psychic 
dimension" as suggested by Kant . According to James these qualities remain as 
feelings and do not "consubstantiate" with the rest of the stream. Kant attempted 
to reconcile the rationalism of Leibniz and the empiricism of Hume by postulating 
an active mind whose nature was to impose a structure on experience to make it 
intelligible to which he attributed the structure to reason, which synthesizes the 
data of sense. James parodise the transcendentalists situation in this way, "after
6. In Chapter Three I-shall argue that James could not avoid but committed himself to atomistic 
philosophy.
7. Principles, pp. 225, 336 ff., and Perry, pp. 77-78.
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letting a number of "pure" feelings successively go "bang", bring their dues ex 
machina of an Ego swooping down upon them from his Olympian heights to make 
a cluster of them with his wonderful "relating thought."8
Against this, James held that "the first fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that 
thinking of some sort goes on." | Principles, v. 1, p. 224|. One could argue that 
by giving prominence to "consciousness" as stream-like continuity and the concept 
of "felt relation", which, according to James the important omission in 
psychology, he thought has gained a major concession in undermining those 
theories which break psychic phenomena into atoms (associationism) and which 
give prominence to the Ego, an agent to relate the atoms (transcendentalism). 
James’s subject-object dualism turned out to be a sort of quasi monism. In the 
stream the "thought-of-an object" and the "object-thought-of" are two names of a 
single experience. The particular experience is regarded as subject and object by 
the new experience which retrospects and appropriates it in the process.
2.2.1. Phenomenism.
On this point we may recall that James had an ulterior motive for monistic 
philosophy, which he suggested even before his psychological commitment. In 
1882-1883 James formulated a "phenomenistic" philosophy, where "phenomena" 
is regarded as a neutral name to explain the subject-object distinction. In an 
unpublished note, James regarded this philosophy as the basis for his psychology, 
and also reserved the "hypothesis of phenomenism" for his monistic pursuit, i.e. 
radical empiricism.
In an unpublished note James explained his thesis of phenomenism in the 
following way:
As regards the "object" known, some call it a mere locus upon 
which the mind projects its own affections; some, on the 
contrary, say the mind is a mere locus into which the objective 
qualities wander and are known. Some say there is no locus of 
either sort, nothing but a stream, for which "phenomena" is the 
neutral name, and which according to one way of viewing it may 
be called "feeling", according to another way "objective fact". 
Others again try to discriminate, and call part of the stream 
"feeling” and the remainder "fact”." | TCWJ, vol. 2, p. 73).
8. "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology", p. 151.
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James half-heartedly accepted this hypothesis of "phenomena" as a neutral name 
which can be viewed either as "feeling" or as "objective fact". Although this 
hypothesis has helped him apparently to explain away the existence of the so 
called "Ego" or "I" in terms o f stream like continuity of consciousness, it did not 
afford him a proper foundation for his psychological discourse. Perry observed:
Instead... of reducing ultimate distinctions, as a phenomenistic 
philosophy undertook to do, he multiplied provisional 
distinctions, in the interest of non-committal scientific 
description.... James was perpetually being led, despite his 
profession of dualism and of metaphysical abstinence, to the 
disclosure of a homogeneous and continuous world." |Ibid., p.
73|.
As a result James was muddled between "phenomenism" and "commonsensism". 
Instead the two tendencies brought much ambiguity in his philosophy. This is 
obvious when he allocated different merits to the terms "thought" and the 
"thought’s object". According to James, the thought suggests "the omnipresence 
o f cognition (or reference to an object other than the mental state itself), which we 
... see to be the mental life’s essence." | Principles, vol. 1, p. 185], For example, 
in the sentence "Columbus discovered America in 1942", the object of the thought 
is neither Columbus, nor America, nor its discovery. The object of the thought is 
the entire sentence or in other words "neither more nor less than all that the 
thought thinks exactly as the thought thinks it, however complicated the matter, 
and however symbolic the manner of thinking may be."9
James thought that by such analysis he had rebutted associationist psychology, 
which supposes that the "Ego must be added to the bundle", whenever an object 
o f thought contains many elements (one idea standing for each element), "to give 
unity, and bring the various ideas into relation with each other" (ibid., p. 277). In 
order to explain the distinction between thought and the object of thought, James 
appealed to brain-physiology where that unity takes place, giving some concession 
to the automaton theorists.
9. A point should he made that one o f the motive of James's neutral monism was that it is an 
attempt to answer the question: how can external objects be "in the mind"? James first attempted to 
answer this in his psychology by suggesting that consciousness has a stream-like continuity. |I am 
grateful to Professor Susan Haack, who, in a letter, suggested this|.
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Without further resolving this James undertook his analysis of the notion of 
"consciousness", which played a significant role not only in his psychology but 
also in his metaphysics.
2.3 Consciousness.
James was very careful in his analysis of consciousness because he had to tackle, 
on the one hand, the automaton theorists, who treats consciousness as an 
epiphenomenon, and on the other hand, the dualist, who postulates a dual element 
in consciousness. His answer to the epiphenomenalist is that consciousness of 
some sort exists as an entity and has certain functions to perform. According to 
James although the relation between mind and brain are somewhat mysterious, 
mind-object relations are exclusively "cognitive" and "emotional". To the dualist 
James's reply is that mind knows the object, presented to it, and therefore 
"inwardly welcomes or rejects them, but it has no other dealings with them."
[Ibid., p. 216]. Although James rejected the notion of "aware of being aware" he 
accepted the Cartesian thesis of interactionism. Thus he stated that,
"when it |consciousness| seems to act upon them, it only does so 
through the intermediary of its own body, so that not it but the 
body is what acts on them, and the brain must first act on the 
body. The same is true when other things seem to act on it 
they only act on the body, and through that on its brain.” \lbi37,
p. 2161
This passage reveals that instead of being critical of the mechanical hypothesis of 
mind, James appropriated the behaviouristic analysis of mind. He was actually 
explaining consciousness in terms of bodily processes, because it is the brain that 
through its body, seems to "welcome or reject" the objects present to mind.
James, as functionalist and an introspectionist, challenged the automaton theorists 
by attributing five different characteristics to consciousness, which distinguishes it 
from anything physical. Being a separate entity "everything actually existing 
consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter fo r  ends, of which many, 
but for its presence, would not be ends at all. Its power of cognition are mainly 
subservient to these ends, describing which facts further them and which do not."
|¡hid., p. 1411. Here James was more concerned about knowledge which reveals 
his early acceptance of what he later called pragmatism. Later as a pragmatist
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James argued that ideas become true just so far as they help us to get into 
satisfactorily relate with other parts of experience.
2.3.1. The Characteristics pf Consciousness.
James lists five different characteristics of consciousness to show the unity of the 
mental state, which is not composed of parts or elements. Consciousness is (i) 
personal, (ii) always changing, (iii) sensibly continuous, (iv) deals with objects 
independent of itself, and (v) performs selective activities.
(i) By saying that thought is a part of personal consciousness, James was not 
advocating the Cartesian concept of consciousness. Rather he meant that there is 
no such thing as a mere thought which is "no one’s" thought. To press the point 
further, in the chapter on "The Consciousness of Self", he distinguished between 
the two aspects of self. They are the "me" the empirical ego, the self as known, 
and "I" the pure ego, the self as knower.
The empirical self consists of three constituents, the "material me", the "social 
me", and the "spiritual me". These constituents serves different purposes and 
functions in unity, whereas the pure ego symbolises a thought different in different 
moments. According to James the I which knows different aspects o f  me,
"cannot itself be an aggregate, neither for psychological 
purposes need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical 
entity like the Soul, or a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as 
out of time." [Principles, vol. 1, p. 305].
He distinguished the "pure thoughts" from the "passing thoughts", o r continuity of 
states of mind, and said that our idea of a rainbow, for example, do not consist of 
eight thoughts, seven for the colours and one for the whole object, which will then 
lead into another thought to grasp the whole thought and then to other thoughts 
and therefore result into endless regress. According to James there is only one 
thought of the whole object. The unity itself lies in the stream of consciousness. 
' I f  the passing thought be the directly verifiable existent which no school has 
hitherto doubted it to be. then that thought is itself the thinker, and psychology 
need not look beyond". |Ibid., p. 401 ]. This characteristic is designed to disprove 
the Kantian notion of transcendental ego.
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(ii) The second characteristic is designed to criticise Locke and the followers of 
the theory of ideas. 'The chain of consciousness is a sequence of differents." 
(James quoted this from Shadworth Hodgson’s The Philosophy o f  Reflection, see 
Principles, vol. 1, p. 230). He agreed with Hodgson that our minds are engaged 
in various complex states like "now hearing", "now seeing", "now recalling" etc. 
James said that instead of reducing the complex to simple ideas, the theory of 
ideas "seeks to show how this is all the resultant effect of variations in the 
combination of certain simple elements of consciousness that always remain the 
same. These mental atoms or molecules are what Locke called "simple ideas"."
With regard to the changing state of consciousness, James argued that a particular 
mental state may have a duration but "no state once gone can recur and be 
identical with what it was before." \Ibid., p. 230|. Following Heraclitus, James 
argued that Heraclitus was correct in suggesting that the same sensation does not 
occur twice. The object may be the same, but since psychologically the brain is 
active and is in a constant process of modification, one cannot have an identical 
sensation, which would require an unmodified brain complex. Moreover the same 
things look and sound distinct on different occasions.
(iii) The third characteristics of consciousness is designed to criticise the Humean 
doctrine that our "thought is composed of separate independent parts". 
Consciousness is sensibly continuous without gap, parts, division or splits. There 
may be interruptions or time gaps, in the stream of consciousness, but such breaks 
have no connection between what happens earlier or followed latter. The 
continuity of consciousness means two things- firstly, whatever the time gap, i.e. 
during sleep, the following consciousness feels as if it is continuous with the 
consciousness before it. It is simply another part of the same stream of 
consciousness. Secondly, the feelings of discontinuity or of break are simply 
"sudden contrasts in the quality of the successive segments of the stream of 
thought." \lbid., p. 239).
One may argue that a sudden noise may produce a break in the stream of 
consciousness. To this James, with an analogy replied that the transition between 
the thought of one object and the thought of another is no more a break in the 
thought than a joint in a bamboo is a break in the wood. | Ibid., p. 240|.
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It could he argued that the flow of consciousness may not have the same speed of 
movement. This is due to the "substantive" state of mind, the resting period filled 
up with sensorial imaginations, and the "transitive" state of mind, the period of 
flight consisting of thoughts of relations, sometimes static, sometimes dynamic.
(iv) James tried to disprove the existence of Cartesian "I" as a necessary part of 
consciousness to explain cognition. He rejected the idea that "I" need to be present 
for thinking of some sort to go on. There need not be a separate knower, a 
subject, to perform the activity of knowing.
According to James the subject-object distinction can be understood by attributing 
the function of knowing to consciousness. He distinguished between two kinds of 
knowledge. They are "knowledge of acquaintance", through which one can have 
access to all the elementary natures of the world, and "knowledge about", through 
which one can have more scope of thinking about their (elementary natures) 
relation and to know about them. James thus brings an antithesis between 
"feeling" and "thought", "Through feelings we become acquainted with things, 
but only by our thoughts do we know about them. Feelings are the germ and 
starting point of cognition, thoughts the developed tree." | Principles, vol., 1, p. 
222|. Instead of solving the so called Cartesian problem James multiplied his own 
problem. He seems to suggest that there are feelings where the process of 
"thinking" starts. But the thinking to be cognitive a second process is required, 
i.e. the "thought". This "thought" seems to replace Cartesian "I" and gives real 
meaning to feelings which are simply "dumb way of acquaintance" (ibid., p. 221).
(v) Selectivity is one of the important characteristics of consciousness. There are 
various sensations which occur in consciousness and may not be necessary for a 
particular purpose. Through its selective activity, consciousness accepts some and 
rejects others "to represent the thing most truly, and consider the rest as its 
appearances." | Ibid., p. 2851. It is through selective activity mind tends to bring 
harmony, the way an artist selects between different tones of colour. "The mind is 
at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities", i.e. it compares, selects, 
suppresses through "reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention." |Ibid., p. 
2881. James held that the five different characteristics should not be thought of as 
parts of consciousness. Consciousness is a stream and the characteristics are the 
ways one can describe the synthetic unity.
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2.3.2. Compounding of Mental Facts.
We know that James had been very critical about the compounding of simple ideas 
into various complexes. He criticized Locke for combining the simple elements of 
consciousness, and Hume for treating them as separate independent parts. He also 
criticised those who believed in the compounding of mental facts. James thus 
provided, a physiological explanation as against Hume and Lockes’ metaphysical 
explanation.
"We cannot mix feelings as such, though we may mix the objects we feel, and 
from their mixture get new feelings." [Ibid. , p. 157). James suggested an 
interesting example where he said that at most we can compare together objects 
previously presented to us in distinct feelings. But we may find that each object 
"stubbornly maintaining its separate identity before consciousness, whatever the 
verdict of the comparison may be." \Ibid., p. 157-58]. The example he gave was 
that of lemonade, which physically contain both the lemon and the sugar. The 
taste of the lemonade is such that it cannot be separated into the taste of lemon- 
sour and sugar-sweet. "These tastes are absent utterly." [ibid., foot note, p. 158|. 
Similarly, according to James, consciousness is like that of lemonade, without any 
divisible parts. But a disinterested observer would not agree to this. There is no 
doubt that lemonade does unravel the feelings of both sour taste and sweet taste. If 
lemonade can be divisible into the elementary feelings of sweetness and sourness, 
then consciousness may also be divisible into elementary sensations quite similar 
to that of Humean explanation of mind.
In 1895, some changes has been observed in James's change in position10 1but 
certainly not a thorough change, because in the same footnote (P.. /, p. 158), 
where James said "absent utterly", he added that "the entirely new taste which is 
present resembles, it is true, both those taste; but... that resemblance cannot 
always be held to involve partial identity." But his initial rejection of 
compounding consciousness returned when he accepted the idea of "compound 
taste". In the essay "The Knowing Of Things Together"" James said "the sour 
and sweet in lemonade are extremely unlike the sour and sweet of lemon juice and 
sugar, singly taken, yet like enough for us to "recognise" the "objects" in the 
compound taste" (ibid., p. 398). James did not stick to his initial commitment that
10. Myers, William James, p. 62.
11. Collected Essays and Reviews.
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mental states are not a compound of smaller parts, and hence cannot be 
introspectively chopped up into simpler mental elements. This is also clear from 
his 1884 essay "What is Emotion?", in which James spoke of "immense numbers 
of parts modified in each emotion." |P. 172|.
With this change of position from the rejection of psychic atomism of Principles, 
to the later acceptance of introspective simpler elements, James entered 
metaphysics. When we discuss his theory of pure experience this point will 
become more clear. As a prelude we may mention that James stated that pure 
experience is made of simple elements of sensible qualities of browness, of 
heaviness, or of flatness etc.
2.3.3. The Role Of Consciousness.
The concept of "consciousness" not only played an important role in his 
psychology, it also occupied a prominent place in his metaphysical discourse. 
James, a naturalist, accepted Darwinism’s emphasis on the function of 
consciousness as a power in the struggle of the organism with environment. 
Moreover he resolved the question of Cartesian dualism by bringing attention to 
the idea of natural selection and not the a priori existence of "I". The theory of 
natural selection appealed to James in one special respect, that is, that in every 
aspect of reality some sort of activity is taking place. This offers a picture in 
which there is a continuous flow in everchanging nature. Change is the 
fundamental characteristics of nature, but this change is continuous with no gaps 
in it. This philosophy of natural selection and change led James ultimately to 
discard consciousness as the "first principle". By reducing consciousness to a 
secondary status, James returned to the notion of "change", "continuity" and 
"selectivity" in his radical theory of the world of pure experience.
As a metaphysician, James followed the same method of introspectionism and 
functionalism which he used for his psychological investigation. In psychology, 
through the method of introspection, James rejected the Cartesian dualism of 
mind, arguing that even in introspection one cannot reveal the existence of a so- 
called "Ego" or "1". In philosophy James argued in favour of the homogeneity 
between consciousness and a physical object. Experiences are of same nature and 
what we call subject and object are simply two different arrangements of the same 
thing.
James On Neutral Monism. 5 4
We have noted how James designed his theory of consciousness to disprove 
certain philosophical positions, including both materialism and idealism in their 
monistic form. Through each of five characteristics of consciousness, James tried 
to give a definite shape to his theory of consciousness. His argument in favour of 
the continuity of consciousness aimed to establish an "open universe" against the 
concept of "blocked universe" of the idealistic monists and the absolutists. The 
idea of "consciousness as a selective agent" was designed to show that 
consciousness is active and its presence can make a certain difference in the flux 
of experience. Therefore consciousness is not an epiphenomenon as the materialist 
thought. Being a positivist and an empiricist and later pragmatist, James waged 
war against those who ignored the change and continuity in nature.
The question that arises may be put as follows: Has James successfully answered 
the epiphenomenalists and the dualists? As regards the dualist hypothesis, James 
had at the beginning made it clear that, since Cartesian dualism and common sense 
belief regarding mind and matter became synonymous, it was difficult to ignore 
and reject this only disagreement with Descartes centred on the division of mind 
into a thinker and the process of thinking. According to James what we call 
thinker and the thinking are simply two names of the same activity. But his 
acceptance of the antithesis of "feeling" and "thought” as a theory of cognition put 
him on the same footing as that of Descartes’.
James’s acceptance of dualism in its restricted form was to fulfil his more serious 
commitment, i.e. to reject the materialist hypothesis of mind as an 
epiphenomenon. But James fell into a pit of his own digging for the materialists. 
One may accept that James did not reject the materialist hypothesis, totally in 
explaining the mind and body distinction. He agreed with the materialist that, "the 
movements of our tongues and pens, the flashing o f our eyes in conversation, are 
of course events of a material order, and as such their causal antecedents must be 
exclusively material." \Principles, vol. 1, p. 132). James only denies the 
mechanical explanation o f consciousness. He noted:
|According to the automaton-theory, each of the feelings 
mentioned is only the correlate of some nerve-movement whose 
cause lay wholly in a previous nerve-movement. The first nerve- 
movement called up the second; whatever feeling was attached 
to the second consequently found itself following upon the 
feeling that was attached to the first. If, for example, good news 
was the consciousness correlated with the first movement, then
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joy turned out to be the correlate of consciousness of the second. 
But all the while the items of the nerve series were the only ones 
in causal continuity; the items of the conscious series, however 
inwardly rational their sequence, were simply juxtaposed. | Ibid., 
p. 133|.
Against this James held that it was simply common sense that "felt pain” not only 
causes outwards tears but also causes inward events of desire, sorrow or 
compunction. What we call consciousness of good-news directly produces the 
feeling of joy.
The irony is that James’s final description of consciousness turns out to be quite 
similar to that of materialist description which he had painstakingly rejected. 
James, impressed about the physiological concept of stimulus and response, 
described the self in terms of "cephalic" motion:
If we divide all possible physiological acts into adjustments and 
executions, the nuclear self would be the adjustments collectively 
considered; and the less intimate more shifting self, so far as it 
was active, would be the executions. | Ibid., p. 302|.
Despite his failure we should acknowledge that as a psychologist James had a duty 
to preserve the importance of the role of consciousness in understanding one’s 
attitude towards others and the world at large. But as a metaphysician James had 
an ulterior monistic motive, that is to repudiate the existence of consciousness.
With this motive in mind James entered the philosophy of neutral plural facts, an 
empirically given data. It is "given” in the sense that it is subjectless. It is neutral 
in the sense that the given data is neither mental nor physical but can figure in 
both groups without being itself either mental or physical.
2.4. The Formative Period.
In 1897, James, in the "Preface" to The Will to Believe launched his theory of 
radical empiricism. There he said:
Were I obliged to give a short name to the attitude in question, I 
should call it that o f radical empiricism... I say "empiricism" 
because it is contented to regard its assured conclusions 
concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in 
the course of future experience; and I say "radical," because it 
treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis...
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He who takes for hypothesis the notion that it |pluralism| is the 
permanent form of the world is what I call a radical empiricist. 
For him the crudity of experience remains an eternal element 
thereof. There is no possible point of view from which the world 
can appear an absolutely single fact. |Pp. vii-ix|.
In his 1897-1898 Seminar notes** under the heading "Philosophical Problems of 
Psychology", James had made a quite distinctive sketch of his future theory of 
neutral monism, at times critical and sometimes accepting doctrines put forward in 
his psychology. This is because he had to rearrange and also ignore and be critical 
of some of his established doctrine as a psychologist. His major concern was to 
repudiate dualism and the theory of consciousness as an entity, which he had 
accepted to refute the automaton theory of consciousness. In the year 1895-1896, 
in his Seminar notes on the "Discussion of Theoretic Problems, as Consciousness, 
Knowledge, the Self, the Relation of Mind and Body etc." James "resolved to 
adopt the hypothesis of phenomenism"12 3 in order to show that mind and matter are 
in the main homogeneous, with perhaps a little heterogeneity in them. |C f., 
Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 2631.
Against the dualistic stand in psychology and the reductionist views of the 
materialists and idealists, James proposed:
|T |here is no stuff anywhere but data. The entire world 
(objective and subjective) at any actual time is a datum. Only, 
within that datum there are two parts, the objective and 
subjective parts, seen retrospectively; and as, within the datum, 
the one part is to the other, so will the datum itself in its entirety 
appear as the subjective part in the next datum which will 
contrast it with the objective part of its own content. | TCWJ, 
vol. 2, p. 366|.
There is no change in the datum apart from its status, i.e. from subjectivity to 
objectivity. "As the field alters and the older content shrivels, it forms connection 
in its new subjective value with the new objective content that marginally comes 
in, that was an appearance of this, from the earlier point of view; this is a
predicate, then unknown, of that__ and corrected; and so corrected, they are
inner, but significant of that larger outer...." \lhid., p. 366|. James's use of the 
word "corrected" shows his early acceptance of pragmatism to shape his 
metaphysical thesis. This is clear when he said,
12. Perry. TCWJ, vol. 2, p. 367 ft.
13. Ihid.. p. 365.
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"we thus reach the abstract notion of an inner part of the field 
meaning and knowing another ... part. We can explain what 
signifying and knowing mean; and, generalizing the notion, we 
can say by anticipation that all fields, even the present and the 
future one, are vehicles of knowledge.... Around every field a 
wider field lying thus beyond itself...." | Ibid., p. 366|.
James’s use of the words "anticipation" and "beyond" could be taken to refer to a 
certain a priori existence. But he would not accept such an interpretation, because, 
in 1897-1898, James explained the "beyond" as the "part o f same continuum, 
whereas for common sense dualism it is discontinuous, and separated by the 
epistemological chasm." | Ibid., p. 370|. How can one get out of solipsism without 
jumping a chasm? James brings in the concept of "conterminousess" in order to 
show that there is no "chasm". He explained thus:
Arrived at the table in my field, I say "more"— viz., that it is 
your table too, or that molecules in it... and so far as my 
verification goes, I end there getting no further. But the "truth" 
of my "more" consists in the fact that my "table plus more", 
which is my terminus, is conterminous with you and with the 
molecules, — there is no "chasm".... Not only percepts seem 
conterminous; concepts seem so tot),— mind meet in truths as 
well as in facts."
These quotations from his pre-radical empiricist position are important because his 
position later does not substantially change apart from careful reinterpretation of 
the theory. Here James has laid emphasis not only the functional aspect of the 
"stuff", but also suggested that within a datum "there are two parts”, seen 
"retrospectively". Moreover James had not ruled out o f  the possibility of basic 
elements in the datum when he stated that "the occurrence, in the stream, of 
objects which, when they occur, occur with specific noetic fringes developable 
into termini, is the initial peculiarity of experience..." It seems that every datum 
has a "peculiarity" which could lead from one datum to the other wherein it 
terminates. This also suggests that every datum is not only qua-objective but are 
qua-subjective as well. The objective content is where the act terminates, and the 
subjective aspects are the sense of "anticipation", the feeling of "beyond", the 
urge of "more" and the capacity of "selection" which would "point" and "lead" 
from one experience to the other, correcting in terms of "meaning and knowing". 
James referred to "specific noetic fringes developable into termini" — and that 
"noetic fringe" is the selective activity, which he earlier (in his psychology) 
bestowed to consciousness. James regarded experience to be "many sided­
dimensional continuum", where "selection... of certain interesting lines of relation
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would... appear to be the actual subjective condition which permits experience to 
fall into so many different systems; whilst the objective condition would be the 
fact that a plurality of relations are there in the content, and may logically and 
possibly be found and followed out." ["Seminar Notes", 1897-98, in TCWJ, vol. 
2, p. 369J.
James stated that such an analysis "may be traced" in his writing but "such an 
analysis does not yet throw a ray o f light...", in his explanation of the proposed 
theory. [Ibid.].
To accept a pre-condition is not necessarily harmful for a metaphysician. For 
Spinoza, for example "God or nature" was an a priori single substance which 
explained reality. For some there are necessary conditions, for instance Kant 
maintained that the forms whereby sensations are received are Space and Time and 
they are in the mind a priori, that is independently of any sense experience. He 
called them "pure forms of intuition". Even the absolutists or dualists like 
Descartes would argue in favour of certain a priori conditions in order to explain 
mind and matter. But for a neutral monist the empirically given data cannot 
possess any a priori element in its constitution. "Experience" is taken to be a 
neutral stuff for both mind and matter may be regarded as their antecedent. There 
is nothing wrong in such an interpretation. The mistake would arise only when we 
say that there are certain conditions which entails the antecedent for such and such 
consequent. For a neutral monist the "stuff" which explains both mind and matter 
cannot possess any sort of determinants or pre-conditions in its nature.
James's 1897 "Seminar Notes" suggest that he was in favour of certain elements 
in "pure experience". Since experience is a many-sided continuum, it can fall into 
many different systems. To James "selectivity" is the subjective condition which 
would "permit" experience to be in different systems. This is because James was 
more concerned about meaning and knowledge. For experience to be in different 
systems it needs to relate itself with other experiences. But James’s analysis shows 
that this it does with the presence of objective condition as a part of pure 
experience, where more than one relation forms its content. It is the subjective 
condition in experience which helps a particular experience to "select" in which 
particular system to fall, and once decided the objective condition will be directed 
through a particular relation, among "plurality of relations".
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It is clear from this discussion that prior to the subject-object distinction, the 
purity of experience cannot be likened with Lockean tabula rasa. According to 
James,
"if we cling to pure experience, it is in part experience of 
activity... a kind of experienced transition, a part of the 
content.... It involves a sense of direction." \TCWJ, vol. 2, p.
384|.
The above discussion reveals James concern and apprehension to introduce his 
theory of pure experience. In his "Seminar Notes" James wrote:
1 wonder if my notion of pure experiences will all the other 
categories formed by additive relations among them may not be 
as fertile a principle in ontology as association has been in 
psychology. [Ibid., p. 384|.
In his pre-radical empiricist position, James was not a neutral monist at all. He 
was certainly a covert dualist, admitting both mental and physical elements in the 
structure of "experience" (see section 1.2.3). Our next aim is to see how James 
fares as a radical empiricist. He had two important things in mind. First to re­
define consciousness by allocating diminishing responsibility, and secondly, to 
dilute the subject-object distinction in the field of pure experience in order to show 
that dualism is not the essence of experience, but rather a way of interpretation.
Section B.
2.3. Rejection o f the Pualistic Epistemological positions o f Inner and Outer.
Knower and Known. Subject and Object and Commitment to a Metaphysical
Monism o f Pure Experience.
Introduction.
Although in his Psychology James oscillated between dualism and materialism in 
his interpretation of the theory of consciousness he was critical about both the 
theories. He followed Hume in rejecting "I" which the rationalist philosophers 
accepted as the basis of unity of thought. James committed himself to an empirical 
method (TCWJ, vol 2, p. 73) in which subject and object distinctions were 
explained in terms of experience. As a result James introduced a world where
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"sensations" and "sensible objects’ and then described them as homogeneous and 
continuous thus reducing the gap created by Descartes and his followers.
James’s initial pre-occupation with psychology, and his rejection of automaton 
theory, led him to give a prominent place to consciousness. By providing an 
empirical basis to consciousness James rejected the materialists claim that 
consciousness is an "epiphenomenon”. Instead he described consciousness a 
stream and functionally "efficacious" and "selective”.
But James was muddled and put himself in an difficult position while discussing 
the unity of thought. According to James, introspection do not reveal any 
psychical or physiological consciousness. In consequence he rejected 
transcendentalists, especially Kant, saying that the stream of consciousness contain 
the qualities of relation and the qualities of absolute, in forming a true synthesis. 
What is revealed to introspection is some form of bodily process, i.e. 
physiological occurrences. W ith this admission James not only argued for 
materialism, but went a step further by suggesting that the unity of thought lies in 
the brain. By providing a different deus ex machina James argued:
Whilst we think, our brain changes, and ... like the aurora 
borealis, its whole internal equilibrium shifts with every pulse of 
change. [Principles, vol. 1, pip. 275-6|.
He threw himself into such a paradox and without resolving it any further entered 
the domain of metaphysics.
James applied the same methodology, the empirical method, as the basis of his 
metaphysical discussion. He provided a "descriptive metaphysics"14 to dissolve the 
initial dualism of his psychology.
14. It differs from traditional metaphysics which establishes necessary truths about the nature of 
existence by a priori argument. Whereas descriptive metaphysician attempts to modify many of our 
familiar concepts, like 'individual', "cause”, "subject" and "object", and assumptions in order to 
construct a kind of logic of reality.
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2.6. The World O f “Pure Experience*
2.6.1. The Concept ’Pure*.
The primary concern of James, as a metaphysician, was to get away from the 
dualistic hypothesis which dominated his Principles, and to introduce a term 
which would generate an aura of neutrality as a prelude to metaphysics. James 
preferred "pure experience" as a term chosen for its "neutrality, concreteness, 
convenience and inclusiveness"15 and which is intrinsically neither objective nor 
subjective, but functionally can operate in both the fields for being neutral. As 
James said:
By the adjective "pure" prefixed to the word "experience", 1 
mean to denote a form of being which is as yet neutral or 
ambiguous, and prior to the object and the subject distinction. 1 
mean to show that the attribution either o f mental or physical 
being to an experience is due to nothing in the immediate stuff 
of which the experience is composed — for the same stuff will 
serve for either attribution — but rather two contrasted groups of 
associates with either of which ... our reflection ... tends to 
connect it. ... Functioning in the whole context of other 
experiences in one way, an experience figures as a mental fact. 
Functioning in another way, it figures as a physical object. In 
itself it is actually neither, but virtually both.16
Reality as such is plural and varietal, where pure experience forms a single neutral 
basis to explain this plurality and variety. James said:
|A|lthough for fluency’s sake I myself spoke early in this article 
of a stuff of pure experience, I have now to say that there is no 
general stuff of which experience at large is made. There are as 
many stuffs as there are "natures" in the things experienced. If 
you ask what one bit of experience is made of, the answer is 
always the same: It is made of that, of just what appears, of 
space, of intensity, of flatness, browness, heaviness, or what 
not. |"Does "Consciousness" Exist?", pp. 14-15).
"Experience" is a generic term or a collective name for all these sensible natures. 
James realized that people would object to such an interpretation because this 
implies that beside red, hard heavy thing there can be "a red, hard or heavy 
thought" (ibid., p. 15). James’s reply to such objection is that things and thoughts 
do have some categories in common, for they are in time and have parts and may
15. Seminar notes, 1904, see Perry, TCWJ., p. 386.
16. Perry, p. 385.
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be simple or complex and can be compared, added and subtracted and arranged in 
serial order. | Ibid.] As a nominalist with respect to universals, James argued that 
the adjective "hotness* belonged both to the idea of fire and also in fire, but 
"Mental fire is what won’t burn real sticks; mental water is what won’t necessarily 
(though of course it may) put out even a mental fire". |Ibid., p. 17).
These pure experiences are the building blocks in terms o f  which reality gets it 
shape and meaning. The experience in its initial state is pure, i.e. there is no 
element or elements internally present, where the subject and object distinction is 
merely extraneous to it. " Subjectivity and objectivity are affairs not of what an 
experience is aboriginally made of, but of its classification. Classifications depend 
on our temporary purposes."17 In order to press home the pristine nature of 
experience, James argued that experiences do not come to us "aboriginally 
stamped", rather "the baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at 
once, feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion;..." [Principles, vol. 1, 
p. 4881. Pure experience is something which not only furnishes the material for 
our later reflection with its conceptual categories, but can also be experienced in 
its pure form.
Only new-born babes, or men in semicoma from sleep, drugs, 
illness, or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in 
the literal sense of a that which is not yet any definite what, tho 
ready to be all sorts of what; full both of oneness and of 
manyness, but in respects that don’t appear; changing 
throughout, yet so confusedly that its passes interpenetrate and 
no points, either of distinction or of identity, can be caught. 
Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or 
sensation. ... Its purity is only a relative term , meaning the 
proportional amount of unverbalized sensation which it still 
embodies. ["The Thing and Its Relations", p. 46 |.
The above passages from his Principles and Essays in Radical Empiricism, clearly 
shows his adherence to Hume. James did not deny this. Rather he confirmed that 
"it is essentially ... a philosophy of plural facts, like that of Hume and his 
descendants .... But it differs from the humian type o f  empiricism in one 
particular which makes me add the epithet radical." |"A  World of Pure 
Experience", p. 22[. The term "pure" does not suggest that experience is 
"empty", otherwise how could James explain the characteristics of browness and 
heaviness which the initial blooming, buzzing experiences possess. To "bloom" is
17. "The Place of Affections! Facts", ERE, p. 71.
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to "come into", i.e. prior to "blossom". To James, a pure experience is as it 
occurs prior to being analysed or conceptualized. He argued:
The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the 
"pure" experience. It is only virtually or potentially either object 
or subject as yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified 
actuality or existence, a simple that. In this naif immediacy it is 
of course valid; it is there, we act upon it; and the doubling of it 
in retrospection into a state of mind and a reality intended 
thereby, is just one of the acts. ["Does "Consciousness" Exist?", 
p. 13].
The sensible qualities of heaviness, flatness, hardness etc. forms the content of the 
stream o f  pure experience. What James denies is that within the immediacy of an 
experience there is room for mind-body or subject-object distinctions. These 
distinctions are, according to James, the retrospective activity of the subsequent 
experience.
2.6.2 The Notion Of "Subject" and "Object“. "Mental" and "Physical".18
The doctrine of pure experience does not deny that minds and bodies exist. What 
it denies is that the difference between them is ultimate. James provided a non- 
reductive analysis of mind and matter in terms o f pure experience:
A given undivided portion of pure experience, taken in one 
context of associates, play the part of the knower, of a state of 
mind, of "consciousness"; while in a different context the same 
undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of 
an objective "content". In a word, in one group it figures as 
thought, in another group as a thing. And, since it can figure in 
both groups simultaneously we have every right to speak of it as 
subjective and objective both at once." [Ibid., p. 7],
The term "subject" and "object" are relational terms and they cannot be regarded 
as thoroughly distinctive and unanalysable. "As "subjective" we say that the 
experience represents; as "objective" it is represented. What represents and what 
is represented is ... numerically the same". [Ibid., p. 13], An experience in its 
state of purity has no self splitting of it into consciousness and what the 
consciousness is about. What we call its "subjectivity" and "objectivity" are 
simply functional attributes realized by a new retrospective experience when a
18. Cf. Russell’s interpretation of the notion of "subjectivty" and "objectivity" (5.1.1.).
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particular experience is "taken" in two different contexts. This seems to be a sort 
of artificial classifications James makes, dependant on our "temporary purposes".
It is not that perceptual experiences have subjectivity and objectivity but this 
equally belongs to the non-perceptual experiences. This, James argued, "will 
probably be due to the intrusion into his mind of percepts, that third group of 
associates with which the non-perceptual experiences have relations, and which, as 
a whole, they "represent", standing to them as thoughts to things" (ibid., p. 10).
James likens this "subject" and "object" distinction to "mental" and "physical" 
distinction. A real, objective pen is that, a bit of experience, and our 
consciousness or perception of the pen is the same that or a bit of experience. To 
put it in James’s own words:
"When we call an experience "conscious", that does not mean 
that it is suffused throughout with a peculiar modality of being 
("psychic" being) as stained glass may be suffused with light, 
but rather that it stands in certain determinate relations to other 
portions of experience extraneous to itself. These form one 
peculiar "context" for it; while, taken in another context of 
experiences, we class it as a fact in the physical world. This 
"pen", for example, is, in the first instance, a bald that, a 
datum, fact, phenomenon, content, or whatever other neutral or 
ambiguous name you may prefer to apply." ("How Two Minds 
Can Know One Thing", p. 61].
In order to classify a bit of pure experience as "physical pen" or "mental pen", 
James stated that it must assume a "function". In that case a pen will be called 
physical if it, the pure experience, has a stable feature, holds ink, and obeys the 
guidance of one's hand. But will be mental or "percept of a pen in my mind" if it, 
the same bit of pure experience, is unstable, coming and going with the movement 
o f the eye and the body, can or cannot hold ink as one fancies. Here James seems 
to make a distinction between fantasy, hallucination and perception. This 
distinction arises because James followed both Descartes and Brentano in his 
characterisation of the mental. Descartes explained the mental in terms of 
consciousness, where the object of consciousness is immediately present to us, 
whereas Brentano characterized the mental in terms of "intentionality", or in other 
words "aboutness". According to him mental states are "about" things or state of 
affairs and is such that things may not exist and the states of affairs may not 
obtain, but the mental has them as its content. This view James regarded as "a 
great mystery" where "peculiar presence in absence" is explained in terms of the
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theory of ’ intentional inexistence"19. James seemed to be sufficiently impressed 
because he does not embark on any criticism. Taking the example "the tigers now 
in India" James said that "at the very least, people would say that what we mean 
by knowing the tigers is mentally pointing towards them as we sit here." (P. 73]. 
Accordingly James explains that "to know an object is... to lead to it through a 
context" (p. 74), whether ideal or real. It is perhaps for these reasons James 
suggested that mental fire may not bum sticks and mental water may not even put 
out mental fire.
Before the functional analysis the bit o f  experience is an undifferentiated that 
which consequently assumes a function o f  being a physical pen and the percept of 
the pen. The crux is that one can point to  the pen as a physical object, or be aware 
of the pen as a particular mental state, but no one can point to the "bald that". 
This not only suggests a practical difficulty but also suggests that a theoretical 
construct of pure experience can be contrasted with the pen or with our percept of 
the pen.20
The other important difference is the question of extension. For Descartes and his 
followers the term "extension" is only attributable to things and not to thought. 
James explained that as physical object a pen has an extension, similarly the 
mental picture of the pen must have all the extension of the physical pen.
The difference between objective and subjective extension is one 
of relation to a context solely. In the mind the various extents 
maintain no necessarily stubborn order relatively to each other, 
while in the physical world they bound each other stably, and 
together, make a great enveloping Unit which we believe in and 
call real Space. ["Does "Consciousness" Exist?", p. 16J.
As "outer" or "physical", experiences maintain their distances to retain unity, but 
as "inner", i.e. "the complete inner life in which the mind plays freely with its 
material". In mind there is less order experiences are loose in which unity is 
lost.21 It is the relation of the extensions which differentiates the physical world 
and the mental world and not the presence or absence of extension.
19. ’The Knowing of Things Together", in The Works o f William James, Essays in philosophy. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978, p. 73.
20. Cf., Myers, G .E., William James, Yale University Press, 1986, p. 310.
21. The looseness of mental characteristic does not entail that mental is anomalous, as Davidson 
had argued. The difference between Davidson and James is that tor James the mental laws are not 
rigid as those of physical laws. But Davidson argued that there are no laws for the mental, and
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Regarding the other qualities James says that there are reasons for us to call a fire 
hot, and water wet, and yet refuse to regard our mental state of these objects as 
either wet or hot. James explained:
The reason is this, that, as the general chaos of all our 
experiences gets sifted, we find that there are some fires that will 
always bum sticks and always put out fires; while there are other 
fires and waters that will not act at all.... having identically the 
same natures, fail to manifest them in the "energetic" way. 
|"Does "Consciousness" Exist?", p. 171.
Beside a "real" world James created a parallel world in which perceptual 
experiences form the nucleus to which,
"we add a lot of conceptual experiences to them, making these 
strong also in imagination, and building out the remoter parts of 
the physical world by their means; and around this core of 
reality the world of laxly connected fancies and mere rhapsodical 
objects floats like a bank of clouds. In the clouds, all sorts of 
rules are violated which in the core are kept. Extensions there 
can be indefinitely located; motion there obeys no Newton’s 
laws." |Ibid., p. 17-18],
James, thus argued for perceptual experiences to explain conceptual experiences 
and vice versa in order to explain the world we experience. As a result he initiated 
circular arguments. Graham Bird, in his William James, pointed out the potential 
circularity in James' philosophy. Bird said that in seeking an account of the 
meaning of some terms we have to consider other "conceptions". Such an account 
leads in explaining the meaning o f one term by reference to the meaning of others 
and thus resulting in circularity. One can avoid circularity by appealing to 
primitive intentions which are supposed to antedate the conventions of a public 
natural language. Instead of appealing to primitive intentions James appeals only 
to other "conceptions", making his arguments circular.22 I will argue that the 
alleged circularity is part of a sophisticated method now known as Boot-strapping. 
This I will discuss in Chapter Seven.
since there are no laws there cannot be a nomological relation between the mental and the physical. 
[See Chapter Six for detail discussion on the anomalousness of the mental.]
22. pp. 31-32.
James On Neutral Monism. 6 7
The analysis of "subject" and "object", "mental" and "physical" is important in 
James's philosophy because he discarded the traditional notion of "consciousness" 
as an entity.
For twenty years past I have mistrusted "consciousness" as an 
entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non­
existence to my students, and tried to give them its pragmatic 
equivalent in realities o f experience. ("Does "Consciousness" 
Exist?", p. 4],
2.6.3. The Term “Consciousness" derives a New Connotation.
Although James denied consciousness he did not deny that "thoughts" exist. The 
term "consciousness" gets a new connotation in James’s philosophy. It stands for a 
function and "that function is knowing. ""Consciousness" is supposed necessary to 
explain the fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known." [Ibid., p. 
4], For James consciousness is simply a relation and not an "epistemological" 
necessity to explain the doctrine of pure experience. He distinguished 
consciousness from the traditional notion of "souls" which were
"detachable, had separate destinies; things could happen to them.
To consciousness as such nothing can happen, for, timeless 
itself, it is only a witness of happenings in time, in which it 
plays no part. It is, ... the logical correlative of "content" in an 
Experience of which the peculiarity is that fact comes to light in 
it, that awareness o f  content takes place. Consciousness as such 
is entirely impersonal-- "selP." | Ibid., p. 4],
The passage reveals that although consciousness plays no part in explaining the 
mental, it exists as a "witness". Therefore it does exist as an entity, a mere 
"epiphenomenon". This is certainly a contradiction James entangled himself. How 
can there be such entity called consciousness and at the same time exist as a 
witness?
James argued that "knowing" is a sort of relation into which "pure experience" 
may enter. Then he seemed to say that the relation of knowing is not something 
external to pure experience because "the relation itself is a part of pure 
experience." [Ibid., p. 4], This seems to suggest that relation is present 
intrinsically to the nature of pure experience, where "one of its "terms" becomes 
the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object 
known." [Ibid].
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James was critical of those, especially G.E. Moore and Paul Natorp, who 
supposed that we can have an immediate consciousness of consciousness itself. 
Moore argued:
When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is 
the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it can 
be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know 
that there is something to look for. ("Does "Consciousness" 
Exist?", pp. 5-6J.
Similarly, Natorp held that the existence of consciousness
"can be brought out by analysis, but can neither be defined nor 
deduced from anything but itself" (ibid., p. 6).
Such an analysis, James argued, suggested that an experience is of dual nature, 
i.e. it has inner constitution, "if you abstract the content, the consciousness will 
remain revealed to its own eye" (ibid., p. 6). James provided an example to 
explain this situation. Here experience can be likened with paint o f which the 
world pictures were made. Paint has a menstrum, i.e. oil and size, and a mass of 
content in the form of pigment. The mass and the pigment can be physically 
separated, i.e. we get the mass by letting the pigment settle and the pigment by 
pouring off the oil. The separation is done by subtracting one from the other. 
Hence analogously via mental subtraction one can separate the two factors of 
experience.
James held that this was a wrong way of interpreting experience which has no dual 
inner constitution. 'Experience I believe, has no such inner duplicity; and the 
separation o f  it into consciousness and content comes, not by way o f  subtraction, 
but by way o f addition ." \/bid., p. 7). Taking the paint example James illustrated 
in the following way:
In a pot in a paint-shop, along with other paint, it serves in its 
entirety as so much saleable matter. Spread on a canvas, with 
other paints around it, it represents, on the contrary, a feature in 
a picture and performs a spiritual function. [Ibid., p. 8|.
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Similarly a portion of experience taken in one context of associates plays the part 
of the knower, a mental state, and the same portion of experience in different 
context plays the part of a thing known. Here the duality is still preserved but 
"instead of being mysterious and elusive, it becomes verifiable and concrete" 
(ibid.).
2.6.4. The Role o f  Experiences.
One may be puzzled, James suggested, by how a bit of identical experience can be 
in two places. But this puzzle can be understood if one sees how one identical 
point can be on two lines. This is possible if a point be situated at their 
intersection. In the same way one can explain the "pure experience", say of the 
room, situated in the intersection of two processes, associated to two groups, 
counted twice, "although it Jthe "pure experience"] would remain all the time a 
numerically single thing". (Ibid., p. 8]. James explained how a pure experience 
can figure in several fields without any split. This can happen both in perceptual 
field as well as non-perceptual field.
2.6.4.1. Perceptual Experiences.
In perceptual field "numerical single" experience can have many relations in 
different contexts. To take the room-experience, for example, James argued that it 
can simultaneously enter into two processes as a single that. The two processes 
can be identified as ones "personal biography" and also "the history of the house". 
In one’s personal biography the that is the last term of a train o f sensations and 
emotions ending in a present, and the first term of a series o f similar "inner" 
operations ending in the future. The same very that is the terminous ad quern of a 
lot of previous physical operations, such as furnishing, and the terminous a quo of 
different future ones. As a room the experience occupied that spot for many 
years, but as one’s field of consciousness it may never have existed until now. As 
a room, attention will go on to discover endless new details in it, but as one 
mental state few new ones will emerge under attention’s eye. "In the real world, 
fire will consume it. In your mind, you can let fire play over it without effect." 
[Ibid., p. 9],
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2.6.4.2. Non-Perceptual Experiences
The distinctions between subjectivity and objectivity do not solely belong to the 
field of perceptual experiences but rather that they equally belong to the non- 
perceptual experiences. In the conceptual field a bit of experience can figure in 
one context as the "thought-of-an-object” and in another context as an "object- 
thought-of", i.e. as subjective the experience "represents" (standing to them as 
thoughts to things); as objective it is "represented (standing to them as things to 
thought).
James attempted to make his theory of concepts plausible and to bring it on a par 
with his theory of percepts. This made him deviate from his true radical empiricist 
position. Because, to put it in James’s own words,
"to be radical an empiricism must neither admit into its 
constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor 
exclude from them any element that is directly experienced" ("A 
World of Pure Experience", p. 22).
James argued that the "conceptual manifolds”, or "memories", or "fancies" were 
also in their initial intention mere bits of pure experience, a simple that, and have 
a world o f  their own in which they lead to as subject and terminate in as an 
objective fact quite similar to that of percepts. This world is "a world merely 
" though t-of" and not directly felt or seen." ["Does "Consciousness" Exist?", p. 9; 
italics are mine]. In the "thought-of" world the experiences come as quasi-chaos, 
similar to that of the world of percepts, and soon gets ordered. Like perceptual 
experiences, the non-perceptual ones associates themselves with different groups 
of associates by experienced relations, where "one forms the inner history of a 
person, while the others acts as an impersonal "objective" world, either spatial and 
temporal, or else merely logical or mathematical, or otherwise "ideal"." \Ibid., p. 
10). This world like the world of pure experience, as we shall see later, is not a 
"closed" o r "blocked universe" but an "open" one where new experiences, James 
argued, "grafts" in. Due to the intrusion of "percepts" in ones mind a third group 
of associates builds up with which the non-perceptual experiences have relations. 
This third group is called "knowing" percepts, which are "through-and-through 
subjective". What James said next was a direct blow to his "pure experience" 
thesis, i.e. the "knowing" percepts are "wholly constituted of stuff called
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consciousness, using this term now for a kind of entity, after the fashion which I 
am seeking to refute.’ [Ibid., p. 10],
In order to establish the "ideal" world that James even rejected Taine’s so called 
thought-of-world as inner and weak in comparison to perceptual world, and said 
that "our world of thought would be the only world, and would enjoy complete 
reality in our belief. This actually happens in our dreams, and in our day-dreams 
so long as percepts do not interrupt them." [Ibid., p. 12], This could be illustrated 
by the room example in the same way. The room thought-of has many thought of 
couplings associated with many thought-of things. In one's personal history the 
room occupies a single date, but in the houses history it forms a permanent 
ingredient. Among the couplings some are curiously stubborn, others show the 
fluidity , i.e. may come and go as one please. Where the relation is of 
stubbornness the collection of experiences form a system of external realities, in 
which the room exits as "real" and the other is a "stream of internal thinking", i.e. 
as a "mental Image" it floats. By "stubborn relation" and "fluid relation" James 
meant physical laws, which are deterministic, and psychological laws, which are 
indeterminstic. The mental is not anomalous as Davidson argues but is not rigid as 
the physical.23 According to James the room not only plays its part in the inner 
world which has "external reality", there is also the system of "ideal reality" in 
which the room plays its part24. Hence James suggests reality ad infinitum.
Whatever the reality, whether "ideal", "logical", "mathematical", "physical", or 
"mental”, the "pure experience" is the only neutral stuff of which every thing is 
composed; what we call subjectivity and objectivity are classifications that depend 
on our "temporary purposes".
23. See Chapter Six, "A Comparison with Anomalous Monism".
24. Cf., "Does "Consciousness" Exist?", p. 12.
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Section C.
2.7. The Theory o f Neutral Entities.
Introduction.
James provided a phenomenological interpretation of reality which is the outcome 
of his earlier commitment to the psychology of the stream of consciousness. He 
depicted reality as a pattern (unlike Russell who argued that mental and physical 
are constructions) where "pure experiences", the "empirical given" in 
"perception" and "feeling" provide flesh to the bare bones of reality.
2.8. Radical Empiricism.
2.8.1. "Experience"; A Neutral Name.
James’s foremost task was to clarify the notion of "experience" from its traditional 
usage which refers to the psychic events of consciousness. Russell, in his critique 
of James’s theory, observed that his use of the word "experience" referred "to the 
lingering taint of an idealistic ancestry. "M In accepting James’s thesis Russell, in 
1921, declared "sensations" as neutral entities. The use of the word "sensation" 
had been criticised by Alan Dorward in his "Critical Notices of Bertrand Russell, 
The Analysis o f  Mind", 1922. Generally the word "sensation" always means 
something connected with consciousness. But Russell might say that the things 
which he called sensation is the same thing which other people call sensation. The 
mistake they commit only when they regard the thing as mental. Therefore he has 
the right to retain the word while freeing it from its false associations. This may 
not be an adequate reply. Dorward points out:
When they call a thing a sensation, |the people) mean to imply 
that it is mental; and if they were convinced that they were 
mistaken in supposing it to be mental, they would probably say, 
not "Well, you have now convinced me that sensation are not 
mental," but "I now see that what I thought to be mental is 
really not so, and 1 was therefore mistaken in calling it a 
sensation". |P. 92]. 25
25. The Collected Papers o f Bertrand Russell, voi. 7, p. 20.
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James’s reply would have been similar to that of Dorward in Russell’s use of the 
term "sensation". Both Russell and James chose these words for the apparent 
neutrality they show. I think that James preferred the term "experience" because 
the term "feeling" is a characteristic of mind which shows a peculiar mental 
function. But the term "experience" not only refers to the function of mind but 
also has an explicit reference to its relation to objects. Similarly Russell’s use of 
the term "sensation" is mainly because it expresses the complex "act-acquainted 
with-object". This is the definition he gave in his "The Nature of Sense-data", 
where he regarded sensation to be synonymous with perception.
For James, experience is not a subjective phenomenon but an empirically given 
neutral phenomenon, which describes mind and matter. A pure experience, which 
is neither subjective nor objective, consists of "neutrals, indifférents, undecideds, 
posits, data, facts." \TCWJ, vol 2, p. 405],
2.8.2. The Concept "Radical".
James’s next aim was to show that his philosophy radically differed from those of 
the intellectualists and the sensationalists. The intellectualists begin their analysis 
of the nature of the world by postulating synthetic a priori premises without any 
real appeal to empirical premises. In their order of logic, wholes are prior to 
parts, and transcendental egos and absolutes are taken to stand as agents of 
unification of parts. The classical empiricism, though rightly emphasizes the part, 
the element, the individual, tends to uphold nature as discrete and atomic. For 
empiricists like Hume and J.S. Mill "substantive psychoses, sensations and their 
copies and derivatives, juxtaposed like dominoes in a game," (Principles, vol. 1, 
p. 245) are really separate and have no connection. These empiricists had a 
tendency to do away with connections as co-ordinate parts of experience. They 
insist most on disjunctions and hence reduce the flow of experience to mere "loose 
and separate" atomic units.
James, who began with the basic claim of the empiricist, that parts are prior and 
the whole is of the second order, insists that relations, in the conjunctive and 
disjunctive forms, are co-ordinate parts of experience. This is the reason for his 
adding the term "radical" to his form of empiricism. James brought in the concept 
of "felt relation", which is the major omission of psychology and which the 
metaphysician ignored as the essential element in forming our knowledge of
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reality. Radical empiricism neither excludes nor includes any element that is not 
directly experienced. James argued:
For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences 
must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind o f  
relation experienced must be accounted as "real" as anything 
else in the system. |"A  World of Pure Experience", p. 22],
2.8.3. The Notion Of "Conjunctive Relations’ .
James argued that our universe of experience is not something ordered a priori, 
hut to a large extent chaotic. It is chaotic in the sense that the world is experienced 
as continuous, related, where a variety of connections run through all the 
experiences that compose it, and are ever-changing. In other words the world of 
pure experience is a "quasi-chaos" {ibid., p. 32), where unity and disconnection 
are real.
In his descriptive analysis of the logic of reality James called "radical 
empiricism" a mosaic philosophy, in which the pieces are held together not by 
their bedding but are "clung together by their edges, the transitions experienced 
between them forming their cement." [Ibid., p. 42]. Like the stream of 
consciousness, the separateness of experiences in the stream remain separate and 
are "felt" where the "substantive states" (the resting period) and "transitive states" 
(the period of flight) run into each other continuously. This is the view which the 
Intellectualists and the Sensationalists failed to understand. It is, in radical 
empiricism, the "conjunctive relation", i.e. to say "a feeling of and, a feeling of 
if, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily we say a feeling of blue or 
feeling of cold," in all its form gets recognized." |Principles, vol. 1, pp. 245-46|.
The conjunctive experience has been discredited by both the empiricists and the 
rationalists. The empiricist, like Hume, left experience permanently disjointed, 
and the rationalists, like Kant and Spinoza, explained the "looseness" by their 
absolutes, or transcendental ego, or other fictitious agencies of union. James held 
that the relation was present in the stream of consciousness and hence required no 
artificial bonding. "Radical empiricism ... does fu ll justice to conjunctive 
relations." ["A World of Pure Experience", p. 23]. James explained, Firstly, if 
the experiences are taken at their face-value, i.e. to feel just as they are without 
confusing it with abstract talk about it involving words that lead one to invent 
secondary conceptions, there conjunctions and disjunctions are accounted as real.
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Secondly, in case of treating things separately, when they are given as 
continuously joined, we ought to perform the converse act by invoking higher 
principles of "disunion" to make experienced "disjunctions" more truly real.
James further explained the "continuity-experience" and "discontinuity- 
experience" in the following way. In order to explain the experience of continuity 
James brought in the concept of "the co-conscious transition' by which one 
experience passes into another when both belong to the same self. Within the 
personal histories of each individual, subject and object, interest and purpose are 
continuous. Since personal histories change in time, the "change" is immediately 
experienced as continuous transition as opposed to discontinuous transition. In 
one’s personal history one may feel the later moment of one’s experience succeeds 
an earlier one forming two moments. But such transition from the one to the other 
is "continuous".
Discontinuity-experience is also a definite sort o f  experience. Discontinuity is felt 
when the transition takes place between at least two individuals. This is because 
what I call my experience and your experience can be externally with each other 
but mine cannot pass into yours or yours into mine. In such transition, James 
held:
I have to get on and off again, to pass from a thing lived to 
another thing only conceived, and the break is positively 
experienced and noted. |"A World o f  Pure Experience", p. 25|.
Although the functions emphasised by both the experiences are same, the 
sameness is ascertained after the break has been felt. The experience of sameness 
can be understood by James’s treatment of thought and thing in terms of cognitive 
relation. In order to facilitate our understanding o f this, 1 shall discuss his theory 
of knowledge.
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2.9. The Theory o f Knowledge.
2.9.1. Introduction.
"The relation o f  knowing is the most mysterious thing in the 
world." | Principles, vol. 1, p. 216|.
James aimed to dissolve duality in the stream of experience which arises from the 
ambiguity involved in the psychological explanation of cognition. "The 
psychologist’s attitude towards cognition.... is a thoroughgoing dualism." \Ibid., 
p. 218]. James revolted against the idea that there are two irreducible elements in 
the process of knowing. The dualism of mind and body gives rise to such a 
mysterious situation and claimed that the relation between the knower and the 
known is such that
"neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is 
the other, neither makes the other. They just stand face to face in 
a common world, and one simply knows, or is known unto, its 
counterpart." | Ibid., p. 218|.
There is no doubt that in his Principles, beside metaphysical dualism, James had 
also accepted epistemological dualism. We have earlier seen that, for James, 
"feelings" are knowledge of acquaintance. Such words like "lo", "there", "ecco", 
"voila", simply start off the cognitive process but which are not cognitive in 
themselves. It is the "thought", the knowledge about, where the full cognition 
takes place. James declared that "the "thoughts," ... are the conceptions and 
judgments." \Ibid., p. 222]. Later when we discuss Russell we will find that like 
James he also laid much emphasis upon these epistemological distinctions but in a 
significantly different way. Russell’s aim was to provide a firm basis for empirical 
knowledge. He held that the sense-data, knowledge by acquaintance, where no 
error takes place, are the basis of knowledge. Sense-data are knowledge by 
themselves. He made a distinction between a sensation and a sense-datum and 
argued for a relational theory of sensation. Russell argued that sensation is a 
relational occurrence in which a subject is "aware" of an object. But as a neutral 
monist, following James, he discarded this view (See Chapter Four and Five) and 
became less interested in epistemology26 and sceptical about its importance in
26. Stace, 'Russell’s Neutral Monism', in Schilpp, 1944, p. 358. Stace thinks that Russell has 
become more "empirical".
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ontological doctrine. For James, the "feelings", unlike Russell's sense-data, to 
which one is acquainted are not knowledge. Thoughts are the proper medium of 
knowledge. These distinctions are not pressed hard by James and will become 
clear as we progress. But there is no doubt that for him dualistic epistemology 
became the footings of his metaphysical theory.27
The process of "meaning and knowing", the foremost function of consciousness, 
not only played a distinctive role in James's psychology but became the essential 
groundwork for two of his most important theses, "radical empiricism" and 
"pragmatism". The essence of these two theses lies in the concept of "relations" of 
ideas as elements in experience to future experiences which are their meaning. For 
James truth lies in the correspondence between ideas and objects. It is essential to 
mention that the relation of mind to its object was discussed by Royce in his The 
Religious Aspect o f Philosophy (1885) which impressed James. In a letter to 
Renouvier, James illustrated Royce’s argument and said:
|T]o me the argument seems irresistible, so long as we take the 
relation of really intending an object, au serieux. \TCWJ, vol. 1, 
p. 705].
James was not enthusiastic about Royce’s theory in its entirety. We know Royce 
was an idealist and James was a venomous critique of idealism. James claimed 
that for Royce there should be a "power" outside of both the thought and the 
object so that the thought can represent, either rightly or wrongly, the object 
which it stands for. James depicts Royce’s thesis thus:
In short, it makes everything, so far as anything has relation to 
truth or error; and since both our thoughts and the things we 
think of have such relation, this Absolute Thought which is 
involved in the idea of their relation, may also be called the 
ground of their being. | Ibid. , p. 705].
27. James seems to disagree. In a letter to Strong, in Oct. 2, 1907, James says, "that in my essays 
on "Radical Empiricism" ... you can find sentences that squint towards idealism, I have no
doubt......  But the problem there was metaphysical, not epistemological; it was an analysis of the
nature o f  what is experienced, not of the meaning of knowing, and whatever epistemology I have 
brought in was by the way illustrative, not fundamental. In those articles I was groping and 
tumbling anyhow, and doubtless guilty of much confusion. But when expressly writing about 
"knowledge" and "truth" as in Pragmatism, I have always intended ... to be realistic, and to be 
called an idealistfas by Montague, and others) makes me feel queer." See Perry, v. II, pp. 549- 
550.
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For James the relation lies in the stream of consciousness where thinking of some 
sort goes on. It is in the stream the comparison and the contrast between the 
thought and the object present to it takes place. In naturalistic psychology there is 
no reason to look "beyond" because the consciousness is the sole verifier of its 
objects. Perry reported that in fact James had confessed that he was "unable to 
overthrow Royce’s argument" though he regarded the argument inconclusive.28 29
As a radical empiricist his foremost task was to prove that there is no duality of 
substances in the sphere of phenomena. This is possible by sticking to 
"experience", the neutral entity, which has no inner duplicity and hence saves him 
from an artificial conception of the relations between knower and known.
2.9.2. "Knowledge o f a c q u a in ta n c e "  a n d  " K n o w le d g e -a h o u t"
In order to explain his theory of cognition James follows John Grote2v in his 
distinction of two kinds of knowledge. They are knowledge o f  acquaintance and 
knowledge about, of which the French and German distinctions are connaître and 
savoir, and kennen and wissen respectively. Beside his Principles, James discussed 
his theory of knowledge in two articles reprinted in The Meaning o f Truth. They 
are "The Function of Cognition", (which James in his letter to Strong in 1907 
regarded "the fo n s  et origio of all my pragmatism’ (TCWJ, vol. 2, p. 548), is said 
to constitute an answer to Royce (TCWJ, vol. 1, p. 800), and "The Tigers In 
India".
In both these articles James aimed to undertake the burden of resolving the 
problem of knowledge by showing that
"the difference between those that are mere "acquaintance," and 
those that are "knowledge-aftoMf"... is reducible almost entirely 
to the absence or presence of psychic fringes or overtones. 
Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its relations. 
Acquaintance with it is limitation to the bare impression which it 
makes" (Principles, vol. 1, p. 259).
We have earlier seen that, according to James, the knowledge of acquaintance are 
the "blooming" "buzzing" sensations with which babies or semi-conscious people
28. See Perry, "The Battle of the Absolute", in TCWJ, p. 799 ff. An elaborate discussion is 
carried out by Perry. A similar discussion is earned out in Reck, A.J., 'Epistemology In William 
James's Principles O f Psychology", Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol. 22, 1973, pp. 85-86.
29. Exploratio Philosophica, London, 1865.
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are acquainted. Through this a first encounter is made with the external world 
which simply however does not give them knowledge about anything. The above 
quotation confirms this further by stating that the distinction between the presence 
and absence is the distinction between knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge 
about respectively. Before we treat his two articles it is important to see how 
James handled the theory of knowledge in his Principles.
In his Principles (vol. 1), James opened his discussion on two kinds of knowledge 
in the chapter of "Conception", by stating that these two knowledges are due to 
"the principle o f  constancy in the m ind’s meanings" (p. 459). He explained that 
"the sense of sameness", the "keel and backbone of our thinking", is the basis of 
our conceptual knowledge. Since the principle of sameness belongs to the 
structure of mind and not to the universe, James said:
"the mind can always intend, and know when it intends, to think 
o f the Same" (p. 459).30
James defined conception as "the Junction by which we thus identify a numerically 
distinct and permanent subject o f discourse" (p. 461). He rules out any ambiguity 
in the word "conception" and says that it neither denotes the mental states nor 
anything signified by the mental state. It simply denotes "the relation between the 
two, namely, the function of the mental state in signifying just that particular 
thing" (p. 461).
Conceptions belong to the flux of experience and remain eternally unchangeable 
although the mental state may change and its meaning be different at different 
times. James illustrated this in the following way: a piece of paper may be white a 
moment ago, may now change into black. But this does not lead us to change the 
conception of white into the conception of black. The conception of blackness and 
whiteness remains in the mind bearing different meanings. James declared:
Thus, amid the flux of opinions and of physical things, the 
world of conceptions, or things intended to be thought about, 
stands stiff and immutable, like Plato’s Realm of Ideas. IP.
462].
He distinguished concepts and percepts in the following way:
30. This interpretation is mainly responsible for the treatment of James's view as 
phenomenological. See for instance, Richard Stevens, James and Husserl: The Foundation o f 
Meaning.
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The great difference between percepts and concepts is that 
percepts are continuous and concepts are discrete. | Some 
Problems o f Philosophy, p. 481
We may recall that James was so enthusiastic to make his ontological theory 
epistemologically viable that on such an interpretation he based his theory of non- 
perceptual experiences. James regarded concepts as parts of pure experience 
which act as an impersonal "objective* world, either logical mathematical or 
ideal. This admission of concepts into the realm of pure experience brought an 
contradiction into his radical empiricism. The contradiction lies in the fact that on 
the one hand he was criticising Humean atomic sensations and on the other hand 
admitting the distinct discontinuous atomic concepts in the flux which is 
continuous. |Cf., Myers, op. cit., p. 314J. James was quite aware of this 
difficulty and in his Some Problems O f Philosophy tried to treat both percepts and 
concepts as "consubstantial", by which he means that they are made of the same 
kind of stuff, and when handled together they melt into each other. The 
importance of concepts and percepts is such that James said:
The world of common-sense "thing"; the world of material tasks 
to be done; the mathematical world of pure forms; the world of 
ethical propositions; the world of logic, of music, etc., all 
abstracted and generalized from which they have as it were 
flowered out, return and merge themselves again in the 
particulars of our present and future perception. By those whats 
we apperceive all our thises. Percepts and concepts 
interpenetrate and melt together, impregnate and fertilize each 
other. Neither, taken alone, knows reality in its completeness.
We need them both, as we need both our legs to walk with. (pp. 
52-53).
Whatever fluidity may be present in concepts and percepts they both contribute to 
the making of neutral plural facts which explains things and thoughts as being of 
the same nature. As we have earlier mentioned, like Russell, James did not keep 
the distinctions of knowledge. The "knowledge of acquaintance" and "knowledge 
about" remain interchangeable in his doctrine. James regarded cognition as a 
function of consciousness. Although not all but some "feelings" (knowledge by 
acquaintance) are cognitive with out any self-transcendency implied in their being 
pieces of knowledge. In "The Function Of Cognition" he argued that feeling may 
be a dumb and helpless thing which neither names, classifies, locates or dates, but 
from cognitive point of view it is "no psychical zero" rather is "most positively 
and definitely qualified inner fact" (The Meaning o f Truth, p. 10). To James
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"knowledge of acquaintance" is in fact "knowledge about". This is reflected in the 
following passage:
A feeling feels as a gun shoots. If there be nothing to be felt or 
hit, they discharge themselves ins blaue hinein. If, however, 
something starts up opposite them, they no longer simply shoot 
or feel, they hit and know.|¡bid., p. 17],
If knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge about, then we face difficulty in 
explaining the concept of "transition" which is essential for his theory. In 
knowledge by acquaintance there is no movement from one experience to another. 
This is because if a bit of experience is cognitive in itself then there is no need for 
any new experience to retrospect and appropriate it in order to give a definite 
meaning. Transition can only take place if a bit of experience is not cognisant in 
itself and requires other experiences to be fulfilled and meaningful. This also 
suggests that, like concepts which are discrete in James’s description, the percepts 
are also discrete. James’s position seems to collapse into the Humean doctrine of 
atomic sensations.
These feelings, or percepts, or sensible things or matters of acquaintance, James 
argued:
... are the mother earth, the anchorage, the stable rock, the first 
and last limits, the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quern of 
the mind.... They end discussion; they destroy the false conceit 
of knowledge; and without them we are all at sea with other’s 
meaning. \Ibid., p. 39].
James’s main aim, prior to his metaphysical theory of radical empiricism, was to 
eliminate the "epistemological gulf” so that the truth-relations fall inside of the 
continuities of concrete experience. This is reflected in both the articles in The 
Meaning O f Truth. We can know things in two ways - immediately or intuitively 
(knowledge of acquaintance) and conceptually or representatively (knowledge 
about). In representative knowledge the outer chain of physical or mental forms 
the connection between thought and thing. Here to know an object means to lead 
it through a context which the world supplies. In immediate knowledge the thing- 
stuff and thought-stuff are of same nature. Unlike the representative knowledge 
there are no intermediaries to separate the thought and thing. James explained it in 
the following way:
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But if our own private vision of the paper be considered in 
abstraction from every other event, as if it constituted by itself 
the universe, ... then the paper seen and the seeing of it are only 
two names for one indivisible fact which, properly named, is the 
datum, the phenomenon, or the experience.... To know  
immediately, then or intuitively, is fo r  mental content and object 
to be identical. This is a very different definition from that 
which we gave of representative knowledge; but neither 
definition involves those mysterious notions of self­
transcendency and presence in absence which are such essential 
parts of the ideas of knowledge, both philosophers and of 
common men. [The Meaning o f  Truth, pp. 48-50].
By claiming that mental content and object are identical James discarded the initial 
epistemological dualism outlined on his Principles. There is no doubt that James 
had not succeeded in filling the epistemological chasm which therefore leads his 
argument to oscillate between the two forms of knowledge. This will become 
more apparent as we examine discussion on cognitive relation.
2.9.3. The Cognitive Relation.
James argued that the treatment of thought and thing, the subject and the object as 
absolutely discontinuous led various school of thought to explain the gap in 
various ways. The representative theorists explained the situation by putting a 
mental "representation", "image" or content as an intermediary to fill the chasm. 
Common-sense theories believed in this gap but which can be cleared by the 
mind’s self-transcending leap. The transcendentalist brought in an absolute knower 
to explain the cognitive relation.
Radical empiricism explains the cognitive relation by claiming that "in the very 
bosom of the finite experience, every conjunction required to make the relation 
intelligible is given in full. Either the knower and the known are:
(1) the self-same piece o f  experience taken twice over in 
different contexts; or they are
(2) two pieces of actual experience belonging to the same 
subject, with definite tracts o f  conjunctive transitional experience 
between them; or
(3) the known is a possible experience either of that subject or 
another, to which the said conjunctive transitions would lead, if 
sufficiently prolonged. |"A World of Pure Experience”, p. 27j
The first type can be explained in terms of knowledge of acquaintance or 
perception. As we have earlier seen this is a direct way of knowing things without
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any intermediary process. In the immediacy of the instant field of the present there 
is no splitting up o f experience into subjective, that which represent, and 
objective, that which is represented. What subjective and what is objective are 
numerically the same experience taken in two differing contexts which is being 
retrospected by a new experience. This however suggests that a single bit of 
experience cannot be known truly without the so called "passing thought" which 
completes the process of knowing by adding a fresh content to it. James says:
To be "conscious" means not simply to be, but to be reported, 
known, to  have awareness of one’s being added to that being; 
and this is just what happens when the appropriative experience 
supervenes. The pen-experience in its original immediacy is not 
aware o f itself, it simply is, and the second experience is 
required for what we call awareness of it to occur.31
This passage contradicts James’s claim that percepts are not psychological zero. 
James at the same time also regarded such "feelings" or "percepts" as the "dumb 
knowledges-of-acquaintance".
Types two and three are the simplest sort of conceptual knowledge or knowledge 
about. James illustrated these two types of knowing with the example of 
"Memorial Hall". He held that it may be that one’s mind may have a clear or dull 
image of the hall but which makes no difference in its cognitive function, "what it 
may, its knowing office" (here James referred to consciousness as an entity).32 
One may be able to suggest that the image means something; or may fail to point 
or lead others towards the Harvard Delta; or even if led by others may be 
uncertain and fail to compare it with the idea in one's mind; or may find very 
little resemblance. Such resemblance is merely coincidental because all things in 
the world resemble each other without being cognitive. On the other hand, one 
may lead others to the hall, however imperfect the idea in one’s mind was, and 
tell its present history. This suggests that one’s idea has terminated into the vivid 
perception of the Memorial Hall. This is what James meant by saying that the 
ideas has passed to the percept by conjunctive experience of sameness and fulfilled 
intention. In such felt transitions, to put it in James’s words:
31. "How Two Minds Can Know One Thing", p. 65.
32. "A World of Pure Experience", p. 28.
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lies all that the knowing o f a percept by an idea can possibly 
contain or signify.... Knowledge of sensible realities thus comes 
to life inside the tissue of experience. It is made; and made by 
relations that unroll themselves in time. Whenever certain inter 
intermediaries are given ... they develop towards their terminus, 
there is experience from point to point of one direction followed, 
and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that their 
starting-point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an 
object meant or known. ["A World of Pure Experience", p. 29],
A cursory reading of the passage reveals several contradictory claims by James 
hence undermining his theory which is supposed to be radically different from the 
other empiricists. One obvious problem is his description that experience runs 
from "point to point" further proving that "experiences" are like Humes 
"sensations". James also claimed that knowledge of sensible realities are "made". 
Does he mean to say that experiences are compounded together so that a definite 
meaning is given? If so, then his critique of Locke, regarding the compounding of 
simple ideas into various complexes falls apart. The other most important point 
which the passage reveals is that the experience "develop towards their terminus". 
This seem to suggest that a single experience is conscious in itself to be able to 
terminate to its fulfilled end. The idea of the desired object is already implicit in 
an experience and becomes explicit when it reaches its desired end. This is further 
confirmed in the following quotation:
Whenever such is the sequence of our experiences we may freely 
say that we had the terminal object "in mind" from the
outset...[Ibid., p. 29].
James argued that the essentials of the cognitive relation consists in intermediary 
experiences, both actual and possible, of continuously developing progress and of 
fulfilment. In such process the percept not only verifies the concept but also 
proves its function of knowing that percept to be true. James knew that his readers 
will not accept such an interpretation. The interpretation reveals that mere 
intermediaries simply separate the knower from the known. To make his claim 
plausible James upheld Lotze’s view of substances that to act like one is to be one. 
James argued that unions by continuous transition are the only ones we know. 
Moreover, to be experienced as continuous is to be really continuous in the world 
where experience and reality come to the same thing. In both intuitive and 
representative knowledge there is no epistemological chasm. But the notion of
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intermediary experience raises two questions. They are: (a) substitution and, (b) 
objective reference. I will begin with the former.
2.9.3.1. Substitution
James explained:
|A) n experience that knows another can figure as its 
representative, not in any quasi-miraculous "epistemological" 
sense, but in the definite practical sense of being its substitute in 
various operations, sometimes physical and sometimes mental, 
which leads us to its associates and results. |"A World of Pure 
Experience", p. 31J.
He was impressed by Taine’s use of the term "substitution" as a cardinal logical 
function. James regard substitution as important for the world of pure experience 
which is present to us as quasi-chaos. He said:
In such a world transitions and arrivals (or terminations) are the 
only events that happen, tho they happen by so many sorts of 
path. The only function that one experience can perform is to 
lead into another experience; and the only fulfilment we can 
speak of is the reaching of a certain experienced end. When one 
experience leads to (or can lead to) the same end as another, 
they agree in function. | Ibid., p. 32|.
Since experiences are all alike and have many-sided continuum the transition can 
take place through different sorts of paths. There may be different sorts of paths, 
but the path which leads to fulfilled end is called a functional substitute for 
another. James held that most thought-paths are substitutes for nothing actual 
because they end outside the real world, i.e. in wayward fancies, utopias, fictions 
or mistakes. | Ibid., p. 32|. This is another reason why James regarded the world 
of experience as quasi-chaos.
2.9.3.2. Objective reference
We know James claimed that the transition from one experience to another takes 
place through various different paths. It is only through a particular path that we 
reach a fulfilled end. Such a claim obviously brings in the paradox of self­
transcendency in knowledge. Why do we substitute one particular path and not 
others? James was aware of this difficulty, which he met by distinguishing two
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kinds of knowing. They are (i), knowing as verified and completed and (ii), 
knowing as in transit and on its way.
In order to understand these two kinds of knowing let us return to the Memorial 
Hall example. When our ideas of the Hall actually terminate in the percept of the 
Hall we became truly cognitive of "that", the hall. Here we become the actual 
knower of the Memorial Hall. But until established by the end of the process we 
were virtual knowers of the Memorial Hall. James argued that greater part of all 
our knowledge "never is completed or nailed down". That does not mean that they 
are not true. There are ideas we may hold which are unterminated perceptually, 
but which could be verified if the trouble is taken. Regarding such ideas James 
said:
To continue thinking unchallenged is. ninety-nine times out o f a 
hundred, our practical substitute fo r  knowing in the completed 
sense. \Ibid., p. 34).
James claims that since experiences always run by cognitive transition there is no 
necessity of objective reference. This objective reference is an incident of the fact 
that so much of our experience comes as an insufficient and consists of process 
and transition. Both our fields of experience and of view are fringed by a "more" 
which develops and supersedes as life proceeds. The transcendentalists may argue 
that radical empiricists are making contradictory demands first by accepting 
knowledge to consist in external relations, and then saying that nine-tenths of the 
time they are virtually there. Such demands suggest that the experiences are self 
transcendent and true in advance. Against such a charge James would find it 
difficult to defend himself. He could reply to his critic by applying the so-called 
pragmatic method and simply stating that it orients us in turning of our 
expectations and practical tendencies into the right path, i.e. to lead us into the 
objects nearest neighbourhood. For instance, your anger is a thing which my 
thought will never perceptually terminate, but it is my concept of the anger that 
will lead to their very brink. James argued, "on pragmatist principles ... a dispute 
over self-transcendency is a pure logomachy". | Ibid., p. 36). We know that in the 
world of pure experience transitions and arrivals are the only events that happen. 
But in its state of purity an experience is always an unqualified actuality, a simple 
"that" and only virtually classifiable as an objective fact or as someone’s opinion 
about the fact. Similarly, knowing is not static but a continuous process like that
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of pure experience. Hence the notion of knowledge which is in transition is 
brought into alignment with the notion of pure experience.
2.9.4. James On Berkeleyan Idealism.
James tried to defend that his theory of pure experience should not be mixed up 
with Berkeleyan idealism. It has more affinities with natural realism. Ideas, as 
Berkeley described them, are discrete and are not in transition. Such notion results 
into solipsism. In his philosophy only God can create a universe, even of 
discourse.
James argued that radical empiricism has a positive way of handling the situation. 
To say that our minds meet in some common objects is the basis that your mind 
exists. To explain the situation in a better way he brings in the concept called 
"conterminous". James views can be understood from the following two 
quotations taken from his "A World of Pure Experience":
1 .
In that perceptual part of my universe which I call your body, 
your mind and my mind meet and may be called conterminous. 
Your mind actuates that body and mine sees it; my thoughts pass 
into it as into their harmonious cognitive fulfilment; your 
emotions and volitions pass into their effects, [p. 38]
2 .
If you alter an object in your world, put out a candle, for 
example, when I am present, my candle ipso facto  goes out. It is 
only as altering my objects that I guess you to exist. If your 
object do not coalesce with my objects, if they be not identically 
where mine are, they must be proved to be positively somewhere 
else. But no other location can be assigned for them, so their 
place must be what it seems to be, the same. |p. 39]
2.9.5. Conclusion.
The aim of this chapter was to analyse James’s theory of neutral entities. These 
entities are the central feature of his philosophy of pure experience. As against the 
"blocked universe" he regard his universe an "open universe". This is because the 
universe is continually growing in quantity by new experiences, which graft 
themselves upon the older mass. In such a world the unity cannot be fully 
experienced, hence the world is form of a pluralism.
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Chapter 3
PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF JAMES’S THEORY OF NEUTRAL
MONISM
What, on pragmatist terms, does 'nature itself" signify? To my mind it 
signifies the non-artificial; the artificial having certain definite aesthetic 
characteristics which I dislike, and can only apperceive in others as 
matters of personal taste, — to me had taste. All neat schematisms with 
permanent and absolute distinctions, classifications with absolute 
pretensions, systems with pigeon-holes, etc., have this character. All 
'classic,' clean, cut, and dried, 'nob le ,' fixed, 'eternal,' 
Weltanschauungen seem to me to violate the character with which life 
concretely comes and the expression which it bears of being, or at least 
of involving, a muddle and a struggle, with an 'ever not quite* to all 
our formulas, and novelty and possibility forever leaking in. |James, 
W., Notes, 1903J1
3.1. Introduction.
James a committed empiricist, who "believed empiricism to be the only open-minded 
and candid philosophy"2, waged war against the Cartesian dualism of mind and 
matter, on the one hand, and the Humean notion of atomic sensations, on the other. 
In so doing he claimed that phenomena are not of a dual nature, but rather that reality 
is simply a pattern composed of neutral entities called "pure experience".
They are chaotic. This chaos is not absolute but relative. James called the phenomena 
a "quasi chaos" because the phenomena is not complete and closed, rather there is 
novelty where new experiences constantly "grafts in". The dualities of "thoughts" and 
"things", or the "mental" and "physical", or "subjectivity" and "objectivity" are not 
the attributes of a pure experience. They are simply different orders of reality. The 
duality which we assume arises due to our interests and temporary purposes. In other 
words they are the result of subsequent classifications into mental and physical. The 
phenomena is uniform and is homogeneous in character. The relation which relates 
experiences is not something independent, but rather is a part of pure experience. It is 
a two term relation, wherein one of its terms becomes the subject or bearer of the 
knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known. Whatever the context
1. Perry, The Thought and Character o f  William James, ., vol. 2, p. 700. Now on I will call it TCWJ.
2. Ibid., p. 703.
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there is continuity and every term is related externally and does not have an intrinsic 
relation as the absolutists have argued. James thus summarised:
... the word "consciousness” is the susceptibility possessed by the 
parts of experience to be reported or known;
This susceptibility is explained by the fact that certain experiences 
can lead to others by means of distinctly characterized intermediary 
experiences, in such a fashion that some play the role of known 
things, the others that of knowing subjects;
These two roles can be identified perfectly without departing from 
the web of experience itself and without invoking anything 
transcendent; ("La Notion de Conscience", p. 271).
For James, phenomena is not discrete, rather it is a "concatenated" universe where 
disjunctions and conjunctions are real. In such a universe transitions and arrivals are 
the only events that happen. He regarded his empiricism as a mosaic philosophy 
where the pieces cling together by their edges. The transitions experienced between 
them forms their cement. For these reasons he termed his thesis "radical". There is 
also another reason why he called his theory radical. He introduced scientific realism 
and accepted scientific epistemology to make his theory more plausible. According to 
James the experiences in their physical arrangements are curiously stubborn, hut in 
their mental arrangements they are fluid, i.e ., may come and go as one please. This is 
what led James to say:
In the real world, the fire will consume it |the house]. In your mind, 
you can let fire play over it without effect. ("Does "Consciousness" 
Exist?", p. 9].
Accepting how objects are determined in the physical world James tried to explain the 
objects of the mental world in similar fashion. As a consequence he used circular 
arguments. |See 2.6.2.J. In chapter seven I shall argue that such arguments are not 
fatally circular and therefore non-viscious.
From the preceding discussion and the earlier exposition in chapter two we can 
summarise James’s theory of neutral plural facts in the following way: (i)
(i) There is not a unique, single experience; experiences are 
innumerable;
(ii) Experiences are pure with no inner duplicity;
(iii) Experiences are not atomic, as Hume suggested, but are related 
in such a way that it gives them a stream-like continuity;
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(iv) These innumerable experiences are homogeneous in nature. One 
"bit" of experience can be subjective and objective simultaneously, 
i.e. at the same time;
(v) The relation which relates the two "bits" of experiences are 
conjunctive relations, i.e. experienced relations;
(vi) In radical empiricism there is no hidden Ding-an-sich.
I have summarised the main points of James's thesis in order to show that the 
supposedly neutral entities in his philosophy is not neutral as James claimed. I discuss 
this issue next.
3.2. Neutral Monism; A Clear Case Of Covert Dualism
In chapter one I tried to expose James's theory of radical empiricism along with the 
subsequent development o f his thought from reluctant psychophysical dualism to 
metaphysical monism of neutral entities. It was argued that James accepted part of the 
Cartesian explanation of mind in order to dispose of the sterile notion of 
consciousness as an epiphenomenon as described by the automaton theorists. James a 
physiologist and a psychologist was impressed by the function of nervous system, and 
his analysis of the theory o f  the sensory and the motor activity of the nervous system 
led James to regard "sensation" as physiological process. As he said:
"|T|he function o f the nervous system is to bring each part into 
harmonious co-operation with every other. The afferent nerves, 
when excited by some physical irritant,... conveys the excitement to 
the nervous centres. The commotion set up by the centres does not 
stop there, but discharges itself,... through the efferent nerves into 
muscles and glands, exciting movements of the limbs and viscera, or 
acts of secretion,.... These acts of response have usually the 
common character of being of service." \The Principles o f 
Psychology, vol. 1, p. 12],
He was convinced that consciousness is not a spiritual activity but is really a "feeling 
of bodily activities" Such biological interpretation lead him to explain consciousness 
in terms of "cephalic movements".
James later had a different interpretation for the notion of consciousness. He asked: 
"Does consciousness exist?" His candid reply was "no". What exists is a sort of 
activity which functions in a peculiar way and hence is called consciousness. There is 
no such thing as "I", a permanent subject of discourse as Descartes and his followers 
believed. What is left behind is a "mere echo", the "faint rumor" of the disappearing 
"soul" which we call consciousness. Now consciousness simply stands for a function
Critique o f James. 9 1
and that function is "knowing". James thought that Cartesian notion of consciousness 
"vanished" from his philosophy once and for all. John Dewey, in his remarkable 
essay "The Vanishing Subject in The Psychology of James" (pp. 589-599), said that 
the biological interpretation of consciousness by James clearly shows that "the 
"subject" of dualistic epistemology disappears and its place is taken by an empirical 
and behavioural self.” [p. 596]. Dewey interpreted James's theory as a form of 
behaviourism because James relied on the physiological interpretation of brain and 
central nervous system. My argument is that James's reliance on physiological theory 
is simply analogical. I will shortly discuss this.
James's metaphysical aspiration led him outline on several occasions how, in his 
opinion, his position differed from dualism; however on close inspection, fa r  from  
convincing one that his position is not dualistic, these statements make it more 
apparent that, covertly, it is.
There is a sort of dualism present in James's philosophy. A.O. Lovejoy, in his The 
Revolt Against Dualism , argued:
While we may "take" an individual thing or event in two relations or 
context, we do not thereby make it possible for it at once to have 
and not have the same relation to a given other term, or to cause and 
not cause the same effect. The final outcome of James's reasoning 
on the matter is thus a complete relapse into the dualism from which 
he set out to escape.3
The above passage indicates that by dualism Lovejoy meant Cartesian dualism. Since 
an event B cannot be the cause of both C (a physical event) and M (a mental event), 
for instance, at the same time, therefore C and M must have separate causes. This 
suggested that since this cannot be explained James has lapsed into a dualism which 
explains that there are two different substances to explain mind and matter, similar to 
that of Descartes.
1 differ to agree with Lovejoy. For James dualism is that of a relation. For instance, a 
man, P, has at some particular time, a certain relation to his neighbour X. He also, at 
that time has a relation to his student Y. Both the relations are simultaneous. The 
dualism James lapses into is of this sort. Here we can say that P, constituted out of 
series of experiences has a relation with both X and Y, similar to two straight lines 
both intersecting at a point. According to James P has a relation to X which is a part
3. The Open Court Publishing Company La Salle, Illinois, 1955, p. 59.
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of a sequence. Similarly it is part of a sequence of Y. James did not deny that this sort 
of dualism is preserved in his theory. Dualism "is an affair of relations ... and can 
always be particularised and defined". ["Does "consciousness" Exist?"J. This is 
reflected in the following example:
To her offspring a tigress is tender, but cruel to every other living 
thing - both cruel and tender, therefore, at once. ["The Place of 
Affectional Facts", p. 70].
My reaction is that the sort of dualism James spoke is a kind of covert dualism. I have 
argued this in section 1.2.3. In short if a neutral entity used in construction needs a 
complex structure composed of elements or qualities and internal relations as a part 
then it has inner duplicity. We should then consider the construction the construction 
of the mental or physical entity as Covert. If the covert elements are themselves 
mental or physical then we have Covert Dualism. Covert dualist implicitly introduce 
both physical and mental elements within the neutral entities. These elements form the 
inherent structure of the individual neutral entity. They are so arranged that the 
subject object distinction follow implicitly without any interference of external causes. 
In my analysis of James’s theory of neutral monism I will argue this point and show 
that he is a covert dualist and not as Lovejoy argued a Cartesian dualist.
I have already claimed that James, in his formative period of neutral monism was a 
covert dualist. In his theory of "phenomenism” he implicitly introduced the dualism 
by suggesting internal elements within a single experience. The theory of radical 
empiricism is the mature version of phenomenism. Though he emphasised the 
"pristine" character of experiences, his attentive analysis showed that in fact they have 
parts. The following passage demonstrates this:
Experience, from the very first, presents us with concreted objects, 
vaguely continuous with the rest of the world which envelops them 
in space and time, and potentially divisible into inward elements and 
parts. |The Principles, vol. 1, p. 487].
Although his mature theory was triumphant on Cartesian dualism, he failed to stick 
the strict programme of neutral monism. Instead James collapsed to his earlier version 
called "phenomenism". There he admitted that the "experience" has internal elements. 
He made no gloss, rather admitted that experiences has "selective" power and 
"tendencies" which leads them from one experience to another in their fulfilled end, 
no matter whatever their "knowing office" (here James hinted on the term 
"consciousness" as a separate entity) may be. Moreover on several occasion James
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stated that relations are part of pure experience. This suggest that apart from 
externally relating different experiences internally the elements of each experience are 
organized and structured.
There is no doubt that James succeeded in closing the gap between mind and matter, 
which Descartes and his followers left asunder. Descartes believed that two different 
substances are the constituent of mind and matter. Mind has two distinct activities to 
perform. Apart from the thinking process there is a permanent subject called ’1" 
which is the actual knower. Such interpretation is responsible for epistemological 
dualism where a distinction is made between the knower and the known, between the 
subject and the object. James denounced such distinctions which make the relation of 
knowing the most "mysterious" thing in the world. He believed that experience, as an 
empirically given, can explain both mind and matter. The mystery of cognitive 
process is dissolved in the stream of conscious flow. One can feel ones feelings 
flowing inward and outward and can be aware o f them immediately without any 
mediator, such as an "Ego".
James could not defend his ambitious theory. In his over enthusiastic analysis of 
experience, he brought in dualism in rather disguised form. This is why 1 called his 
theory covertly dualistic. This will become more clear as 1 set my reasons as to how 
James’s theory lapses into dualism.
In this chapter I will analyse his theory of pure experience in general. This will lead 
me to point out especially as to why James theory collapses into dualism. For the 
purpose of my discussion 1 have isolated eight points. The discussion of them will 
reveal how James fell into the trap of dualism. The points of my discussions are as 
follows:
3.2.1. Experiences are not neutral as James claimed.
3.2.2. James failed to give proper reasons for why experiences at 
their initial stage are pure.
3.2.3. James brought in neourophysiological imagery to explain the 
continuity of experience.
3.2.4. His theory of relations only partly answered Hume.
3.2.5. Extrinsic analysis of an unwarranted experience—, mental and 
physical, is not applied to sequences but to points,
3.2.6. The functional explanation of experiences remain inadequate
3.2.7. Experiences are heterogeneous and not homogeneous as 
James claimed.
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3.2.8. Experiences have intrinsic elements. His theory of knowledge 
by acquaintance further, inadvertently, supports this.
3.2.1. The Concept “Neutral*: Two Approaches.
Approach: L
It is quite difficult to define the term "neutral". When, for instance, it is said that the 
car is in the neutral gear it means that the car if started would neither move forward 
nor backward but would remain stationary. Again, when it is said that Switzerland 
maintains a neutral foreign policy at the time of war, it usually means that she does 
not assist either o f two (or more) belligerent states and thus stands aloof. In 
philosophy, when James used the term "neutral" to explain his plural facts he means 
that the plural facts neither side with materialism (which holds that everything in the 
world is made up o f matter) nor with mentalism (which holds that reality can only be 
explained in terms of mind). Let us for the sake of convenience call the plural facts, 
i.e. "pure experience" "neither subjective nor objective". It is in this sense that pure 
experience is supposed to be neutral.
In order to prove that pure experience is not subjective, (unlike that of Humean notion 
of "ideas", and also his claim that the idea of necessity, essential to the concept of 
causation is derived from the felt force of our habitual associations of "perceptions of 
mind") James names his thesis "radical empiricism" and declared that this type of 
empiricism must neither admit into its constituents any element that is not directly 
experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. This 
claim clearly suggests that the experiences must be "directly experienced" in order to 
be truly radical. Now the question naturally arises: Directly experienced by what? The 
instant reply will be, "by an experiencing being which can at least feel", since the 
term "feel" is always associated with the term "subject". And since pure experience 
relies on the subject to be radical, we can therefore unhesitatingly say that it sides 
with the subject. Thus pure experience cannot be neutral, the way James claims.
To this James would reply that apart from one’s own experiences there are 
experiences, such as the other peoples experiences and those experiences which have 
not been experienced. The term "experience" is not a neutral term, rather it is 
subjective. Experience cannot be something out there, it is such that in order to be 
known it is to be experienced.
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Again, according to James pure experience is another name for "feeling or sensation” 
("The Tiling and Its Relations", p. 46). He held that only "new-born babes" and men 
in semi-coma from sleep, drugs and illness may have pure experience in the literal 
sense of a "that" which is yet to become a definite "what". If sensation is the pure 
experience then it is possible for normal human beings to have experience in the sense 
of so-called "pure". "Sensation" (a that) before becoming a definite "perception" (a 
what), i.e. meaningful, is pure experience. But sensation is purely subjective, it 
belongs to the being who can have sensation. Sensation cannot be "out there", because 
what could be "out there" is the object of sensation, for instance a tea cup. Hence 
pure experience is, in a sense, subjective and not neutral.
But I am not arguing that James has in fact promoted a thesis which could be called a 
form of mentalism. He simply faced a terminological difficulty by referring the 
neutral facts to be "experience". If experience would have been simply mental, and 
confined to the person concerned, than sharing experience would have been difficult. 
According to James experiences are conterminous. This suggests that for which a 
father and mother feels similar pang at the illness of their child. By "similar" I mean 
that the pain is not numerically identical. The feeling of pain may be there, but one 
cannot feel the "raw feel" experienced by different individuals. Whatever it may be, 
one cannot doubt that there are certain experiences which are private to the individual 
concern and hence cannot be shared, and therefore cannot be claimed to be neutral.
Approach; 2.
In its epistemological use some ambiguity is attached to the concept of neutrality.* 
There are two meanings which we may attach to the concept. They are, (i) neutral in 
a specified respect or reference, and (ii) neutral in the metaphysical or ontological
sense.
In the first sense to regard anything neutral means In a specified respect or reference. 
According to Dewey in this sense the term "neutral" simply means that a certain 
things are neutral only with respect to the distinction o f mental and material. In other 
words, one cannot carry the discussion further without proper specification, i.e. 
proper distinctions should be marked out by the terms "mental" and "material". 
Dewey wrote: 4
4. Dewey, J., "The Concept Of The Neutral In Recent Epistemology", pp. 161-163. In my second 
approach I will mostly follow Dewey, since his account seems quite convincing.
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(B|efore discussing whether a certain term, say "experience," has 
subjectivistic or objectivistic implications, we might have to 
consider whether, taken without specific qualifications, it was not 
rather a neutral term, a term to be used "without prejudice".[p. 
161].
This meaning of the term neutral is called the logical.
In the second sense, a term may be neutral metaphysically or ontologically. This 
suggests that a particular "stuff" is intrinsically neutral. In this case it is unnecessary 
to pin-point any specific reference in which the stuff is taken as neutral. As Dewey 
said:
| An] attempt is made to discover and describe a particular kind of 
material or stuff which may be called neutral exactly as a certain 
stuff may be called lead or wood. [p. 161],
Let us see in which sense James considered the term neutral. Since James's thesis is 
metaphysical thesis of neutral stuff we will take it that he regarded his concept of 
neutral in proper metaphysical sense. But certain ambiguity is found in his analysis of 
"experience".5 At times he seemed to identify pure experience with experience of a 
peculiar stuff. This is reflected in his claim that experience is pure because "it is made 
of tha t' which is not a what. By "that" he meant that an experience is made of space, 
of intensity, of flatness, browness, heaviness, etc. These are the qualities which form 
the content of the pure experience. So in its form of purity an experience is not 
"empty", i.e. unstructured.
James also argued that, in its immediacy experience is pure and "unqualified 
actuality" which is yet "undifferentiated" into thing and thought. In its unqualified 
state it can only virtually be classifiable as an objective fact or as somebody’s opinion 
about fact. |£ssays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 13, 71]. Here the distinction of 
experience is made in reference to fact and opinion. The experience is neutral in 
reference to it.
Accordingly, it is evident that for James neutrality is not a matter of a peculiar stuff, 
rather it is to do with a classification made for a specific purpose or need. If there is a 
need a distinction is made, otherwise the distinction is not relevant. As Dewey said:
5. Cf.. Ibid., p. 162.
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This position seems to me as sound as appeal to the hypothetical 
experience of the new born babe is trivial or misleading. Such 
"purity" as the latter possesses is something to outgrow as rapidly as 
the baby in fact does outgrow it. |p. 163].
This reflects that experience is not "pure" as James claimed.
3.2.2. The Concept "Pure"
In James’s philosophy the concept "pure" is used to characterize the pristine nature of 
experience. It is on the basis of purity that he claimed that experiences are neutral 
prior to the subject and the object distinction. In its maiden journey an experience is 
simply that, empty but not impotent. Full of potentiality lies within the so called 
purity of experience. This is why James called it "blooming, buzzing confusion". But 
potentiality cannot belong to emptiness. There must be something which has the 
possibility to become, in James’s term, what. Everybody knows the famous saying, 
"Ex nihilo nihil fit", which means nothing comes out of nothing. So James added that 
purity is a relative term. It does not mean complete emptiness, rather it means a 
"proportional amount o f unverbalized sensation" the experience still "embodies". That 
is why James said:
The first sensation which an infant gets is fo r  him the Universe.... 
The infant encounters an object in which (though it be given in a 
pure sensation) all the "categories of the understanding" are
contained__ Here the young knower meets and greets his world.
[The Principles, vol. 2, p. 8].
James’s analysis also suggests that experience in its pure form is simply empty. Who 
can have such an experience? James held that only new bom babies and men in semi­
coma, from drug or illness are supposed to have experience in its true sense of pure. 
This is simply an hypothetical assumption he makes. Since one cannot communicate 
with the new boms or men in coma the fact seems to remain hypothetical. But doubt 
has been cast on the evidence that drug involved subject have "pure experiences".
A.J. Ayer wrote of such an experience. Ayer was suffering from acute pneumonia 
when he had an "astonishing experience" which occurred in June 1988 when, the 
doctor reported, his heart beat stopped for four minutes.6 Ayer reported:
6. Hahn, Lewis Edwin, ed.. The Philosophy O f A.J. Ayer, 1992, p. 43. Ayer has recorded his 
experience in two articles appeared in the London Sunday Telegraph for 28 August 1988 with the title 
"What I Saw When I Was Dead..." and the London Spectator for 15 October under the heading 
"Postscript to a Post-mortem".|pp. 43-44] Physiologically even if the heart stops for few minutes the 
brain do not stop functioning immediately.
Critique of June». 9 8
The only memory that I have of an experience, closely 
encompassing my death, is very vivid. I was confronted by a red 
light, exceedingly bright, and also very painful even when I turned 
away from it. I was aware that this light was responsible for the 
government of the universe. Among its ministers were two creatures 
who had been put in charge of space. These ministers periodically 
inspected space and had recently carried out such an inspection.
They had, however, failed to do their work properly, with the result 
that space, like a badly fitting jigsaw puzzle, was slightly out of 
joint. [The Philosophy o fA .J . Ayer, p. 46].
The above passage throws light on host of problems, such as, personal identity, life 
after death, mind-body relation etc. Our concern here is simply that if people in a 
coma can have experience in the "literal" sense of the pure in James’s analysis then 
Ayer’s personal observation would falsify such a claim. Perhaps James as a doctor 
was aware of such a queer situation and that is why he emphasised the relative purity 
of pure experience.
Our discussion shows that experiences do have unverbalized sensations in their 
constitution. Only in an epistemic encounter these sensations tend to become 
meaningful.
3.2.3. Neurophysiological im agery.
In Chapter Two and also in this chapter |3 .2 | I have mentioned that James has likened 
consciousness of self with "cephalic movements". In this section I will deal with how 
his knowledge of the central nervous system led him to analyse a "bit" of experience 
and its relation to other bits of experiences. A brief discussion about the central 
nervous system will give us a better insight into the matter.
The central nervous system, which is made up of the brain and spinal cord, is the 
body’s control centre. It co-ordinates all its actions. Nervous systems are made up of 
special cells called neurones. A neurone contains certain basic parts. Each neurone 
has a nucleus, cytoplasm, and a cell membrane. The structure o f the neurones are 
such that they are able to carry massages to and from the brain to different parts of 
the body. In order to enable them to carry messages from one neurone to the other, 
they have long thin fibres, called nerve fibres, stretching out of the cell body. The 
longest fibre is called axon and the shorter fibres are called dendrites. The dendrites
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receive a message from the neighbouring neurone and pass it to the cell body and then 
along the axon. The axon then pass it on to another neurone.
There are millions of neurones which make up the central nervous system. When 
activated, the neurones co-ordinate the messages by taking them to the brain and then 
sending them back to the periphery of the body in a stream like continuity. For 
instance if 1 prick my finger I will feel pain, but the knowledge of the pain sensation 
will only be felt after the signal has been carried to the brain and the motor impulse 
sent back to the muscles. In other words the pain is only known as retrospectively, 
although in its instant action it was simply a prick.
This analysis of neurones, perhaps, impressed James. In his theory of 
"phenomenism", James admitted that an experience has parts similar to the parts, 1 
suppose, each neurone have, which makes its structure. Similarly an experience has 
two distinctive parts, the objective and the subjective. James said that within the 
datum, "the one part is to the other, so will the datum itself in its entirety appear as 
the subjective part in the next datum which will contrast it with the objective part of 
its own content" (already quoted in Chapter Two). In this way the message from one 
experience will pass to the next and the next until we reach "the abstract notion of an 
inner part o f the field meaning and knowing another... part". James held that the 
subject-object distinction is a matter of retrospection. It is when an experience 
becomes truly cognitive of that. At the initial stage a bit of experience was simply a 
that (a prick), and only in retrospection does it become a what (a pain).
There is another point which is important for explaining experiences and also the 
function of neurones. James was perhaps also impressed by the concept called 
"synapse". Neurones with their nerve fibres are not completely joined to the 
neighbouring neurones. Between each pair of neurones there is a small gap. These 
gaps are called synapse. Every axon of the neurones have hundreds of tiny vesicles. 
These each contain a chemical, called transmitter substance. When an impulse comes 
along the axon, it makes these vesicles empty their contents into the gap between the 
two neurones. The transmitter substance quickly spreads out across the tiny gap, 
attaches to the membrane of the relay neurone and triggers an impulse in the relay 
neurone. In this way the impulse is carried from one neurone to the other hence 
cementing the path way as it goes along. The location of the neurones are such that 
they could communicate through various path ways. From various paths it selects a 
particular path which would lead to a particular response, the most important of which
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is that synapse ensure that nervous impulses only travel in one direction. We shall 
see that experiences have similar selective tendencies which make them to travel into 
a particular direction.
James at the beginning of his "A World of Pure Experience" regarded the philosophy 
of pure experience as a "mosaic philosophy". In the end of the essay he rejected the 
terminology because, James argued, in mosaics the pieces are held together by their 
bedding. He said that it is only the transcendentalists and the absolutists who prefer a 
neat and clean "bedding” type of philosophy for their purposes. James regarded this 
as a philosophy of "bad taste". In order to avoid the so called "mosaic philosophy", 
he described that the pieces are clung together by their edges. This description 
suggests that there are small gaps in between the pieces (experiences) quite similar to 
those of neurones. According to James, the continuous transitions when experienced 
between the pieces forms their "cement". The other important aspect of an experience 
is that they are not simply continuous but have "tendencies" to move from one 
direction to another through a specified path. This means that experiences have a 
sense of direction, as synapse ensures for the nerve impulses, which leads them to 
their fulfilled ends. This will become clear from the following quotation where James 
said:
|Selection... of certain lines of relation would... appear to be the 
actual subjective condition which permits experience to fall into so 
many different systems; whilst the objective condition would be the 
fact that a plurality of relations are there in the content, and may 
logically and possibly found and followed out. |"Seminar Notes", 
1897-98, see Perry, TCWJ, vol. 2, p. 369|.
This physiological knowledge about the nervous system has given James a better 
knowledge about the continuity, movement and conjunctive relation.
3.2.4. The conjunctive and the disjunctive relations.
In order to explain his theory of conjunctive relations James coined a phrase "feeling 
of relation", borrowed from Spencer. Spencer in his Principles o f Psychology said 
that considered subjectively a relation
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"itself |isj a kind of feeling - the momentary feeling accompanying 
the transition from one conspicuous feeling to another conspicuous 
feeling."7
For James relations are not something foreign in the stream of experiences. Relations 
are parts o f experiences. Relations are "feelings", like experiences are "feelings". 
Although James accepted the Spencerian phrase, he rejected the idea that relations are 
limited to likeness, unlikeness, coexistence in space and sequence in time. According 
to James:
(R)elations are numberless, and no existing language is capable of 
doing justice to all their shades. |"<>i Some omissions of 
Introspective Psychology", p. 146)..
This prompted him to accept the notion of external relation in favour of the internal 
relations. His theory of conjunctive and disjunctive relations led him to discard the 
notion of relation held by Bradley and Hume’s world of mere atomism with no real 
relations.
3.2.4.1. Relations Are External.
Bradley in his Appearance and Reality argued that the very notion of relation is self- 
contradictory and that this inconsistency alone can condemn "the great mass of 
phenomena," since space, time, causation, the self, all imply relations.
James held that the logic of realism urges relation to be external. Described by 
Russell as "the most important of all critics of Monism"8, James regarded Bradley’s 
absolute as a "metaphysical monster" (A Pluralistic Universe, p. 46|. According to 
him, as absolute the world has no history, because the doctrine on which the 
absolutists lay most emphasis is the absolute's "timeless" character. On the other 
hand, for pluralists, time remains as real as anything, and nothing in the universe is 
great or static or eternal enough not to have some history. James was in fact 
influenced by Bergson, who maintained that "real time" is experienced as duration 
and apprehended by intuition, not through separate operations of instinct and the 
intellect. Although influenced, James had the originality to interpret the notion of real 
time in terms o f felt relations This is beautifully expressed by Perry. He wrote:
7. This is quoted from James's essay "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology”, in The Works 
Of William James, Essays in Psychology, p. 145.
8. See, Passmore J., A Hundred Years O f Philosophy, p. 262.
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Bergson,... took as his point of departure the logico-mathematical 
way of thinking, which, in neglecting real time, missed, he 
believed, the very essence of things. James did not,... begin with 
experimental psychology, but rather with British empiricism, which, 
in neglecting fe lt relations, also missed the essence of things. In 
other words, while for Bergson the crucial truth was temporal 
passage, for James time was only one of many cases of that 
transitiveness or continuity which was his crucial truth. Both 
thinkers found the key to metaphysics in a certain aspect of 
conscious experience, namely, its continuity. \TCWJ, vol. 2, pp. 
601-2].
Hence against absolutism James said:
Pluralism, in exorcising the absolute, exorcises the great de-realizer 
of the only life we are at home in, and thus redeems the nature of 
reality from essential foreignness.\A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 49- 
50],
James held that the absolute is useless for deductive purposes, because one cannot 
enter the phenomenal world with the notion of it in ones grasp, and name beforehand 
any detail which one is likely to meet there. The absolute, as an hypothesis, only 
functions retrospectively only, not prospectively. The a priori statements, unlike the 
empirical statements o f science, do not give information about characteristics of 
objects in the world but merely show the various conclusions that can be derived from 
a given set of axioms. For instance, Berkeley’s conclusions are a priori deductions 
from the premise "To be is to be perceived". Whereas, James argued:
Radical empiricism and pluralism stand out for the legitimacy of the 
notion of some: each part of the world is in some ways connected, 
in some other ways not connected with its other parts, and the ways 
can be discriminated, for many of them are obvious, and their 
differences are obvious to view. \A Pluralistic Universe, p. 79],
James admitted that Bergson had made him bold enough to repudiate intellectualists 
logic. In a letter to Strong, he wrote:
"Have you read Bergson’s Evolution creatrice?.... he has killed the 
beast Intellectualism dead! And he has put the opposition to its 
categories in the right place to be defended- in the intervals, 
namely, the "conjunctive" places, in which life actually goes on ..." 
\TCWJ, vol 2, p. 604|.
James, being a steadfast realist, rejected the realist distinction between the act and the 
object of the act, which was thought to dispose off idealism. In his Radical 
Empiricism, James argued that one cannot distinguish between act and object. Russell
Critique of Junes. 1 0 2
Bergson,... took as his point of departure the logico-mathematical 
way of thinking, which, in neglecting real time, missed, he 
believed, the very essence of things. James did not,... begin with 
experimental psychology, but rather with British empiricism, which, 
in neglecting fe lt relations, also missed the essence of things. In 
other words, while for Bergson the crucial truth was temporal 
passage, for James time was only one of many cases of that 
transitiveness or continuity which was his crucial truth. Both 
thinkers found the key to metaphysics in a certain aspect of 
conscious experience, namely, its continuity. ITCWJ, vol. 2, pp. 
601-2],
Hence against absolutism James said:
Pluralism, in exorcising the absolute, exorcises the great de-realizer 
of the only life we are at home in, and thus redeems the nature of 
reality from essential foreignness.\A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 49- 
50],
James held that the absolute is useless for deductive purposes, because one cannot 
enter the phenomenal world with the notion of it in ones grasp, and name beforehand 
any detail which one is likely to meet there. The absolute, as an hypothesis, only 
functions retrospectively only, not prospectively. The a priori statements, unlike the 
empirical statements of science, do not give information about characteristics of 
objects in the world but merely show the various conclusions that can be derived from 
a given set of axioms. For instance, Berkeley’s conclusions are a priori deductions 
from the premise "To be is to be perceived". Whereas, James argued:
Radical empiricism and pluralism stand out for the legitimacy of the 
notion of some: each part o f the world is in some ways connected, 
in some other ways not connected with its other parts, and the ways 
can be discriminated, for many of them are obvious, and their 
differences are obvious to view. |A Pluralistic Universe, p. 79].
James admitted that Bergson had made him bold enough to repudiate intellectualists 
logic. In a letter to Strong, he wrote:
"Have you read Bergson’s Evolution creatrice?.... he has killed the 
beast Intellectualism dead! And he has put the opposition to its 
categories in the right place to be defended— in the intervals,
namely, the "conjunctive" places, in which life actually goes on__"
\TCWJ, vol 2, p. 604|.
James, being a steadfast realist, rejected the realist distinction between the act and the 
object of the act, which was thought to dispose off idealism. In his Radical 
Empiricism, James argued that one cannot distinguish between act and object. Russell
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later conceded to Janies in his The Analysis o f Mind. According to James, one who 
accepted radical empiricism will he saved from an artificial conception of the 
"relations between knower and known". One who regarded "pure experience" to be 
the only stuff of the world will realize that in the very bosom of the finite 
experience, every conjunction required to make the relation intelligible is given in 
full.
This radical acceptance of conjunctive and disjunctive relations further helped him to 
discard Hume’s notion of psychic atomism. There is no doubt that James conceded 
that his philosophy of plural facts is "like that of Hume and his descendants”. But 
admitted that it differed from the Humean type of empiricism which made him add 
the epithet "radical". This led him to depart from Hume’s main thesis that,
"all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences... the mind never 
perceives any real connection among distinct existences." 1 Treatise, 
"Appendix", p. 636J.
According to James, in experience both disjunctions and conjunctions are present. But 
Hume in accepting disjunction has omitted conjunction which, according to James, is 
true in the same sense.
3.2.4.2. Has James rebutted Hume?
The opinion varies. To some he has9, and to some only partly10. My opinion is that 
James has only partly answered Hume.
James’s theory of the stream of consciousness is an excellent example as to how 
relations are felt immediately within the "substantive p a n s" (resting places" and the 
"transitive p a n s' (the places of flight) of the stream o f thought. |See Chapter Two], 
In his "A World Of Pure Experience", James with similar deftness has shown how 
conjunctive relations occur when only having a vague image of the "Memorial Hall" 
leads us to the vivid sense-perception of the Hall. The feeling of experience is such 
that any gap, if present, seems to be cemented in the process of transition. Of course 
James agreed that disjunctions are as real as conjunctions.
9. Sing-Nam Ten, in his essay titled "Has James Answered Hume?’ , said that James has answered 
Hume's question "squarely once and for all". See, pp. 159-167.
10. Smith, John E., in his essay on "Radical Empiricism" agreed that conjunctive and disjunctive 
relations are present in experience, but there are terms which cannot be related directly. Hence we have 
to introduce a mediating term. See, his Themes in American Philosophy, 1970, pp. 26-41.
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The experience of continuity is found in the passage of one experience into another 
within the history of the same self."  For example one can set a particular goal for 
oneself and can map out the steps through which one can achieve and feel the instant 
satisfaction of reaching the goal. In such a process one is immediately aware of a 
continuous series of ideas and feelings distinctively flowing from each other and 
passing into each other in an orderly sequence. This is because one is "co-conscious" 
about his interior flow.
Disjunctions or breaks are felt when one tries to experience the feelings of others into 
which one fails to pass as one can into one’s own feelings. For instance two persons, 
Salome and Sahir, may enjoy a football match with same enthusiasm and spirit. 
Salome can feel the enjoyment passing through her own self, but she doesn’t feel the 
similar experience going through Sahir’s mind. This is because her experiences do not 
pass to Sahir’s the way they pass (and are felt) into her own. At best, Salome can 
make judgements by Sahir’s gestures, movements, and other verbal and non-verbal 
signs and knows and is directly aware that Sahir is also having similar experiences, 
although not identical. In other words she conceptualizes the whole of Sahir’s 
experiences through her own experiences. This break or disjunction is felt when one 
passes from one’s own experience of continuity and sameness. *2 This is how James 
has answered Hume.
Smith argued that relations are found in experience, but some are a priori and cannot 
be derived from the flux of pure experience "without appeal to a synthetic or 
constructive activity on the part of the one who knows". This is because "the stream 
of experience is neither self-organizing nor self-interpreting."1 23 Seigfried disagreed 
with Smith and said that to regard experience as neither self-organizing and nor self­
interpreting "encapsulates a basic misunderstanding"14. Seigfried said, the stream of 
experience cannot be reduced to organizer and organized. This is because in the 
immediacy of the instant field of experience there is no duality of thing and thought. 
He held that
11. See, Smith, p. 35.
12. Cf., Ibid.
13. Ibid., pp. 37, 40.
14. Seigfried, C.H., "The Structure o f Experience for William James’ , in Charles Peirce Soc. 
Transactions, vol. 12, 1976, p. 331.
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"there is no a priori structures, but rather the interpretive effort 
which articulates experienced relations arises from a subsequent 
reflection on a unitary experience. "|p. 332J."
The passage suggests that according to Seigfried experiences are "unreconstructed", 
borrowing a term from Perry. He claimed that James was right in claiming that only 
in retrospection can we determine the subject-object distinctions, which is not present 
in its initial stage. We know that James followed Shadworth Hodgson in claiming 
that two sub-feelings are required to be cognitive of an experience.
The question now arises: Why in retrospection and not in introspection can one have 
the immediate knowledge? We know that James used the method of introspection not 
only in his psychology but also in his metaphysics. Perhaps to avoid psychologism 
and to keep metaphysics a complete distinctive discourse, James preferred the term 
"retrospection". It should be noted that retrospection means looking back and 
introspection means to look within one’s own self. As Price puts it, "even if it is 
always "retro", the point is that it is "intro"."15 It is to look back into one’s own past 
experience and in so doing one needs to look in to look back. Therefore every 
experience which gets retrospected had to be introspected.
There is another point which we may recall, according to James, is "the relation itself 
is a part of pure experience". The intrinsic relations are required because experiences 
should not be thought of as a totally empty concept. Rather they are "potentially 
divisible into inward elements and parts". Every experience has "unverbalized 
sensations" which need to be organized and interpreted. Since the basic structure is 
present in every experience, although "vaguely", the subjective and the objective 
conditions are so related that they can "select" and organize, and tend to move from 
one datum to the other wherein it terminates. James of course would argue that 
"tendencies exist" but they are "psychical zero". At the same time he said that they 
are "often so vague that we are unable to name them at all" (Principles, vol. 2, p. 
254). If the tendencies are psychical zero then how can they exist in "vague" form? 
Some sort of a priori vague tendencies are present in the structure of experience as 
the foundation of future possibility. An experience only then gets verbalized or 
actualized in a proper experienced situation. In its immediacy it is possibly that ready 
to be actually what.
15. Price, H.H., "Some Objections to Behaviourism", p. 79.
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From this discussion it is clear that experience do have parts which are intrinsically 
related. It is through introspection an experience gets retrospected to be truly 
cognitive of that. That is, in a proper epistemic situation, the unverbalized sensations 
become meaningful. This will become clearer when I discuss how his theory of 
knowledge inadvertently confirmed this position.
3.2.5. The transition o f experiences from one to the other run not in sequences
but in points.
According to James the only function an experience can perform is to lead to another 
experience. This is because the only fulfilment we understand is the reaching of a 
certain "experienced end". Since the world of experiences are present to us as a quasi­
chaos, an experience must have the tendencies and sense of direction to move from 
one to the next by many possible paths. The paths which terminates and results "are 
highly advantageous paths to follow" ("A World of Pure Experience", p. 32). These 
paths are the "functional substitute" for another. The movement is carried out in point 
to point because of various paths. It seems that the experience needs to be in the right 
path so it selects from various experiences which way to move. It is only then that 
they agree in function when one experience leads to the same end as another.
If the movement is in sequence there is an order of succession, i.e. coming after or 
next. Here the set of things belong to each other on some principle of order, which is 
a priori. In other words sequence means series without gaps. James rejected such an 
analysis in which experience needs to follow a prestablished path to reach a goal. 
There is no particular order and experiences are in some chaos. They only get ordered 
or classified for specific purposes. This is another reason why James has rejected the 
mosaic philosophy where mosaics are held together by their bedding.
A point is single and particular. Every experience is unique in its form and has the 
peculiarity of getting distinguished into subject-object. The individuality of 
experiences is such that they are distinctively attached to each other by their edges. 
The minimal gap present due to arrangements are cemented in an experienced 
transition. As James said:
Whenever certain intermediaries are given, such that, as they 
develop towards their terminus, there is experience from point to 
point of one direction followed, and finally of one process fulfilled, 
the result is that their starting-point thereby becomes a knower and
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their terminus an object meant or known. |Ibid., p. 29. James’s 
italics, and my underline].
The passage reveals that in an analysis of an experience, what we call Icnower and 
known, or mental and physical, is applied to points and not to sequences. This further 
suggests that each experience has some sort of inherent structure which guides them 
through a highly advantageous path.
We may further argue that experiences are atomic. Following Mach, James, accepting 
the anti-atomistic thesis of physics, rejected the atomism of Hume. |See Chapters 1 
and 2]. James, both in his psychology and metaphysics, argued that "consciousness" 
or "experience" is not "chopped up in bits" and is not "loose or separate", as if it had 
no manner of connection. [Principles, vol. 1, p. 239; "A World of Pure Experience", 
p. 23]. Despite ani-atomism James used such word as a "bit of experience" ( "Does 
"Consciousness" Exist?", p. 7). John Wild, in his The Radical Empiricism o f William 
James, questioned that describing experience as "a bit", "a unit", or as "so many little 
absolutes",- "is this not falling into that abstract atomism ... which he attacked so 
vigorously in the Principles, and still rejects |£jsqyj in Radical Empiricism]" (p. 
367).
James’s acceptance of atomism further supports the above discussion that the 
transition from experiences from one to the other run in points.
3.2.6 The functional explanation pf experiences remain inadequate.
In order to dispose of dualism James provided a functional analysis of experience. 
There are not two kinds of experience, but its function may be of two different kinds. 
As we have earlier seen, James provided an interesting example where the function of 
paint can be explained without bringing any dualism. The paint in a pot could be a 
saleable matter, or could represent a feature in a picture and perform a spiritual 
function.
The notion of "function" gives rise to the question: Why an experience functions in 
one particular way and not other? In order to show that consciousness does not exist 
James argued that what we call consciousness is simply a sort of function, and not a
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so called entity, as Descartes suggested. Woodbridge1® rightly pointed out that we 
have been ’tricked" by allowing ourselves to be influenced by forms of speech in our 
acceptance and rejection of consciousness. There are at least two questions that could 
be asked about consciousness. They are: What is consciousness? What is it to be 
conscious? These two questions are generally identical. The linguistic analysis is such 
that one responds to the first one by saying that consciousness is a stuff. The second 
one alludes to its function. This disjunction between the two questions appealed to 
James. As Woodbridge wrote:
James’s challenge brought some calm to many of us in spite of the 
fact that it made "consciousness" a Junction of the stu ff of 
"experience".[p. 561].
The problems of consciousness, according to Woodbridge, are many, but most 
important of them is the problem of knowledge. It is not a problem of cognitive 
relation but of discovering and analysing the factors which control the elaboration of 
what we are conscious of into systematic and communicable expositions. Therefore 
the disjunction "stuff or function" is misleading. Woodbridge said:
For consciousness is seeing, hearing, and the rest, and seeing and 
hearing— and the rest appropriately— are sight seen and sounds 
heard, and in what sense these are functions of anything is hard for 
me to discover They are materials of knowledge, [p. 567).
The above passage reveals a phenomenalist interpretation according to which the 
appearances presented to the senses are the ultimate foundations of all our knowledge. 
But James tried to translate consciousness into cognitive relations. He admitted that 
the attitude of the psychologists towards cognition has produced the idea that there are 
two irreducible elements in the process of knowing. They are knower and the known. 
But if analysed properly the knower and the known become the two functions, in two 
different contexts, of the undivided experience. This brings us to the initial question 
as to what makes an experience function in two different ways in two contexts.
James in his Principles regarded attention to be the "reproduction of the sensation 
from within,..." (vol. 1, p. 477). We have seen that in his pre-radical position he 
referred to the term "anticipation" by which we can explain what "signifying" and 
"knowing" mean. By anticipating both present and future experiences we can know 
what is about to happen. Some sort of "dim image" must be present which our
16. Woodbridge, F.J.E., "The Problem of Consciousness Again", in The Journal O f Philosophy, vol. 
XXXIII, No. 21, 1936, pp. 561-568.
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attention discriminates before any function to occur. For this reason James stated that 
the knowledge of sensible realities come to life within the tissue of experience. Thus 
he argued the "terminal object" or the later vivid sense perception of the initial dull 
image " is what we had “"in mind" from the outset" ("A World of Pure Experience", 
p. 29).
This is also clear from his example of "Memorial Hall". In order to reach Memorial 
Hall one might have a "very dim image of the hall" though it makes no difference in 
its cognitive function, "be it what it may, its knowing office". It will be truly 
cognitive when the vague idea "has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness 
and fulfilled intention". It suggests that in the content of an experience the terminal 
object in its dim form is present from the beginning. This is why every experience 
tends to function in one particular way and not in another. James in the guise of 
functional distinctions of experiences had actually produced metaphysical distinctions.
3.2.7. Experiences are heterogeneous and not homogeneous as James claims.
James categorically stated that what we call "things" and "thoughts" are not at all 
fundamentally heterogeneous. They are made of one and the same stuff. The 
distinction between them is not in the nature of primal stuff but only its arrangement. 
In other words an experience is both "subjective and objective at once".
The term "homogeneous" means " consisting of parts all of the same kind". The term 
"heterogeneous" means "composed of diverse elements". If James was thinking that a 
bit of experience is homogeneous and not heterogeneous he was certainly referring to 
the internal structure of the experience, now object and now subject. When James said 
that "experience, I believe, has no such inner duplicity", he was in fact pointing that 
an experience is constituted out o f homogeneous elements. If James conceded that an 
experience is heterogeneous then that would mean that the experience is composed of 
more then one elements. Whatever the situation may be there is no doubt that an 
experience does have parts but they are of the same nature.
On the principle of homogeneity James argued that the plurality of experiences are of 
same nature, and "experience" is the neutral name given to the sensible totals. Now 
the question arises: Is James's thesis of pure experience plural in the weaker sense or 
stronger sense? I would call it weaker if each bit of experience resemble and in fact 
identical with every other bits o f experience in its constitution; where the principle of
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homogeneity will count as one of the conditions. I would call it stronger if each 
experience differs from the other experiences in its constitution, although retains 
internal homogeneity to the individual experience concerned. By internal homogeneity 
1 mean that structurally an experience is similarly constituted.
Now, in one of the passages I have earlier quoted in chapter two James mentioned 
that there is only one primal stuff of which everything is composed and that stuff is 
pure experience. In other passages he claims that "there is no general stuff of which 
experiences at large is made". This means that each and every experience is not made 
of one kind of thing. In the next sentence James said that "there are as many stuffs as 
there are "natures" in the things experienced." Experience is only a collective name 
for all these sensible natures. From the above consideration we can easily deduce that 
there must be different stuffs and "experience" is simply a collective name; a name 
just named on the principle of homogeneity. This will be also clear when we discuss 
what James means by the phrase "the given".
When James regarded experience as "the given" he simply did not refer to the 
phenomenal qualities or sense qualia. His concept of "the given" is wider in scope17 
than from the sense data philosophers and phenomenalists. In James’s philosophy "the 
given" includes both universals and particulars. Beside the patches of colour, odours, 
tastes etc. the given also includes the entirety of physical objects18. Since two persons 
can perceive the same object the construction of physical objects does not arise.19 This 
is further confirmed by Perry, who noted that James did not try to identify the thing 
with the sum of its appearances because
"he recognized a general philosophical demand that the thing should
have some sort of significance beyond the multiplicity of bare data."
\TCWJ, vol. 1, p. 498J.
17. See, Madden, H .E., and Chakravarti, C ., ’James’s "Pure Experience" versus Ayer’s "Weak 
Phenomenalism” , in Transactions o f the Charles S. Pierce Society, vol. 12, 1976, p. 8.
18. Here James differed from Russell. For Russell physical objects are constructions out o f sense-data 
and therefore knowledge by description.
19. Cf., Madden, and Chakravarti, p. 8. This also discloses the fact that James was not a 
phenomenalist as Ayer, in his 'Radical Empiricism’ (in The Origins o f Pragmatism, 1968J, suggested 
(see pp. 216, 224-42, 219-93). Ayer argued that James's strong phenomenalism was a failure, but 
thought that the weak version of phenomenalism "gives him (James| most of what he wanted (from the 
doctrine of pure experience]’ (p. 293; cf.. Madden and Chakravarti, p. 4). For a phenomenalist what 
we are directly acquainted with are sense-data and not physical objects. For James there was no need of 
constructing physical objects. Madden and Chakravarti had deftly shown that James’s thesis of radical 
empiricism was not a phenomenalism. Perry in his Present Philosophical Tendencies also regarded 
James a phenomenalist. [p. 365],
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This shows that James’s theory is plural in the stronger sense of the term because each 
experience does not possess the same elements. Some experiences are entirely 
physical since they represent the entirety of physical objects. Similarly there must be 
certain experiences which are entirely subjective. For instance the experience of pain 
felt by me is entirely private to me and can only conceptually be known by others. 
This means that there are two types of experiences, those representing subjective and 
private, and those representing physical and public experiences.
According to James, a bit of experience can be both subjective and objective at once. 
In this case it means that an experience is a qua thing and qua thought. But James 
claimed that there is no internal duality in the constitution of an experience. If this is 
so then how can an experience of a physical object, say a chair, having stable 
characteristics be also entirely mental, having an unstable and fluid character at the 
same time? It is possible that at time t, the elements in an experience can be exposed 
to physical laws and at time t2 to psychological laws. But if an experience is mental 
and physical at the same time this means that parts of its elements act as physical and 
part as mental. James admitted that physical and psychical are heterogeneous elements 
which are fused together. He said:
[Tjhey are so little heterogeneous that if we adopt the common-sense 
point of view, if we disregard all explanatory inventions— molecules 
and ether waves,... which at bottom are metaphysical entities... then 
... this sensible reality and the sensation which we have o f it are 
absolutely identical one with the other at the time the sensation 
occurs. ["La Notion de Conscience", p. 2263. Italics are mine].
This admission reveals a few important things. First that physical and mental are 
heterogeneous. Secondly, experiences are not metaphysical entities like those of 
molecules and ether waves. But James admits that experience has both stable and fluid 
characteristics which are the peculiarities of the molecules and ether waves. If 
experiences are not metaphysical are they psychical? Or does he mean by 
metaphysical simply physical? Thirdly, sensible reality, a physical object, sensation, 
and mental representations of the object, are identical. According to James my percept 
of the Memorial Hall and the Hall as a physical object are numerically the same. At 
the same time he admits that
"apart from colour-blindness and such possibilities we see the Hall 
in different perspectives." |"A World of Pure Experience", p. 40).
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If we have different perspectives from different places then how is it possible that the 
percept of the Hall, which varies according to the laws of perspective, and the 
physical Hall in its entirety be identical at the same time? This is only possible when 
the experience has two equal parts, one representing the entire physical object and one 
the entire mental image of it.
James also said that when two or more people view the Hall at the same time, then,
"whatever differing contents our minds eventually fill a place with, 
the place itself is a numerically identical content of the two 
minds,..." [Ibid., p. 41].
If we see the Hall from two different places at the same time, we will see the Hall in 
different perspectives. More over the place will also be of a different perspective. As 
a result my perspective of the place where the Hall is situated will be different from 
the perspective of the place of others. How then can the place be the numerically 
identical content of two minds?
Since experience has parts, the subjective content and the objective content are so 
organized that what we call physical or psychical are numerically the same. It is in 
this sense that an experience in its entirety represents matter and in its entirety 
represents mind
3.2.8. Experiences have intrinsic elem ents- his theory of knowledge by 
acquaintance further inadvertently supports this.
I have already discussed in chapter two that James's main aim prior to his 
metaphysical theory of radical empiricism was to eliminate the epistemological gulf 
created by the dualist theorists. Following John Grote in his distinction of two kinds 
of knowledge- "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge about"— James tried to 
show that the truth-relations fall inside the continuities of concrete experience. By this 
he thought he had achieved two things. They are (i), experiences are not discrete as 
Hume thought and that they are continuously related to each other, and (ii), the 
cognitive relations are such that the epistemological chasm disappears. It is only in 
retrospection that an experience becomes meaningful because at its first instance there 
is no subject-object distinction. The distinction is generated only when the subjective 
part in the next datum contrasts with the objective part of its own content.
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created by the dualist theorists. Following John Grote in his distinction of two kinds 
of knowledge— "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge about"— James tried to 
show that the truth-relations fall inside the continuities of concrete experience. By this 
he thought he had achieved two things. They are (i), experiences are not discrete as 
Hume thought and that they are continuously related to each other, and (ii), the 
cognitive relations are such that the epistemological chasm disappears. It is only in 
retrospection that an experience becomes meaningful because at its first instance there 
is no subject-object distinction. The distinction is generated only when the subjective 
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I have also said in chapter two that James initially claimed that knowledge by 
acquaintance such as feelings are "dumb” and "helpless" because they can neither 
name or classify. In other words, acquaintance with a thing is the limitation to the 
bare impression which it makes. Therefore there is no cognition. Whereas an 
acquaintance with an experience does not provide knowledge. In order to have 
knowledge an experience has to be retrospected by other experiences in the stream of 
experiences. It is in "knowledge about", where the transition takes place from one 
experience to another, that we have cognition. The initial term becomes the knower 
and the point of terminus becomes the object known. At the same time James admits 
that knowledge by acquaintance is not "psychical zero" and that knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge about are reducible to each other. From a cognitive point 
of view, a feeling is "most positively and definitely qualified inner fact".
I have earlier mentioned that this explanation results in two difficulties which in fact 
James tried to resolve. First if feelings are cognitive by themselves then the so called 
transition cannot take place, because the transition occurs only in knowledge about. It 
is only through transition from one experience to another James explained the concept 
of "continuity" and "felt relation". This suggests that there is no stream-like 
continuity in the experiences and that each experience is discrete. In other words, it 
further proves, experiences are similar to Humean atomic sensations. Secondly, If a 
bit of experience is cognitive in itself then the question of appropriation and 
retrospection does not occur. It is only in retrospection the subject-object distinctions 
occur. James had argued that a bit of experience can be both knower and the known, 
the mental and physical at the same time. This suggests that the distinctions occur 
"within the datum" where "the one part is to other". The following passage will 
further enlighten us as what James means:
A feeling feels as a gun shoots. If there be nothing to be felt or hit, 
they discharge themselves ins blaue hinein. If, however, something 
starts up opposite they no longer simply shoot or feel, they hit and 
know. |The Meaning of Truth, p. 17],
There is no doubt that experiences have parts. If one part is to the other then the two 
parts are distinctively different from each other. One part represents matter the other 
mind. James holds that "relations" are parts of experience. As its parts, they organize 
and arrange the different elements present in experience. In the part, representing 
matter, the elements are stably related to each other. The elements in the other part
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are fluid and unstable. This is what James called mind. Therefore a bit of experience 
is both mental and physical at once.20
3.3. James and Spinoza.
The question now arises: If an experience is capable of representing mind and matter 
and has relations as its parts, then why is it necessary to have innumerable 
experiences of a similar kind? One of the plausible reason may be his critique of 
Spinoza's so called idealistic monism.
Spinoza’s monistic theory can be identified with a type of monism called "substantival 
monism". According to this theory the apparent multiplicity o f substances is really a 
manifestation of only a single substance in different states or different points of view. 
Spinoza in his Ethics, defined "God" and "Nature" in synonymous terms. According 
to him, God is not a personal, creative agent, separate from the universe that he 
creates. God is being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite 
attributes only, two of which are known by the human intellect. They are "extension" 
and "thought". To put it in Spinoza’s words:
The mind and body, are one and the same individual, which is 
conceived now under the attribute o f thoughts, and now under the 
attribute o f extension .21
In other words "thoughts" and "extensions" are the two aspects of the same thing, 
now a thing and now a thought.
But James is critical of this account. Though he speaks of one stuff, the experience, it 
is the collective name of innumerable experiences. Where each experience can be 
simultaneously a "thing" and a "thought". We can represent both the views in the 
following schema:
20. 1 shall return to this discussion in Chapter Six to show that Russell also followed James in 
admitting that a neutral event admits of both physical and psychical elements, thus leaving it covertly 
dualistic.
21. Boyle, A., trans., Spinoza’s Ethics And On The Correction O f The Understanding, p. 58. Italics 
are mine.
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Spinoza
Cod, Nature. Substance
Isubstances
/ l \  / l \  / l \attributes
thing thought
James
IExperiences
I* * * * * * *
\  /  
\  /
\  /
\  /
*
thing thought
thought and thing at the same time, being two aspects 
of one thing
one bit of experience isolated from innumerable experiences
thing * thought
Ione bit can be both thing and 
thought at the same time.
What James disliked about Spinoza’s theory is that the substance which he speaks of 
is all thinking or mind oriented. But James’s experience is, as he claims, neutral. 
Again Spinoza deduced the multiplicity from single stuff, whereas James explained 
multiplicity by plural facts. But Spinoza explained that a single substance has 
attributes belonging to both mind and matter. To James one bit of experience is both 
mental and physical when related to other experiences. It is not difficult for the stuff 
to be thought and thing at once. How can, for James, one single bit o f  experience be 
thought and thing at once and now? It is not difficult either for James. For an 
experience to be cognitive it does not always require a second experience because 
feelings are not psychical zero. By accepting dualistic epistemology James accepted 
metaphysical elements (mental and physical) within the structure of pure experience. 
It is not difficult for an experience to be both mental and physical at once.
I should not say that James’s theory is at bottom pure Spinozism. For Sinoza the 
relations between mentality and materiality shows that the possession of either may 
entail that of the other.22 The fact is James could not totally disassociate himself from 
Spinozism. He tried in vain by bringing in a plurality of experiences. In the "open 
universe" where the new experiences are constantly "leaking in", James collapsed in a
22. Cf., C.D. Broad, The Mind And Its Place In Nature, p. 642.
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disguised foim of dualism. Unlike that of Spino7a, for James it would be that the 
possession of mentality or materiality may entail neither the possession nor the 
absence of the other. An experience can belong to mind in a particular arrangement. 
In another arrangement it can exclusively belong to matter. Since an experience can 
figure in both the groups James, in his over enthusiastic analysis of experience, tried 
to prove that a single experience, if need be, can be both mental and physical at the 
same time. There is no need to accept two kinds of distinct substances to explain the 
physical and the psychical distinction in Cartesian style.
3.4. Conclusion.
James failed in his effort to dispose of dualism. He could not fill the epistemological 
chasm without admitting mental elements together with the physical ones. His neutral 
experiences were a mixture of subjective and objective ingredients. Moreover the 
experiences were left as discrete as Humean atomic sensations. Although he only 
partly answered Hume with regard to experienced relations, he could not make 
relations external to experiences. A bit of experience became a "qua" thing and a 
"qua" thought. As a result he brought in dualism in a disguised form, which I call 
covert dualism.
1 1 7
CHAPTER 4.
Russell’s Early Commitment to Neutral Monism;
A Passage From Dualism to Phenomenalism.
... if we cannot be sure of the independent existence of objects, we 
cannot be sure of the independent existence of other people's bodies,
and therefore still less of other people’s minds...... Thus if we cannot
be sure of the independent existence of objects, we shall he left alone 
in a desert- it may be that the whole outer world is nothing but a 
dream, and that we alone exist.
[Russell, "The Existence of Matter", in The Problems o f 
Philosophy (1912)]
4.1 introduction
This chapter traces the development of neutral monism in Russell’s philosophy before 
his true commitment to the theory. Between 1912 and 1921 Russell shifted from 
outright dualism to a half-hearted phenomenalism and finally to neutral monism. My 
purpose is to explore how and why such a shift took place in his philosophy. Before 
going into detail I will mention the most relevant works of Russell and the chief shifts 
detectable in these works. They are as follows:
1912, The Problems o f Philosophy. Russell was concerned about the 
knowledge of the physical objects and how it is possible to have access to 
them, and therefore distinguished between knowledge by acquaintance (of 
sense-data) and knowledge by description (of physical objects). 
Knowledge of physical objects was by inference from knowledge by 
acquaintance.
19131, "Neutral Monism": Russell, accepting Moore’s analysis of 
perceptual experience, believed in the distinction between act and object 
of the act and hence did not accept James’s account of knowledge in his 
attempt to get rid of consciousness, the mental. He thought neutral 
monism failed for several reasons; the problems with James’s account of 
knowledge was one reason Russell gave prominence.
1914, Our Knowledge o f the External World: (The period of logical 
atomism extended upto 1921.) Phenomenalist approach for the 
verifiability of physics. Physical objects are constructs from sense-data, 
not inferences from them, so knowledge of physics is made easier to 
explain. Against phenomenalists he maintained the reality of unperceived 
events, the sensibilia. He reduced sensibilia into "ideal" elements and 
defined them in terms of actual elements, i.e. sense-data.
1. I have dated the essay 1913 because it appears that Russell wrote this in May, 1913 and later 
published in the Monist in 1914. The source of information is The Collected Papers o f Bertrand 
Russell, vol. 7, pp. xxiv and xxvi.
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1914, "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics": Less directly concerned 
about epistemology. Russell accepted the metaphysical hypothesis that 
sensibilia and sense-data had the same metaphysical status and were the 
ultimate constituents of matter. He justified his claim by the principle o f  
continuity.
1915, "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter": Retained a similar position 
as 1914. Russell maintained the dualism between sense-data and 
sensations, the mental particulars as the ultimate constituent of mind.
1921, The Analysis o f  Mind: Russell attempted to give an account of 
mental via neutral stuff, the wholly empirical entities. He accepted 
James's account that, in perception, there is no distinction between acts of 
consciousness and their non-mental objects. But his account of the mental 
required "images", which are wholly subjective, and his account of matter 
required unsensed "sensibilia", which are wholly physical.
1927, The Analysis o f Matter, and An Outline o f Philosophy. The 
influence of Einstein and Whitehead led Russell to become committed to 
the ontology of events. Both of these books also reveal his desperate 
attempt to save neutral monism by restating most of his previous 
arguments. He exploited science in his favour. These works of Russell’s 
are "scientific philosophising" in the field o f epistemology .2
1940, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth: Russell’s interest shitted to 
language, truth and verification, which he, of course, mentioned in many 
of his earlier works. He became interested in the definition of "meaning" 
and in the relation of language to fact. His views on egocentric 
particulars, i.e. the indexicals, takes a turn different from that which he 
had first put forward against the neutral monists in 1913.
1948, Human Knowledge Its Scope and Limits: Russell declared that all 
the data of physics are also data of psychology, but not vice versa. Russell 
no longer called the data neutral. He presented a variety of inductive 
principles in order to justify inferences to unknown events from known 
events.
Russell very aptly wielded Occam’s razor to develop his theory. While detecting the 
chief shifts in these works I have come across three important phases of Russell's 
philosophy culminating in neutral monism. They are dualism, (1912-1913), 
phenomenalism, (1914-1919), and neutral monism, (1921-1927). 1 will discuss the 
first two phases in this chapter. The last phase, i.e. his commitment to neutral 
monism, will be discussed in chapters five and six. This chapter will consist of three 
sections.
2. Op.cil., Braithwaite, p. 130.
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Section A
4.2. DUALISM.
Introduction.
Russell’s main motive in his The Problems o f Philosophy, 1912, was to explain how 
we have knowledge of the physical objects and epistemological access to them. In so 
doing he made a bifurcation between mind and matter, not in a Cartesian style3 , but 
in a style which could be called "barely dualistic". As we proceed, it will be clear that 
Russell's concerns were primarily epistemological and that this explains the 
differences between his type of dualism and Descartes.
4.2.1 DESCARTES* DUALISM
Dualism is a theory according to which mind and matter are two independent sorts of 
thing, neither type being reducible to the other. Such a dichotomy is mostly initiated 
by theologians and metaphysicians. Descartes, influenced by medieval theology and 
the then advancement of science, left a dualistic legacy. Descartes set forth his 
influential and provoking metaphysical doctrine in his Meditations on the First 
Philosophy and A Discourse on Method.
In his thesis Descartes dealt with two issues: (1), the nature of mind and matter and
(2), the nature of the self and its relation to one’s body. These issues are closely 
related to each other.
According to Descartes there are two substances, mind and matter, which exist 
entirely independent of the other. One is mental or spiritual substance and the other is 
physical or material substance. "Mind stuff" and "matter stuff" differ in their nature, 
and the difference between the two could be characterized by their varied attributes. 
The distinctive attribute of physical substance is extension, and therefore it has its 
own shape, size, a position in space and parts. The mental substance, on the other 
hand, is distinctively characterized by thought and devoid of extension. It has no 
shape, size or location and therefore the question of divisibility does not arise. But 
this independence of the two substances is relative, because both depend on God,
3. I differ with Anthony Quinton who says that Russell in his The Problems o f Philosophy set forth 
"qualified Cartesian Dualism"("Russell's Philosophy of Mind", p. 80).
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which is an independent being, the absolute substance. Regarding spiritual substance, 
Descartes held that since the whole nature of it is to think, then mind is a thing which 
thinks, which doubts, affirms, wills, understands, feels and imagines. Moreover, 
although mind is intimately conjoined to the body, they function independently of 
each other; and even if separated they will function uninterruptedly. Death may 
destroy the body but the mind will survive and continue to exist and function. But 
Descartes was compelled to introduce the concept of interactionism in order to 
distinguish what is mind from what is body. Unlike the mind, one can see and touch 
the body as the proof of its existence. For instance, one can see a sore in a particular 
area of the body, but one cannot locate the feeling of pain unless it is said where this 
occurs. Although mind and body are distinct Descartes tried, through interactionism 
to prove the existence of one by indirect reference to the other. For example, he 
remarked:
But there is nothing that this nature teaches me more expressly or 
more sensibly than that I have a body, which is ill disposed when I 
feel pain, which needs to eat and drink when I have feelings of 
hunger or thirst, etc. And therefore I must in no way doubt that 
there is some truth in all this. \Discourse on Method And the 
Meditations, p. 159].
Here he tried to prove the existence of the body. In a similar fashion he showed how 
mind exists. For Descartes, the interaction between mind and body takes place in the 
pineal gland of the brain. In his The Passions o f  the Soul, he explains that although 
the soul is joined to the entire body, its principle seat is in the pineal gland which 
exists in the middle of the brain. From here the soul communicates through all the 
remainder o f the body by means of the animal spirits. Regarding how the soul and the 
body act on one another, Descartes says, the communication with the body takes place 
the moment animal spirit comes into contact with the soul and hence activates nerves, 
muscles, which connect all the parts of the body. In return, the body reacts with the 
slightest movement of the gland by the soul and pushes the spirits towards the pores 
of the brain by means of which it brings about movement in the organs o f  the body.4
This theory of Descartes received adverse criticism from various philosophical 
schools. Here I am concerned with how Russell reacted and partially accepted his
views.
4. Cf. Eaton, Ralph M., ed. Descartes Selections, pp. 374, 375.
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4.2.2. Russell’s Reaction to Descaites.
Russell in 1894 in a Cambridge est^y* claimed that Descartes’s argument that 
imagination, by which material things are conceived, can convince one of their 
existence, "gives no ground whatever for believing in a material world as distinct 
from the spiritual: there is no reason why extension should not been referred to the 
perceiving subject alone." |"Paper On Descartes", p. 153). In the next paragraph 
Russell argued:
Descartes’s entire rejection of sense as a source of knowledge makes 
his subsequent dualism even more surprising. He points out the 
possibility of deception by the senses, in dreams for instance, and 
when pains are felt in amputated limbs: from these he ought to have 
concluded that we have no right to affirm a world of extended 
objects, but he fails to take the final step and considers only the 
secondary qualities as due to the imagination. [Ibid.)
Russell’s theory of neutral monism did not result from a sudden change of mind but 
from a long period o f contemplation. The constitutive phase began when he attempted 
to reduce the gap between mind and matter but failed for various reasons which I shall 
discuss shortly. Though less successful one should not undervalue Russell’s effort, 
which I think left his 1912 position to be barely dualistic. Commentators, especially 
Stace, Ayer and Quinton5 6 regarded Russell in 1912 as a psycho-physical dualist.
As against this, I will argue that Russell was not a dualist in Cartesian style, rather 
that he oscillates between Descartes’ thesis of intuitive self consciousness and Hume’s 
thesis of no knowledge of self. This is because, as I have mentioned earlier, his main 
concern was to explain how one can have access to physical objects in order to have 
knowledge of them. He uses the word "know" in two different senses. In one of the 
senses it could be used in opposition to error, the sense applies to ones beliefs and 
convictions. The other sense of "know" applies to the knowledge of things. Russell 
explained the distinction between propositional knowledge and non-propositional 
knowledge in order to  develop his technical distinction of knowledge by acquaintance 
versus knowledge by description, parallel to that of the French distinction, 
"connaitre" and "savior" or the German, "kennen" and "wissen" respectively. Thus
5. "Paper on Descartes" (unpublished), written in 1894 for Ward's course on the history of philosophy. 
Now published in The Collected Papers o f Bertrand Russell, vol. I .
6. See, Stace, W.T., "Russell's Neutral Monism", pp. 353-384. Also Ayer, A.J., Russell and Moore: 
The Analytic Heritaye, and Quinton, op.cit.
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Russell distinguished between things known immediately without an inference, and 
those known through inference.
4.2.3. Dualism in Russell 11912-1913).
It was in 1912 that Russell made an unsuccessful attempt to narrow the gulf between 
mind and matter. Accordingly he picked up the term "sense-datum" and its relation to 
physical objects from the writing of G.E. Moore. [See "Preface", The Problems of 
Philosophy]. Russell thought that "sense-datum", apparently a neutral term in 
comparison to "ideas", "sensations" and "impressions", would solve our knowledge 
of physical objects and how it is possible to have access to them.
Russell maintained that one can never have acquaintance with objects, even very near 
to one’s sight, as tables, chairs, shoes etc. They are known only by description. What 
one is acquainted with are the "sense-data" which constitute the appearance of the 
table or the chair or the shoe. This is "knowledge by acquaintance", as Russell 
explained:
Thus in the presence of my table 1 am acquainted with the sense-data 
that make up the appearance of my table its colour, shape, hardness, 
smoothness, etc.; all these are things of which I am immediately 
conscious when I am seeing and touching my table.... Thus the 
sense-data which make up the appearance of my table are things 
with which I have acquaintance, things immediately known to me 
just as they are. [Ibid., p. 25].
According to Russell, the knowledge of the table was the kind which one should call 
"knowledge by description", i.e. inference from knowledge by acquaintance. But he 
argued we do have direct access to the sense-data which make up the appearance of 
the physical object.
As regards to this the question arises: what is the "sense-datum" and what is its status 
in Russell’s philosophy of 1912? The answer to these questions are important because 
this will illuminate on Russell’s dichotomy of mind and matter and his understanding 
of dualism as being distinct from that of Descartes.
Russell regarded "sense-data" to be the name of things
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”... that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, 
sounds, smells, hardness, roughness, and so on." |P. 4).
A certain ambiguity arises by regarding "colour", for instance, as sense-data. What 
one is actually aware of in sensation is a particular patch of colour, say green. The 
term colour is a general term which includes all types and shades of colour to form a 
whole class. The colour green is an attribute common to many subjects, e.g. grass, 
leaf etc. I take it that it is particular colour patches, etc. which Rjssell meant by 
sense-data. For after his discussion of sense-data he continued:
In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we 
also have acquaintance with what we shall call universals, that is to 
say general ideas, such as whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, and so 
on. fP. 28).
Sense-data are the particular existing things with which one has acquaintance. He used 
"sensation" differently from sense-datum, saying that
"... the colour is that o f  which we are immediately aware, and the 
awareness itself is the sensation." [P. 4].
Russell also distinguished sense-data from physical objects. The physical object, 
which is physical, is constructed out of sense-data, and therefore is purely inferential. 
He thus made a triple distinction between: the act o f being aware, that is the 
sensation; an appearance of the table, i.e. sense-datum; and the physical object, e.g. 
table. In making such a triple distinction Russell had, in fact, accepted Meinong's 
view that in sensation there are three elements. They are the act, the content, and the 
object. Later we will see how he eliminated these distinctions in order to accept the 
theory of neutral monism. [See 5.2.; 5.2.1. J.
From the above consideration we can isolate sense-data as distinct from sensation and 
physical object. This leaves us to investigate the status of sense-data, which are "signs 
of the existence of something independent of us and our perceptions" (The Problems, 
p. 13). But this independence is partial because sense-data depend upon two causes, 
namely, physical object and the eye, nerves and brain of the person who sees it. As 
Russell puts it:
|S|ense-data are to be regarded as resulting from an interaction 
between the physical object and ourselves. (Ibid ., p. 48).
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By describing them thus, the promissory tone of neutrality departs leaving the status 
o f sense-data to a somewhat ambivalent position. I say this because it was in 1912 that 
Russell first attempted to close the gap between physics and perception. |My 
Philosophical Development, p. 78J. The ambivalent position of sense-data is due to 
Russell’s over-ambitious epistemological plans. The transparency of sense-datum 
depends on the real presence of an observer otherwise the absence of an observer 
would mean the ideal presence of sense-datum, which Russell avoided for a good 
reason. He had rejected the Berkleyan idealism and did not want to fall into a similar 
trap.
Sense-data seem to be something intermediate between physical objects and 
sensations. Hence, two very important questions at once arise: namely, (i) what is a 
physical object, if not sense-data? (ii) Does the appeal to sensations, distinct from 
sense-datum and the physical object suggest the existence of a separate entity? 
Consequently the answer to these questions will reveal how his dualism differs from 
that of Descartes’.
I will begin with the first question. According to Russell we do not have direct access 
to a physical object, but only to its appearance, i.e. sense-data. He contends that if 
physical objects exist, apart from sense-data, then the agglomeration of all physical 
objects is called "matter" (cf., The Problems, p. 4) a name given to something which 
is opposed to "mind" and is to be thought of as occupying space and is devoid of 
thought or consciousness.
The sense-data which make up the appearance of the physical object are in fact private 
to each separate person. At any given moment each individual has set of sense-data 
through his different senses. For instance the visual data can be gathered through the 
sights we see, the audible data from the sounds we hear etc. These data are correlated 
with the various data of other senses which forms the private world of each 
individual. |See 6.2.1.]. Each individual thus has different sense-data. But two 
individauls can have sense-data with very little difference. For this there must be 
something neutral to different observers which gives rise to similar, but not identical, 
sense-data in order to characterise that particular thing, say, the table. Russell called 
these "public neutral objects", which are in some sense, known to many different 
people, and of which sense-data are appearances. These public neutral objects are 
physical objects which causes sensations. Russell wrote,
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"although different people may see the table slightly differently, still 
they all see more or less similar things when they look at the table, 
and the variations in what they see follow the iaws of perspective 
and reflection of light, so that it is easy to arrive at a permanent 
object underlying al! the different people’s sense-data" (The 
Problems, p. 9).
One thing peculiar about the quoted passage is that Russell on many occasions 
categorically mentioned that we cannot see a table; what we see are appearances of 
the table, and the table itself is an inferential knowledge. But the above passage 
suggests that we can actually see the table, and this is contradictory to the notion that 
the table is an inferential knowledge, i.e. via sense-data. He went on to say:
I bought my table from the former occupant of my room; I could 
not buy his sense-data, which died when he went away, but I could 
and did buy the confident expectation o f more or less similar sense- 
data... which makes us suppose that over and above the sense-data 
there is a permanent public object which underlies or caused the 
sense-data of various people at various time.[Ibid., p. 9).
In order to strengthen his argument Russell stated that if a cat, for instance, appears at 
one moment in one room and in another moment in the next room, it is no mistake to 
suppose that the cat is passing over a series of intermediate positions. But if it were 
merely an agglomeration of sense-data it would not exist at all whilst no one was 
present at that situation. Moreover a group of sense-data cannot explain the cat’s 
being hungry since no hunger but one’s own can be sense-datum to one. Russell thus 
contended that such a situation is bound to convince one that there are objects other 
than ourselves and our sense-data which have an independent existence without being 
depending upon our perceiving them.7
Russell thus concluded that the only neutral object accessible to all concerned, are 
physical objects, which are public. These neutral objects give rise to sense-data, 
which are private to each person and hence cannot be shared. But one cannot have 
direct awareness of the physical object. The only knowledge by acquaintance we have 
is with our private sense-data which indirectly gives us the knowledge of the physical 
objects. Russell then went on to say that
|W |e are not only aware of things |sense-data|, but we are often 
aware of being aware of them. | The Problems, pp. 26-27|.
7. Cf., Problems, p. 11.
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With this we come to our second question: whether there is anything called "m<nd" 
apart from matter (a collection of physical objects)? The urgency to explain mind led 
Russell to introduced introspective data of thinking, feeling, willing etc. According to 
Russell, when one sees the sun one is aware of an object that is one’s "seeing the 
sun", and furthermore, one is also aware of events like feeling, thinking, pain or 
anger which happen in one’s mind. Russell called this "self-consciousness" (ibid., p. 
27), which does not refer to consciousness of one’s "self", but merely to 
consciousness of particular thoughts and feelings. Before we go further we find that, 
from the preceding analysis, Russell was a dualist in 1912. He had clearly 
differentiated between physical objects, which make up matter, and one’s knowledge 
and experience of the physical objects, which make up mind. What Russell was doing 
was in fact following the Cartesian foot-steps, regarding the mind and body 
dichotomy. Russell entered dualism through his theory of sense-data.
1 have mentioned earlier that Russell’s dualism was different from that of Descartes 
because he oscillates between Descartes and Hume in his analysis of mind. This 
resulted into a queer mixture of a Humean and Cartesian analysis of mind.
We know that Hume in his A Treatise o f  Human Nature contended that nothing was 
experienced except loose and separate "perceptions of the self". To quote Hume:
For my part, when 1 enter most intimately into what 1 call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or 
cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. 1 never can 
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
anything but the perception. [P. 252].
In a similar way Russell said:
When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon 
some particular thought or feeling, and not upon "I" which has the 
thought or feeling. (The Problems, p. 27)
Moreover he argued that it was not necessary to suppose that one was acquainted with 
a more or less permanent person that remained identical over time. But then he moves 
to a position held by Descartes, who in his Discourse argued that the "I" of his "I 
think, therefore I am" was essentially a thinking Substance. "... the soul by which I
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am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know from 
body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if the body were not, 
the soul would not cease to be what it is.*"
In a similar way, Russell maintained that one was acquainted with two different things 
when one said that one was acquainted with one’s "seeing the sun". First there was 
sense-datum which symbolizes the sun. Secondly, there was that which sees the sense- 
datum. Russell then said it was difficult to understand what was meant by it, unless 
one was acquainted with something which one called "I". Therefore it was essential 
that one must be acquainted with "I", whatever its nature, which sees the sun and has 
acquaintance with sense-data.
Russell in the following year admitted that he "tentatively" (Collected Papers, vol. 7, 
pp. 36, 37) maintained that one had acquaintance with "I". He was perhaps right. 
What in fact Russell was doing was to explain mind and matter in terms of "data", 
both in sensation and introspection. As we shall see later, in the following year he 
retreated to Humean position. Russell in his "Analysis of Experience" said:
Hume’s inability to perceive himself was not peculiar, and I think 
most unprejudiced observers would agree with him. Even if by great 
exertion some rare person could catch a glimpse of himself, this 
would not suffice; for "I" is a term which we all know how to use, 
and which must therefore have some easily accessible meaning. It 
follows that the word "I" as commonly employed, must stand for a 
description; it cannot be a true proper names in the logical sense, 
since true proper names can only be conferred on objects with which 
we are acquainted. (Ibid. , pp. 36,37.)
We know that, according to Hume, minds and bodies are simply bundles of what he 
calls "perceptions". But his theory results in ultimate scepticism. 1 would not say that 
Russell put forward a similar theory to Hume, but what I want to say is his theory of 
mind and body is in significant ways unlike that of Descartes. l.et me represent 
Russell’s theory of 1912 in the following schema: 8
8. Descartes, R., 'Discourse on The method of Rightly conducting the Reason', in The Philosophical 
Works O f Descartes, vol. I, p. 101.
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(Knowledge by description) 
Matter
IPhysicalobjects (chairs, tables)
appearances
Sense-data (patch of colour,sound etc.
(Knowledge by acquaintance)
IMind
Isensation, introspection and memory
IInner feelings 
awareness of
fi J M
But if we conjoin his 1912 and 1913 positions we see that mind and matter are both 
known by description. What we are acquainted with are data, in sensation and in 
introspection. Mind and matte’- are not the objects o f immediate awareness and 
therefore it is a matter of inference constituted out of introspective-data and sense-data 
respectively. This position of Russell can be represented in the following way: 
Knowledge by Acquaintance
IDATA
sense-data introspective-datapatches^of colour, sound pain, desire, anger
physical constituents mental constituents
Inferences Inferences
, I . Iphysical objects one's own mind(chairs( tables, books)
other person's mind
Knowledge by Description.
Despite Russell's giving much emphasis to sense-data, the constituent of material 
objects, yet he gave more prominence to sensation and introspection, the functions of 
the mind. The reason was that both were responsible for immediate awareness- 
where, as Russell said:
We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of the outer senses, 
and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner 
sense- thoughts, feelings, desires etc.; |Problems, p. 28|.
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By giving prominence to mind and by making data (both inner and outer senses) the 
constituents of troth mind and matter Russell produced a thesis which is more inclined 
towards a sort of monism. It should be noted that Descartes gave prominence to mind 
("I", "I think"), and believed in the interaction of mind and matter, yet he maintained 
that they exist independently of each other, i.e. ever if the tiody died, the mind would 
continue to exist without interruption. Thus interaction is not a necessary condition, 
rather it is a contingent fact since the existence of either the mind or body does not 
demand interaction. When mind and body co-exist they interact but the matter does 
not require interaction of mind for its existence and vice-versa. The distinction 
between the mind and the matter is absolute.
4.2.4. Conclusion.
In 1912 Russell produced a relative dualism by making a relation between 
consciousness and physical objects via data belonging to sensations and introspection. 
Mind has access to physical objects via sense-data, and to itself through introspective- 
data. He makes a significant move, to close the gap between the mental and the 
physical.
Was Russell a neutral monist in 1912? The data out of which mind and matter are 
explained apparently looks to be monistic. To be monistic the data should be of 
unique kind capable of explaining both mind and matter. Russellian data lacks 
uniqueness because matter requires sense-data, caused by physical objects, while mind 
requires introspective-data, which are subjective. These data have no independent 
existence, either from physical objects or from consciousness. Sense-data are the 
result of matter and sensation (function of mind) and introspective-data are the result 
of consciousness and introspection (function of mind). This left the status of "data” to 
be both mind oriented and relational, and not neutral. This is because neutrality 
demands that the "stuff", out of which mind and matter are constructed, should exist 
independently, without any reference to mind and matter. Russellian stuff depends 
heavily on mind. The data are subjective and as a result creates a Berkeleyian 
problem.
On the basis of this theory of mind and matter Russell criticised James’s theory of 
neutral monism. I now turn to this criticism.
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Section B.
4.3. Russell’s Critique of Neutral Monism.
Introduction.
Preoccupied with epistemological problems, it was in 1913 that Russell produced his 
first objections to neutral monism, Under the heading "On The Nature Of 
Acquaintance"9 Russell wrote three essays of which his critique of neutral monism is 
the second one. In his critical estimation Russell quoted Mach and James to discuss 
the shortfalls of neutral monism in general. He held that neutral monism failed for 
several reasons; the problem with James’s account of knowledge was one he gave 
prominence.
Russell produced twofold arguments showing both the advantages and disadvantages 
in accepting such a theory. Moreover he also suggested a certain solution in order to 
overcome any difficulty arising from the theory.
4.3.1 Arguments In Favour Of Neutral Monism
Eight years before he formally accepted the theory and declared himself a neutral 
monist Russell gave a wonderful description of neutral monism in his critique.
"Neutral Monism"— as opposed to idealistic monism and 
materialistic monism— is the theory that the things commonly 
regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded as physical do 
not differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessed by the one 
set and not by the other, but differ only in respect of arrangement 
and context. The theory may be illustrated by comparison with a 
postal directory, in which the same names comes twice over, once in 
alphabetical and once in geographical order; we may compare the 
alphabetical order to the mental, and the geographical order to the 
physical. The affinities of a given things are quite different in two 
orders, and its causes and effects obey different laws. Two objects 
may be connected in the mental world by the association of ideas, 
and in the physical world by the law of gravitation. |Collected 
papers, vol. 7, p. 15).
According to Russell the first and most favourable aspect of the theory is the 
"simplification which it introduces" (ibid., p. 21). He regards that dualism in
9. First printed in The Monist in 1914. Reprinted m Logic and Knowledge, ed. R.B. Marsh, 1956, and 
The Collected Papers o f  Bertrand Russell, vol. 7, 1984. My reference would he the latter.
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perception is far less satisfactory to our intellectual desires. According to Russell, 
Occam’s Razor pi escribes neutral monism as preferable to dualism if it could be made 
to account for the facts. Moreover under the influence o f scientific hypotheses the 
matter is reduced to "a remote super-sensuous constructionR ussell writes:
What is immediately piesent in sense, though obviously in some 
way presupposed in physics, is studied rather in psychology than in 
physics. Thus we seem to have nere, in sense, a neutral ground,... 
from which we may pass either to "matter" or to "mind"...." (ibid., 
p. 21).
Russell quoted in a footnote, as an illustration of neutrality as regards sensation in 
orthodox philosophy from Stout’s Manual o f  Psychology. He remarked that although 
there is an acceptance of neutral monism as regards "sensation" for psychology. Stout 
would be far from adopting it generally. | Ibid., p. 21, footnote).
Secondly, a large part of the argument in favour of neutral monism consists in a 
polemic against the idealists’ view that we know the external world through the 
medium of "ideas" which are mental. Russell fully agreed with neutral monists and 
did not think that when an object is known to me, there was in my mind something 
which may be called an idea of the object, the possession of which constitutes my 
knowledge of the object. Russell pointed out,
"But when this is granted, neutral monism by no means follows. On 
the contrary, it is just at this point that neutral monism finds itself in 
agreement with idealism in making an assumption which I believe to 
be wholly false. The assumption is that. I f  anything is immediately 
present to me, that thing must be part o f  my mind." fp. 22).
The term "idea" has gained different connotations in the hands of different 
philosophers. Plato regarded an idea as something objective, quite independent of 
minds. For Descartes, whatever the mind directly perceives is an idea. By an idea 
Locke understood that it is an immediate object of the mind which it perceives and 
has before it. The idealist, like Berkeley believed that material objects are nothing but 
ideas created in the mind of God or other conscious beings. What we call the external 
world is mind dependent or rather a copy which we possess as a conscious being. This 
is based on the assumption that what is immediately present is part of my mind. But 
when the neutral monists argue that what is immediately present they mean that they 
are "subjectless given" and therefore not mental. Hence what is subjectless cannot be 
part of one’s mind in the sense the idealist use of the term. What is part of a
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particular mind is a set of entities governed by psychological laws. The same entities 
are subject to physical laws. The entities as such are neutral.
According to Russell since the idealists believe in the duality of the mental and the 
physical, they infer from such an assumption that only ideas and not physical things 
that can be immediately present to us. Neutral monists, rightly recognised that 
constituents of the physical world can be immediately present to us, infer that the 
mental and the physical are composed of the same "stuff". Since the assumption is 
false hence, according to Russell, the opposing theories are false. But if we consider 
the assumption in two parts neutral monism simply conforms to the first part, i.e. that 
the entities are immediately present to us.
4.3.2. Objections Raised Against Neutral Monism.
We know that Russell believed that neutral monism would be preferable to dualism if 
it could possibly be made to account for the facts. He thought that neutral monism 
proved its inability to do so and therefore suggested that it should be replaced by a 
better theory which explained the difference between what is experienced and what is 
not experienced by a given subject at a given moment, rather than denying the 
existence o f  mental entities.
As we proceed we encounter eight major defects which Russell pointed out, although 
he registered only five. They take two forms:
(4.3.2.1.) arguments that the theory is not neutral, and (4.3.2.2.) arguments that 
the theory cannot account for the facts.
(4.3.2.1.).
(1) According to Russell there is a difference between a colour seen and the same 
colour unseen, which has nothing to do with relations. But to the neutral monist it is 
not logically possible to have one experience since a thing is mental in virtue of its 
external relations.
With regard to this criticism, Russell was right in pointing out that James and other 
neutral monists categorically speak of external relations in relating two bits of 
experience, be it a mind or a body. Suppose, if I have a momentary experience of a
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patch of colour it does not follow that one bit of experience is being experienced. 
Between what we call mind and the patch of colour a series of experiences, related 
causally, are experienced. It is logically possible for a mind to have exactly one 
experience, say a particular orange patch, and neutral monist can prove it easily. For 
James a particular patch of colour (one experience) is both physical and psychical at 
once. But such an analysis brings a sort of contradiction to what James said about the 
cognitive aspect of a particular experience. At least two sub-feelings are required to 
have knowledge. Since there is no subject and object distinction in the stream of 
experiences it is in retrospection and appropriations one can have knowledge. At the 
same time he also reiterates tliat a particular feeling is not "psychical zero". |See 
Chapter Two|. We have seen that such analysis proves that an experience is 
heterogeneous and have intrinsic elements. |See Chapter Three).
(2). Russell showed how James confused belief with sensation; and had no theory of 
error or false belief. There was no entity corresponding to the erroneous belief that to­
day is Wednesday.
I think that Russell rightly contended that belief was different from sensation or 
presentation, and error was in no way analogous to hallucination. He also held that a 
hallucination is a fact and not an error. Russell said;
What idealists have said about the creative activity of mind, about 
being relations due to our relative synthesis, and so on, seems to be 
true in the case of error; to me, at least, it is impossible to account 
for the occurrence of the false belief that to-day is Wednesday, 
except by invoking something not to be found in the physical world. 
\Collected Papers, vol. 7, p. 24.)
In order to illustrate his argument Russell examines W .P. Montague's essay "A 
Realistic Theory of Truth and Error". He summarises Montague's views in three 
statements;
(1) every reality is a proposition; (2) false propositions subsist as 
well as true ones; (3) the unreal is the class of false propositions. 
|Ibid., p. 25.|
Russell pointed out that the error committed by Montague and the neutral monists in 
general is the so-called "illusion of sense" which is no more illusory than normal 
sensation. Russell argued that mistaking the day of the week or a date of a historical 
event, forced into the mould of illusion of sense,
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"at the expense of supposing the world to he full of such entities as 
"the discovery of America in 1066"— or in any year that the 
ignorance of schoolboys may suppose possible." | ibid., p. 25.]
We know that Montague was not a neutral monist |see 1.3.3.] and therefore the 
particular criticism does not apply to his theory. But as regards neutral monist it is 
different. It is true that a belief is different from presentation. But this does not mean 
that belief necessarily involves something different. A mental belief of extramental 
object could be done in the same way as the mental belief of the object present. James 
provided a solution |see Chapter Two] by showing how subjectivity and objectivity 
equally belongs to the non-perceptual experiences, i.e. the experiences which has no 
presentation in the world we accept to be true. He argued that our world of thought 
would be the only world, and would enjoy complete reality in our belief. So belief in 
mental objects which differ from sensation can be cashed in the "ideal" world which 
happens in dreams and day-dreams. But instead of multiplying the entities James 
multiplied the world and suggested reality ad infinitum.
When we discuss Russell’s theory of neutral entities (in Chapter Six) we will see that 
he also failed to explain belief in terms o f neutral stuff. Beside the neutral stuff he 
brought in the concept of images, which was essentially subjective.
(3) James’s definition of knowledge is not satisfactory. But Russell doubted how far 
this view of knowledge was relevant to neutral monism.
The definition of knowledge is not regarded by James as it is typically regarded. For 
example, "I know that the earth is spherical" or "Colombus discovered America" 
could be called propositional knowledge or knowledge by description. We have seen 
that, according to Russell, we can have immediate knowledge of sense-data like a 
patch of colour. This is knowledge by acquaintance. For James, in knowledge by 
acquaintance there is no cognition. He held that knowledge is a relation, a mode of 
connection between experiences; i.e. a process of leading from one experience to 
another. This is what he called "knowledge about" where a certain transition within a 
stream of experiences takes place and hence we are cognisant of them.
(4) . Russell considered the term "space" to be ambiguous, and therefore granted it to 
the neutral monist without analysing it.
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We know that a thing is both in space and time, but a thought is only in time. If we 
say that the neutral entities are in space, we could side with the materialist and if we 
say that they are in time we would side with idealism. Russell contended that with 
scientific developments in the field of physics and psychology, different 
interpretations had been suggested about the concept of space, and therefore it could 
not be a criterion to distinguish the mental and the physical.
How could Russell grant this premise to the neutral monists when it is true that the 
term "space" if it remains unexplained, poses a major threat to the holders of the 
theory? Perhaps Russell was too enthusiastic about the neutral monistic theory. In 
criticising he was actually ntaking the theory more acceptable and pushing the 
exponents to  clear up the apparent inconsistencies by suggesting possible solutions. 
Mach and James did not live long enough to enjoy the revolutionary development (the 
Theory of Relativity) brought in by Einstein in the field of physics. Russell was 
lucky. In an opportune moment (1927) he incorporated Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity to explain his version of neutral monism, which he had finally accepted in 
1921. The theory of relativity triumphed by abolishing the concept of one cosmic time 
and the one persistent space by substitution of space-time in place of both.
(4.3.2.2J.
(5) . A belief is a temporal fact, but James and his followers regard it as an event in 
time.
A neutral monist can explain this situation very easily. If a belief in the thing, e.g. a 
chair, is the arrangement of neutral entities, then belief in thought, e.g. 2 + 2 = 4 , is 
similarly the arrangement of the same stuff We know that both thing and thought are 
in time. The question which concerns us here is whether the stuff out of which 
everything temporal a id  non-temporal is constructed is essentially neutral or not. If it 
is, then mental or physical, temporal or non-temporal is constructed out of neutral 
entities and the difficulty diminishes. Russell in 1927, following Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity declared that the ultimate stuff out of which mental and physical 
are created are neutral events which are in space-time.
(6) . Is it possible to analyse remembering a past event? According to Russell what we 
remember now is something which happened in the past, so the present event, i.e. my
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remembering, cannot be identified with the past event the essence of which is not any 
present event.
It is possible to answer Russell's fourth objection. No two moments are identical. For 
example if a particular event is experienced in two moments, say A and A’, it could 
not be experienced the way it is experienced once in A and again in A’. But if the two 
events counted in terms of degrees, we find a negligible difference. Russell suggested 
that it could be possible if we analysed remembering in terms of "ideas" of the past 
event; but conceded that it goes against neutral monism. The neutral monist could 
analyse this in a similar way a belief could be analysed.
(7). To this seventh objection Russell urged the question; "How is the group of my 
present experiences distinguished from the things?" He said that it is undeniable that, 
at any given moment, some of the things in the world, but not all, are somehow 
collected together into a bundle consisting of what now lies within my immediate 
experience. Russell thought that neutral monism couldn’t give a tenable account of the 
bond which unites the parts of this bundle, and the difference which marks them out 
from the rest of the things in the world.10
In order to show how neutral monists explain this situation Russell quoted Perry. 
Perry, in his Present Philosophical Tendencies, explained it by reference with the 
nervous system. Accordingly he said that elements become mental contents when 
reacted in a fashion peculiar to the central nervous system. This did not satisfy 
Russell. He argued that to know what lies within one’s experience does not 
necessarily mean having knowledge about one’s nervous system. There are people 
who are not aware of physiology. They are able enough to know what comes within 
their experience. Russell thought the issue is liable for further investigation. He 
suspects if that is so,
"then neutral monism cannot be true, for it is obliged to have 
recourse to extraneous considerations, such as the nervous system, 
in order to explain the difference between what I experience and 
what I do not experience, and this difference is too immediate for 
any explanation that neutral monism can give." (Collected Papers, 
vol. 7, p. 31J.
Later when we discuss Russell’s theory of neutral monism we will see that he 
emphasised the importance of brain, quite like the phvsicalist theorists, in order to
10, Cf. Collected papers, vol. 7, p. 28-29.
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explain things which comes within one's experience. The critics read this that in the 
guise of neutral monism Russell produced an identity theory of mind. I shall discuss 
this issue in chapter six. One of the major problem with neutral monism, as Russell 
argued, was that it failed to deal with the "emphatic" particulars. Since Russell 
considered this criticism decisive against neutral monism I have dealt this separately 
which I discuss next.
4.3.3. The Problem of Indexicals.
(8). Russell regarded this criticism as the most conclusive one, and demanded an 
explanation as to whether the neutral monist could solve the problem and remain a 
neutral monist.
Russell doubted whether neutral monism could account for such emphatic particulars 
as "this" and "I" and "now". He said:
What I demand is an account o f  that principle of sensation which, to 
a given peison at a given moment, makes one object, one subject, 
and one time intimate and near and immediate, as no other object or 
subject or time can be to that subject at that time, ... it seems 
obvious that such "emphatic particulars" as "this" and "I" and 
"now" would be impossible without the selectiveness of mind. I 
conclude, therefore, that the consideration of emphatic particulars 
affords a new refutation, and the most conclusive one, of neutral 
monism. ["Analysis of Experience", Collected Papers, voi. 7, pp. 
40-41],
Russell himself suggested possible solutions to the problem. The characteristics of 
experience shows that experiencing is a two term relation which, he thought, the 
neutral monists ignore. Russell held that it was true that the neutral monist cannot 
readily accept this, but it was necessary to  explain experience of our experiences to 
arrive at the notion that we have experiences.
This situation had been explained by James. He introduced the concept of "co- 
conscious transition" to show that we have the knowledge of experiences. This I will 
discuss shortly.
In his evaluation we find that Russell not only criticized neutral monism but also 
criticized his own views and believed that there are arguments which went in favour
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of neutral monism. One such argument is the analysis of experience into a dual 
relation of subject and object, and the suggestion that it was perhaps "derived from 
the elusiveness of the subject in introspection." [Ibid., p. 36]. What we are aware o f 
are our experiences and not the subject itself. Russell, who "tentatively" agreed that 
we have acquaintance with subject, now rejected the thesis that we have such 
acquaintance. The tmth is, according to the neutral monist, there are no subjects 
except "experiences" or "sensations", the neutral entities. I have mentioned in section 
A, that this was one of the reason why Russell retreated to the Humean position. Now 
mind and matter simply stood for a description. What we are acquainted with are data 
of inner sense (thoughts, feelings, desires =  mind) and outer sense (a colour patch, 
shape, heavy, sound = matter).
Russell went on to redefine "I" without the assumption that we are ever acquainted 
with the bare subject of an acquaintance, which we are not. Russell said:
When two objects O and O’ are given as parts of one experience, we 
perceive the fact "something is acquainted with both O and O’".
Thus two instances of acquaintance can be given as having a 
common subject, even when the subject is not given. It is in this 
way, I think, that "I" comes to be popularly intelligible. \Ibid., p.
37],
After clarifying his position Russell tried to produce a possible solution to the 
problems of so-called "emphatic particulars". According to him, in one moment, e.g. 
of conscious life, a man can attend at least to one object, and since he is attending can 
name the object as "this". The word "this" being a logically proper name can be used 
for various objects and therefore does not describe the object. It can only be applied 
to the object attended by a given subject at a given moment. At the same moment 
there must be a subject attending to "this", and that subject is called "I". Russell held 
that the relation of presence, i.e. the time of the things which have to "1" is called the 
present time. So "I" is attending to "this" at the present time, i.e. "now".
By suggesting this possible solution Russell in fact reduced the burden of the neutral 
monist, who can, I think, easily prove that it was possible to have a very intimate 
relation with the part of the person concerned.11 One can have an intimate experience 
of muscle movement and heartbeat of one self. Even in one’s own "sneeze" the 
particulars related to them are present to one at the moment of sneezing. Moreover by
II. Cf., Sainsbury, Russell, p. 265.
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claiming that experience is the neutral stuff, which explains mind and matter, the 
neutral monists can easily meet Russell’s challenge by showing that an experience is 
both object(this) and subject (I) at any moment (now). In order to explain such a 
situation James introduced the concept of "co-conscious" (see Chapter Two under the 
heading Conjunctive Relations! experience where one is immediately aware of the 
flow of experience within oneself. According to James within the person; 1 history 
there are certain interests and purposes which are continuous. One can be co- 
conscious of these interests belonging to the same self. The question of selectivity of 
experience can be answered by saying that it depends on the degrees of near to and far 
off. By near we mean that the experience of the part of the person, and far, which is 
not part of the person.
Russell increased the plausibility of neutral monism by further suggesting that:
It may be urged that different people can know the same object but 
cannot have the same presentation, and that this points to something 
other than the object as a constituent of a presentation. As against 
neutral monism, the argument is valid if its premiss is granted.12
By doing this, Russell simply paved the way for the neutral monists by granting the 
premise, and in a way unfolded his true motive. This finally resulted in his acceptance 
of neutral monism.
Russell first proposed the above argument in 191213, where he said that different 
people may see the table slightly differently, but all see similar, not the same, things 
when they look at the table. Later he dealt with it in his essay "The Relation Sense- 
data to physics" (Scientia, 1914), where he argued that the physical objects are simply 
theoretical constructions, i.e. they are constituted out of sense-data, and "if such 
objects are to be verified, it must be solely through their relation to sense-data" 
(Mysticism and Logic, p. 108). So physical objects cannot be the object of any 
presentation. The objects of different presentations are the immediate data of senses, 
i.e. sense-data. Russell stated that he did not hold that the difference between the 
mental and the physical is one o f  arrangement, yet he said that what he had to say was 
compatible with Mach and James’s doctrine and "might have been reached from their 
standpoint" (ib id .,p . 112).
12. "Analysis of Experience’, p. 43.
13. See section A. The passage is already quoted for different reason.
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4.3.4. Conclusion.
Russell’s admission and his later realization enlightens us that what in fact he was 
doing was actually preparing his own ground for accepting neutral monism, which he 
finally did in 1921. In his "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1918) Russell 
admitted that "the whole theory of neutral monism is pleasing to me," and realising 
his mistakes said, after a few lines, "I think some of the arguments I used against 
neutral monism are not valid. I place most reliance on the argument about "emphatic 
particulars", "this", "I", all that class of words, that pick out certain particulars from 
the universe by them relation to oneself, and I think by the fact that they, or 
particulars related to them, are present to you at the moment of speaking." Regarding 
"this" Russell argued that it is a proper name for the present object of attention and 
therefore means nothing. Finally he said that what we do is we pick out certain facts, 
past and future and all that sort of thing, they radiate out from "this". Russell then 
concedes "I have not myself seen how one can deal with the notion of "this" on the 
basis of neutral monism."14
This sincere admission of Russell’s and his interest in "rewriting" the criticisms 
suggests a significant step towards neutral monism. As a preliminary arrangement he 
shed his dualistic guise only to embrace phenomenalism before finally accepting 
neutral monism.
14. Logic and Knowledge, p. 222. While I discuss Russell’s later commitment to neutral monism I will 
discuss how he handled the problem of indexicals. Also how he accepted knowledge, supposedly a 
significant difficulty for James.
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Section C
4.4. Phenomenalism (1914-1919).
Introduction.
It is sometimes said (e.g. Maxwell, Quinton, Ayer)15 6 that Russell’s 1914 position is a 
kind of phenomenalism. I shall argue, however, that it is not a true phenomenalism. It 
is rather an odd quasi-phenomenalist position16, half way, as it were, between the 
dualism of 1912 and the neutral monism of 1921. And because it fails to resolve the 
questions o f how knowledge of physics is possible, it already contains the seeds of 
Russell’s later shift i.e. a commitment to neutral monism.
Russell did not set out to develop a theory of phenomenalism as a stop gap between 
his theory of dualism and ultimate development of the theory of neutral monism. 
Phenomenalism was simply a technique in Russell’s hand to overcome the 
epistemological dualism of 1912 in which his theory of sense-data left an 
"uncomfortable gulf" between mind and matter. As we have seen, his pre-occupation 
with the epistemological problem led him in 1912 to consider the question: How do 
we have an access to physical objects? There he explained that sense-data, which 
make up the appearances of the physical objects, are known by acquaintance, without 
any intermediate processes. Knowledge of physical objects is a risky inference from 
knowledge by acquaintance; probable opinion at best.
By 1914 onwards, Russell tried to bridge the gap between physical objects and sense- 
data, by making physical objects hypothetical constructions from sense-data. This is 
the main reason, as far as I understand, why his position is called phenomenalistic17.
15. Maxwell, Grover, 'Russell On Perception: A Study In Philosophical Method" in Pears, ed., 
Bertt ind Russell, p. 110; A. Quinton, in "Russell’s Philosophical development", said that "running 
fiom Ou* Knowledge o f the External World to The Analysis o f  Mind, in which material things were 
identified in almost phenomenalist fashion with the class of their appearance "(p. 5); A.J. Ayer in his 
"An Appraisal of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy"(Pears, ed.) said that in 1914 Russell gave up causal 
theory of perception "in favour of the phenomenalist position" (p. 15).
16. I came to this conclusion independently, but later found that Lockwood, in his "What Wav 
Russell’s Neutral Monism", regards that quasi-phenomenal ism was a feature of Russell’s thinking of 
this period [1914], p. 145.
17. MacNabh, in his essay "Phenomenalism" regarded Russell a phenomenalist. According to him 
phenomenalism offers an answer to philosophical questions about material objects via sense-data of 
which we are immediately aware in sense experience, p. 67.
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The opposite view has also been maintained. C.D. Broad rejected Russell's 1914 
position as phenomenalism. He argued that one of the objectives of the phenomenalist 
was to dispense with physical objects. This was what Russell was trying to do in 1914 
and hence is regarded as phenomenalist. But in order to get rid of physical objects, 
according to Broad, Russell assumed
"more entities than the common view, and those entities seem to be 
precisely the same kind as physical objects on the ordinary 
theory"18.
Russell had his own answer about the introduction of hypothetical entities Beside 
sense-data. In his "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics", 1914, he admitted that it 
would be difficult to construct matter out of experienced data only. [Cf. My 
Philosophical Development, pp. 78-9]. He stated that if physics is to be verifiable we 
are faced with the following problem:
Physics exhibits sense-data as functions of physical objects, but 
verification is only possible if physical objects can be exhibited as 
functions of sense-data. We have therefore to solve the equations 
giving sense-data in terms o f physical objects, so as to make them 
instead give physical objects in terms of sense-data. [Ibid., p. 79],
Russell was compelled to assert that this was an impossible task and therefore agreed 
upon "with a picture of the world which fitted physics and perception harmoniously 
into a single whole" (Ibid.). Such confessions by Russell led his critique to be 
regarded as "his brief and notorious flirtation with phenomenalism"19.
As I understand it, phenomenalism was merely the ideal Russell set before himself for 
a very different motive than that which he suggested. I partially agree with Russell 
about his reasons for admitting hypothetical elements in his construction of mind and 
matter in terms of neutral elements. This will become clearer as we proceed.
18. "Phenomenalism", p. ?36.
19. Maxwel, p. 110.
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4.4.1. What is Phenomenalism?
Phenomenalism is the thesis that what we are aware of in immediate perception are 
sensations or sense-data; or what appears are the basis of knowledge and that we can 
know nothing that is not given in sense-experience. On the basis of such interpretation 
the term "phenomenalism" has been used in different ways: (A) phenomenalism as a 
thesis about the world, and (B) phenomenalism as a thesis about statements.
4.4. l.i Types Qf Phenomenalism.
A. Factual Phenomenalism20: As a thesis about the world, phenomenalism analyses 
physical objects in terms of actual and possible sensations. This version aims to bridge 
the gap between sensations and physical objects by rejecting the notion that there are 
forever inaccessible physical objects lurking behind the curtain of appearance.
B. Linguistic Phenomenalism. According to this version, statements about physical 
objects can be analysed into equivalent sets of statements about sense-data.
The theory proposed by Russell in 1914 was quite akin to that of factual version of 
phenomenalism. Following Ayer21 I will regard phenomenalism, as a theory 
according to which physical objects, such as chairs, tables, shoes etc., are 
constructions out of sense-data. On the basis of this I will distinguish three forms of 
factual phenomenalism. They are:
(1) Hyper-phenomenalism: everything is a logical construction from one’s own sense- 
data. This is the view held by Berkeley which ends in solipsism.
(2) Pure phenomenalism: everything is a logical construction from ali actual (i.e. all 
actually sensed) sense-data.
(3) Weak or quasi-phenomenalism, everything is a logical construct from sense-data 
and sensibilia. We shall see that this fails to resolve the epistemological problem in 
Russell’s philosophy of 1914.
20. Cf., Hirst. "Phenomenalism”, p. 131.
21. "Phenomenalism", in Proceedings, p. 163.
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4.4.1.2. Phenomenalism Vs. Newtral Monism.
In chapter one, under the heading "Neutral Monism", I have discussed the aims and 
characteristics of neutral monism and its differences from phenomenalism. Here I will 
briefly summarise what I have already discussed in order to show the extent of 
Russell’s commitment to phenomenalism.
One of the basic agreements between phenomenalism and neutral monism is that they 
both postulate sense-data as the fundamental elements in accounting for the 
phenomena. As a result both argue in favour of empirical substratum known by 
acquaintance to underpin physics and psychology and to reject any sort of elements 
not known as the constituents of physical objects.
Despite such an agreement, neutral monism does deviate from its own promise to 
stick to only observable elements. The exponents of neutral monism reasoned that 
physics demands continuity, but continuity is incompat'ole with phenomenalism. 
Phenomenalism explains physics in terms of only observed entities, but physics 
requires the possibility of hypothetical unobserved occurrences in places where there 
are no sense-organs. As against phenomenalism, neutral monism gives way to the 
inferred elements by providing similar metaphysical status as those of observed 
elements. Hence to the neutral monists both observed and unobserved elements are 
identical, i.e. having same metaphysical status.
It may be argued that beside actual sense-data a phenomenalist also introduces 
possible (inferential) sense-data. Mill defined matter as a "permanent possibility of 
sensation". Beside actual sensations there are a large number of possible sensations 
which remain unobserved. These potendal data have the possibility of being actualised 
in the process, i.e. when one moved or turned one’s head. But the neutral monist 
argues that the merely potentially inferred elements can never be a data to a mind. 
The phenomenalist would reject such an interpretation.
4.4.2. Russell and Phenomenalism.
Russell contended that 'there is a philosophy called "phenomenalism" which is 
attractive, but to my mind not practically feasible". But he maintained that "for my 
part, I regard phenomenalism as an ideal, which a prudent man will approach as 
nearly as he can without rejecting physics". |Collected Papers, vol. 9, p. 281J.
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There is a further confirmation made by Russell to those who regard him a 
phenomenalist. In his "Physics and Perception" (1922), written as a reply to C.A. 
Strong’s "M r Russell’s Theory of the External World" (1922) where Strong used both 
Our Knowledge o f the External World and The Analysis o f  Mind in preparing his 
article, Russell categorically denied that he was a phenomenalist. \lbid.,, vol. 9, p. 
125-33], He said,
"I am not a phenomenalist. For practical purposes, I accept the truth 
of physics, and depart from phenomenalism so far as may be 
necessary for upholding the truth of physics.... But I do not in the 
least accept the phenomenalist philosophy as right...." (ibid., p.
128).
Russell agreed that on the question of probable inferences by induction and analogy "I 
approach as near to phenomenalism as I can without destroying the whole edifice of 
science. What is involved is not an absolute philosophical principle, but a method o f 
securing a higher degree o f probability'' (ibid., p. 130. The italics are mine).
The term "sense-data", technically used by Russell in 1912 to mean simply the 
appearances of physical objects, acquired a new connotation in 1914: constituents of 
physical objects. This view, which he put forward in Our Knowledge o f the External 
world, then explicitly formulated in his two essays, "The Relation of Sense-Data To 
Physics" and "Constituents of Matter" both published in Mysticism and Logic, was 
labelled as phenomenalism. I will begin first by sketching Russell’s theory, proposed 
on the three occasions and second by showing that Russell was not a phenomenalist, 
in the true sense of the term, but arrived at such a position as a stop gap, a transitional 
phase to neutral monism.
The concept o f sense-data redefined.
Russell had two objectives in mind. First to provide a basis for the empirical 
verifiability of physics. Secondly to prove that physics demands continuity. This he 
does by re-defining the term "sense-datum". Two quotations from his essay "The 
relation o f Sense-Data to Physics" will provide an insight into the direction that 
Russell was heading:
|N |o  valid objection exists to the view which regards sense-data as 
part of the actual substance of the physical world, and that, on the
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other hand, this view is the only one which accounts for the 
empirical verifiability of physics, [p. 131J
When I speak of a "sense-datum", I do not mean the whole of what 
is given in one sense at one time. I mean rather such a part of the 
whole as might be singled ort by attention: particular patches of 
colour, particular noises, and so on .... the particulars which are 
constituents of a datum of perception are always sense-data in the 
strict sense, [pp. 109-110]
These quotations suggests that sense-data, which we know exists, forms the 
epistemological ground of all knowledge of external particulars. But the difficulty 
arises as to whether the objects which are at one time sense-data continue to exist at 
times when they a. c not data to any one. Berkeley faced a similar problem, but solved 
it by appealing to the omnipresence of God. Russell said:
I wish to distinguish sharply between ontology and epistemology. In 
ontology I start by accepting truth of physics; in epistemology 1 ask 
myself: Given the truth of physics, what can be meant by an 
organism having "knowledge," and what knowledge can it have? 
["Reply", p. 700j.
He tried to solve it philosophically by embarking from an epistemological 
consideration to an ontological consideration. He suggested that "they [sense-data] are 
all that we directly know gives of course, no presumption that they are all that there 
is." [Mysticism and Logic, p. 110]. Hence he conceded the fact that there are 
particulars with which we are not acquainted, and thus left us in a baffling situation. 
Baffling, because the moment he took his mission to empirically verify physics he 
abandoned it by suggesting particulars with which we are not acquainted. This is one 
reason why his theory failed to be phenomenalistic. I shall discuss this later.
Sensibilia. the unperceived sense-daLi.
In order to accommodate ooth sensed and unsensed sense-data Russell gave the name 
"sensibilia" (singular "sensibile") to "those objects which have the same metaphysical 
and physical status as sense-data, without necessarily being data to any mind." [Ibid., 
p. 110]. He illustrated this by saying that the relation of a sensibile to a sense-datum 
is like that of a man to a husband A man is a husband when married. Similarly, a 
sensibile is a sense-datum when someone is acquainted with it. Hence all sense-data 
are sensibilia but we cannot say vice versa. (Similarly all men are not husbands). As 
we know men can exist without being husbands; but Russell faced an awkward 
question: "Can sensibilia exist without being given?" (Ibid.)
Russell: Dualism Io Phenomenalism. 1 4 7
As far as sensed sense-data are concerned, Russell faced no difficulty because we are 
acquainted with such objects which constitutes the epistemological basis of our 
knowledge of external particulars.. Interpreted in this way the status of sense-data in 
Russell’s position in 1914 is similar to that of 1912. As Russell became less 
concerned about epistemology in 191422 and became more inclined towards ontology, 
such questions bother us: What is the metaphysical position of sense-data in 1914? 
Are sense-data mental or physical or neutral?
Status of sense-data.
Since both the questions point to similar answers, I will not deal with them separately. 
Before answering such questions it should be noted that Russell distinguished between 
the "mental" and the "physical" but said nothing about "neutral". By "physical" 
Russell meant "what is dealt with physics." \Mysticism, p. I l l ] ,  Regarding the term 
"mental" he said: "I shall call a particular "mental" when it is aware of something, 
and I shall call a fact "mental" when it contains a mental particular as a constituent." 
[Ibid.]. Russdl then went on to say that "sense-data are physical" and perhaps "never 
persist unchanged after ceasing to  be data." [Ibid., p. 112J. He rejected the view that 
non-persistence implied that sense-data are mental, rather if sense-data did persist 
after ceasing to be data, that would, perhaps tend to show that they are mental.
Sense-data are not only physically but also physiologically subjective. By 
"physiological" subjectivity Russell was referring to their causal dependence on the 
sense-organs, nerves and brain. The declaration of sense-data a* physical was not at 
all a surprise. It was a very expected move which Russell undertook in order to bring 
his 1914 position closer to neutral monism. With the help of Occam's Razor he 
eliminated such thing as physical objects. In 1912 Russell initiated the distinction 
between sensations, sense-data, and physical objects, and gave an ambivalent status to 
the sense-Jata. Now Russell was in a position to have a direct access to the 
Constituents of matter and not via physical objects. This is also one of the reasons 
why he was called a phenomenalist.
Sense-data, which were somewhat intermediary between physical objects and 
sensations in 1912, have replaced physical objects by becoming the jonstituents of 
physical objects. The fate of the "sensations” i.i 1914 remain the same as in 1912. As
22. Cf., State in Schiipp. He thinks Russell has become more "empirical", p. 358.
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in 1912 Russell reiterated that by a "sensation" he means the fact consisting in the 
subject’s awareness of the sense-datum. "Thus a sensation is a complex of which the 
subject is a constituent and which therefore is mental." [Mysticism, p. 113].
Russell’s analysis of "sense datum" and "sensation" clearly suggests that his positions 
of 1912 and 1914 were quite similar. The difference we find is that in 1912 Russell 
claimed that two things are to be taken into account while explaining a piece of 
matter.23 One is that physical objects might have other intrinsic properties apart from 
their appearances, constituted by sense-data. The intrinsic properties which form the 
real basis of physical objects remain unknown. The ether is the sense-data or 
appearances, which we perceive and can be acquainted with, exist where matter is; 
and the matter, which we cannot know, is the cause of those appearances. Let us 
compare his positions of 1912 and 1914 schematicaUy:
As we have noted, his theory of 1912, was barely dualistic and which by 1914 was 
reduced to its minimum, and in consequence brough. in line with neutra. monism. 
More concerned about matter, Russell in 1914 declared "sensibilia" as the ultimate 
constituents of the external physical world and hence gives a direct blow to 
phenomenalism, which I shall discuss later. To him no sensible is ever a datum to two 
people at once. The different appearances of the same thing to different observers are 
each in a space private to the observer concerned. Each observer has a private world 
different from every other. But the fact remains that the things seen by two different
1 9 1 2
Matter Mind
Physical
objects sensation | m
introspectionemory
appearances Sense-data awareness
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Matter Mind
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23. Cf., Stace in Schilpp, p. 357.
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people are so similar that the same word can be used to denote them. This similarity 
does not terminate the difference, which remains. The place at which a sense-datum 
is, is a place in the private space of another. Russell explained the world of sense with 
a model hypothesis.:
Let us imagine each mind looks out upon the world, as in Leibniz’s 
monadology, from a point of view peculiar to itself;... Each mind 
sees at each moment an immensely complex three-dimensional 
world; but there is absolutely nothing which is seen by two minds 
simultaneously.... The three-dimensional world seen by one mind 
therefore contains no place in common with that seen by another. .. 
inspite of the differences between the different worlds, that each 
exists entire exactly as it is perceived, and might be exactly as it is 
even if it were not perceived. V/e may further suppose that there are 
an infinite number of such worlds which are in fa^t unperceived. 
I Our Knowledge o f the External World, pp. 94-95].
In saying this, Russell departed from his own commitment, that is, "empirical 
verifiability of physics". Instead of having knowledge of physics in terms of sense- 
data, he brought in the hypothetical and inferential elements like unsensed sense-data 
and also sensed sense-data beiongi.ig to the private world of different people. Russell 
proved the existence of the unsensed :,ense-data in the following way:
If two men are sitting in a room, two somewhat similar worlds are 
perceived by them, a third world, intermediate between the two 
previous worlds, begins to be perceived. It is true that we cannot 
reasonably suppose just this world to have existed before, because it 
is conditioned by the sense-organs, nerves, and brain of the newly 
arrived man; but we can reasonably suppose that some aspect of the 
universe existed from that point of view, though no one was 
perceiving it. [Ibid., p. 95; Mysticism, p. 114],
Instead of getting rid of unnecessary multiplication of entities, Russell was in fact 
doing the opposite. I know, possibly, the sense-data connected from my perception of 
the table, for instance, but I cannot know the sense-data o f other persons, which ate 
quite different, and the nature of more mysterious entities that are never a datum to 
any mind. This shows that I can never know a whole table but only a part of it 
constituted by my own sense-data. So, as in 1912, the table simply becomes 
inferential knowledge. 1 his, 1 consider, is one of the significant departure from 
phenomenalism.
Russell thought that it was possible that we could in fact empirically verify that there 
is a table. This could be done by the system of "perspectives", which includes both 
the perceived and unperceived universe.
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Thus a "private world" is a perceived "perspective" but there may 
be any number of unperceived perspectives. |Our Knowledge, p.
95).
He holds that it is possible for two men to perceive very similar perspectives when 
they see the table. In between the two similar perspectives we can imagine a whole 
series of other perspectives, some unperceived but quite similar, and thus the space 
which consists of relation between perspectives can be rendered continuous, and 
three-dimensional.
Russell also said that there are as many private spaces as there are perspectives. [See 
Chapter Six). But as to perspective-space there is only one whose elements are single 
perspectives, each with its own private space. The word “perspective" is used by 
Russell equivocally and this confuses the reader. He some times says that perspective 
"is a place where a thing is" (ibid., p . 99) and also at the same time says "when 1 
wish to speak of a private world without assuming a percipient, I shall call it a 
perspective" (Mysticism, p. 118). At times it seems Russell was talking about an 
aspect of a thing as perspective and sometimes "the appearance which the universe 
presents from <* point of view" (Ibid.). Russell uses "perspective" in both the senses 
simultaneously, hence making it difficult for the reader to decipher actually in what 
sense he uses when he uses the term "perspective".
Russell then went on to explain the correlation of private perspective space by an 
interesting example. He considered, in this case, a penny24 which appears in many 
j ^rspectives. In a number of different perspectives a penny looks in some la. ger and 
in some smaller, in some circular, in others elliptical etc. We may collect all those 
perspectives in which the penny appeared circular, say, and place them in a series 
depending upon the change in the apparent size of the penny. The perspective in 
which the penny looks larger is considered as nearei to the penny. In another straight 
line of perspectives the penny looks like a straight line of a certain thickness. These 
are also ordered as before by the apparent size of the penny. These two lines will 
meet in a certain place in perspective space and will determine a place for the penny. 
What Russell has not said is how we collect these perspectives and bring them into a 
straight line. But from his analysis it seems that hypothetically we may collect the 
perspectives and place them in two different straight lines. According to Russell, the 
apparent size of the penny will not grow beyond a certain limit and if brought very
24. Cf., Mysticism, p. 161, also see Our Knowledge, p. 98.
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near to the eye it could not be seen. He then says that if we move along and form a 
straight line of perspectives and reach a point where all the lines meet in a certain 
perspective, this is "the place where the penny is". Common-sense tells us that the 
size, shape etc of the penny depends on how near you are to the penny or how far 
off. It holds that the place of the penny is always where the penny is, and not the 
where the perspectives meet.25
Russell then explained the correlation between a private space and parts of perspective 
space. If there is ar aspect of a given thing in a certain private space, then we 
correlate the place where this aspect is in the private space with the place where the 
thing is in perspective space. According to Russe!! various parts of our body acquire 
positions in perspective space. H? then said "that the perspective to which our sense- 
data belong is inside our head" (Mysticism, p. 120), by which he meant that the 
private world is a place in perspective space, and may be part of the place where our 
head is.
Russell stated that two places in perspective space are associated with every aspect of 
a thing, i.e. the place where the thing is, and the place in which *he «expects forms 
part. Thus the aspects of a thing in different perspectives are to be conceived as 
spreading towards from the place where the thing is and also undergoing changes. 
Russell regarded these to be empirical facts out of which the hypothetical picture of 
the world is constructed.
In a similar way he constructed time out of sensibilia. Between two perspectives of 
one person’s experience there is a time-relation of before, after or simultaneity. He 
introduced the term "biography" and defined it "as everything that is (directly) earlier 
or later than, or simultaneous with, a given "sensiole"" {ibid. , p. 123). This resulted 
in a series of perspectives, which form parts of one person’s experience dividing the 
history of the world into a number of mutually exclusive biographies. With the help 
of a "velocity of sound and light" Russell tried to show how the correlation of times 
in the different biographies is achieved. The example below assumes a velocity of 
sound:
25. As far as we understand Russell had two reasons for saying that the place of the penry is where the 
perspective meet. They are first, fo; instance when there is lightning we do not instantly hear the 
thunder. We ¡.ear the sound later thar the actual occurrence. Secondly, Russell accepted the causal 
theory of perception and insisted that from the epistemological point of view the percepts are in our 
head. So what we see or hear is in our brain and not something out there. I will d.scuss this issue in 
Chapters Five and Six.
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Suppose |Russell says| A shouts to B, and B replies as soon as he 
hears A’s shout. Then between A’s hearing of his own shout and his 
hearing of B's there is an interval; thus if we made A’s and B’s 
hearing of the same shout exactly simultaneous with each other, we 
should have events exactly simultaneous with a given event but not 
with each other.... we assume a "velocity of sound". That is, ... the 
tiate when B hears A’s shout is halfway between the time when A 
hears his own shout and the time when he hears B’s. (Mysticism, p.
1231
After this explanation Russell proceeded to consider how appearances at different 
times are formed as part of one "thing" and how we arrive at the persistent "matter" 
of physics. He thinks that the supposition that things are permanent is not 
"metaphysically legitimate" (ibid., p. 124). What is seen by us is merely a 
construction, i.e. the grouping of certain "sensibilia". Russell elaborates this in his 
essay "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" (1915)
Russell argued that "a true theory of mr.tter requires a division of things into time- 
capsules as well as into space-capsules" (Mysticism, p. 196). He explained this by 
suggesting that a persisting thing for common sense is simply an illusion, which arises 
only through the approach to continuity. But for physics matter is in constant change. 
The conception of the persistence of matter is because two appearances of the same 
piece of matter at different time is "continuity"; which, Russell thinks, cannot be the 
criterion for the total explanation of persistence for two reasons. First, it is largely 
"hypothetical", because we do not see any one thing which is continuous. Secondly, 
continuity is not a sufficient criterion to explain persistence. As foi example, in the 
case of a chair or a table it is sufficient, but it fails in respect of a fluid. Then we can 
explain, something like "the real man... is really a series of momentary men, each 
different one from the other, and bound together, not by numerical identity, but by 
continuity and certain intrinsic causal laws" (Ibid ). The ego is not >>tvt single 
persistent entity, but a series of entities in time succession and of which lasts for a 
short duration. The same could be said of a body consisting of smaller bodies, each 
occupying a very tiny volume of space and is composed of entities of less duration.
Russell declared that the world consisted of a multitude of entities in a certain pattern. 
Hntities so arranged are called particulars. The particulars collected as a whole are 
called, by Russell, "logical constructions' or "hypothetical constructions" or 
"symbolic fictions". Though Russell did not give a precise view as what he precisely 
means by logical construction, there is no doubt that he used it as an epistemological
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theory to cement the gap between perception and physics.26 In 1912 he struggled to 
give a definite status to sense-data in order to have an immediate acquaintance with 
the physical objects. In 1914 Russell deconstructed physical objects in terms of both 
actual and possible sense-data. The sense-data became the ultimate constituents of the 
physical objects. In order to prove the epistemological viability of unperceived entities 
Russell said: “The supreme maxim of scientific philosophising is this: wherever 
possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities." (Mysticism, 
p. 115). Since the arrangements of both perceived and unperceived entities is 
hypothetical Russell preferred to call them symbolic fictions27. According to Russell 
entities arranged in a certain pattern are called “particulars", which are analogous to 
that c f notes in t  symphony which lasts for a short time.
Russell faced a hard task in providing similar metaphysical status to both perceived 
and unperceived sense-data. But this was solved by a discovery o f a new theory. 
Russell claimed:
There we.e several novelties in the theory as to our knowledge of 
the externa! world which burst upon me o p  New Year’s Day, 1914.
The most important of these was the theory that space has six 
dimensions and not only three. [My Philosophical Development, p[.
79],
The whole world of particulars is arranged in a six dimensional space, i.e. where 
three is to assign its position (of a given particular) in its own space and three of its 
space among other spaces. These particulars are classified in two ways; those that 
belorg to a given "perspective" and those that are different "aspects" of the same 
"thing". To quote Russell:
... if I am (as is said) seeing the sun, what I see belongs to two 
assemblages: (1) the assemolage of all my present objects of sense, 
which is what I call a "perspective"; (2) the assemblage of all *he 
different particulars which would be called aspects of the sun of 
eight minutes ago- this assemblage is what I define as being the sun 
of eight minutes ago. Thus "perspectives" and "things" are merely 
two different ways of classifying particulars. [Mysticism, p. 104],
26. I will discuss this in chapter six. There I will explain Russell's two usage of construction: 
epistemological and metaphysical. It is the second usage he laid emphasis on as a neutral monist.
27 See Prichard, "Mr Bertrand Russell On Our Knowledge of The External World", p. 185, where 
Prichard said that Russell confirmed that h. held his constructions to he fictions. See further discussion 
in chapter six.
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It is difficult to define perspective, since it includes both perceived and unperceived 
data. Russell defined a perspective of a given particular as "all particulars which have 
a simple (direct) spatial relation to the given particular" (Ibid., p. 104). Between two 
patches o f colour seen by different men, those particulars which have direct spatial 
relations to a given particular will belong to the same perspective. But there must be 
particulars with no direct relation that a'so belongs to the same perspective, according 
to Russell. He also said that for their own convenience physicists classify particulars 
into "things" and the psychologists classify them into "perspectives" and 
"biographies”. After such explanation Russell said:
The particulars occupying... six-dimensional space, classified in one 
way, form "things", from which with certain further manipulations 
we can obtain what physics can regard as matter, classified in 
another way, they form "perspectives" and "biographies", which 
may, if a suitable percipient happens to exist, form respectively the 
sense-data of a momentary or o f total experience.|Mysticism, p.
107],
According to Russell this theory cleared the puzzles (My Philosophical Development, 
p. 81) (a) about the distinction between different peoples perception of one thing, (b) 
about the causal relation between a physical thing and its appearances at several 
places, and (c) between mind and matter.
The above explanation indicates Russell’s real motive behind his theory which is quite 
like that of a neutral monist. The main motive out of which neutral monism, as a 
theory, came into being is to get rid of psycho-physical dualism by resolving the 
conflicting views of physics and psychology. Russell claims he has done so. As he
says:
It is only when physical "things' have been dissected into series of 
classes of particulars, as we have done, that the conflict between the 
point of view of physics and the point of view of psychology can be 
overcome. |Mysticism, p. 107).
4.4.2.1. Was Russell a Phenomenalist?
Russell moved towards phenomenalism to resolve an epistemological problems. But 
the form of phenomenalism he adopts (or quasi-phenomenalism) is so weak that it 
only partly solves the epistemological problem, because it requires a hypothetical 
inference to sensibilia. Whereas the epistemological virtue of phenomenalism is
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presumably that sense-data (i.e. the actually given sensihilia) are perfectly transparent, 
knowledge by acquaintance, can’t be mistaken about.
The fuzziness (weakness, quasi-) of Russell's phenomenalism is connected with his 
eventual shift to neutral monism:
(1) introduces new ontology (vis. sensibilia), eventually to scrap both sense-data 
and sensibilia, work with sensation alone;
(2) criticizes James’s neutral monism for inadequate account of knowledge. But 
his own quasi-phenomenaiism does not solve the epistemological problem he began 
with;
(3) criticizes James’s neutral monism for inability to handle emphatic pprticulars- 
but he avoids solipsism only by introducing hypothetical sensibilia.
We have seen the main motive out of which phenomenalism has developed is the idea 
that physical objects can only be known through appearances. Both of its 
fonoulations, factual and linguistic, lay stress on the claim that physical objects can 
be analysed in terms of sensations and therefore there is no need to postulate 
unknowable objects mistakenly thought to be hidden behind them. This is what the 
phenomenalists intends to do.
We have uncovered at least two reasons why Russell was called a phenomenalist. 
First, his declaration of sense-data as the ultimate constituents of matter. Secondly, 
his decomposition of physical objects into sen:>e-data in order to show that there are 
no physical objects other than sense-data, thus making sense-data physical and 
empirical constituents of matter.
Befoii proving that Russell was not a phenomenalist, it would be better to see as to 
what he thought of his 1914-1915 position. In 1921, when Russell officially declared 
himself a neutral monist he, in The Analysis o f  Mind, regarded that the stuff, out of 
which both mind and matter aic constituted is neither mental nor material but 
something more primitive than either. |C f., ibid., pp. 10-111. In one of the footnotes 
(see p. I t)  he mentions that a., regards matter ne has set out his neutral monistic 
views in Our Knowledge o f the External world (chapters III and IV), and also 
Mys'i' ism and Logic (Essays VII and VIII). This claim contradicted his original claim
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in 1914, that the ultimate constituents of matter are sense-data which are purely 
physical. In order to make physics empirically verifiable he tried to explain physical 
objects in terms of physical elements without making any reference to mind. In 1914 
Russell was a physicalist and not a neutral monist as far as the explanation of physical 
objects are concerned.
There is more evidence which proves that Russell's position of 1914 and 1915 was 
not that of a neutral monist. In his 'Excursus into Metaphysics: What There Is" in 
The Philosophy o f Logical Atomism, 1918, he expressed his bias in favour of neutral 
monism. First because it exemplifies Occam’s razor, because one runs less risk of 
error by assuming fewer entires. Secondly, every diminution ir. the number of entities 
increases the work for mathematical logic to do in building up things. Russell said, 
"therefore the whole theory of neutral monism is pleasing to me but I do find so far 
very great difficulty in believing it" (p. 86). He also said, "I do not profess to know 
whether neutral monism is true or not. I am not without hopes of finding out in die 
course of time, but I do not profess to know yet". But in the same page he also said, 
"I feel more and more inclined to think that it may be true. I feel more and more that 
the difficulties that occur in regard to it are all o f the sort that may be solved by 
ingenuity." (p. 153).
From the above consideration and especially the confession of 1918 we can conclude 
that Russell was not a neutral monist in 1914
Russell was not a phenomenalist either. A well defended version of phenomenalism 
is, I think, Ayer’s essay "Phenomenalism", which possibly will help us in judging 
Russell’s position of 1914 as a phenomenalist. In Ayer’s essay one is bound to 
encounter at least two basic requirements, if not more, which are necessary' to carry 
out the programmes o f  a true phenomenalist. They ire: (1) no reference, whether 
directly or indirectly, to  a physical object should occu. in the phenomenalist’s analysis 
of the external world, and, quite analogous to the one stated, (2) the phenomenalist 
should not allow himself "to speak of "sensibilia" having a continued and distinct 
existence in space and tim e—" (p. 196).
The only tool or raw material, or whatever we call it, a phenomenalist has, is sense- 
data. The sense-data are the only things that exist and hence the question of any 
hidden mysterious cause or object behind the veil of perception does not arise. 
Moreover a phenomenalist cannot say that such and such things causes sense-data, nor
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can he say that sense-data cause physical objects. What there is are sense-data and 
sense-data are all that we know. As Ayer said:
The phenomenalist’s tale does not include the author; it is in that 
respect, a tale that tells itself. |p. 195].
According to Ayer difficulty arises if anyone says that the sense-data are sensed by 
anyone. From this we could gather, anyone could be myself, my neighbour, my 
friend or anybody else. Such reference not only implicate to spurious existence of 
physical objects, but also leads us to such difficulties "concerning the possibility of 
physical interaction between the observer and the event that he is put there to 
observe" (ibid. , p. 194).
Russell in 1912, in discussing the causes of sense-data, stated that sense-data, which 
we think are connected with a chair, for example, "are really signs of the existence of 
something independent of us and our perceptions' (The Problems, p. 13). These 
independent objects are physical objects. But in 1914 without much explanation he 
tacitly avoided mentioning physical objects and regards sense-data, of which we are 
aware in our sensations, to be the ultimate constituents of the external world. Then 
concluded that sense-data differ from person to person,
"yet there is sufficient similarity among their data to enable them to 
group together certain of these data as appearances of one "thing" to 
the several spectators, and others as appearances of another 
"thing“." [Mysticism, p. 114]
This means that in the presence of a table, e.g., "A" senses certain sense-data peculiar 
to himself, "B" senses certain others, so do "C", "D", "E" etc. Each o f their data are 
different. But how are we to assume their similarity? Is it via a hypothetical 
generalisation about the private experience? Or illegitimate reference to physical 
bodies as th“ source of the similarity? In either way we are bound to damage the 
whole programme of phenomenalism. Russell did both. He made hypothetical 
contentions, and in doing so draws attention to the presence of physical bodies. He 
did it so openly that it leaves no doubt that the actual programme of Russell is not 
phenomenalism. To make it more clear let me quote Russell;
|T]he appearances which a given thing in the room presents to the 
actual spectators, there are, we may suppose, other appearances 
which it would present io other possible spectators. If a man were to 
sit down between two others, the appearance which the room would
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present to him would be intermediate between the appearances 
which it presents to the two others. (Mysticism, p. 114],
This passage and many other similar passages, which I have already quoted, suggests 
that Russell was not a pheno.nenalist nor did he intend to be, because he was so 
overwhelmed with the theory of neutral monism that he, perhaps, used 
phenomenalism to be a technique to bridge the gap between mind and matter. As a 
first step, in 1914, he declared that there are no such things as physical objects but 
only sense-data. What we call physical objects are simply constructs out of more basic 
constituents known as sense-data.
Ayer ^aid that once we accept "sense-datum language" then not only physical objects 
but also the observers, which are at the physical level, must be reduced to sense-data. 
To quote Ayer:
For to allow them |the observers] to stand outside "having" or 
"sensing" the sense-data would be to bring sense-data themselves up 
to the physical level and sc vitiate the whole phenomenalistic 
programme. |p. 194],
This is what kussell did in 1914. He declared sense-data to be physical, i.e. is to say 
that they are part of the actual subject-matter of physics. He also held that sense-data 
which are causally dependent on sense-organs, nerves and the brain, are 
physiologically subjective. In order to be a true phenomenalist, physical fact should 
be totally analysed in purely sensory terms.
Russell’s departure came, only if he did try tc establish phenomenalism, when he 
declared "sensibilia" to be the ultimate constituents of matter. Sensibilia, the unsensed 
sense-data, supposed to have the similar metaphysical and physical status as sense- 
data. These unsensed sense-data exists in space and time without any change as the 
existence of tKe sense-data. To put it in Russell’s words
We must include among appearances not only those which are actual 
sense-data, but also those "sensibilia", if any, which, on grounds of 
continuity and resemblance, are to be regarded as belonging to the 
same system of appearances, although there happen to be no 
observers to whom they are data. | Mysticism, p. 154|.
Ayer thinks that if phenomenalists speaks of sensibilia it will vitiate the ultimate aim 
of phenomenalism. Not only that, Ayer contends "these sensibilia are only physical 
objects, or attenuated physical objects, in disguise" (p. 19d). By claiming the
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existence of sensibilia, it has been argued2" that Russell postulated sensibilia on the 
same level as that of physical objects. His acceptance of sense-data was simply to fill 
up the gaps where no observers are present.
The above consideration makes us more convinced that phenomenalism was simply a 
catalyst in Russell s philosophical exercise, but certainly not his objective. He has 
spelled out his desire, I think very clearly, when he said that physics, being an 
empirical science, is supposed to be verifiable, and that is what he thought he did in 
1914. The question which really concerns us in this context is not whether Russell 
succeeded in establishing phenomenalism or neutral monism, but whether he establish 
the verifiability28 9 of physics? I do not think Russell does.
4.4.2.2. Sensibilia: The Introduction of Hypothetical Elements.
He deviated from his own commitment by analysing unsensed sensibilia into the 
logical constituents of physical objects. The hypothesis of unperceived sensibilia is 
itself nut verifiable, i.e. not knowable by acquaintance. Also by making sense-data 
private to oneself, Russe'l left us in a hypothetical assertion that others also have 
sense-data, say in the presence of a table, quite similar to mine. I can only know my 
sense-data, but I possibly cannot know, though can guess, our sense-data and the 
unsensed sense-data which might become mine if I am properly placed. Moreover 
sense-data are short lived, like the notes of a symphony as Russell said, and this 
transitoriness makes it difficult for sense-data to be compared.
I think Stace rightly observed that by 1921 epistemological motives were becoming 
less important to Russell. In his The Analysis o f Mind Russell concerned himself with 
the problem of what there is and not how rio we know. Perhaps, actually in 1914 he 
implicitly laid the ground for his future investigation, and in doing so bis 1914 and 
1913 papers did not really succeed in establishing how physics can be known.
28. For instance Hirst, op.dl.; Stace, 'Russell’s Neutral Monism; cf., Nusenoff, "Russell’s External 
World: 1912-1921", p. 69.
29. Please note that when Russell uses the word "verifiable" he simply means "knowable". His initial 
engrosment in epistemological problem pushed him to establish physics knowable by acquaintance. So 
the use of the word "verifiable" should not be taken to classify him as "verificationist".
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4.4 .2.3. (A) The Problem o f Knowledge and (B) The Problem o f Indexicals 
Remain Unresolved.
The Problem o f Knowledge.
We have already noted that in his critique of James’s neutral monism Russell thought 
that James's account of knowledge was the main reason his theory failed. Apart from 
this he also thinks that neutral monism cannot account for such "emphatic particulars" 
or indexicals as "this" and "I" and "now" which, according to Russell, is the most 
conclusive argument against neutral monism. These are the few issues which held 
Russell back form accepting neutral monism, although he found the Iheory 
"pleasing". Before he finally accepted the theory in 192i , Russell tried to solve these 
problems.
As to the first problem we know tha* Russell moved towards phenomenalism to 
resolve epistemological problems. But the form of phenomenalism he adopted, which 
is weak, only partly solves the epistemological problem. Because it requires 
hypothetical inferences to sensibilia; whereas the epistemological virtue of 
phenomenalism is presumably that sense-data, i.e. the actually given sensibilia, are 
distinct and known by acquaintance. In 1912 Russell’s main intention was to have 
access to physical objects, which he partially did via sense-data which made up the 
appearance of physical objects. But in 1914 he gave up physical objects in favour of 
sense-data, the ultimate constituents of physical objects, and could not resist the 
admission of hypothetical elements, sensibilia. And with this admission he failed to 
solve the epistemological problem he began from. It is interesting to note that as he 
approaches neutral monism he becomes less interested in epistemological problems 
and gives more emphasis to the questions of the ontological status of sense-data 
including unperceived sensibilia. This became more apparent in 1921 when he openly 
declared "those occurrences (if any) which do not form part of any "experience" 
belong only to the physical world" (The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 25). Perhaps Russell 
realized that for neutral monism epistemology is not important, and this he expressed 
in 1913 when he said, "... difficulty arises in regard to the definition of knowledge 
offered by James, though here it is hard to say how far this definition is essential to 
neutral monism". |Collected Papers, vol. 7, p. 32]. Hence we find that in 1921 
Russell, somewhat reluctant about epistemology, totally avoided bringing up the issue 
which therefore remained unresolved in this phase of his philosophy.
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(B1 The Problem o f Indexicals.
Similarly the issue of emphatic particulars remained unresolved in 1921. We have 
already seen that Russell casts doubt that since "this", being a proper name, does not 
stand for one particular thing, its connotation is determined the moment it is used, and 
differs at the next moment, because the object of attention is always changing from 
moment to moment and not from person to person. Hence it is ambiguous, and 
therefore Russell doubts how one can deal with the notion o f "this" on the basis of 
neutral monism. This o f course he admitted in 1918. But if we look back we find that 
in 1914 Russell could not solve this problem.
In his "The Relation o f sense-data to Physics" Russell claimed that it is true that two 
people cannot have the same sensations, and, although similar, the sense-data of one 
cannot belong to the o f the other. x his shows that it is not possible for any person to 
be aware of all sense-data. Not only this, there are uusensed sense-data which are not 
dat? to any mind. Russell had no alternative. If he only said that one’s fense-data is 
all that exists his theory would eventuate in solipsism. He avoids solipsism only by 
introducing hypothetical sensibilia And in doing so he failed to deal with emphatic 
particulars in 1914. he failed because his analysis of selves into biographies tends to 
show that no two people can have the same biography. He explained biography in the 
following way:
The sum-total o f all particulars that are (directly) either simultaneous 
with or before or alter a given particular may be defined as the 
"biography" to which that particular belongs. ... just as a 
perspective need not be actually perceived by anyone so a biography 
need not be actually lived by any one. [Mysticism, p. 105].
Not only this a person’s own biography is also not constant, there are different 
moments in his history. For instance, "this" a moment earlier and a moment later 
does not have the same reference. Because the transitcriness of sense-data are such 
that it becomes difficult to give a proper reference to the indexicals. The identical 
sense-data may never form the part of biography to a particular individual.
Russell, of course, did take up the issue in 1940 in his An Inquiry into Meaning and 
Truth only to tell us that the problem of indexicals could be solved but they are not 
needed in any part of the descrption of the worlu, whether physical or psychological" 
(p. 103). He explains that all ind^xicals can be defined in terms of "this". Hence, "I" 
means "the biography to which this belongs"; "here" means "the place of this";
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"now" means "the time of this" and so on (cf., p. 102). He further states that "this" 
designates an object without describing it. According to Russell many objects are 
present to attention but on each occasion the word "this" is used to refer to only one 
object. Since the word “this" is a proper name, he says, it can be used to different 
object at different time. When it is applied to a new object it ceases to be applicable to 
the old one. But Russell was not content with such an explanation because if "this" is 
merely a name then it cannot have a constant meaning since a name means "what it 
designates, and the designatum of "this" is continually changing" (p. 103). Since 
"this" is a proper name and applies to one object at a time it cannot be treated as a 
description..
In the Inquiry Russell suggested a way in which the problem of indexicals could be 
solved. This is a way where a verbal reaction to a particular stimulus may be 
immediate or delayed. When it is immediate the afferent nerves are stimulated and 
carry nerve-impulses to the brain which passes the impulse back through the efferent 
nerve to the appropriate muscles and produces a sentence beginning "this is". In 
delayed leaction the message passed is stored and later sent back in such a way that it 
produces a different sentence, such as, "that was". Hence the difference between a 
sentence beginning "this is" and one beginning "that was", lies not in their meaning, 
but in their causation. In such an analysis it shows that the word "this" is not needed 
for the description of the world. Russell thought that in a similar way the problem of 
all the indexicals could be solved.
According to Russell the word "I", since it persists for a certain period of time is 
derived from "I-now" by certain causal relations. Then he went on »o say:
The connexion between "I-now" and "this" is obviously close. "I- 
now" denotes a set of occurrences, namely all those that are 
happening to me at the moment. "This" denotes some one of these 
occurrences. "I", as opposed to "I-now", can be defined by causal 
relations to "this", just as well as to "I-now"; for I can only denote 
by "this" something that I am experiencing. | Inquiry, p. 107],
Subsuming a similar theory of selves as he did in 1914 „nd in 1921 Russell echoed:
[T]he e is reason to believe that no two families ever have a 
common member, i.e. that there is nothing of which two different 
persons can be aware. \Inquiry, p, 217],
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There he explained that awareness, "A", is a relation between two events in one 
person’s experience. He also said that in terms o f A, we can define the person to 
whose biography a given event belongs. Russell explained this position by means of 
"the R-family of x". If "P", e.g., means "parenthood", the P-family of x is x’s 
ancestors and descendants, and brothers and sisters and cousins, and himself- 
provided he has parents or children. But if x has no parents or children then the P- 
family of x does not include x (p. 216). Russell applied this in "awareness", "A", 
where awareness consists of noticing or remembering. Russell said if x is an event in 
some person’s biography, x’s nearest relatives with respect to A will be events noticed 
or remembered by x and events which notice or remember x. And if y is one of these, 
events noticed or remembered by y and events which notice or remember y will be 
relations of x in the second degree. This process will go on for any finite number of 
generations. By regarding an event as "personal" (if it is aware of something or 
something is aware of it> Russell said its A-family contains the event itself and other 
terms, but if the event is not personal its A-family is the null class. Russel then 
defined "persons" as "all A-families except the m il class", and hence says it is 
possible to define "I" as "the awareness-family o f this". ( Inquiry, p. 217],
It is on tiiis ground that Russell reiterateu his position by saying that two people 
cannot have same sensation. This also shows that since no two families ever have a 
common member the fate of the emphatic particulars remain unresolved as iate as 
1940. Perhaps, Russell found difficulty in solving the issue in a neutral monists way, 
he thought that they are not needed either in physics or in psychology.
4.4.3. Conclusion.
In discussing the types of phenomenalism I have distinguished factual phenomenalism 
into three *ypes. If Russell had accepted hyper-phenomenalism, i.e. only one’s own 
sense-data exists, then his theory would nave eventuated in ultimate solipsism. 
Possibly Russell could have solved the immediate problem of knowledge by saying 
that one is acquainted with one’s own se^se-data that are all supposed to exist. But 
that would have left e.g. the other people’s sense-data unexplained. We have seei. his 
acceptance of we?1 phenomenalism left him with unsensed sense-data.
Now the question that arises is what wculd have happened if Russe'.l accepted purt 
phenomenalism, i.e. actual sense-data are all what we know exists and are public? 
This perhaps would have solved the problem of both knowledge and the indexicals.
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One would say, for example, the plate, a physical object, is construction out of 
actually sensed sense-data. The sceptics would argue about the existence of sense-data 
from different point of view. An elliptical sense-data may turn out to be round with 
the movement of body and change o f position In that case we cannot possibly assert 
that the elliptical sense-datum is the actually perceived constituent of the plate. Russell 
of course was aware of this problem. Moreover the object plate may have certain 
causal properties which make it brittle for example. How can one have access !o the 
data which constitutes this brittleness?
We know that Russell’s explanation of the indexicals shows that not only can two 
person communicate but also that in a particular person’s own history the same sense- 
datum does not occur twice. The problem could be solved by a slight change in 
defining "this". In this case the word "this" could refer to a sense-datum, not private 
to oneself, as a publicly observable event, so that when a person utters it he can have 
the experience of it at that moment.30
Perhaps Russell could solve the problems partially but his aim was not to commit 
himself to the theory of phenomenalism. His aim was to develop the theory of neutral 
monism anu explain mini! and matter in terms of neutral stuff only. He has 
categorically said that physics demands continuity and phenomena'ism cannot explain 
continuity with out postulating inferential elements which would be against its own 
programme. Although Russell failed to solve the epistemological and the indexical 
problems, this was not a hinderence to develop his ontology of neutral events. What 
neutral monism demands is that the ultimate constituents of both mind and matter 
should be neutral, i.e. neither mental nor physical. This will become clear when we 
discuss his theory of neutral monism. But for the present we can say that his 
acceptance of quasi-phenomenalism has at least solved his immediate problem that the 
epistemological questions are not necessary to make ontological theory viable. In 
explaining the sense-data and physical objects Russell gave in to a number of circular 
arguments in order to ground his theory in a more profound epistemology. 1 will 
again raise this issue in chapter six and fully discuss it in chapter seven.
30. Cf., Gale, R.M., "Indericals Signs, Egocentric Particulars, And Token-Reflexive Words", p. 152. 
Also see Chapter Five under th. heading "Events as neutral entities".
Chapter 5.
R u sse ll’s Theory o f  N eutral E ntities: A C ritical A ppraisal
The Stuff of the world may be called physical or mental or both or 
neither, as we please; in fact, the words serve no purpose. ¡.4/1 Outline 
ofPhilosophy, 1927, p. 148|.
But from the stand-point of philosophy the distinction between 
physical and mental is superficial and unreal. (Russell, The Analysis 
o f  Matter, 1927, p. 402],
Introduction
Six years after his critique of James’s theory of neutral monism Russell said:
William James, in his Essays in Radical Empiricism, developed the 
view that the mental and the physical are not distinguished by the 
stuff of which they are made, but only by their causal laws. This 
view is very attractive, and I have made great endeavours to believe 
it. I think James is right....
A few lines later he pronounced:
[W |hen we come to consider the stuff of the two sciences |he means 
physics and psychology], it would seem that there are some 
particulars which obey only physical laws (namely, unperceived 
material things), some which obey only psychological laws (namely, 
images, at least) and some which obey both (namely, sensations). 
Thus sensations will be both physical and mental, while images will 
be purely mental.1
Conscious of the need to be both careful and definite. Russell unceremoniously 
launched his famous theory of neutral monism in 1919, not even mentioning that he 
was doing so, perhaps, to feel the pulse of his critics, so that in an opportune moment 
he could establish it. It was not until 1921 that he officially declared himself a neutral 
monist, and it is this theory (the second quoted passage) he developed and elaborated 
in The Analysis o f  Mind, without making any significant change.
We know that Russell’s acceptance and ultimately his commitment to neutral monism 
was initia'ed by his reading of Mach and James. Further the scientific progress made 
in the fields of psychology and physics prepared a ground work which pushed him to
1. Both the passages are taken from his essay "On Propositions: What they are and how they mean", in 
Logic and Knowledge, p. 299.
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make an effort to reconcile psychology and physics. As I have already said the 
twentieth century movement in physics led to the re-introduction of idealistic 
argument by suggesting an active role for consciousness in the perceptual act, whereas 
in the field o f psychology an opposite trend had been observed. The behaviouristic 
movement led to the denial of introspective mental states such as thoughts and 
explained all actions in terms of behaviour; hence making psychology a materialist 
study. |See Chapter One],
In 1921 Russell took his task to be to reconcile this materialistic tendency of 
psychology with the anti-materialistic tendency of physics, and to present a thesis 
according to which the "entities" of which me world is ultimately composed are 
neither mental nor material, but neutral, out of which both mind and matter are 
constructed.
We have earlier seen in chapter four that between 1912 and 1915 Russell was not a 
neutral monist. In 1912 Russell produced a relative dualism by making a relation 
between consciousness and physical objects via data belonging to sensations and 
introspection, both functions of mind. But by 1914 he reduced ?he gap between mind 
and matter by absorbing physical objects into sense-data and declaring sense-data, 
which are physical, to be the ultimate constituents of matter, thus making an easy 
access to matter. As regards this explanation of matter he is a physicalist and not a 
neutral monist. Russell categorically denies that sense-datum is mental. In a letter to 
the editor of The Journal O f Philosophy Psychology, And Scientific Method, June 7, 
1915, he wrote "indeed my whole philosophy of physics rests upon the view that the 
sense-datum is purely physical." | Collected Papers, vol. 8, pp. 88). But the fact is 
that until 1914 Russell’s world remain divided, because sense-data could support only 
the theory of matter anu the theory o f mind remain unsupported. Perhaps he still 
believed his 1912 analysis of mind and did not feel any urgency to change it un‘il 
1921, the year he finally accepted neutral monism
As a neutral monist Russell has to show that the entities out of which mind and body 
are created are of a single unique kind. This single kind of entity should be such that 
it should not depend for its existence either on mind or matter; but it should be able to 
constitute both mat'er and mind. If Russell intends to turn his theory of 1914 into 
neutral monism, it is essential for h'*n to bring about some changes. They are as 
follows:
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(1) he has to show that the data, the entities, should be neutral and should 
explain mind and matter well. Sense-data are physical and only explain matter;
(2) he has to get rid of hypothetical elements, such as unperceived sensibilia. 
This is because there are sensibilia, according to Russell, which are never a 
datum to any mind and therefore it is difficult to know about their status which 
is essential for the theory to be truly neutral.
These changes are necessary to abolish the relative duaiism of 1912. My main 
concern will be,
1. to see how he analyses "neutral entities" and to determine whether there is 
any shift in his position;
2. to see whether he is successful in explaining mind and matter wholly out of 
"neutral entities" and how he retains a monistic stance as against dualism;
3. and finally to prove that his theory of neutral entities, like James, succumbs 
to covert dualism.
In this chapter I will ueal with his analysis of neutral entities. In ooing so I will arg ie 
that the supposedly neutral entities are not neutral but covertly dualistic. For an entity 
to be neutral it should not admit any elements which were mental or were physical. 
[See section 1.2.3.]. The second and the third parts will follow in detail in chapter six 
when I discuss his theory of mind and matter as a neutral monist.
Russell at the very beginning of his analysis of mind and matter in terms of neutral 
entities undertakes to refute a theory o f  consciousness which he held as a dualist.
5.1 Rsi££tion of the Tvrm ‘Consciousness* in Jamesian Style.
We have seen earlier in chapter two how James in his essay "Does "Consciousness" 
Exist?" made an effort to give a new connotation to the term "consciousness"". There 
he rejected consciousness as an entity and argued that it stands for a function and that 
function is knowing. This knowing is a sori of relation between two terms where one 
of the terms becomes the subject knower and the other becomes the object known. 
For James the term "consciousness" is an "epistemological necessity", though there is 
"no direct evidence of its being there" (Radical Empiricism, p. 5).
Following James, Russell, in his The Analysis o f Mind, adopted a similar attitude in 
refuting a theory according to which "the essence of everything mental is a certain 
quite peculiar something called "consciousness"" (p. 9) and said "which 1 formerly
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held myself". Here he spoke of consciousness "eithei as a relation to objects, or as a 
pervading quality of physical phenomena" (ibid.). But in 1912, as we have seen, 
Russell did not speak of consciousness either as quality or relation. All he said was 
that we could not know the truth or even understand what is meant by "I am 
acquainted with this sense-datum” unless we are acquainted with something which we 
call "I". This "I", of which Russell speaks, is a thing different from sense-data, which 
constitutes the appearance of mattei (1912). If "I" is a thing other than matter o 
sense-datum, then "I" n.ost be an independent entity, which constitutes mind.
Russell's refutation of consciousness began with a historical analysis, in which he 
showed the importance of  consciousness from ti.e stand point of both traditional and 
modem psychology. Traditionally mind has been characterized as being conscious. 
When I talk to a friend, e.g.. I am not only conscious of what she is saying or doing, 
but I am also conscious of my own feelings, attitudes and intentions, which be'ongs to 
the category of wilful act. "Being conscious" is the major criterio.. of separateness 
between ourselves and ohysical objects, such as tables, chairs, desks and so on. We 
usually think *hat when we bang on a table, we are conscious of banging on it; but the 
table is not aware of being banged on. Russell said that perception, memory and 
belief are the ways of being conscious.2 These ways are important for the analysis of 
mind but not in the way a conventional psychologist might suppose. Russell said that 
in perception we perceive anything which we recognize through senses. What I am 
writing at a particular moment is a perception to me, so is my uttering of a sound. But 
customarily it is thought that in perception we go beyond the sensation to the "thing" 
which it depicts. When I hear a cock crow I do not only hear a noise, but realize that 
it comes from a cock. In memory, Russell said, we are conscious of the past 
happening which no lunger exist. And belief is the way of consciousness which gives 
both knowledge and error.
Apart from these three ways of being conscious there are things like desire, pain, 
pleasure, which are ordinarily called mental, which together form the cognitive 
elements in mind, i.e, they denote mental processes connected with understanding, 
such as, formulation of beliefs, attainment of knowledge quite distinct from such 
wilful acts as wanting, intend ng etc.
2. In Chapter Six, in discussing Russell's theory of mind, we shall see that he analysed these in terms 
of neutral entities and considered them to be complex mental phenomena.
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According to Russell, in describing consciousness in this way there is one element 
which is common: that they are all directed to "objects" in the sense that 
consciousness is one thing, and that of which we are conscious is another thing. More 
precisely, traditionally it is thought that the object of consciousness is not mental, but 
consciousness is. In order to explain the importance of this view in traditional 
psychology, Russell disrussed the theory of Brentano, presented in his Psychology 
from the Empirical Stand-point (1874). Following Brentano he believed that mental 
phenomena has essential reference to objects, except in the case of pleasure and pain. 
But Russell confirmed in The Analysis o f  Minu that he no longer believed this, even in 
the case of knowledge (cf., p. 15).
The rejection of consciousness led Russell to repudiate various dualistic criteria he has 
accepted to distinguish between the mental and the physical. The acceptance of these 
criteria left his earlier (1912) analysis of mind and matter as "relative dualism".
One of the criterion is the notion of intenrionality developed by Brentano. Brentano’s 
view has also been developed by his successor Meinong. According to Meinong, there 
are thre^ elements mvclved in the thought of an object. They are the act (or subject), 
the content, and the object. If, for instance, 1 think of a book, I perform the act of 
thinking. Then there is what makes the character c f  the thought as contrasted with 
other thoughts; this is the content. And the third is the book which is the object of the 
thought.
Russell accepted this realist distinction between the act and the object but rejected the 
content. In his Manuscript Notes, "On Sensations and Ideas", in 1918, Russell 
explained his reasons for accepting this distinction in the sphere of cognition. Suppose 
we see a "patch of red". The patch of red is not psychical but physical, whilst our 
seeing of it is not physical but psychical. Hence our seeing the patch must be other 
than the patch itself. Since the argument is directed against idealism Russell accepted 
it to refute idealism (cf., The Collected Papers, vol. 8, p. 253) This relational view is 
rejected by lames, Dewey and the American realists. They accepted the object, but no 
longer used the name "object", because the term suggests a relation to a subject.
In the same "Notes", Russell discussed the view held by Dewey in order to accept that 
our seeing a patch of red is identical with the patch of red. Dewey, in his Studies in 
Experimental Logic, says that perceptions are not per se causes of knowledge, but 
simply natural events with no knowledge status. He challenged the realists to try the
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experiment of conceiving perceptions as pure natural events and not as awareness or 
apprehension, - "they will be surprised t '' see how little they miss" (ibid., p. 253). 
Russell argued that Dewey is right and says that it will be necessary to reduce every 
thing cognitive to "pure natural events", if "neutral monism" is to be defendable. This 
is what James tries to do with his philosophy of "pure experience". In thii particular 
"Note" Russell cautioned that he was not developing the theory of neutral monism but 
accepted Dewey’s proposal to dispense with the r t ’ational occurrence consisting in 
awareness of sense-data. This he thought as the first step towards abolishing dualism 
of mind and matter. According to the doctrine of inteniionality the difference between 
the psychical and the physical is that the psychical phenomena consists of "acts" 
directed to "objects".3 The dualism in the Cartesian tradition has emphasized not only 
the "raw feel" but also the "intentional" features of mind.4 Now he thought that "act" 
is "unnecessary and fictitious" and therefore cannot be discoverable "empirically" 
(The Analysis o f  Mind, pp 17-18). Moreover "the reference of thoughts to objects is 
not ... the simple direct essential tiling that Brentano and Meinong represent at as 
being" (ibid., p. 18). Such reference is largely "derivative" and consists in beliefs.
As we go along we shall see that in 1921 Russell also accepted the concept of 
"mnemic ” in characterizing mind (The Analysis o f  Mind, pp. 82ffj- According to him 
sensations which enter mnemic context constitutes mind, and that it is by means of 
mnemic phenomena that an "experience" is defined. | Collected Papers, vol. 9, pp. 
31-2], This he confirmed in a letter to The Editor of "The Japan Weekly Chronicle" 
against the review made by Neil Gordon Munro published in January.]
Although Russell accepted the concept "mnemic" as a criterion of mind, he did not 
regard it belonged exclusively to mind. The difference between mind and matter is 
simply a difference of degree, and therefore on should not "erect and absolute 
barrier" between them (see An Outline o f  Philosophy, p. 306).) Russell explained that 
to "some slight extent" the "inanimate matter" behaves the way the living body 
behaves. For instance if we umoll a roll of paper, it will roll itself .'»gain, Russell said 
that mnemic causation is "too wide" (The Analysis o f Mind, p. 295), and hence:
(Ilf we are to avoid what I have called "mnemic" causation, which 
involves action at a distance in time, we must say that mnemic 
phenomena in mental events are due to the modification of the body 
by past events. \An Outline, p. 306].
3 The Analysis o f  Mind. p. I4ff.
4. Feigl, H ., "The "Mental" And The "Physical"", p. 417.
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Russell not only rejected the mnemic phenomena to distinguish the mental and the 
physical, he also rejected the "subject-object" distinction.
5.1.1. The Notion_pf ’Subjectivity* and 'Objectivity*/
As we know that in accepting neutral monism James not only rejected that "subject" 
but also the "object" which distinguishes the mental and the physical. For James the 
"subject-object" distinctions arise simply out of "special purposes", i.e. when a 
complex of neutrai entities are viewed in two ways. |See Chapters Two and Three].
Accordingly, Russell argued that subjectivity is not a characteristic of mind, nor is 
objectivity the characteristic of physical object. These characteristics are equally 
shared by organism with brain and also the photographic plate.
The acceptance of the criterion of "subjectivity" was mainly due to the acceptance of 
"introspection" as a source of self knowledge. James in his Principle accepted 
"introspection" to explain knowledge. But by accepting neutral monism he accepted 
the term "retrospection", which, 1 have argued, amounts to similar interpretation as 
that of the term "introspection". Russell also accepted the method of introspectioi , 
and hence committed similar mistakes like James. This will become apparent as we go 
along.
Russell discussed James’s theory of introspection which Knight Dunlap discussed in 
his article "The Case against Introspection" (Psychological Review, vol. xix, no. 5, 
1912; see The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 110). According to Dunlap the real ground for 
"James’s original belief in introspection was his belief in two sorts of objects, namely, 
thought and thing ... it was a mere inconsistency on James’s pari to adhere to 
introspection after abandoning the dualism of thoughts and things" (The Analysis o f  
Mind, p. 116) Russell partly disagreed with this view and said:
But then I hold that knowing itself consists of much constituents 
suitably related, and that in being aware of them we are sometimes 
being aware of instances of knowing. |P. il6].
According to Russell the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is "one of 
degree, not c f kind" (The Analysis o f M>nd, p 119).5 6 If v.e confine ourselvts to
5. Cf James’s notion of "subjectivity" and "objectivity" (2.6.2).
6. Cf., "Perception", Collected Paperv, p. 188; the abstract of the first part "Introspective Analysis" 
forms the subject matter of Chapter 19 of An Outline o f Philosophy, but the second, "Causal Analysis",
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sensations we see that "there are different degree of publicity attaching to different 
sorts of sensations" (ibid., p. 118). Sight and hearing are the most public of the 
senses. The smell, touch and the taste are semi-public. Touch can be regarded as 
public "in the sense that a number of people can successively have very similar 
perceptions, but they cannot all touch the „ame „pot at the same moment" (Collected 
Papers, vol. 9, p. 188; cf., The Analysis o f Mind, p. 118). The bodily sensations, like 
headache, toothache, hunger, thirst, the feeling of fatigue and so on are the private 
sensations. Regarding privacy, Russell said that all images, of any sort, belong with 
the sensations which only give knowledge of our sensations are such that "even the 
most primitive sensation has correlations which would theoretically enable another 
observer to infer it" (ibid., p. 119; cf., Collected Papers, vol. 9, p. 188). For 
instance the dentist who does not observe the pain of his patient, can see the cavity 
and can guess that one is suffering even if the patient did not tell him. Thus Russell 
enacts die behavioural principle in explaining mind.
By bringing neutral monism in line with behaviourism, Russell showed that mind and 
matter are constructed out of three neutral entities - sensations, images and sensibilia.7 
Earlier he said that "other occurrences" such as sensibilia belonged to the physical 
world only and "images" being mental belonged to mind exclusively (see Chapter Six. 
An elaborate discussion is carried out to show how mind and matter is constructed out 
of neutral constituents). In 1927 Russell argued that images have a position in the 
brain and hence are part of external world. Mind and matter are constructions not of 
one but three entities which is not even nearer to James’s position.
Despite his adaptation c f behaviouristic psychology Russell accepted introspection or 
self observation. He provided three possible reasons. First the acceptance of 
introspection was because "some o f the things we observe cannot, even theoretically, 
be observed by any one else" (The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 117). Second, because images 
caiinot be brought under the causal laws of physics, "though perhaps ultimately they 
may be" (ibid.). As to the third reason Russell spoke adversely to introspection. "I 
think that observation shows us nothing that is not composed of sensations and 
images, and that images differ from sensations in their causal laws, not intrinsically."
|Ibid. |. He explained these successively.
is not found in the book (ibid., p. 180). The second abstract, I think, forms the subject matter of 
Lecture VI, "Introspection", of The Analysis o f  Mind.
7 Quinton, A., op.cit., p. 96.
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For instance two people looking at the same table do not get the same sensation, 
because of the law of perspective and the way the light falls. But one can correlate 
one’s private data. More over the most private sensations have similar correlations 
with things that others can observe. Suet; as dentist does not observe somebody else’s 
ache but can see the cavity which causes it, and guesses the suffering caused by the 
ache. Russell argued that Watson and his followers by laying importance on 
observable behaviour try "to extrude from science observations which are private to 
one observer" {The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 119). Favouring introspection as a source of 
knowledge Russell said "privacy, therefore does not by itself make a datum 
unamenable to scientific treatment. On this point, the argumen* against introspection 
must be rejected" (ibid. , p. 119).
The acceptance of introspection as a source of knowledge differentiates Russell’s 
theory f.om the behaviourists, particularly J.B. Watson. In his An Outline o f  
Philosophy Russell carried out an elaborate discussion on Watson’s views against 
introspection. He agreed that publicity of physical facts, which is the greatest assets of 
physics and is accepted by the behaviourists must be admitted. |P. 177], On this 
Russell has no reservation. But his objections to behaviourism a« an ultimate 
philosophy come from a different kind of considerations. To explain this He said that 
let us take a proposition: "All facts that can be known about human beings are k iown 
by the same method by which the facts of physics are known" (ibid., p. 180). this 
Russell considered to be true.
As we shall see that Russell conveniently located percepts on the head. Since percepts 
explains both physics and psychology Russell held that "the facts of physics, like 
those of psychology, are obtained by what is self observation". |Ibid.]. According to 
Russell, from the stand point of physics, all of our percepts come at the end of the 
causal chain. Therefore whether visual or auditory all percepts, are in our head. For 
instance when we "see the sun", it is an event in us that we know; their external 
causes are simply inferences and therefore could sometimes be mistaken. [Ibiu . , p. 
180). The only distinction that can be discovered between physics and psychology, 
according to Russell is the degree of correlation with events outside the body of the 
observer. [Ibid., p. 181).
We have seen that James coined the concept "co-conscious transition" by which one 
experience passes into another when they belong to the same self. Within the personal 
histories of each individual, subject and object, interest and purpose are continuous.
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He also argued that discontinuity is felt when the transition takes place between at 
least two individuals. In such transition one has to get on and off again, "to pass from 
a thing lived to another thing only perceived". (Sec Chapter Two],
In a similar fashion Russell argued that a man can know more about his own body 
which is an inference to another man and the knowledge is therefore indirect. In 'die 
case of toothache, the dentist by looking the cavity infers that the patient feels 
toothache. But such difference is a matter of "degree" not of a "kind".
In 1927 Russell carried out an elaborate discussion on the issue of "subjectivity" and 
"objectivity" in a perception in hi" An Outline o f  Philosophy (pp. 158 ff.) and The 
Analysis o f Matter (pp. 222 ff.) Regarding objectivity in a perception Russell 
reiterated that this is a "matter of degree" which not only depends on the physical 
condition but also upon the experience of the percipient. Russell argued:
We shall call the elements which are alike "objective" elements in 
the impression, and those which are peculiar we shall call 
"subjective". ¡An Outline o f Philosophy, p. 160).
For instance when two people have percepts as belonging to  one group, and if the 
inference of the two observers agree, that perceptions may be objective. But if the 
inferences of the one differ from the other then one of them must be drawing false 
inferences, and therefore has an element of subjectivity. |C f., The Analysis o f  Matter, 
pp. 222-2231.»
According to Russell subjectivity in perceptions can be traced to three sources. ¡The 
Analysis o f Matter, pp. 222-2251. They are:
(1) physical subjectivity, i.e. when the objects are between the body of the 
percipient and the centre of the group to which the percepts belongs;
(2) physiological or sensory subjectivity, i.e. when they are in the body of the 
percipient and not in the brain; and,
(3) psychological or cerebral subjectivity, i.e. when they are in the brain.
"Physical subjectivity" exists in a photograph, compact disc etc. The stick that looks 
bent when it is half in water is an example of physical subjectivity. "Physiological 
subjectivity" arises through defects of sense-organs, efferent nerves and drugs. We 8
8. The Analysis o f Mind, pp. 130-31; An Outline o f Philosophy, pp 160ff.; The Analysis o f Matter, pp. 
222ff; also cf., Feigl, the notion of "in-principle-intersubjectively conformable". According to this the 
terms "subjective" or "private" is not to be considered as logically incompatible with "objective" or 
"public", op. cit., p. 399.
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will have physiological subjectivity where, for instance, "one person sees two colours, 
red and green, another only sees one" (The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 224). 
"Psychological or cerebral subjectivity" arises as a result of past experience. "An 
obvious example is a sensation which appears to be in a leg which has been 
amputated." \Ibid., p. 225).
In explaining physiological subjectivity Russell held that subjectivity enters in 
perception when "we are led to make false inferences" (ibid., p. 225). His use of the 
concept "subjectivity" is some what puzzling. In the one hand subjectivity is the 
source o f "error", on the other hand the subjectivity enters as a source of 
modification. [See section 5.7.].
Russell’s discussion of this is interesting but, as I said, puzzling. The analogy between 
physical misperception - the stick appearing bent when in water- and physiological 
misperception is misleading. Certainly the perceptual effects of the physical and the 
physiological environment through which the causal chain passes are equally 
important.
But the "subjectivity of perception" which Russell needs occurs equally when the 
physiological apparatus is functioning properly. This element of subjectivity - the 
perspective- is also shared with the properly functioning photographic plate.
Conclusion.
Russell’s analysis of the notion of "subjectivity" and "objectivity" on the one hand 
was to provioe a theory of neutral entities and on the other hand to counter 
behaviourism. It should be .nade clear that behaviourism rejects any form of inner life 
and therefore cashes mentality in terms of observable behaviour. In other words 
behaviourists tend to reduce mind as something that can be observed. According to 
Russell since matter and bodies have been dissolved by Einstein and relativity into a 
series o f "events", "the behaviourist may remain justified as against traditional 
psychology, but not as against the revolutionary physics of our time"9. On the 
contrary the neutral monists excludes any reductive analysis not only about mind but 
also about matter. There is only one thing that is the neutral stuff, the subjectless 
given, and the question about mental and physical is simply viewing of the same thing
9. "Behaviourism”, in The Collected Papers o f  Bertrand Russell, vol. 9, p. 52; the essay first published 
in Vanity Fair, 21, 1923 under the title "An Essay on Behaviourism" (see ibid., p. 45).
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in different ways. James maintained that what we call "subjectivity" and "objectivity" 
are simply functional attributes realized by a new retrospective experience when a 
particular experience is taken in two different contexts. [See 2.6.2].
5.1.2. Amalgamation o f Sense-data And Sensibilia into Sensations.
Eight years after his critique of James’s theory of neutral monism Russell accepted 
and followed what James accepted almost thirteen years earlier. He argued:
I have to confess that the theory which analyses a presentation into 
act and object no longer satisfies me. The act or subject, is 
schematically convenient, but not empirically discoverable. It seems 
to serve the same sort of purpose as is served by points and instant:. 
by numbers and particles and the rest of the apparatus of 
mathematics. All these things have to be constructed, not postulated: 
they are not the stuff of »he world, but are essamblages which it is 
convenient to be able to designate as if they were single things. The 
same seems to be true of the subject, and I am at a loss to discover 
any actual phenomenon which could be called an "act" and could be 
regarded as constituent of a presentation. ["On Propositions", p.
305],
In order to abolish psychophysical dualism Russell argued that the "act" or "subject" 
seem to me to be "derivative, and to consist largely in beliefs: beliefs with various 
other elements which together make up the object" (The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 18).
In rejecting Meinongian distinctions Russell pronounced that the "act seems 
unnecessary and fictitious. The occurrence of the content of a thought constitutes 
the occurrence of the thought" (ibid., p. 17; my italics), the supposed act cannot be 
discovered empirically, theoretically no reason to say it is indispensable. Russell 
ridiculed: "Meinong’s "act" is the ghost of the subject, or what once was the full- 
blooded soul." [P. 18|. Russell explained that the "act" is introduced because "it is 
supposed that thoughts cannot just come and go, but need a person to think them" 
(ibid.) for instance wnen we say, "I thins so-and-so, and this word "I" suggests that 
thinking is the act of a person.
Accepting neutral monism Russell declared that thoughts can be collected into bundles 
or groups, so that one group is my thoughts, another is your thoughts and so on. 
Because such commitment does not require person, and therefore one can easily 
dispense with it. Russell reasoned that a "person"
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"is not an ingredient in the single thought: he is rather constituted by 
relations of the thoughts to each other and to the body" (ibid., p.
18).
Now the question arise how can we explain such grammatical forms such as "I think", 
"you think". Russell replied that instead we can change the form as "it thinks in me" 
and "there is a thought in me". If this could be done then why Russell accepted 
"subject" on the first place. Russell reasoned: First, "it is introduced, not because 
observation revealed it, but because it is linguistically demanded by grammar. .." 
| Ibid., p. 141], Second to counter idealism and to emphasise that the "patch of 
colour" is physical and not psychical as Berkeley and his followers maintained.
Thus Russell discarded "subject" from his general philosophical pursuit. As a neutral 
monist he argued that the subject appears to be a logical fiction like mathemat.jal 
points and instants and therefore it is not necessary to retain this in the particular case 
of sensations (the neutral entities) because it is "perfectly a gratuitous assumptior". 
He explained:
The functions that they (subject) appear to perform can always be 
pe. formed by classes or series or other logical constructions, 
consisting of less dubious entities. [P. 142]
Since subject is no longer the "actual ingredients" of the world, "the possibility of 
distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes" (p. 142). Following 
James, Dewey, and the realist Russell declared:
The patch of colour may be both physical and psychical, the reason 
for distinguishing the sense-datum from the sensation disappears, 
and we may say that the patch of colour and our sensation in seeing 
it are identical. |P. 143].
He further emphasised:
|T |he sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour simply 
is that patch of colour, an actual constituent of the physical world, 
and part of what physic, is concerned with. A patch of colour is 
certainly not knowledge, and therefore we cannot say that pure 
sensation is cognitive, through its psychological effects, it is the 
cause of cognitions, partly by being itself a sign of things that are 
correlated, and partly by giving rise to images and memories after 
the sensation is faded. But in itself the pure sensation is not 
cognitive. |P. 142; My Philosophical Development, p. 10].
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This is how Russell merged sensation and sense-datum in order to enact the doctrine 
he had so long criticized and resisted.
5.2. A Critical Analysis of Neutral Entities.
It was in 1921 Russell finally accepted the theory of neutral monism. The analysis of 
his theory is spread out in several of his well known books.10 As we discuss his 
theory we shall see that in 1921, beside sensation, the neutral entity, Russell also 
declared image, the subjective entity, and the unperceived, the physical entity. It was 
in 1927, in accepting the theory of quantum mechanics and Einstein’s theory of 
relativity, he declared events as the ultimate constituent of the world. He reither 
rejected images nor the unperceived as constituents of mind and matter. The only 
change we shall see that Russell tried to show that both image and the unperceived 
have similar status like sensation or percept, the neutral entity. This he did on the 
basis of "structural similarity". Intrinsically images and sensations are similar and 
both have a position in the brain. Regarding the unperceived and the sensation he said 
that their mathematical properties are same. This wil! become clearer as we go along. 
But this left his theory different from that of James. James explained his theory of 
mind and matter by a single unique neutral entity called "experience".
It was in 1948 Russell declared allegiance with James (see Chapter Six) and hence 
repudiated the dualistic theory of perception. As a result the epistemological 
distinction between sensation and image lost their significance. More over by 
accepting "postulates" of scientific inference from percepts to material objects and 
unperceived events, Russell claimed that percepts and unperceived events have 
"similar" or "semi-similar" structure. [See section 5.5[.
In discussing his theory of neutral entities I shall show that A.J. Ayer is not right 
when he, in his Bertrand Russell, argued that Russell has attributed the same 
properties to "percepts" as he had attributed to sense-data. My arguments will unfold 
that sense-data are different from sensations. It is rather percepts that have the same 
properties as those of sensations. That ri to say in Russell's philosophy percepts and 
sensations are interchangeable. In my further analysis I will show that, like James’s 
supposedly neutral cnlities, percepts or sensations are covertly dualistic. |See, section
1.2.3.).
10. The Analysis o f Mind, An Outline o f  Philosophy, The Analysis o f  Matter, Human Knowledge, 
Portraits Form Memory and My Philosophical Development; see Chapter Four, "Introduction".
Neutral Entities: A Critical Appraisal. 1 7 9
5.3. The Analysis o f Sensations
Before his abandonment of sense-data, Russell argued in "1 he Nature of Sense-Data", 
1913, that there are two main cognitive relations with which a theory of knowledge 
has to deal. They are presentation - which is the same as acquaintance - and 
judgement. He explained the distinction between the tivo in the following way:
|Presentation (or acquaintance) is a two-term relation of a subject, 
or (better) an act, to single (simple or comple :) object, while 
judgement is a multiple relation of a subject or act to the several 
objects concerned in »be judgment. From the fact that presentation is 
a two-term relation, the question of truth or error cannot arise with 
regard to it .... In the case of judgment, error can arise .... The 
difference, in this respect, between judgment presentation is due to 
the fact that judgment is a multiple relation, not a two term relation.
IP. 76],
The only objects in which the presentation is sensible are sense-data defined by 
Russell as "presented objects simultaneous with the act of presentation" (p. 77). As 
opposed to "sense-datum" the word "sensation" is us**d either for the act alone or for 
the complex "act-acquainted-with-object" (p. 77). Russell used the term "perception” 
synonymously with "sensation".
Now it had become imperative for him to produce a theory of presentation and belief 
where the "subject" or "act" did not have any role in the constituent of a presentation. 
Russell knew that the assumption of existence or non-existence of a subject ought to 
be avoided totally in his new theory. He thought that the effect of the refusal of the 
subject is to present a less relational theory of mental occurrences. On this ground he 
said that Brentano’s view that mental phenomena are characterized by "objective 
reference" is unacceptable.
Then Russell, by assuming the theory of physical objects (constructions out of sense- 
data) developed in his Our Knowledge o f  the External World, said:
IA j sensation becomes equally part of the subject-matter of physics 
and of psychology: it is simultaneously part o f the mind of the 
person who "has" the sensation, and part of the body which is 
perceived" by means of the sensation. | Ibid., p. 306|.
This is what he said in 1919, and Finally declared in 1921 as a neutral monist. 
Obsessed by the thesis of James and his counterparts, the American realists, Russell
Neutral Entities: A Critical Appraisal. 1 7 9
5.3. The Analysis of Sensations
Before his abandonment of sense-data, Russell argued in "The Nature of Sense-Data", 
1913, that there are two main cognitive relations with which a theory of knowledge 
has to deal. They are presentation - which is the same as acquaintance - and 
judgement. He explained the distinction between the two in the following way:
[Presentation (or acquaintance) is a two-term relation of a subject, 
or (better) an act, to single (simple or complex) object, while 
judgement is a multiple relation of a subject or act to the several 
objects concerned in the judgment. From the fact that presentation is 
a two-term relation, the question of  truth or error cannot arise with 
regard to it .... In the case of judgment, error can arise ....  The 
difference, in this respect, between judgment presentation is due to 
the fact that judgment is a multiple relation, not a two term relation.
[P. 76],
The only objects in which the presentation is sensible aie sense-data defined by 
Russell as "presented objects simultaneous with the act of presentation" (p. 77). As 
opposed to "sense-datum" the word "sensation" is used either for the act alone or for 
the complex "act-acquainted-with-object" (p. 77). Russell used the term "perception" 
synonymously with "sensation".
Now it had become imperative for him to produce a theory of presentation and belief 
where the "subject" or "act" did not have any role in the constituent of a presentition. 
Russell knew that the assumption of existence or non-existence of a subject ought to 
be avoided totally in his new theory. He thought that the effect of the refusal of the 
subject is to present a less relational theory of mental occurrences. On this ground he 
said that Brentano’s view that mental phenomena are characterized by "objective 
reference" is unacceptable.
Then Russell, by assuming the theory of physical objects (constructions out of sense- 
data) developed in his Our Knowledge o f  the External World, said:
IA | sensation becomes equally part of the subject-matter of physics 
and of psychology: it is simultaneously part of the mind of the 
person who "has" the sensation, and part of the body which is 
"perceived" by means of the sensation, \lbid., p. 306|.
This is what he said in 1919, and finally declared in 1921 as a neutral monist. 
Obsessed by the thesis of James and his counterparts, the American realists, Russell
Neutral Entines: A Critical Appraisal. 1 8 0
could not but finally declare, in 1921, "sensations” to be the ultimate stuff out of 
which both mind and matter are constructed. He said:
Our knowledge is to be constructed out of what the American 
realists call "neutral" entities, which have neither the hardness and 
indestructibility of matter, nor the reference to objects when is 
supposed to characterize mind. [ The Analysis o f Mind, p. 36|.
We could represent his professed theory in the following way:
The above representation shows that within the box are the neutral entities which 
explains both mind anJ matter. There are no illegitimate additions which together 
with the neutral entities belong to the constitution of either mind or matter.
We have seen how, in Jamesian fashion, Russell tried to discard psycho-physical 
dualism by repudiating consciousness as an entity. He merged sensation and sense- 
datum into sensation. According to him the sensation that we have when we see a 
patch of colour simply is that patch of colour, which is the actual constituent o f  the 
physical world. In 1914 Russell identified the patch of colour with sense-datum. But 
in 1921 Russe'l thought that an act or the subject seems "unnecessary and fictitious" 
[The Analysis o f Mind, p. 17] and therefor’ the polar opposition between the sensation 
and the sense-datum breaks down which bring.; them together to stand for the same 
thing. At the end we are left with an entity called "sensation' which may eventually 
belong to both psychology and physics. Hence the term "sensation" gains a new 
connotation and a new status as a neutral entity in his 1921 philosophy.
By giving a new status to sensation, in 1921, Russell defined sensations as the 
intersection of mind and matter (cf., ibid. , p. 144). The essence of sensation is its 
independence of past experience. It is core in our actual experiences which exists in 
very young infants but never in isolation. Sensation, which was knowledge by itself in 
1912, now supplies the data of our knowledge of the physical world, including
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bodies. When I see a person, for example, it seemed that mere seeing were 
knowledge. But this was a mistake.
In his new definition, sensation stands for coloured patches, sounds, smells and also 
the seeing of coloured patches, hearing the telephone ring, the feeling of muscular 
strain and so on. (Sensation replaced the sense-data o f 1912. In his later works 
Russell gave similar status to "percept"). They are the neutral entities, the stuff of the 
world. Sensations are innumerable and have a short duration. For instance the same 
patch of colour will not occur twice. At the most there might be similarity between 
the two patches occurring at two different occasions. These entities are subjectless ind 
are given. Russell called these entities "particulars", "aspects" and "appearances”, 
which are in themselves neither mental nor physical but neutral. What we call a piece 
of matter or mind is simply arrangements of the neutral entities. The distinction 
between the mental and the physical is simply contextual. The same arrangement in 
one context is considered as a mental phenomenon and in another context a physical 
object.
Russell explained how sensations can enter two relations at the same time. With the 
help of the stellar photography (ibid., p. 99ff; My Philosophical Development, p. 79) 
he clarified his point. If a photographic plate is exposed on a clear night, it can 
produce a picture of any selected portion of the starry heavens. Any star can be 
photographed at any place from which it would be visible if a human eye were there 
instead of the photographic plate. At the place where the photographic plate is placed, 
innumerable things are happening which are connected with all the different stars that 
can be photographed there. \My Philosophical Development, p. 79; The Analysis o f  
Mind, p. 100).
There are two ways of collecting these "happenings" or "appearances" (as Russell 
sometimes preferred to say) into bundles. First:
We can collect to gather all the happenings, in different places,
which are connected in the way tnat common sense regards as being
due to their emanating from cne object. [The Analysis o f  Mind, p.
100].
In this bundle all the appearances of a, say a given star, in different places are 
collected together by "continuity and inherent laws of correlation". This bundle, 
according to Russell, is considered a piece of matter or physical object.
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Second:
We can collect together all the happenings in one place, as is done 
by photography so far as light is concerned. \!bid.\
In the second bundle, instead of collecting all the appearances which ore appearances 
of one thing, we collect all the happenings which are appearances at one place. The 
whole of appearances at one place, Russell called it a "perspective". The sum total of 
one’s sensations at a given dme constitutes one perspective.
In the firs» way of making bundles, we had a bundle consisting of many appearances 
of the given star., But the second bundle contains only one appearance of the star 
associated with one appearance of each "thing" that is perceptible from that place. 
Russell said:
It is this second way of making bundles that is especially appropriate 
in psychology. One perspective, when it happens to be a brain, will 
consist of all the momentary percepts | sensations] of the man whose 
brain is concerned. [My Philosophical Development, p. 81].
It is the second bundle which represents a momentary mind.
Regarding perspective, Russell further emphasised that there are as many perspectives 
as there are views of the world of different things from a given place (see Chapter 
Four). Subjectivity is the characteristic of perspective, the characteristic of giving the 
view of the world from a certain place. This subjectivity is equally present in the 
photographic plate and the organism with brain and nervous system. For instance if an 
organism with sense-organs form part of the intervening medium, instead of the 
photographic plate, we receive an impression of the star which is called an appearance 
of the star. Analogous to the above example the sensations can be collected in two 
ways, one bundle will form a material object, the star, and the other bundle will make 
a mind, together with mages. [See, 5.3.]. Thus sensations are the neutral stuff which 
explains both mind and matter.
According to Russell every particular belonged to the two groups simultaneously, 
constituting, on the one hand a physical object, and on the other, a momentary mind 
(perspective). Hence both physical object and perspective are constituted out of same 
entities, the sensations. They differ not in respect of substance or stuff, (as the neutral 
monist prefers to call them), but only in respect of arrangement, i.e. the way the
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particulars are collected. Let us see how Russell characterized sensations as neutral 
entities.
Are Sensations Neutral?
Russell defined sensation as "those that have physical causes and mental effects" and 
hence we can consider "sensation as the non-mnemic elements in a perception". [The 
Analysis o f  Mind, pp. 138, 139], Every thing is sensation that comes to us through the 
senses. Not only the sound we hear or smell we smell, but also such things as 
headache or the feeling of muscular strains. Traditionally, experiences like "telephone 
ringing" is interpreted as perception and not sensation because it gives us immediate 
knowledge. Russell warned:
|S]o much interpretation, so much of habitual correlation, is mixed 
with all such experiences, that the core of pure sensation is only to
be extracted by careful investigation__ In order, therefore, to arrive
at what really is sensation in an occurrence ... we have to pare away 
all that is due to habit or expectation or interpretation" (ibid., pp. 
139-40).
Although sensations are the source of our knowledge, unlike sense-data, they are non- 
cognitive. A patch of colour may stand for a knowledge but in itself is not a 
knowledge.
We know that the ma;n motive behind Russell’s abandonment of sense-data was to 
produce a theory in which the distinction between the subject and object did not arise. 
Such a distinction not only creates ep;*4emological dualism but also ontological 
dualism between mind and matter.
C. Wade Savage, in his article "Sense-Data In Russell's Theories of Knowledge" in 
Rereading Russell (1989), argued that "Russell’s suggestion that he "dispense^] with
the subject" in Ami is a dramatic overstatement__  Russell... replaces the simple
subject by a complex subject composed of metaphysically neutral constituents" (pp. 
144-145). Thi:. is true. Russell did not deny the fact that there are subjects and objects 
which are constituted out of neutral entities. What he denied is that "sensation" is a 
relational term. In its pure form a sensation is non-cognitive. A sensation may be 
grouped with a number of other occurrences by a memory-chain, which becomes a 
part of mind or it may also be grouped with its causal antecedents, in which case it 
appears as part of the physical world. This simplification helped Russell to abandon
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the "subject" and to regard the traditional problem of the relation of mind and matter 
as definitely solved (Cf., My Philosophical Development, pp. 103-4).
But new problems, of which at first 1 was not fully conscious, arose 
as a consequence of the abandonment of "sense-data". Such words 
as "awareness", "acquaintance", and "experience" had to be re­
defined . [Ibid., p. 101],
The problem in question is what is meant by "empirical evidence", i.e. how we have 
knowledge of the external world, since "sensation" is not cognitive. In his The 
Analysis o f  Mind. Russell said that when a person has a sensation it does not provide 
him with knowledge the way sense-datum did. Unless there is some sort of awareness 
one cannot possibly have knowledge. And if one has no knowledge of one’s 
sensations one cannot have knowledge of the external world. This difficulty led 
Russell to assert:
There is a duality ... in any form of knowledge__We are aware o f
something, we have a recollection o f  something, and, generally, 
knowing is distinct from that which is known. This duality, after it 
has been banished from sensation, has to be somehow re-intreduced. 
\My Philosophical Development, p. 104],
Accordingly, Russell said, "In the Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, ... I replaced 
"acquaintance" by "noticing", which I accepted as an undefined term" (ibid., p. 104). 
The term "noticing" which is "hard to define" is a "matter of degree". Russell says,
"[noticing] seems to consist mainly in isolating from the sensible 
environment. You may, for instance in listening to a piece of music, 
deliberately notice only the part of the cello. You hear the rest, as is
said "unconsciously"__  It seems then, that the most immediate
knowing of which we have experience involves sensible presence 
plus something more.... |which| may be called "attention"; this is 
partly a sharpening o f the appropriate sense-organs, partly an 
emotional reaction. A sudden loud noise is almost sure to command 
attention, but so does a very faint sound that has emotional 
significance, [ibid., pp. 47-8. also My Philosophical Development, 
pp. 1^4-1061.
Following the above, Russell declared:
Every empirical proposition is based upon one or more sensible 
occurrences that were noticed when they occurred, or immediately 
after, while they still formed part of the specious present. Such 
occurrences, we shall say, are "known" when they are noticed. 
\MPD, p. 106, Inquiry, p. 48].
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Thus Russell could not but re-introduce the duality between the act of knowing and 
the object known. |See Chaptei Three; James accepted epistemological distinction as a 
result his theory succumbed into covert dualism]. This is in fact a deviation from his 
promissory note that he will abolish any form of dualism in order to make neutral 
monism a success. Russell did this rather openly unlike James. What Russell called a 
"sensation" is regarded by James as "feeling" in his psychology, and "experience" in 
his metaphysics. In both the places James (see chapter two and three for detail 
discussion) said that knowledge by acquaintance such as feeling is "dumb" cud 
"helpless" because it can neither name nor classify, i.e. in other words it is non- 
cognitive. Feeling is cognitive only through its relation to different feelings in a 
particular arrangement. But at the same time he argued that a "feeling" is not 
"psychical zero". By saying this, James brought in the duality of subject and object. 
This is one of the reasons I call his theory covertly dualistic. (See 1.2.3].
In case of Russell he did not deny that any form of knowledge did involve duality 
which cannot be avoided. Such innocent admission left his theory c c e rtly  dualistic 
like that of James. I v ill discuss this point again in chapter six when I discuss 
Russell's theory of mind and matter. At present let us see what Russell had to say 
about perception. In his Analysis o f Mind Russell said that when mnemic phenomenon 
(see, 5.3.) is added to sensation we have perception. "Sensation is the theoretical core 
in the actual experience; the actual experience is the perception." (P. 132). "But at the 
time when 1 wrote the Analysis o f Mind I was not fully aware of the need for re­
interpreting what common sense calls "the evidence of the senses"." (My 
Philosophical Development, p. 102). After re-introducing duality in sensation Russell 
brought out the following distinction between "sensation" and "perception".
"Perception" as opposed to "sensation" involves habit based upon 
past experience. We may distinguish sensation as that part of our 
total experience which is due to die stimulus alone, independently of 
past history. This a theoretical core in the *otal occurrence. The total 
occurrence is always an interpretation in which the sensational core 
has accretions embodying habits. When you see a dog, the 
sensational core is a patch o f colour stripped of all the adjuncts 
involved in recognising it as a dog. You expect the patch of colocr 
to move in the way that ¡s characteristic of dogs, you expect that if 
it makes a noise it will bark or growl, and not crow like a cock.
You are convinced that it could be touched and that it will not 
vanish into thin air, but has a future and a past, i do not mean that 
all this is "conscious", but its presence is shown by the astonishment 
that you would feel if things worked out otherwise. It is these 
accretions that turn a sensation into a perception. | Ibid., p. 106|.
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If we analyse what Russell had to say about his abandonment of a relational theory of 
sensation we clearly see that the concept of "awareness" or "acquaintance" has been 
replaced by the term "notice", and "sense-data", the object, by the term "sensational 
cores".11 Russell reasoned that he had to do this in order to explain how we have 
knowledge of the external world. He said that there is a difference between different 
sensations. Accordingly he explained:
Smells and tastes and bodily feelings such as headache or stomach­
ache do not suggest this duality [knowing as distinct from known) as 
forcibly as sight and touch and hearing. Before we begin to reflect, 
we think of the things that we see and hear and touch as external to 
ourselves, and it is only by an effort that we can turn our attention 
to seeing as opposed to what is seen. When a Jog sees a rabbit, we 
can hardly suppose that it says to itself, "I am having a visual 
sensation which probably has an external cause". But if the view of 
James and Mach is right, what occurs in the dog when it "sees a 
rabbit" has only an indirect and causal relation to the rabbit. This 
view strikes one as odd, and it is on account of the oddity that I was 
so slow in adopting it [the theory of neutral monism], \My 
philosophical Development, p. 104|.
The above passage leads us to two questions. They are: Has Russell introduced the 
mental act to explain knowledge? Or, has he re-introduced the sense-data which are 
knowledge by acquaintance? Regarding the above questions A.J. Ayer, in his book 
Bertrand Russell, argued:
In The Analysis o f  Mind,... Russell gives up his belief in the 
existence of mental acts. This is partly because of his view that the 
subject, to which they are ascribed, is a logical fiction, and partly 
... because he has been persuaded that no such things are 
empirically detectable. No longer believing that there are sensations, 
in the sense in which he had previously used the term, he cannot a 
fortiori believe that they have any objects; and he therefore denies 
that there are sense-data. But although he subsequently speakes of 
himself as having "emphatically abandoned" | My philosophical 
Development, p. 245] sense-data at this time, the change in his view 
is much less radical than this would suggest. He did cease to employ 
the term "sense-datum", but he continued to speak o f percepts, to 
which he attributed the same properties as he had attributed to sense- 
data, except that of being correlative to sensory acts. [P. 71 ].
Ayer’s suggestion has been regarded by Savage as "dubious".12 He quoted Russell, 
who, in his review of Ryle’s Concept o f Mind (in My Philosophical Development, p. 
245), said "A second point upon which I am in agreement with him |Ryle] is the
1 i. Cf., Savage, p. 147.
12. Ibid., p. 150.
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rejection of sense-data. I believed in these at one time, but emphatically abandoned 
them in 1921". Savage pointed out that first, this statement o f Russell cannot be 
reconciled with Ayer's suggestion. Second, there is an evidence that Russell replaced 
sense-data with entities having different properties. To quote Savage:
(Before) abandonment, sense-data were held to be absolutely certain 
(infallible, indubitable), immediate (uninferred, self-evident) and 
precise (analyzed, simple); after abandonment, they were held 
relatively certain, immediate and precise. IPp. 150-151].
Russell would be in more agreement with Savage than Ayer. There is no doubt that 
Russell abandoned sense-data in 1921. Earlier in 1914, Russell regarded sen. e-data as 
physical, whereas sensations are neutral. Moreover in any case o f presentation (sense- 
data are objects of sensible presentations) there is a certain relation of an act to an 
object. As a neutral entity a sensation does not have such "certain relation". What 
Russell did was that he provided a "relative certainty" to sensation by redefining the 
term "acquaintance" in terms of "noticing". For example, "the patch of colour" may 
not produce such knowledge that "it is a dog", but it aoes produce certain 
expectations that it lielong* to ..jmething and that may be a dog. That is why Russell 
said "I do not mean that all this is "conscious", but its presence is shown by the 
astonishment that you would feel if things worked out otherwise . It is in these sense 
Russell described the word "sensation", which stands for neutral entities.
Russell also emphasised that the neutral entities which are the "ultimate constituents" 
are simple. [See 6.1.]. But while further characterizing sensations Russell declared:
When I speak of "ultimate constituents," I do not mean |that the 
neutral entities i*re] incapable of analysis, bet ... at present, we can 
see no means of analysing. I speak of such constituents as 
"particulars", or as "relative particulars" when I wish to emphasize 
the fact that they may be themselves complex. \The Analysis o f  
Mind, p. 124],
In discussing his theory of events I will show that in 1948 Russell analysed events in 
the similar way making his theory covertly dualistic. [See section 5.6.].
Beside "sensations", neutral entities, Russell also accepted "images" and 
"unperceived" entities (mental and physical respectively) as the constituents of mind 
and matter. As far as the neutral monist programme goes, mind and matter should be 
constructions of neutral entities, and if they are not, the theory will not be accepted as 
a neutral monist theory. Any admission of mental entities (images) and physical
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entities (unperceived particulars) will result in a Cartesian type of dualism. It was 
Descartes who accepted two kinds of substances to explain mind and matter. As we 
know the whole programme of neutral monism is directed against Cartesianism.
Keeping this in view my next topic will be to discuss Russell’s theory of images and 
to sec how they fit in his thesis. This will help us to judge the status of images as the 
constituent of mind and matter.
5.4. The Status o f Images
In 1919 and 1921 Russell had clearly stated that sensations are the neutral entities 
which can be arranged in two group, where one group will represent a piece of 
matter, and the other will represent a momentary mind. Despite such assertions 
Russell was not fully convinced as what James and the American realists had to say 
about the constitution of mind and matter in terms of neutral entities only. In his The 
Analysis o f  Mind he declared this in the following way:
|T]he American realists are partly right, though not wholly, in 
considering that both mind and mat»er are composed of i  neutral- 
stuff which, in isolation, is neither mental nor material. I should 
admit this view as regards sensation: what is heard or seen Lslongs 
equally to psychology and to physics. But 1 should say that images 
belong onty to the mental world, while those occurrences (if any) 
which do not form part o f any "experience" belong only to the 
physical world. [P. 25, italics mine].
The above passage clearly suggests that sensations, the neutral entities, cannot in 
isolation construct mind or matter wholly. The mental world requires, beside 
sensations, images in order to be complete. It is the strict programme of neutral 
monistic theory of the world not to admit into itself any element which is not neutral. 
Russell could be right13 in saying that the mental world and also the physical world 
requires something else, beside sensations; and if he is right he cannot call himself a 
neutral monist. Apart from "images" Russell also admitted of other "occurrences" 
(unperceived entities) which do not form part of any experience. These occurrences if
13. See, Price, H.H., Perception. Price holds that it seem to he true that "sense-data are intimaHy 
related, and in more than one way, both to minds and to external, that is extracerebral objects; and that
without reference to sense-data the nature of neither can be fully understood__ Only the conclusion
drawn by Neutral Monism, that both mind and matter consists of sense-data, does not follow from this, 
and does not, in fact, seem to be true. There are other relations Beside that of "being a constituent of", 
p. 138.
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any, do not belong to neutral stuff, for them to be neutral they have to be a core in 
our actual experiences and can never exist in isolation.
With the admission of images and other unperceived entities Russell could not depart 
from dualism as he professed to do so by entering neutral monism. We can represent 
his theory of 1921 in the following way:
mnemically
In box =  neutral entities; outside box =  illegitimate additions
Now let us see what Russell has to tell us about the status of images and unperceived 
entities in his theory of neutral monism. I will begin with images and see,
(1) what prompted him to admit the existence of images,
(2) how images differ from sensation
(3) can images be neutral.
In his essay "On Proposition" Russell declared that:
Russell was prompted to admit the existence of images because he thought that any 
"theory of language which takes no account of images is incomplete in a viial point" 
(ibid., p. 291). Here he was mainly pointing to the behaviouristic theory of language 
as put forward by J.B Watson in his book Behaviour (1914). According to Russell:
The behaviourist view ... maintains that "mental" phenomena ... are 
not amenable to scientific treatment, because each of them can only 
be observed by one observer, ... it is highly doubtful whether even 
one observer can be aware of anything not reducible to some bodily 
occurrence.\Ibid., p. 291],
Images
(mental)
caused
Sensations 
(neutral entities)
Unperceived 
Entities 
(never a datum 
to any mind)Mind Matter
We have ... two sorts of mental "stuff”, namely (a) sensations, 
which are also physical, and (b) images, which are purely mental. 
Sensations do not "mean", but images ofte.i do, through the medium 
of belief. \Logic and Knowledge, p. 306].
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Russell maintained that behaviourism is not a "metaphysics" but a "principle of 
method". He argued:
Since language is an observable phenomenon, and since language 
has a property which we call "meaning", it is essential to 
behaviocrism to give an account of "meaning" which introduces 
nothing known only through introspection. |P. 291]
Watson denied the occurrence of images but replaced them by faint kinaesthetic 
sensations. Russell conceded to the fact that kinaesthetic images can be explained 
away as being small sensations of the same kind as those that would belong to actual 
movements, when the word is uttered. For example, inner speech consist of small 
sensations, which is accompanied by small movements of the tongue or throat. 
Similarly tactile images could be explained. But the difficulty arises with visual and 
auditory images, which, according to Russell, if taken as sensations would contradict 
the laws of physics. Russell put it:
The chair opposite to you is empty; you shut your eyes and visualize 
your friend as sitting in it. This is an event in you, not in the outer 
world. It may be a physiological event, but even so it must be 
radically distinguished from a visual sensation, since it affords no 
part of the data upon which ou/ knowledge of the physical world
outside our own body is built__  When Professor Watson says: "I
should throw out imagery altogether and attempt to show that 
practically all natural thought goes on in terms of sensori-motor 
processes in the larynx (but not in terms of imageless thought)"... he 
is, it seems to me, mistaking a personal peculiarity for a universal 
human characteristic. [Ibid. , p. 293],
Russell contended that the rejection of images by behaviourists was due to their 
rejection of introspection as a source of knowledge. For instance Knight Dunlap |see 
Russell's The Analysis o f  mind] rejected introspection and said that images are 
muscular contractions. But, Russell said, the essential characteristic of introspective 
data is concerned with localisation. It could be that the introspective data are either 
not localized or they are localized in a place already physically occupied by something 
which would be inconsistent with them if they are regarded as part of the physical 
world. In any case these data do not obey the laws of physics and therefore an attempt 
is made to reject tnem.
Russell explained localization of stomach-ache, Eg., by saying that it has a position 
near the surface of the stomach. But the localization of images differ according to the 
nature of images. Images of private sensations can be localized where the private
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sensations would he. Similarly the images of words in the mouth is located in the 
mouth. But visual and auditory images cannot he localized because "the physical event 
to which they would point if they were sensations is not taking place" (p. 296). Since 
the physical world does not include all that we are aware of (visual and auditory 
images), introspection must he admitted as a source of knowledge different from 
sensation.
Russell's introduction of images as distinct from sensations is a direct blow to the 
behaviourists, who try to explain all feelings and thoughts in terms of publicly 
observable behaviour. Not only the behaviourist theory is at stake so is Russell’s own 
neutral monism. Russel1 openly admitted that images are mental. He was perhaps 
aware of this and thought that images can be reduced to sensations of a peculiar kind. 
One can feel his anxiety when he said: "If Professor Watson is right as regards inner 
speech, this whole region is transformed from imagination to sensation'.14
We know Russell accepted images as part of the stuff of the world beside sensations. 
But he followed Hume in explaining the epistemological distinction between images 
and sensations. According to Russell although in the causation of sensations the 
stimulation of nerves carrying an effeci into the brain...plays an important 
role...images and sensations cannot ... be distinguished by their intrinsic nature”. 
\The Analysis o f Mind, pp. 151, 154; An Outline o f Philosophy, p. 187ff|. 
Intrinsically they are same because images are "copies" of sensations.
Now the question arise that why do we need images? In order to explain this Russell 
quoted several passages from Hume, where he made distinction between 
"impressions" and "ideas". According to Hume impressions are all our sensations, 
passions and emotions, as they firsi appear in the soul. Ideas are the faint images of 
these impressions in thinking and reasoning. Russell explained that similar to Humean 
distinctions images resemble antecedent sensations "which enables to call them images 
"of" this or that. To uphold the importance of images Russell said:
For the understanding of memory, and of knowledge generally, the 
recognizable resemblance of images and sensations is of fundamental 
importance. \The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 1551.
There is no absolute difference between images and sensations. It lies simply in their 
causes and eflects. (Cf., ibid., pp. 145, 149ff.). Sensations come through sense-
14. The Analysis o f  Mind, r>. 152.
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organs, while images have mnemic causes. Following Semon |see Russell’s The 
Analysis o f Mind], Russell gave the name of "mnemic phenomena" "to those 
responses of an organism which ... can only be brought under causal laws by 
including past occurrences in the history of the organism as part of the causes of the 
present response". (Ibid., p. 78). He said "the causation of an image always proceeds 
according to mnemic laws, i.e. tha; it is governed by habit and past experience. 
Images, beside having mnemic causes may also have physical causes. But sensations 
have only physical causes".)ibid., p. 151].
Apart from the above distinction, images also differ from sensations in respect of their 
effects. Sensations have both mental and physical effects, whereas images have only 
mental effects. But images may produce bodily movements, but that is only in 
accordance to mnemic laws.
Although against behaviourist programme Russell included images as one of the 
constituents of the world, his theory failed to comply with the strict programme of 
neutral monism. Russell was aware of this situation. In 1927 in his An Outline o f  
Philosophy, he carried out an elaborate discussion on images under the heading 
"Images'.
Here we find that Russell’s entire exercise rests on one consideration: images and 
sensations have similar status. It is correct to say that images are "centrally excited" 
which are excited by a stimulus to some sense organ. Accordingly he argued:
Sensations ... have proximate causes in the brain; images also may 
be due to some excitement of a sense-organ. [Ibid., p. 188].
In Russell’s philosophy neutral entities are located in the brain |See below]. In orcer 
to provide similar status to images as those of sensations Russell said that ine 
connection of images with past experience "works through an effect of the past 
experience on the brain" (ibid., p. 189). Russell thus provided a "physical basis" to 
images. He explained:
If a physical basis is wanted, it can be assumed to exist in the brain.
The state of the brain which causes us to hear the word "Napoleon" 
may become associated with the state of the brain which causes us to 
see a picture of Napoleon, and thus the picture will call each other 
up. The association may be in the sense-organs or nerves, but may 
equally well be in the brain. [Ibid., p. 187, my italics].
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This should not be thought that by providing physical basis to images Russell 
abandoned the idea that there is no distinction between images and sensations. He 
clarified that the psychological distinction is abandoned; the distinction that remains is 
"solely one as to physical antecedents" (ibid., p. 192). We have seen that sensations 
have physical antecedents, without which Russell reasoned physics will collapse. [See 
Chapter Six; it was in 1948 the distinction between the sensation and image lost their 
epistemological significance].
After explaining both the similarities and differences between images and sensations, 
Russell provided the definition of images. He said, "we might have called an event an 
"image" when it is recognizably of the same kind as a "percept" (sensation), but does 
not have the stimulus which it would have if it were a percept".¡An Outline o f  
Philosophy, p. 193[. Russell further clarified himself by redefining the concept of 
"image" as "an occurrence recognisably visual (or auditory or etc., as the case may 
be), but not «..¡used by stimulus which is c i  the nature of light (or sound or etc., as the 
case may be), or at any rate only indirectly so caused as a result of association" (ibid., 
p. 193).
These definitions of "image", in 1927 certainly show a shift from his 1919 and 1921 
position. There Russell clearly stated that images aie mental and depends on mnemic 
laws, which are psychological. Russell knew that such an assertion will undermine his 
theory of neutral monism. At the same time he believed that images exist. Russell 
brought images under physical law in order to provide similar status as those of 
sensations. This he did by bringing certain changes in his analysis of mnemic 
causation and menmic phenomena. Following Semon Russell called "menmic" 
phenomena a certain kind of effect of past occurrence:,. There is a time gap between 
the cause and the effect. This is, what Russell called, action at a distance in time. 
Now Russell s^id:
Russell agreed with Laird ("On Certain of Russell’s Views Concerning The Human 
Mind") that "the hypothesis of causes acting at a distance is too violent, and I should 
therefore now explain habits by means of modifications of brain structure" (Reply, p. 
700). He rejected mnemic causation as a criterion of mental phenomena because it is
[I]f we are to avoid what I called "mnemic" causation, which 
involves action at a distance, in time, we must say that mnemic 
phenomena in mental events are due to the modification of the body 
’ jast events. ¡An Outline, p. 306; Inquiry, Chapter 21, pp. 272-
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"too wide" (The Analysis o f Mind, p. 295). The reason is the mnemic causation is not 
wholly confined to living organisms. Russell said, "magnetized steel looks just like 
steel which has not been magnetized, but its behaviour is some ways different" (ibid., 
p. 78). As to this Anthony Quinton observed:
This is presumably an acknowledgement of the fact that temporarily 
remote causes, which are not linked to any hitherto discoverable 
present state of affairs, have to be invoked to explain the responses 
of living organisms generally, and not just those that have minds. 
["Russell’s Philosophy of Mind", in Pears ed., Collection, p. 104],
As a result images turn out to be less mental and more physical somewhat on 
"behaviourist lines", to put it in Anthony Quinton’s phrase (p. 106). This 
development disclaimed that images are purely subjective and can never be found in 
the physical world.
But the inclusion of images, as neutral entities, does not solve Russell’s problem. 
What Russell did was instead of making the image an illegitimate addition (outside the 
box in the above diagram) , he gave it a similar status as to that of sensations. We 
know that according to the neutral monist there must be a single kind of stuff which 
should explain both mind and matter. Beside images he also includes unperceived 
entities which further damaged his theory.
5.5 The Status of Unperceived or Sensibilia.|S
In his The Analysis o f  Mind Russell said:
If physics is true, there are, beside the particulars that we 
experience, others, probably equally (or almost equally) transient, 
which make up that part of the material world that does not come 
into the sort of contact with living body that is required to turn it 
into a sensation. [Pp. 143-44).
What Russell said in 1921 is the same as that of 1914. 1 have already discussed this at 
length in discussing his phenomenalistic account of matter. I have shown that Russell 
failed to stick to the strict programme o f phenomenalism and could only produce a 
theory which could be at best named "quasi phenomenalism". In 1921 he thought that 15
15. I have discussed this theory of unperceived entities in discussing R ufsell’s commitment to 
phenomenalism in Chapter Four, under the heading "Sensihilia: The Introduction of Hypothetical 
Elements”. Here I will mainly concern Russell's trec'menl of the unperceived entities as neutral stuff; 
cf. Chapter six, by accepting postulates of scientific inference Russell provided similar status to the 
unperceived entities as those of percepts.
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what he had said in 1914 was the neutral monist account of matter. If this is so then it 
turns out to be suicidal.
According to the programme of neutral monism mind and matter both should be 
explained in terms of neutral stuff. We know, as Russell has explained, sensation is a 
neutral entity, which fulfils cetain criteria to be neutral. They are:
(1) it should belong to the actual core of experience,
(2) given in sensation it must be isolated, simple, exclusive and transient,
(3) in isolation it must neither be mental nor physical, and
(4) it should be there when sensed.
When Russell said "sensibilia" or unperccived entities he meant i t  least two things. 
First he meant that there are sensibilia which when obtained become sense-data, i.e., 
their epistemological and metaphysical status are the same. (Cf., Mysticism and 
Logic, p. 148). But there are sensibilia that cannot be obtained and can never be 
obtained. They are also similar (hypothetically) to that of sense-data, and hence both 
perceived and unperceived sense-data must be neutral. Second, he meant that although 
the status of both sense-data and sensibilia is the same, the unperceived ones belong 
only to the physical world because they obey physical laws, and therefore it is, I think 
relevant to call them physical
This involves contradiction. If sensibile is neutral then it should also belong to mind 
as its constituent, and if it wholly belongs to the physical world, which Russell 
conceded, then it is physical and cannot have a similar status to that of sense-datum. 
Hence he admitted two different types of entities in the construction of matter.
Before we discuss the status of unperceived entities, let us go back to remind 
ourseb'es that while adhering to  phenomenalism Russell tacitly abolished any 
reference to physical objects. The immediate knowledge of matter is possible only via 
sense-data. But sense-data, Russell argued, cannot explain matter alone. Beside one’s 
own sense-data there are data which belongs to other person and data which are never 
known and are simply hypothetical assertions. As a result, in Russell’s world, instead 
of unobserved physical objects, we aie left with unobserved cense-data, called 
sensibilia.16 Physical objects are, in another senst, different arrangements of sense- 
data (including unsensed ones). Russell’s acceptance of the existence of sensibilia is 
on the basis of similarity and continuity. (The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 99).
16. See Chapter Four; the unperceived entities are considered as physical objects in disguise.
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Russell provided similar explanation of unperceived entities as those of sensibilia 
which he did in his The Problems o f Philosophy, and "The Relation of Sense-Data to 
Physics’ . As a neutral monist he carried out an elaborate discussion in his The 
Analysis o f Mind and The Analysis o f  Matter.
Russell very aptly explained how unsensed entities forms the part of the constituents 
of the physical world. Let us revert to the earlier example where sensations are 
grouped in two different arrangements. We have seen that a photographic plate is 
exposed in a clear night it reproduces the appearance of the sky with stars. Each star 
produces a separate effect on the photographic plate. According to Russell in between 
the star and the photographic plate "something" happens which is associated with the 
star. Russell explained these "something" as appearances or happenings. The crux of 
the argument is that these "something" in large part are accepted on hypothetical 
ground and on the basis of scientific inference. Russell explained the acceptance of 
this unperceived "something" in the following way:
If we assume, as science normally does, the continuity of physical 
processes, we are forced to conclude that, at the place where the 
plate is, and at all places between it and a star which it photognphs 
something is happening which is specially connected with the star.
[The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 99].
Russell argued that he accepted this "partly on general grounds of continuity, partly to 
account for the fact that light is transmitted with a certain definite velocity" (p. 100).
In a similar way he explained the existence of the unperceived entities by employing 
the principle of continuity in his The Analysis o f Matter. This time cameras. 
Dictaphones or even compact disc can be used to prove that there are unperceived 
entities. For instance the cameras and Dictaphones can be used to record that 
"something" happens where there are no percipient. Say, a room is arranged with a 
man hidden behind a curtain, and also a camera and a Dictaphone. Suppose two men 
came into the room, converse and dine. If the record of the camera and the 
Dictaphone agrees with that of the man behind the curtain, "it is impossible to resist 
the conclusion that something happened where they were which bore an intimate 
relation to what the hidden man perceived" (p. 209).
But R u sse ll thought that the p r in cip le  o f  continu ity  is  not e n o u g h  to  exp la in  the
ex isten ce  o f  the unperceived  en titie s . F o llo w in g  W h iteh ead ’s  v ie w  o f  perception
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Russell accepted the causal theory of perception and agreed with him that "bifurcation 
of nature" does not follow. According to Whitehead the division of nature as the kind 
of view of appearance and reality conveyed secondary qualities such as colours to 
subjective experience and primary qualities to the physical sphere. He discarded this 
attempt of bifurcation and regarded perception as nature ordered in a perspective from 
the stand point of an event with nature itself called the percipient event. In this respect 
all perceived qualities are qualities of nature.
Russell regarded that causal theory of perception affords a solid ground for review 
that unperceived entities exist. He contended that the causal theory has two parts. 
First the causal theory rejects the view that perception gives us direct knowledge of 
external objects. Second, it asserts the view that perception has external causes as to 
something can be inferred from it. Since it has all the qualities of a good scientific 
theory, Russell thought "epistemologically, physics might be expected to collapse if 
perceptions have no external causes".17
In order to make his position clear, about the causal theory of perception, Russell 
made a distinction between science and common sense. He explained that common 
sense holds that perception disclose*' external objects to us directly, when we "see the 
sun", for instance, we see me sun directly. But science interprets it quite differently. 
When we "see the sun" there is a process starting from the sun, travelling the space 
in between the sun and the eye, changing its character when entering the optic nerve 
and the brain and finally producing the event which we call "seeing the sun". This 
long chain of events includes both perceived and unperceived events. The unperceived 
events turn into sensations as they come into contact with the living organism. Russell 
held that the acceptance of the causal theory of perception lies in its three fold merits:
that it links to gather a number of known facts, that it does not have 
any demonstrably false consequences, and that it sometime* enables 
us to make predictions which are subsequently verified. \The 
Analysis o f  Matte', p. 1991.
On the basis of causal theory of perception, Russell attempted to prove the existence 
of the unperceised entities. They are not mere Ding-an-sich or Spencerian 
Unknowable (The Analysis of matter, p. 226). Russell agreed that difference in 
percepts imply difference in stimuli, for instance when a person hears two different 
notes o f two different pilches. Russell explained:
17 The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 197.
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[I]f a person hears two sounds at once, or sees two colours at once, 
two physically different stimuli have reached his ear or his eye. This 
principle, together with spatio-temporal continuity, suffices to give a 
great deal of knowledge as to the structure of stimuli. Their intrinsic 
characters ... must remain unknown; but we may assume that the 
stimuli causing us to hear notes of different pitches form a series in 
respect of some character which corresponds causally with pitch, 
and we may make similar assumptions as regards to colour.... there 
is a roughly one-one relation between stimulus and percept ... This 
enables to infer certain mathematical properties of the stimulus when 
we know the percept, and conversely enables us to infer the percept 
when we know these mathematical properties of the stimulus. [The 
Analysis o f Matter, pp. 226-7],
From the above passage we can infer that percepts and the events causing them are 
similar in structure.'8 This inference is made on the basis o f assumption that a 
complex cause and effect have the same structure. |C f Fritz, p. 170-1, (1952)]. Thus 
"similarity" is one-one relation between stimulus and percept- "i.e. between the 
events just outside the sense-organ and the event which we call a perception" (The 
Analysis o f  Matter, p. 227).
Beside being "similar" the relation between percepts and unperceived events can also 
be "semi-similar", i.e. many-one relation. The many-one relation »s also important in 
explaining the group of events constituting a physical object. The relation of the 
events which are nearer the object to those which are further from it is many-one. In 
many-one relations the two systems which it correlates are "semi-similar". Although 
there is a different cause for every different percept, the different cause may not give 
different percepts. Russell explained:
We find often that indistinguishable percepts are followed by 
different effects- e.g. one glass of water causes typhoid and another 
does not. In such cases we assume imperceptible differences- which 
microscope mav render perceptible. But where there is no 
discoverable difference in the effects, we can still not be sure there 
is not a difference in the stimuli which may become relevant at some 
later stage. [Ibid, p. 255].
This is how through the acceptance of the causal theory of perception and on the basis 
of "similarity of structure" Russel! claimed the existence of the unperceived entities. 
We know that Russell has warned that perceptions need external causes if physics has 
to be explained. 18
18 Russell introduced the importance of structure in his The Analysis o f  Matter, it reached its 
culmination in his Human Knowledge-, also cf., Alan Wood, p. 135.
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Another reason for accepting unperceived physical entities on Russell’s part was to 
discard the probability that his theory was berkcleyan. in his An Outline o f 
Philosophy, Russell explained that if non-mental events of physics have no reality 
then matter will be a construction built out of sensations and "our metaphysics will be 
essentially that of Berkeley" (p. 301).
But there are unperceived entities which can never be a data to any mind. This may be 
so that we are unaware of their existence. Now the question arise: Can we assert their 
existence only on the basis of causal theory of perception? In order to make his 
argument more plausible Russell argued that the events in the physical world have 
relations to each other through which we can arrive at the notion of "neighbour-hood" 
of an events. He said
It will consist roughly speaking of all the events that are very near 
the given event. When we say that neighbouring events have a 
certain relation, we shall mean that die nearer two events are to each 
other, the more nearly they have this relation, and that they 
approximate to having it without limit as they are taken nearer and 
nearer together. ¡An Outline o f Philosophy, p. 116].
The notion of "neighbour-h(x>d" is essential to show that group of percepts can be 
enlarged by unperceived evenis which are correlated with percepts by causal laws.
On the basis of this Russell argued, epistemologically the percepts come first but from 
the ontological stand point they are the last in the chain o f events. There are evenis 
which are ontologically first in the chain and which are also the cause of the percepLs. 
Those events cannot be turned into sensations because we cannot know them directly. 
We can only think that they exist if we accept the causal theory of perception. But 
those events which cannot be a percept cannot become the cause of the percept. This 
is because according to the causal theory of perception, the unperceived events also 
are accessible as they come in contact with the living body.
By accepting the causal theory of perception Russell declared that the unperceived 
events are accessible and are quite similar to the percepts. This he did in order to 
show that these entities are not illegitimate additions but neutral. He thought that the 
acceptance of this did not undermine the neutrality of neutral monism. Russell said 
that the argument that the unperceived entities exist is not probable as those percepts 
of other people, but these arguments, the one from the causal theory of perception,
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are as good as any of the fundamental inductions of science. |77ic Analysis o f  Matter, 
p. 206]. Accordingly on the basis of probability or certainty about the knowledge of 
the events we can say that our own percepts are extremely probable, the percepts of 
other people are less probable, and the unperceived events ate less certain then the 
percepts of other people.
The inclusion of Unperceived events, or as Lockwood calls them "surrogate sense- 
data"19 (probably because they have similar metaphysical status as those of sense-data) 
had been criticised by different philosophers at different times. One of the difficulty 
pointed out (about sensibilia or unperceived entities) is by A.J. Ayer, in his Russell 
anil Moore. Ayer said that by sensibilia Russell understood that what "be presented to 
an ... observer who., had the appropriate point of view" (p. 60). But such an 
assertion would lead to the objection "that the character of a perspective is supposed 
to depend not only on the location but also on the physical condition of the observer, 
and that there is no reason to assume that all hypothetical observers would be in the 
same physical condition" (ibid.). In reply to this Lockwood argued that perhaps Ayer 
thought that there was a circularity in the procedure. The circularity arises "if we ... 
appeal to the physical condition and spatial location in the very specification of those 
elements out of which physical objects and spaa: itself are to be constructed". 
Lockwood says "Ayer is labouring under a serious misapprehension if he thinks that 
the existence or character of unsensed sensibilia is a function of how things would 
look to an observer."20 In fact Russell was talking about the continuity of events and 
the causal dependence on the sense-organs, nerves and brain. Russell said:
We have not the means of ascertaining how things appear from 
places not surrounded by brain and nerves and sense-organs, 
because we cannot leave the body; but continuity makes it not 
unreasonable to suppose that they present some appearance at such 
places. Any such appearance would be included among sensibilia.
|Mysticism and Logic, p. 111.]
Ayer observed:
I do not press the point that the postulation of unobservable entities 
as causes of our percepts is inconsistent with Russell’s own 
derivation of the concept of cause from observed regularities, and 
with his principle that a concept is intelligible to us only if it is in 
our experience or is reducible to concepts which are so 
exemplified—  What I do find objectionable... is the notion that
19 "What Was Russell's Neutral Monism?", p. 145.
20. Ibid., p. 148.
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these unobservable entities are located in an unobservable space.
|Russell and Moore, p. 127],
Similar criticism had been provided by Stace. State in his "Russell’s Neutral 
Monism" has pointed out that there was contradiction in the two claims, first that 
"unperceived aspect do not possess the same sort of characters as do the perceived 
aspects" and second "the unperceived aspects are verifiables because they are exactly 
the same sort of things as the perceived aspects, except that they do not happen to be 
perceived". Such counter arguments 'falls to the ground". |P. 366].
In a sense Stace is right in showing the contradiction which lies between the two 
assenions. We know tha. since the inclusion of sensibilia in his construction of matter 
Russel' had provided different interpretations of the unperceived entities at different 
times. This is because along with gradual change in the construction of the external 
world, his epistemological presuppositions ucdei'vent a change. In this respect Anders 
Wedberg said:
The epistemologist Russell of 1914 occasionally gives the 
impression of not condoning the use of uncertain, non-demonstrative 
inductive inferences. In Human Knowledge, its Scope and Limits 
(1948), on the other hand, the study of induction stands at the centre 
of Russel!’s interest. He piesents a number of inductive principles 
wnich are thought to justify inferences to unknown events from 
known events. For the epistemo!igist Russell of 1948 the 
supposition of non-experienced events is no longer 
illegitimate.|"Logic and Empiricism: Bertrand Russell", p. 158].
In The Analysis o f  Matter Russell said that although the unperceived entities arc 
structurally similar to those of percepts we do not know the intrinsic character of 
those entities. It is on the basis of structural similarly Russell argued that 
unperceived entities have the same metaphysical and epistemological status as those of 
percepts. But we know that Russell also included unperceived entities whose structural 
similarities cannot be known because they can never be a percept. They remain pure'y 
hypothetical assertion in Russell’s philosophy.
Apart from the above criticism Stace also pointed out that Russell’s interpretation also 
showed that "the unperceived aspects are to be identified with the etheric or spatial 
radiations of the physicist".[P. 366). In reply to this Russell said:
Mr. Stace is puzzled by n.y hypothesis of unperceived aspects. Yet 
the hypothesis of such aspects is inevitable if we admit- as we all do 
in fact- that (a) causation does not act at a distance, (b) we can
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perceive (in some case) things from which we are separated by an 
interval which is not a plenum of souls. For practical purposes, 
these unperceived aspects may be identified with light-waves or 
sound waves or their analogues for other senses, but in strict theory 
I should say that light-waves and sound waves are logical structures, 
built out of events more or less as points are built. Unperceived 
aspects, therefore, will be constituents of light-waves or sound­
waves, but not be the waves themselves. |"Reply To Criticisms", p. 
709],
After making himself clear Russell included the unnerceived entities as the neutral 
stuff along with sensations or percepts and images. Now they seem to be no longer 
illegitimate additions in his theory of neutral entires. We can represent this in the 
following diagram:
Thus by providing a physical basis to images and making unperceived entities 
epistemologically viable, Russell brought his theory much closer to neutral monism. 
At this stage he renamed his neutral entities "events" and "percepts" instead of 
"sensations".
From die previous analysis it is clear that Russell’s explanation of "sensations" as 
neutral entities affirms the fact that he brought in the duality of act and object in order 
to make percepts epistemologically viable. Before the introduction of this duality in 
1921, Russell in fact postulated three distinct kinds of stuff, where one (namely 
"sensations") belong equally to both mind and matter. The images belong only to 
mind and unperceived entities belong only to matter, thus leaving a polar opposition 
between mind and matter. In his "Reply" Russell admitted tha* he no longer agreed 
with the view that he advocated in Knowledge o f the External World and The Analysis 
o f Mind, due to the reasons similar to those I have stated above [P. 706].. According 
to him in The Analysis o f Matter he had proposed some change of view, which 
contained fuller and more careiul statement of theories not very different from ’hem.
(Sensations, images, unperceived entities)
Percepts ( Of various 
Degrees of certainty)
Mind Matter
(entities never 
become percept)
Our next discussion will be of his theory of events as neutral entities. The main aim 
will be to see whether he can hold the above position as a neutral monist. I shall,
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however, argue that Russell applied all the characteristics o f "sensation" to the 
"percepts", which represented the neutral entities in his philosophy.
5.6 The Analysis ol Evenly
Accepting the results of modern physics, Russell, in his later philosophy (1927), 
declared that everything in the world is composed of "events". "[This] is the thesis 1 
wish to maintain."21
He defined an "event" as having a small finite duration in time and a small extension 
in space. This occupation of a finite amount of space-time does not entail that it has 
parts. According to Russell the visible parts which could be identified are simply to be 
counted as events. He declared:
Seeing a flash of lightning is an event; so is hearing a tyre burst, or
smelling a rotten egg, or feeling the coldness of a frog. [An Outline
O f Philosophy, p. 287],
These events are data in the sense that they are objects of direct awareness. Such 
events are called percepts, i.e. percepts are a subset of all events in the brain. Apart 
from percepts there are events, such as telephone ringing, a tyre bursting etc., which 
are not data since they occur outside ones body. These events may be data to other 
people, or data belonging to nobody’s experiences but cannot be data in the sense that 
they are an object of direct awareness. It is through percepts that one accounts for all 
inferences to events that are not percepts, and the accountability is because it is said 
that events are causally continuous, i.e. between the telephone ringing and ones 
hearing the telephone in the brain. To say that events are causallv continuous means 
that in between the telephone ringing and the hearing of the telephone there is an 
atmospheric disturbance consisting o f events travelling outward from the place where 
Uie ringing takes place, and then when this disturbance reaches the ear of a person 
that can hear, there :s a percept. This percept is causally continuous with the events 
between the telephone ringing and the persons body, where perception takes place. Ip 
a similar manner, particular colours and sounds etc. are events, which are causally 
connected with other events in the brain.
21. An Outline o f Philosophy, p. 287. Also see The Analysis o f  Matter, Human Knowledge, Portraits 
from memory. My Philosophical Dewlopment.
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Einstein’s theory of relativity and Whitehead’s construction of "points" as systems of 
finitely extended events helped Russell to arrive at such a notion of an event. 
Einstein, creator of the special and general theory of relativity, brought a 
revolutionary change in both physics and philosophy. Two aspects of relativity theory 
has attracted Russell. [Ibid. , p. 114], They are (1) continuous theory of intervening 
medium (ree further discussion in section 5.7), and (2) that the laws of nature should 
he so formulated that it should be the same for any choice of space and time 
coordinates. Russell incorporated Einstein’s general theory of relativity to make his 
philosophy of neutral monism more plausible.
Accordingly Russell held that for philosophy the most important thing about the 
relativity is the abolition of one universal time and the one constant space and the 
substitution of space-time in place of both. [Ibid., p. 114J.
Russell further held that it is a mistake to regard the universe as being in one state at 
one time and in another at anothe., because there is no cosmic time. For this reason 
one cannot speak of the distance between two bodies at a given time.
Since the notion of one cosmic t’nv' and one persistent space is abolished from 
physics, one should, according to Russell, deal with "events" instead of bodies. 
Russell explained this saying that "event" is anything which has a both a date and a 
place. An explosion, a flash of light etc. would be an event.
Russell further characterised events by other attributes: every event in space-time is 
overlapped by other events. The events with which we are familiar are not infinitely 
complex, rather every complex event has a finite nuriber of parts, composed of 
events. Accordingly he argued that a neutral event is devoid of any parts. It is only 
the physical objects (which are constructions out of neutral events) have snatio- 
temporal parts. Such events are called "minimal events". [An Outline o f Philosophy, 
p. 288|. Despite such assertion Russeli in his The Analysis o f Mind maintained that 
the sensations are capable of analysis. But such analysis does not prove that neutral 
events have spatio-temporal parts|See 5.3.].
In order to clarify his point Russell distinguished an event from complexes of events. 
According to him in a certain sense, any series ot events may be considered as a 
single event. For instance the Battle of Waterloo may count as a single occurrence. 
Russell argued:
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But in a complex event of this sort, there are parts which have spatio 
temporal causal relations to each other; no single entity devoid of 
physical stnicture persists 'hrough the whole period. | The Analysis 
o f  Mattel, p. 293,1.
By this Russell meant that anything simultaneous with everything that happened 
during the Battle is complex of parts not all simultaneous with each other. This 
complex parts have spatio-temporal position.
As for other characteristics events are neither impenetrable (An outline, p. 287) nor 
indestructible (The Analysis of Matter, p. 386). Following Eddington, kussell noted 
that events in the form of electrons and positrons may combine in order to destroy 
each other. Persistent units of matte' no longer enjoy the metaphysical status they 
formerly enjoyed. He maintained tb“ events have upper time limits according to 
which "no event lasts for more than a few seconds at most". [The Analysis o f  Matter, 
p 294]. He disagreed with Whitehead who assumed that there is neither upper time­
limit or lov er time-limit to the size of events. (Ibid., p. 292).
According to Russell everything in the world can be explained by "causal lines" 
(Human Knowledge, p. 477, The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 313, An Outline o f 
Philosophy, p. 124; see Fritz {1952}, p. 192, Alan Wood, p. 135). Accepting this he 
denied "action at a distance". In causal chains the events are so situated that the 
knowledge of one event can help to infer other events situated in the causal line. The 
universe at large is composed of causal lines which are mutually dependent hence 
effect "modification". [The Analysis o f Matter, p. 314- Human Knowledge, p. 490|.
Events thus become the final residue in terms of which both mind and matter can be 
explained. Although Russell indicated in 1921 that "sensations" are further 
analysable, his analysis of "percepts" in 1927 denied spatio-temporal stnicture. But by 
giving similar status as those of sensations Russel! in 1948 declared:
The view /  am suggesting is that an "event" may he defined 'is a 
complete bundle o f  compresent qualities, i.e. a bundle having the 
two properties (a) thiu all the qualities in the bundle are 
compresent, (b) that nothing outside the bundle is compresent with 
every member o f  the bundle. 2
22 Human Knowledge, p. 97-98; my italics; a further discussion on this in chapter viii, Th j Principle 
of Individuation"; also cf., Fritz (1952), p. 198; Ayer, Russell and Moore, p. 75ff; cf., Ahmad,M, 
(1968). He, in his thesis, argued that Russell was in "emergent neutralist". But l.iy argument will show
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Then Russell went on to say that a collection of qualities forms a complex of 
compresence, but "is not reducible to a statement about any or all of its constituents 
|Human Knowledge, 325). Such complex of compresence of qualities in a particular 
relation will make the event "unique". When the qualities, within the event, are 
mutually compresent, "the complex is something new" | ibid.].
Such a complex, according to Russell, may be called an event. It will occupy a 
portion of space-time which has no parts that are portions of space-time.
One of Russell’s commentators* 23 viewed this analysis of neutral events in different 
way from that which Russell suggested. Tully argued that neither events nor 
sensations and images are the neutral stuff of Russell’s doctrine. "Sensible qualities 
are the neutral stuff of Russell’s doctrine." (P 224.] His argument gained ground 
from Russell’s suggestion that "the aim of physics ... has always been o discover ... 
the caus?' skeleton of the world" (The AmitysL o f  Matter, p. 391). And since percepts 
belong to the brain, Tully argued that "the necessary fleshing-out of this skeleton is 
made possible by the intrinsic character r.f percepts, since it is by means of sensible 
qualities that observers come to know directly both the physical world and 
themselves. Such qualities are the primary focus of psychology" (p. 223).
I agree with the point that Russell’s analysis shows that percepts (or rather events in 
general) have intrinsic character. Russell did not deny this either. But a single percept 
does not represent a single sensible quality, which is only studied by psychology and 
is therefore mental. Tully admitted that sensible qualities are the result of ones 
introspection, through which one can have knowledge of oneself and the external 
world. Such qualities of the pcicepts are studied by psychology, according tc Russell 
"for their own sakes" ( The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 392). The interpretation of percepts 
in terms of sensible qualities suggests that percepts are essentially mental. If peresp's 
are mental am* if matter is simply a construct’on of percepts, Russell feared, then 
"our metaphysics will be essentially that of Berkeley. If there are no non-mental 
events, causal laws will be very odd; for example, a hidden Dictaphone may record a 
conversation although it did not exist at the time, since no one was perceiving it" (An 
Outline o f Philosophy, p. 301). Russell further argued that we can say:
that Russell was a covert dualist (in section 1.2.3. I have shown how covert dualism differs from other 
form of dualism). This will become clearer as we progress.
23. Tully, Robert, "Russell’s Neutral Monism", 1988, pp. 209-224.
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I cannot verify a theory by means of another man’s perceptions, but 
only by means of my own. Therefore the laws of physics can only 
be verified by me in so far as they lead to predictions of my 
percepts. If then, I refuse to admit non-mental events because they 
are not verifiable, I ought to refuse to admit mental events in every 
one except myself, on the same ground Thus I am reduced to what 
is called "solipsism", i.c. the theory I alone exist. [Ibid., p. 302).
Tully’s contention that sensible qualities are the neutral stuff of Russell’s philosophy 
is another way of saying that Russell’s neutral monism is essentially Berkeleyan.24 
The position of percepts in the brain does not make a percept mental. According to 
the theory of causal perception the "percepts" which come at the very end of the 
causal chain "are in our heads" (The Analysis o f Matter, p, 320). I will discuss this 
issue in the next section.
Ayer argued tnat the position Russell seeks to establish is
"that sensory particulars are after ail dispensable: they can be 
replaced by complexes of qualities. For this purpose, Russell 
introduces the undefined relation of "compresence" which holds 
between qualities which occur at the same time in the same 
experiece" (Russell and Moore, p. 75).
A percept is the "complex of compresence qualities" together with their relations. It 
has both the physical and mental elements. The sensible quality responsible for 
producing immediate knowledge of the percept, with regard to the external world, is 
the mental characteristic representing part of the percept. Beside mental qualities there 
are other qualities together with their relation we can have a complete knowledge of 
physics and psychology. It is through the physical characterisfxs o f the percept we 
discover the "causal skeleton of the world".
Russell’s interpretation of events as neutral entities provides a clear picture that an 
event is compresence of qualities and relations. The events are neither physical, like 
those of sense-data (1912), nor mental, like sensations (1912-1919). They are neutral 
in the sense that they can figure both as mind and matter. But the question is: Are 
events neutral as such? My view is they are neutral because they can figure i.oth as 
mind and matter. It is this analysis which I will argue is covertly dualistic.
I have already said that by covert dualism I mean the acceptance of both distinctively 
physical and mental elements within the datum (a neutral entity). These compresent
24. I will revert to this argument in chapter six.
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element* (but not spatio-temporally distinguished elements) may be analysed as 
essentially mental or essentially physical. These elements form the inherent structure 
of the individual neutral entity. They are so arranged that the subject-object distinction 
follow implicitly without any interference of external causes.
Ayer argued that Russell seemed to imply,
"at one and the same time I am seeing something and hearing 
something else, remembering what happened yesterday and 
anticipating what will happen tomorrow, my visual and auditory 
percepts and whatever feeiings or images form the psychological 
content of my remembering and anticipating are all mutually 
compresent" (Russell and Moore, p. 75).
Aver, critical about this suggestion, argued that the "uniqueness which Russell 
attributes to complete complexes cannot plausibly be claimed for the combinations of 
qualities which characterise the neurta! objects of our system |P. 76|. But according to 
Russell the uniqueness of the bundle does not come through individuation but thorugh 
their mutual compresentness. I have explained that Russell did not deny that there are 
elements within the event. He called the elements qualities which are so compresent 
that we can perceive a complex without perceiving all its component qualities. 
|Human knowledge, p. 325|. These qualities are such that their mutual arrangement 
within the event makes it "new". For instance, when a shade o f blue occurs it does 
not occur alone as a mere quality. It occurs as complex of compresent qualities. Such 
qualities include the hardness, the thickness, a particular shape and size etc. More 
over these qualities are so related that when the shade of blue occurs it is instantly 
"noticed" without any sort of inference. This shows that the subject and object 
distinction can follow without any interference of external causes. And this is one of 
the reasons, I think, why Russell has said that the view "I am having a visual 
sensation which has an external cause" strikes one as "odd", and because of this he 
was slow in adopting the thee • y of neutral monism. |See, 5.3.). Percepts when occurs 
are "noticed", i.e. one can immediate knowledge of them. The [ ercepts do not 
provide a "certain" relation, like those of sense-data, but they do provide a "relative 
certainty", like those of sensations. It is because although we perceive a complex we 
do not independently perceive all of its component qualities. It is for these reasons I 
consider that sensation and percept are interchangeable in Russell's philosophy.2-' 25
25. Cf. Lockwood, "What Was Russell’s Neutral Monism?". He said, "the neutral stuff of the earlier 
works is accordingly equated with a manifold of Einsteinian "even's", or space-time regions, which 
includes "percepts” (roughly equivalent to what he previously referred to as "sensations) as a proper 
subset" (p. 153).
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From the above discussion we can see that an event is not simple. It is neither mental 
nor physical but is a complex of qualities. These qualities are so compresent that they 
have no spatio-temporal distinctions. It is through the mutual relations between the 
qualities within the event that makes it both physical and mental. It is in this sense 
they are covertly dualistic.
In short Russell constructed the neutrality of the event by integrating (through 
compresence) two disparate groups of qualities - the mental group and the physical 
group. There is no neutral affinity between members of the two subgroups and thus 
the ensuing ’neutrality" is an artifact of Russell including them together in the 
"compr-sence". I will return for a fuller discussion of this in chapter six.
Ontologically all events are alike, i.e. they are complexes of qualities. The events 
have different grades of certainty. [The Analysis o f  matter, p. 338). From the 
epistemological point of view the highest grades belong *.o one’s own percepts 
(events); the second grade belongs to the percepts of other people who can 
communicate; the third grade to the events which are not percepts of anybody. 
Percepts are the subset of events, i.e, conies at the end of causal chain, and are 
dependent on both physical and physiological conditions.
5.7. The Physiological Condition.
According to Russell two people cannot have identical percepts because they are not 
only dependent on physical condition but also the physiological condition of the 
person concerned. The modification due to physiological dependence is also accepted 
by Ernst Mach. He explained:
When I see a green leaf (an event which is conditioned by certain 
brain-processes) the leaf is of course different in its form and color 
from the forms and colors, etc., which I discover in investigating a 
brain. \The Analysis oj Sensations, pp. 61-2].
How perceptual organs "conditions" the appearances of objects is clearly stated thus:
A magnet in our neighbourhood disturbs the particles of iron near it; 
a falling boulder shakes the earth; but the strving of a nerve sets in 
motion the whole system of elements. Quite involuntarily does this 
relation of things suggest the picture of a viscous mass, at certain 
places (as in ego) more firmly coherent than in others. [/bit1., p.]2'’ 26
26. Cf. Hamilton, A., op. cu., p. 123.
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The two quotations clearly reflects that Mach has accepted not only intrinsic 
modification but also extrinsic modification. In its extrinsic modification the 
disturbance takes place among several correlated elements. Further modification is 
carried out in their dependence on nerves and brain.
The influence of physiological apparatus was also maintained by Holt. According to 
Holt our physiological apparatus of perception and thought habitually distorts, 
mutilates, and disguises what it is perceiving.27 Perhaps Russell was influenced by 
Mach’s and Holt's interpretations.
We know that Russell accepted two aspects of theory of iclativity. One of the aspects 
is the continuous theory o f  intervening medium. Accordingly he claimed that the 
sense organs, nerves and the brain forms the intervening medium for the percepts or 
sensations. For instance our experience which we call "hearing the bell" can be 
explained in the following way: I.et us suppose that the Church Bell which are ringing 
is a quarter of a mile away from the hearer. The sound which require some time to 
reach the ear goes through different processes. I he sound travels ove, the space 
between the Church and the hearer’s ears, produces certain effect on the tympanic 
membrane and finally in the brain where the "hearing the bell" takes place. There is a 
time gap between the "bell ringing" and the "hearing the bell". As a result their are 
certain modifications between these two events. It is in this way the percepts are 
subjected to various adjustments, which are partly physiological, before the actual 
"hearing the bell" takes place.
According to Russell the percepts are causally dependent upon the condition and the 
location of the observer’s body. [Cf., Ayer, Russell and Moore, p. 58]. Russell 
explained that the causal process involved in perception forms causal chains from the 
external object to the percipient’s brain. In such a process the object we perceive, for 
instance the sun, becomes inferential, and our knowledge of events becomes direct.
I The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 197|. But before the actual "seeing the sun" takes place, 
similar to "heating the bell", the whole process is subjected to various mode of 
operation. This results into modification of events. According to Russell since 
percepts has its own causal antecedents different from those of the other percepts.
27. Rohtschon T., "E.B Holt", in Encyclopedia o f  Philoxophy, vol. 3 & 4, ed. Edwards, P., 1967, p.
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"there may be mutual modification- e.g. a colour looks different in the neighbourhood 
of another colour" (ibid., pp. 314-5,; cf Mach’s analysis).
In chapter four we have encountered how sensations are subjected to laws of 
perspective and are modified. For instance two persons looking at the same object 
will not have identical sensations. This modification depend on the physiological 
disposition of the individual. [Cf., James; in his philosophy since two people can 
know same object the question of modification docs not arise).
In order to explain how sensations are modified Russell accepted both intrinsic and 
extrinsic causations. | Ibid., pp. 314, 324ff- Mysticism, pp. lOlff; Human Knowledge, 
pp. 494ff.|. In his "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" Russell explained the 
"causal dependence of events" and the concept of "modificatio.i".
According to Russell there exists a chain of antecedent events v.hich makes our seeing 
dependent upon the eyes and nerves and brain. But this does not even tend to show 
that there is not another chain of antecedents in which the eyes and nerves and brain 
as physical things are ignored. Russell argued that if we are to escape from the 
dilemma which seemed to arise out of the physiological causation of what we see 
when, for instance, we see the : in , we must find a way of stating causal laws for the 
physical world, in which the units are not material things. We know in accepting 
neutral monism Russell regarded that physical objects -nd mental phenomena are 
assemblages of momentary particulars. As a result the sun itself and the eyes and 
nerves and brain are regarded as assemblages of momentary particulars.[Mysticism, p. 
102; Collected Papers, vol 8, p. 82; cf. Broad-Lovejoy criticism given below]. Now 
Russell is in a position to explain how the modification place:
Thus the sun of eight minute ago is a class of particulars, and what I 
see when I look at the sun is one member of Ibis class. The various 
particulars constituting this class will be correlated with each other 
by a certain continuity and certain intrinsic laws of variations as we 
pass outwards from the centre, together with certain modifications 
correlated cxtrinsically with other particulars which are not member 
of this class. It is these extrinsic modifications which represent the 
sort of facts that, in our former account, appeared as the influence 
of the eyes and nerves in modifying the appe<*rance of the sun.
|Collected Papers, vol. 8, p. 82).
The cursory reading of the passage will disclose that in Russell's philosophy the 
modification of events rests on two causes, intrinsic and extrinsic. According to the 
intrinsic law (the law of perspective) the same object will look different from different
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points of view. For instance when a man sees a table it may look round from one 
perspective and oval from another. Even if the man takes the same position his 
physiological condition will be different to what he had a moment ago. The other 
cause of modification is due to extrinsic cause. According to this there is a mutual 
modification of events. For instance the table is constituted out of a number of 
particulars or events. In the immediate neighbourhood of events there are other events 
which constitute another object, say a chair. Similarly throughout the world there are 
enormous numbers of events coexisting and are responsible for various other "things". 
This happens because of the mutual modifications between the events.
One may still have questions about the extrinsic modification. V/e know that 
something is modified when it passes from one medium t ' another. For instance a 
straight piece of stick will look slightly bent when immersed in water. Such 
modifications cannot be denied.
Apart from the above explanation we can say that since events are covertly dualistic, 
i.e. the complex of compresent qualities and relations the modification may take place 
within the datum. Whether an event is menta1 or physical can be determined by how 
the qualities are «-e’ated.
Russel1’s notion of "causal dependence" and "extrinsic and intrinsic modification" is 
critically assessed by A.J. Ayer in his Russell and Moore. According to him "this 
seems...unnecessarily complicated" (p.. 58).
Ayer’s argument is countered by Lockwood. Lockwood quoted Ayer, who said that 
"if sense-data are existentially dependent on the presence of observers, they cannot 
exist, in the absence of observers as unsensed sensibilia" ({1981}, p. 147). Lockwood 
argued that Russell did not mean "existentially dependent" and did not use such a 
phrase. Lockwood explained:
But Russell did think it highly probanle that the existence of such a 
sensibile causally required the presence of appropriate, and 
appropriately functioning, sensory apparatus and that - again as a 
matter of scientific fact- wherever one had that one would a fortiori 
have a conscious subject. |Pp. 147-8}.
The dependence of percepts on the physiological condition led to more severe 
criticism. A.O. Lovejoy in his The Revolt Against Dualism (pp. 259-61) extensively 
dealt with this issue. Lovejoy explained:
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Among the eccentric causal objects recognized as such by Mr. 
Russell is the brain of the percipient;... the presence of this object in 
the region of space where that "appearance" of (say) the table which 
is a sense-datum occurs, distorts the appearance, making it... 
different from the pure or perfectly regular perspective aspect of a 
table which would have occupied the place if no brain had intruded 
there- and if also, no distorting influence had been at work in the 
intervening medium. |P . 259J.
Lovejoy cited C.D. Broad’s criticism which, he thought, Russell totally 
misunderstood. Broad recorded his criticism in his Scientific Thought (1952). Lovejoy 
explained that Broad accused Russell treating the observers body and the physical 
objects in two different ways in his theory. According to Russell’s theory a physical 
object is a construction. I; is constituted out of various correlated events. But, 
according to Broad Russell treated body as something which exists and is not a 
construction. Broad suggested that the theory
"owe some of its plausibility to the fact that, while we read his 
(Russell’s) exposition, we think of our own bodies (and perhaps of 
other media, like mirrors and coloured glass) as physical objects in 
the non-Russellia>i sense, and other pieces of matter as physical 
objects in the Russellian sense" (p. 534; also quoted by Lovejoy, p.
259).
Russell met this criticism in his The Analysis o f  Matter. Clarifying his position Russell 
said that Broad’s view,
"suggested that ... [Russell’s] theory takes a common-sense view of 
the percipient’s body, and derives from this an undue plausibility for 
the view which it suggests as to external objects. This is not the
case...."
Russell argued that Broads criticisn. is generated from his failure to understand that in 
the theory o f  perception a physical object has "twofold location". On the one hand, a 
physical object is a group of events or appearances; on the other hand, it has an 
influence upon the appearances of other objects, especially appearances in its 
neighbourhood, causing these to depart from what they would have been if they had 
strictly followed the laws of perspective. [CL, Lovejoy, p. 259|. Russell argued that 
the sense-organs have only this second function to perform in the theory of 
perception, while the object perceived has the first function. He explained that "it r  
this difference of function, in the theory of perception, which makes it seem as if we 
were treating the percipient’s body more realistically than external objects". But
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actually "the appearance of an external object is modified also by other external 
objects- e.g., by blue spectacles or a microscope" (The Analysis of matter, pp. 259- 
60; Lovejoy, pp. 259-60).
The above explanation by Russell does not satisfy Lovejoy. First, he aigued that a 
"physical object", from Russell’s point of view, cannot have a neighbourhood because 
it is the aspects composing the object which can be neighbours to other aspects. 
Second, he said that Russell missed the main crux of Broad’s argument. Lovejoy 
pointed out that Broad's objection is that objects, for instance, like mirrors, coloured 
glas> and particularly sense-organs and nerve are not treated as having the properties 
of "a piece of matter" as defined by Russell. "It is no reply to this remark that a 
"physical object" (in the theory) has "a twofold character"; that fact :s the point of 
departure of the objection." (P. 260]. The concept of "twofold character" of physical 
objects is dubbed by Lovejoy as "implicitly incongruous". To allocate one of the 
characters to the objects perceived and the other to the "media" such as sense-organ, 
mirrors, coloured glass, does not answei Broad’s objection. In fact sense-organs or 
any other media "must have both characters - one set qua physical "in the Russellian 
sense", the other set qua causal - and yet cannot have both consistently" (p. 261). 
I^ovejoy emphasised that Broad had "abundant ground" for suspecting that Russell’s 
theory of matter consisted in operating two entirely distinct and opposed concept- of a 
"physical object", using one or the other as the excegencies of the argument required.
Lovejoy is right in a way in pointing to the fact that any medium, whether sense- 
organ, or mirrors must include both characteristics if Russell’s theory of physical 
objects is to be coherent. But my reaction to the above two objections is that Russell’s 
mistake is rather an innocent one. In Russell’s philosophy both sense-organs, mirrors 
and photography plate or any other physical objects are constructions out of neutral 
particulars. It is true that physical objects have no neighbourhood, but the aspects 
constituting the physical objects have a neighbourhood. But those aspects which have 
a neighbourhood consisting of other aspects may, from another point of view, be 
called a physical object (assemblage of aspects). In every neighbourhood of events 
there may be physical objects from a certain point of view. It is in this sense Russell 
has said that physical objects have neighbourhood.
More over in explaining his views on intrinsic and extrinsic modification Russell 
categorically pointed out to the fact that "the sun itself and the eye; and nerves and 
brain must be regarded as assemblage of momentary particulars’ instead of
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considering them as material units. I think that both Lovejoy and Broad over reacted 
to the issue.
In essence, the Broad-Lovejoy objection is that Russell did not construct the physical 
just from neutral entities, but rather from neutral entities plus some particular physical
objects - sense-organs.
Quite apart from the discussion of the neighbourhood issue above, I will argue that 
this apparent circularity of Russell’s analysis is really part of Bootstrapping. I will 
return to this general issue in chapter seven.
5.7.1 Are Percepts In The Brain?.
One of the reason why Tully’s assertion that sensible qualities are the neutral stuff in 
Russell’s philosophy is the admission that neutral entities have a location and that is in 
the brain.28 Rjssell spoke of both physical and sensible loertion of the percepts. I 
shall begin how Russell assigned physical location to the neutral entities.
Russell argued that whoever accepts the causal theory of perception is bound to wind 
up saying that
"percepts [the neutral entities) are in our heads for they come at the 
end of a causal chain of physical events leading spatially, from the 
object to the brain of 'he percipient. V'e cannot suppose, that at the 
end of the process, the last effect suddenly jumps back to the 
starting-point, like a stretched rope when it snaps. And with the 
theory of space-time as a structure of events ... there is no sort of 
reason for not regarding a percept as being in the head of the 
percipient. I shall therefc.e assume that tnis is the case, when we are 
speaking of physical, not sensible location’ (The Analysis o f Matter, 
p. 320).
This view has outraged his critics. But at the same time it has also been accepted as a 
positive outcome of Russell’s philosophy. In Russell’s theory a percept has both 
physical and perceptual (sensible) location.
28. Tully identified the percepts with sensible qualities, hence making it subjective. But the location of 
percepts in brain also suggests that Russell's neutral monism is in fact physicalism in disguise. I will, 
of course, argue negatively. This I will discuss in chapter six when I discuss "anomalous monism".
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In explaining the above passage A.J. Ayer called it, "the startling conclusion"29. Ayer 
disputed that "naive realistic way of locating objects is incorrect,... one reason why I 
wish to dispute it is that the alternative theory, to which Russell believes that we are 
committed by the causal account of perception, appears to me quite unacceptable" 
(Russell and Moore, p. 127).
Although Russell has expressed himself in an unnecessary "paradoxical” way, the 
location of percepts, according to Lockwood, also makes a perfect sense within the 
context of Russell’s neutral monism.30
|W)hat the physiologist sees when he looks at a brain is part of his 
own brain, not part of the brain he is examining. \The Analysis o f  
Matter, p 383; also cf., An Outline o f Philosophy, p. 146; 
Lockwood, p. 153].].
In order to explain the above assertion Russell said that when we have percept, just as 
we perceive is an event occupying part of the region, which for physics, is occupied 
by the brain. This is because perception gives us the most concrete knowledge we 
possess as to the stuff of the physical world. What we actually perceive is not part of 
the stuff of tables and chairs, sun, moon, and stars but part of the stuff of our brains. 
Russell said:
Suppose we are looking at a leaf, and we see a green patch. This 
patch is not "out there" where the leaf is, but is an event occupying 
a certain volume in our brams during the time that we see the leaf. 
Seeing the leaf consists of the existence, in the region occupied by 
the brain, of a green patch causally connected with the leaf, or 
rather with a series of events emanating from the place in physical 
space where physics places the leaf. The percept is one of this series 
of events, differing from others in its effects owing to the 
peculiarities of the region in which it occurs. |An Outline o f  
Philosophy, p. 292; my italics!.
This view has confused philosophers and laymen equally. Russell argued "the feeling 
of paradox about this ' iew comes... from wrong views of space" (The Analysis o f 
Matter, p. 383). Russell in his "Reply" made his position clear. He said that Nagel "is 
indignant with me because I use the word "see in an unusual sense. I admit this, the 
unusual sense implies naive realism, and whoever is not a naive realist must either 
eschew the word "see" or use it in a new sense" (p. 704). Russell explained that 
common sense says: (1) "I see a brown table." This can be interpreted to such
29. Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage, p. 123.
30. See Lockwtxxl, "What Wav Russell's Neutral Monism".
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statements: (2) "I see a table" and (3) "I see something brown". The first statement 
denies physics, the second denies that I see a table and the third deny that I see 
something brown. Among these three Russell chose (2), but admitted that (1) or (2) 
"would lead to at least equal paradoxes ’(ibid., p. 705).
Russell undertook an elaborate discussion to clarify his position (about the above 
quoted passage) which not only shocked Nagel31 but "has |also] shocked various other 
philosophers" (p. 705). According to him every event occupies a finite amount of 
space time, i.e., overlaps with events which do not overlap with each other. Certain 
collection of events "points". "Causal laws enable us to arrange points in a four 
dimensional order. Therefore when the causa' relations of an event are known, its 
position in space-time follows tautologically." |P. 705). For instance when the 
physiologist sees the other persons brain a chain of event from "the other person’s 
brain" produces a certain effect in the optic nerve and then to the brain of the 
physiologist, where the seeing takes place. Russell in his "Reply" held that it is the 
causal and temporal connections of percepts in sersory and motor nerves provides 
percepts a position in the brain of the perceiver. |P. 7051. He explained:
"Observe ciat a "portion" of a brain is a set of points (o. minimum 
volumes); an event may be a member of certain points (or minimum 
volumes) that arc members of the brain, and is then said to be "in" 
the brain, but it is not "part" of the brain. It is a member of a 
member o* the brain". |P . 705-6).
Daniel Cory explained that the above quotation, though "difficult as it stands", 
presupposes "a certain familiarity with Russell’s general analysis of matter and in 
particular his logical construction o f "points" out of overlapping events. A physical 
object, such as a chair or human brain, is conceived to be an obstinate system of 
events, rather tnan a "thing" or "substance". | "Are Sense-Data "in" The Brain", p. 
537|.
Lockwood in his "What Was Russell's Neutral Monism" further clarified Russell’s 
position. He argued:
What the physiologist sees when he examines someone else’s brain 
is, as common sense would dictate, the other person’s brain. For ex 
hypothesi the physiologist has visual percepts that are appropriately 
causally related to events in that brain; therefore he may be saitJ 
visually to perceive the latter; and that after all precisely what the
31. Nagel, E., "Russell’s Philosophy of Science", in Schilpp; Edwards. P.E., "Are Percepts In The 
Brain?".
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word "see" would normally he taken to mean. What Russell has 
done, clearly, is assign to the term "see" a sense of his own, 
according to which having a visual percept may also be described as 
"seeing" it. |P. 153|.
Thus the percepts have, to put it in Cory’s words, a "definite "home" in the brain. 
This is the physical location of the percept where the "seeing" takes place. Here 
Russell clearly employed the bootstrap strategy to locate percepts in the brain. 
Percepts are events, and that events are in space time, and therefore percepts are in 
space time. Since percepts are in space-time they must have a location. The ideal 
location is the brain of the percipient and is known immediately. There is an obvious 
circularity. |See 5.I.J.
It is the physical brain which gives a definite location to the percept. Percepts are not 
only physically located in the brain, they are also sensibly located from where one can 
have a "view o f the world".32 According to Russell private space belongs to the 
private worlds of different percipients, with sense-organs, nerves and brain (see 
Chapters Four and Six for detailed discussion). This "view o f the world" is also 
shared by properly functioning photographic plate. In other words the private space is 
the appearance which the universe presents from a certain point of view. This private 
space has a location in the percipients brain. Russell explained that in every area
"of physical space there is at every moment a vast multiplicity of 
occurrences corresponding to all the things that could be seen there 
by a person or recorded by an instrument. These things,... have 
spatial relations to each other which correspond ... with the 
correlated objects in physical space. The whole complex world that 
appears in a photograph of stars is at the place where the photograph 
is taken and, likewise, the whole complex world of my percepts is 
where I am ... from the stand point of physics. \My Philosophical 
Development, pp. 79-80|.
A cursory reading of the above passage indicates that each private space, which is a 
view of the world, is a "visual area" or "duration" in the physical space. Russell in 
his Human Knowledge explained that a "samll region" of sp e-time is a collection of 
compresent events, and "among the events constituting a region thoughts are 
included ... |Therefore| a given thought... is a member of a class, and the class is a 
region in the brain " (p. 246).
32. I have discussed this issue ir. chapter t, under the heading Status of Sense-data". Russell spoke of 
both physical and physiological status of sense-data and sensations.
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We have seen that an event is a compresence of qualities and relations. The space it 
occupies is along with other physical elements, together so compresent that they are 
not spatio-temporally distinguished i.e. not a sub-space of physical space. [I have 
argued that percepts are covertly dualistic; see above]. In other words each private 
space is a perspective space in which a percept is related to various other percepts 
forming a spatial unit or perspective.
Above we have seen that in explaining the sensible location Lockwood said that the 
physiologist has visual percepts that are appropriately causally related to events in that 
brain. It is for this the physiologist may be said visually to perceive the latter; and 
that after all precisely what the word "see" would be taken to mean.
Ayer not only criticised the physical location of the percepts but also the sensible 
location. He argued:
?f we insist on there being a place where the mental processes occur, 
the obvious candidate is indeed the brain. I am... somewhat 
reluctant to follow Russell in identifying the mental processes, into 
which I am suggesting that percepts become transmuted, with events 
in the brain. I am i.ot disposed to question the hypothesis that these 
processes are causally dependent upon events in the brain, but I 
doubt if the evidence is sufficient for us to be justified in translating 
this causal dependence into a factual identity. \Russell and Moore, 
pp. 128-9],
Daniel Cory found Russell’s argument "rather convincing" when he said that percepts 
are "in" our brains. Cory quoted Russell from his Physics and Perception.
When 1 say that something is "outside" me, there are two different 
things that 1 may mean. I may mean that I have a percept which is 
outside the percept of my body in perceptual space, or I may mean 
that there is a physical object which is outside my body as a physical 
object in the space of physics. Generally there is a rough 
correspondence between these two. The table that I see is outside 
my body as I see it in perceptual space, and the physical table is 
outside my physical body in physical space. ["Are Sense-data "In" 
The Brain?", p. 538]
From the above passage it is clear that the star is in physical space "outside" one’s 
body which is also in physical space. But the percepts of the stars along with other 
percepts are "within" the percipient, which forms the private space. This private space 
is the "tiny region" in physical space "in" the percipients body. And that physical 
space is the "brain" of the percipient. This point is further clarified by Cory, who
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agreed with Russell’s explanation of location of percepts in the head. Cory points out 
that to a layman a table, for example, cannot be "inside" one’s head but "outside” 
one’s head. Cory argued:
|H |e is right in one sense of the word "outside". The content of the 
naive perception ... can be phenomenally analyzed into a given 
arrangement of colored patches - what I call ... the "apparent 
thing", and the apparent table is certainly outside of my head, 
considered as another apparent thing in perceptual space [private 
space].... But if we are using the word "outside" in Russell’s other 
sense, the layman is neither right nor wrong, because he does not 
make the necessary distinctions. In the second sense of the word, 
then, the physical table is outside of my physical head in the 
"inferred" space of physics. It does not follow from this, however, 
that the apparent table is outside of my physical head; on the 
contrary, if Russell is right, it is in it. ["Are Se^se-data "In" The 
Brain?", p. 539],
Cory said that Russell’s explanation shows that there is a "rough correspondence" 
between the private space and the public space. They are not identical.
We can explain this in the following way. The "spatial relation" given in the percept 
is not the spatial relation of the percepts. Each is a different sub-'et o f the 
compresence qualities and relations. But we know that accoiding to Russell we can 
infer their structure as similar. It is through the sensible location of the peicepts in 
private space that we can know the intrinsic qualities of percepts. Although we can 
infer that each and every event has intrinsic nature we can only infer from our 
percepts, since they come at the end of the causal chain. But this should not be 
interpreted to mean that percepts are subjective, i.e. they are conscious and therefore 
wholly mental. On the basis of the above interpretation we can reject Tully’s 
argument that the sensible qualities are the neutral entities in Russell’s philosophy.
As I have already said that in Russell’s philosophy the percepts have similar status as 
those of sensations. The percepts are neither physical nor psychological. The claim 
that percepts are physical is because of their dependence on the brain. To consider 
percepts as subjective is because they enable us to explain how things are "noticed" 
and "known". According to Russell the corcept "subjectivity" does not entail the 
"conscious" aspect of mind because their is no such thing as consciousness. Following 3
33. Cf., the status of percepts with sense-data in chapter 4, under the heading ’Status of Sense-data".
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James he has refuted consciousness. Percepts are physiologically subjective in the 
sense that they are dependent on the brain and nervous system of the organism.
Percepts are the neutral entities in Russell’s mature philosophy. It is "simple", 
"subjectless" and are given. Both physics and psychology can be explained in terms of 
these basic neutral entities. Every thing in the world can be explained as construction, 
out of these percepts. |See Chapter Six, "The Theory of Construction’ !.
In Russell's philosophy, not only commor-sense physical objects are constructions but 
also scientific entities. According to Russell something is a construction when it has 
properties:
The electron has very convenient properties, and is therefore 
probably a logical structure upon which we concentrate attention just 
because of these properties. [ The Analysis o f Matter, p. 319]
But Nagel34 is critical about Russell’s claim that Nature is not kind enough to provide 
the mathematician with "agreeable smooth mathematical properties". It is true, for tiie 
sake of the development of mathematical physics, that certain features of things have 
been isolated and others ignored, but it is not right to say that on t’tis criterion "the 
event out of which electrons and other objects are said to be constructions should not 
be regarded as constructions" (Nagel, p. 340).
According to Russell, any thing which is complex have constituent parts. In other 
words whatever is analysable into parts having certain relations is a complex. Russell 
insisted that physics which deals with such concepts as "instants", "points", 
"electrons" etc. are all complexes becar.se they are analysahle into percepts which 
have spatio-temporal position. This can be explained in the following way: Let i:s 
consider a series of overlapping areas. With the addition of more and more members 
to the series, the area common to the members become smaller and smaller. One 
might consider that this series has a limit and take that limit to be a point. But such 
assertion would leave us with the problem of determining whether such a limit is an 
entity. One might argue that such a limit is a point or instant. Instead of referring 
these expressions as instants or points we can replace the expressions referring only to 
series of areas or durations. According to Russell such an analysis satisfies all the
34. Nagel, "Russell’s Philosophy of Science", in Schilpp.
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usual logical and mathematical uses of points. Such an analysis is considered as 
logical construction.3'
As a result the complex concepts of physics cannot be considered as a part of the 
'ultimate furniture of the world".
In our analysis of events we have seen that in 1948 Russel1 claimed that an "event", a 
neutral entity, has internal structure. That is to say that an event is a complete bundle 
of compresence quality. Does this make an event a construction? Russell’s reply was 
no. [Cf., Human knowledge, Chapter Tight, pp. 310-25]. He said that in a "complete 
complex of compresence" all the members of the group are compresent, and nothing 
outside the group is compresent with every member of the group. Although we 
perceive a complex of compresent qualities we cannot perceive the constituent 
qualities. For instance, in the sentence "this is red", the subject can be named as 
"this" (a proper name I and then by attention we observe that redness is one of the 
constituent qualities. The later analysis into redness is a judgement by perception. But 
the initial naming as "this" is not analytic because the "whole was defined as "this”, 
not as a complex of known parts" (Human Knowledge, p. 320). Russell said:
A complex of compresence ... is not to be conceived, like a class, as 
a mere logical construction, but as something which can be known 
and named without our having to know all its constituent 
qualities.... |ln  other words] a complex can, therefore, be 
mentioned in a way which is not reducible to a statement about any 
or all of its constituents. | Ibid., p. 325].
When the qualities are given, such a complete complex is "unique". Ayer, critical 
about this suggestion, argued that "the difficulty is that the uniqueness which he 
attributes to complete complexes, in their capacity as total momentary experiences, 
cannot be plausibly lie claimed for the combinations of qualities which characterise 
the neutral objects of our primary system" (Russell and Moore, p. 76). It is true that 
in his explanation of total momentary experience in one’s personal biography Russell 
did not mean *ha‘ it is the result of one eve.it as complete complex of compresence. 
He mentioned a series of events forming a complex makes a momentary experience 
"unique". But the uniqueness of an event as bundles of qualities does not come 
through individuation but through their mutual comprescntncss (Human Knowledge, 
p. 325). 35
35. Cf., Fritz, ’Russell’s Philosophy of Science", pp. 159-60.
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When I say "I can see a colour red" I mean "redness occurs", i.e. it is "this". That 
means when a sensation occurs it is immediately "noticed" and "named". A sensation 
or percept is both an object and knowledge. For Russell “the event is both mental and 
material at once" (Portraits From Memory, p. 152). This is what, I think, Russell 
meant when he said that an event is a bundle of complete compresence of qualities. 
Such a complex is "new" over and above the qualities. By which, 1 think, he meant 
that the new complex is neither mental nor physical but both mental and physical. 
This provides the basis of neutrrlity to the event which can figure in two groups. 
Since the event have both the mental elements and physical elements "it is possible for 
an event to have both the causal relations characteristic of physics and those of 
psychology" (ibid., 4 . 152). This is why I called the percepts or neutral entities 
covertly dualistic. (See 5.6.].
In Russell’s philosophy "percepts" and "sensation" have a similar status. Although 
percepts have internal elements these elements have no spatio-temporal position. 
Russell analysed "percepts" in the similar way James analysed "experience". James 
argued that experience is the ultimate datum according to which every thing in the 
world can be explained. It is neutral but "only, within the datum there are two parts, 
the objective and subjective parts... and as, within the datum, the one part is to the 
other, so will the datum itself in its entirety appear as the subjective part in the next 
datum which will contrast it with the objective part of its own content" (see 2.4). But 
James said that these parts can be seen in retrospection, hence it is mental and 
physical both at once. In chapter three I have shown that how James committed 
himself to covert dualism.
5.8. Conclusion.
The main aim of this chapter has been to analyse Russell's ontology of neutral 
entities.
Russell developed his theory of neutral entities in several of his well known books. 
The process of development started in 1919 until 1959. It was in 1921 he finally 
declared that James and the American realist had been right in denouncing that in 
perception we cannot see anything like mental act". He rejected Meipong’s threefold 
distinctions between act, content (this Russell never accepted from the very beginning
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as a realist) and the object. In a process, following James, he rejected "consciousness" 
as an entity which explains mind and its function.
In chapter four I have shown that Russell’s development of neutral entities began as 
early as 1912, when he accepted sense-data as the immediate object of knowledge. 
The knowledge of physical object became knowledge by description. Mind as a 
separate entity has been retained. It is in sensation we are aware o f sense-data, such as 
a patch of colour, sound hardness etc. "We are not only aware of things, but we are 
often aware of being aware of them." [The Problem, 1912, pp. 26-27).
As his first objective as a neutral monist, Russell's immediate task was to abolish the 
distinction between "sense-data" and "sensation" in order to get rid of psychophysical 
dualism. This he did in 1921 with the announcement that since the subject is a 
"gratuitous assumption", and not empirically discoverable, we should dispense with 
it. Thus we are left with "sensation", the neutral entity, which is non-cognitive. A 
patch of colour is no longer knowledge by acquaintance, but is the empirical basis of 
our knowledge. With this came the end of his relational theory.
Now we are left with "sensations" as neutral entities, which can figure as a constituent 
in the construction o f both mind and matter. But sensations are not enough to explain 
mind, which requires "images" (mental), and matter, which requires unperceived 
entities called "sensibilia" (physical). As regards the introduction of images Russell 
argued that the behaviourists had been wrong in rejecting introspection as a source of 
knowledge. Since the physical world does not include all that we are aware of, such 
as visual and auditory images, hence introspection must be admitted as a source of 
knowledge different from sensation. The introduction of "sensibilia" was mainly due 
to the fact that since physics demands continuity, there are entities which make up that 
part of the material that does not come into the sort of contact with living body that is 
required to turn it into a sensation.
Such an assertion left his theory of neutral entities, of 1921, openly dualistic in 
Cartesian style. Russell realised this mistake. In his later development he brought 
images (which have mnemic causes, i.e. action at distance) on par with sensations. 
Following Hume Russell said images are copies of sensations and have no intrinsic 
difference between them. He discarded mnemic causation and said tha* mnemic 
phenomena in mental events are due to modifications of brain structure. He rejected 
action at a distance and provides images with a physical basis. It was only in 1948
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that images and sensation lost their epistemological importance. As regards 
unperceived entities Russell said that they have the similar metaphysical status as 
those of sensations. He seemed now to be less interested in epistemology. As a result 
he presented a number of inductive inferences (1948) to justify inferences to unknown 
events from known events. His acceptance of tne theory of causal perception provided 
a surer ground for the unperceived entities. Accordingly, in the causal network of 
events those which come at the end of the chain have epistemological certainty. Since 
we know the intrinsic character of these events we can infer the structural similarity 
of other events (unperceived).
At this stage Russell took i  more scientific approach and renamed his neutral entities 
as "percepts" (or "events" in the wider sense to include unperceived entities). 
Einstein’s theory of relativity and Whitehead’s construction of "points" helps Russell 
to arrive at a notion of an "event". Although he accepted some of the analysis of 
events furthered by these two men, Russell also analysed them in his own way.
Despite his new approach, Russell still faced the question: How do we have 
knowledge of the external world? Since percepts or sensations are not knowledge by 
themselves, then one cannot have knowledge of the external world. In 1959 he could 
not but speak his mind that there is a duality in any form of knowledge. This duality 
(the act of knowing and the object known) had to be re-introduced. What he did was 
to replace the term "acquaintance" with an undefined term "noticing". But he did not 
introduce "sense-data" which is knowledge by acquaintance. In place he introduced 
the term "sensational cores". They seem to provide relatively certain knowledge than 
sense-data, which are truly certain in Russell's philosophy.
In 1948 Russell declared that an event is not simple but a complete bundle of 
compresent qualities and relations. Thu sensational cores which be'ongs to the percept 
gives us immediate knowledge of the object. For instance when a shade of blue occurs 
.i does not occur as a mere quality. It occurs along with hardness, the thickness, a 
particular shape, so related that it is instantly "noticed". It is this analysis I argue that 
is covertly dualistic.
In the next chapter I will discuss the general function of Russell’s theory of matter 
and mind, in the light of my analysis of its detailed epistemology and ontology. As a 
neutral monist Russell’s main aim was to show that "the traditional separation 
between physics and psychology, mind and matter, is not metaphysically defensible,"
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rather "the two will be brought to together, not by subordinating either to the other, 
but by displaying each as logical structure composed of ... "neutral stuff"". [The 
Analysis o f Matter, p. 10J.
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Chapter 6.
Russell On Neutral Monism: Matter And Mind.
... physicist assure us thr there is no such thing as matter, and 
psychologists assure us that there is no such thing as mind. This is an 
unprecedented occurrence. Who everheard of a cobbler saying that 
there was no such thing as boots, or tailor maintaining that all men 
are really naked?
Russell, 'What is the Soul?" in 
Let the People Think,( 1941 ).
The word "mind" and "matter" are used glibly, both by ordinary
people and by philosop’iers__ My own feeling is that there is not -
sharp line, but a difference of degree; an oyster is less mental than a 
man, but not wholly un-mental.
Russell, An Outline o f  Philosophy, (1927, p. 209).
Introduction.
This chapter will consist of three sections. The first section will deal with Russell’s 
theory of construction. This will be followed by an elaborate discussion of his theory 
of matter. The second section will consist of a discussion of his theory of mind as 
explained in terms of neutral entities. In the third section an attempt will be made to 
show that although neutral monism has its own drawbacks it is certainly not a form of 
physicalism. A comparison will be made between a particular form of physicalism 
called anomalous monism.
Section I
6.1 The Theory o f Construction,1
In accepting neuLal monism Russell argued that mind and matter are simply 
constructions out of very basic entities. [See 5.7.2] These basic entities are called 
percepts and are therefore considered as the ultimate constituents of the external 
world.
1. Russell's theory of logical construction is amplified in his various philosophical discussion. Here I 
will try to restrict my discussion only to his application of the "logical construction" in order to explain 
his analysis of mind and matter in terms o f neutral entities.
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Unlike Russell, James considered the world as pattern. In his philosophy the basic 
entities includes both universals and particulars. Beside the patches of colours, odours 
etc. the given he also included the existence of physical objects, in his Radical 
Empiricism James argued that two persons can perceive the same object. Because of 
this there was no need of constructing physical objects. [See 3.2.7], But for Russell 
no two views are same. More over he did not postulate physical objects at the same 
level as the neutral entities. Russell accepted the method of construction in order to 
explain physical objects and mental phenomena.
Before we discuss his theory let us see how Russell arrived at the notion of neutral 
entities.
Ontological Reduction.
In chapter one I have shown why the neutral monists rejected the concept of 
"substance" and instead accepted the notion "stuff". They generally reason that the 
traditional analysis o f substance raises certain difficulties. Substance as substrate, in 
the analysis of Descartes and Locke, does not emphasise its distinction from „ ccidents 
and properties. In such an analysis substance remain unknown. What we know are the 
properties that inhere in the substance.
The replacement with the concept the "stuff", neutral monist argues, provides a better 
understanding of the relation of matter and mind to the stuff of the world. As a result 
two problems are solved: (1) ontological, and (2), epistemological. Ontologically the 
"stuff" is not any hidden unperceivable Ding-an-sich. Epistemologically one can have 
immediate knowledge of the oasic elements which underpin both psychology and 
physics. Accordingly they argue that the stuff of the world is simply a "collection of 
entities".
In the preceding chapter we have seen that by accepting the empiricist’s siarting-point 
Russell arrived at the theory of neutral entities. These entities, such as patches of 
colours, shapes, sounds, are simple and are known in perception. They are simple in 
the sense that they occupy a small finite duration in time and a small extension in 
space. This space-time occupation does not entail that they have parts. In other words 
"simples" are devoid of spatio-temporal structure.
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Russell arrived at this theory through his denunciation of Hegelian absolutism, the 
theory of internal relations and his early acceptance of Moore's dualistic realism (act- 
object distinction). The simples or neutral entities are the result of "the justification of 
logical atomism", inspired by Wittgenstein, and the "purpose embodied in the maxim 
called Occam's Razor", that it diminishes the risk of error if one assumes fewer 
entities. Russell explained his justification of analysis by saying that "you can get 
down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples out of which the world is built, 
and those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else." \The 
Philosophy o f  Logical Atomism, p. 142], He called these simples logical atoms. This 
doctrine o f logical atomism is given in a series of lectures in 1917-18. There Russell 
says:
[Tjhe atoms that I wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in 
analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms. Some of them 
will be what I call "particulars" - such things as little patches of 
colour or sounds, momentary things - and some of them will be 
predicates or relations and so on. The point is that the atom I wish 
to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom of physical 
analysis. \Ibid., p. 37J.
These logical atoms, that reality is composed of are not further analysablc. The atoms 
could he reached through two approaches. Russell used the empirical argument, in the 
spirit of Hume, whereas Wittgenstein used an a priori argument. | Ibid., 
"Introduction", p. 4-7],
Russell applied this "newly developed logic" to metaphysics and the theory of 
knowledge in order to establish empiricism on a firmer basis. This is described by 
Pears in the following way:
Previous empiricists, from Hume to J.S. Mill, had relied on a 
theory of mind which stood on the shifting sands between 
philosophy and psychology. Russell wished to replace this theory 
with something more robest. Hi*, new theory would be concerned 
with the expression of thoughts rather than with their psycho'ogical 
structure, and so would make everything open to view amenable to 
scientific treatment. [Ibid., "Introduction", pp. 7-8).
As a result Russell arrived at his theory of neutral entities which is discussed in 
chapter five. The neutral entities are not only epistemologically certain out 
ontologically identical. They are "subjectless given". They are not constructs but are 
the constituents which explains both mind and matter. In Russell’s philosophy mind
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and matter are constructions out of the simple suhjectless neutral entities. Now let us 
see what Russell meant hy construction.
log ica l Construction.
In discussing Russell’s theory of logical construction we will identify two uses of the 
notion of "construction". They are: (1) epistemological, i.e. to explain how physics is 
knowable;2 3and (2) ontological, i.e. the entities which are constituents are "genuine"’ 
entities and the constructs are "logical fictions". Both the problems will appear 
simultaneously in our discussion.
Before we go into further detail we must mention that Russell’s analysis of "logical 
construction" from 1912 to 1920 reflects the epistemological problem, i.c to close 
the gap between physics and perception.4 5This is the phenomenalistic period which I 
have discussed in chapter four. It is in the period 1921-1927 Russell laid much stress 
on the ontological problem i.e. neutral entities are the primal stuff and what we call 
mind and matter are simply constructions.
U is believed that constructions have lost some of their significance in the later period 
when Russell considered that the world is constituted by a multitude of events many 
of them grouped around "centres". | See 6.2.2.). We shall see that during the logical 
atomism period, constructions made it possible to substitute classes of sense-data for 
external objects. Since Russell has admitted external events it is thought that 
constructions can serve no such radical purpose for which it was initially accepted. 
But as we go along we shall see that construction enable us to substitute statements 
referring to classes of entities in place of statements referring to an entity, namely 
material object or scientific entity.’’
Russell’s effort but failure to close the gap between physics and perception in 1912 
made him accept that "the whole conception of the world of physics as a construction 
rather than an inference" ,6 He regarded this method of construction as "the supreme
2. Fritz in 1952 suggested that Russell's "epistemological purpose of construction is to determine in
what manner statements referring to unperceived entities may be justified, especially those concerning 
material objects......"¡P. I76-77|. This is the epistemological use of the construction.
3. Cf., Sainsbury, Russell, p. 236.
4. See My Philosophical Development, p. 10. Russell confirmed that since 1910-1914 he v/as concerned 
with problem that how we know physical world, i.e. a relation of perception to physics.
5. Cf., Fritz, C.A., "Russell's Philosophy of Science", p. 162-3.
6. Our Knowledge o f the External World, p. 8. Russell suggested that he has been made aware of this 
by Whitehead. This has been refuted by Sajahan Miah in his "The emergence of Russell's logical
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and matter are constructions out of the simple subjectless neutral entities. Now let us 
see what Russell meant by construction.
l ogical Construction.
In discussing Russell’s theory of logical construction we will identify two uses of the 
notion of "construction". They are: (1) epistemological, i.e. to explain how physics is 
knowable;2 and (2) ontological, i.e. the entities which are constituents are "genuine"3 
entities and the constructs are "logical fictions". Both the problems will appear 
simultaneously in our discussion.
Before we go into further detail we must mention that Russell’s analysis of "logical 
construction" from 1912 to 1920 reflects the epistemological problem, i.e. to close 
the gap between physics and perception.4 56This is the phenomenalistic period which I 
have discussed in chapter four. It is in the period 1921-1927 Russell laid much stress 
on the ontological problem i.e. neutral entities are the primal stuff and what we call 
mind and matter are simply constructions.
It is believed that constructions have lost some of their significance in the later period 
when Russell considered that the world is constituted by a multitude of events many 
of them grouped around "centres". [ See 6.2.2.]. We shall see that during the logical 
atomism period, constructions made it possible to substitute classes of sense-data for 
external objects. Since Russell has admitted external events it is thought that 
constructions can serve no such radical purpose for which it was initially accepted. 
But as we go along we shall see that construction enable us to substitute statements 
referring to classes of entities in place of statements referring to an entity, namely 
material object or scientific entity.'
Russell's effoi, but failure to close the gap between physics and perception in 1912 
made him accept that "the whole conception of the world of physics as a construction 
rather than an inference" f  He regarded this method of construction as "the supreme
2. Fritz in 1952 suggested that Russell’s "epistemological purpose of construction is to determine in
what manner statements referring to unperceived entities may be justified, especially those concerning 
material objects......"(P. 176-77J. This is the epistemological use of the construction.
3. Cf., Sainsbury, Russell, p. 236.
4. See My Philosophical Development, p. 10. Russell confirmed that since 1910-1914 he was concerned 
with problem that how we know physical world, i.e. a relation of perception to physics.
5. Cf., Fritz, C.A., "Russell’s Philosophy o f  Science", p. 162-3.
6. Our Knowledge o f  the External World, p. 8. Russell suggested that he has been made aware of this 
by Whitehead. This has been refuted by Sajahan Miah in his "The emergence of Russell’s logical
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maxim of scientific philosophising" (Mysticism, p. 115), anti is a form of Occam’s 
Razor
In his The Problems o f Philosophy, Russell explained that physical objects are 
constructs out of sense-data. But sense-data has an ambivalent position (see Chapter 
One, Dualism in Russell) - i.e. dependent on physical object and sensation (act- 
acquainted-object). The existence of an inferred physical object is assumed to infer the 
existence of entities (sense-data) which are evidences of a physical object, which is a 
logical construction. Russell used the term "inference" equivocally- For instance a 
physical object which is a construct is an inference from sense-data which are known. 
But to have an epistemological access to sense-data Russell tacitly accepted the 
existence of physical objects which are not there and is simply an infererce. The 
presence of sense-data can only be inferred by the presence of physical objects. More 
over in his Mysticism and I  ogic Russell argued that sensib-lia (which has similar 
status as those of sense-data) are also inferred. But such inference does not make the 
neutral entities constructs. By arguing thus Russell complicated the notion of 
"construction" and "inference". As a result he brought circularity in his explanaron of 
sense-data and physical objects.
Fritz in his Bertrand Russell’s Construction o f  the External World noted this 
"circularity" (p. 177-8). He believed that the inclusion of unperceived events in the 
very inference which Russell was trying to justify, makes his construction circular. I 
have already mentioned that such apparent circularity is part of a programme known 
as Bootstrapping. |See, Chapter Seven], Russell’s main contention here was to show 
that what we call sense-data are the actually given entities in acquaintance and the 
inferred entity, the physical object (say table) is construction. Here we can pass from 
perception to physics simply by inference.
He also applied his principle of construction versus inference for the ontological 
purpose, i.e. to explain both matter and mind. This view can be seen as a shift from 
his earlier explanation of construction. Following Whitehead’s "important heuristic 
maxim", in his The Philosophy o f  Logical Atomism Russell said:
When some set of supposed entities has neat logical properties, it 
turns out, ... that the supposed entities can be replaced by purely 
logical structures composed of entities which have not such neat
construction of physical objects" (Russell, vol. 7, No. 2, 1987-88, pp. 11-24. Russell in his My 
Philosophical Development acknowledged that the question o f construction which he has developed in 
Our Knowledge "was already very much in my mind in 1911 ’ (p. 121).
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properties. In that case, in interpreting a body of propositions 
hitherto believed to be about the supposed entities, we can substitute 
the logical structures without altering any of the detail of the body 
of propositions in question. This is an economy, because entities 
with neat logical properties are always inferred.... (P. 161).
After such explanation Russell said that the principle may be stated in the form: 
"Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to 
unknown entities" (Logic And Knowledge, p. 326). The above quotation suggests that 
inferred entities have "neat" properties which are the mark of a "logical construction" 
(cf., Logic And Knowledge, pp. 329-330). Russell said that matter has two neat 
properties (1) two pieces of matter cannot be at the same place; (2) one piece of 
matter cannot be in two places. "Experiences in the substitution of constructions for 
inferences makes one suspicious of anything so tidy and exact" (ibid., p. 329).
Russell distinguished the constructs from the constituents.7 Accordingly he argued that 
die constituents, i.e. the neutral entities have no such neat properties. An immense 
number of such entities coexist in a little region of space-time. In them we do not find 
any property as "impene'rabil'ty" but endless overlapping of  the events in a part of 
space-time. Therefore they are ro t constructs but simple. But physical objects are 
constructs. With an analogy Russell explained that portion of matter cannot be 
considered as the building blocks out of which the world is built. The blocks are 
events, and the fragment of matter are portions of the structure to which we find it 
convenient to provide separate attention. | Ibid., p. 329).
Russell said that "construction versus inference" can also be applied in order to 
explain the mental occurrences. He explained:
The subject, and the relation of a cognition to what is known, both 
have that schematic quality that arouses our suspicions. It is clear 
that the subject, if it is to be preserved at all, must be preserved as a 
construction, not as an inferred entity.. .|Pp. 329-30]
But Russell is slightly apprehensive whether the "subject" is sufficiently to be worth 
constructing. Russell agreed with lames that the relation of cognition to what is 
known is not straightforward. "William James was right in drawing attention to the 
complexity of "knowing"." | Ibid.] But as we go along we shall find that Russell
7. Status o f Percepts (5.7.2). Here, following Russell, I have shown that although Russell's final 
analysis suggests that a percept is complete bundle of compresenl qualities it is simple and not a 
construct.
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explained the complex mental phenomena as constructions out of neutral entities. |See 
6.3.1.21.
Russell also said that "wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted 
for inferred entities". He used his constructions as "substitutes"1* for "unknown" 
entities. To call construction "substitutional" is motivated by his concern to deal with 
the epistemological problem. Russell explained:
The method by which the construction proceeds is closely analogous 
in these and all similar cases. Given a set of propositions nominally 
dealing with the supposed inferred entities, we observe Jie 
properties which are required of the supposed entities in order to 
make these propositions true. By dint of a logical ingenuity, we then 
construct some logical function of less hypothetical entities which 
has the requisite properties. Th.'s constructed function we substitute 
for the supposed inferred entities, and thereby obtain a new and less 
doubtful interpretation of the body of propositions in question. 
[Mysticism, pp. 115-6]
In explaining the above passage Sainsbury, in his Russel! said that for Russell (when 
the programme of logical construction Wus in its heyday) constructions were meant to 
be substitutional (p. 237). We know thai in las phenomenalistic phase Russell brought 
two kinds of inferred entities, i.e. percepts of other and unperceived entities 
(sensibilia). He provided similar metaphysical status to all known and inferred 
entities. These data are real and therefore "verifiable" (see Chapter Four). Although 
they are unperceived the relation between the sensibile to the sense-datum is "like that 
of a man to a husband" (Mysticism, p. 110). In his Our Knowledge o f  the External 
World he only included the "hard" data as verifiables, whereas "soft" data remain 
non-verifiable (p. 89). But we know that mind and matter are also inferred entities. 
But they are not "verifiable" in the sense the sensibilia are verifiable. But it should not 
be thought that sensibilia are constructs like those of mind and matter. Mind and 
matter are constructs but not in the sense of being "substitutional". Fritz warned:
We must be careful in interpreting statements in which Russell 
speakes of "substituting", or "replacing", entities by constructions 
that the real nature of a construction be kept in mind, and avoid 
attributing too literal a meaning to "substitute".
In Russell's theory of neutral monism the ultimate stuff is simple. Mind and matter 
are complexes which are composed of simple neutral entities. This is the ontological 
use with which his theory of construction deals. We know that prior to his 8
8 Cf., Sainsbury, p. 237.
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commitment to neutral monism Russell showed considerable interest in the 
epistemological use of constnction. I have discussed as how in his phenomenalistic 
phase attempted to justify and close the gap between physics and perception. He 
emphasised that "the objects which are mathematically primitive in physics, such as 
electrons, protons, and points in space-time, are all logically complex structures 
composed of entities which are metaphysically more primitive, which may be 
conveniently called "events" (The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 9).
In our discussion of Russell's theory of mind and matter as construction we will find 
that he emphasised on the ontological use of construction. Ontologically the neutral 
entities which explain mind and matter as complexes are the "genuine entities". Mind 
and matter is logical constructions and therefore "fictions".9 This is because the 
entities which are constructed ontologically depend on the "simples", which are the 
element of their construction. Simples are given, and the construction could not exist 
without the simples.
According to Sainsbury such dependence is "asymmetric". The sense which Russell 
invoked was constructions are "now-empty" classes, and these classes could not exist 
without there members. [P. 239]. Sainsbury exemplified his criticism in the following 
way: He said that a father might have existed without his son, but the son could not 
exist without him having existed. This asymmetric relation of ontological dependence 
does not make the son a fiction. We have already mentioned that Russell’s 
construction is circular and such criticism is the result of apparent circularity. More 
over we should not simply consider the criterion of asymmetric relation of 
dependence. Russell's fictions are simply collections from different points of view. 
He held,
"classes or series of particulars, collected together on account of 
some property which make it convenient to be able to speak of them 
as wholes, are what 1 call logical constructions or symbolic 
fictions". (Mysticism, p. 97],
Fritz argued that Russell’s use of the word "fiction" seems "more dubious":
"Fiction" can convey the impression that, for example, objects 
described, and material objects, do not exist as entities. | p. 217],
9. Cf. Sainsbury on this issue, p. 237-8; Fritz (1952), p. 217.
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To make Russell's interpretation more plausible Fritz explained this in the following 
way. Material object is a "fiction" because at first sight it appears to denote some 
entity. But when analysed we find that is not the case. They are symbols (such as 
descriptions, material objects) "which have a certain convenience in language and 
logic, but are convenient symbolic devices only; they do not denote any constituent of 
the world" (p. 217).
Fritz’ explanation corresponds with what Russell said in his The Philosophy o f 
Logical Atomism:
You find that a certain thing which has been set up as a 
metaphysical entity can either be assumed dogmatically to be real, 
and then you will have no possible argument either for its reality or 
against its reality; or instead of doing that you can construct a 
logical fiction having the same formal properties to those of the 
supposed metaphysical entity and will fulfil fill the scientific 
purposes that anybody can desire | Logic and Knowledge, p. ”72; 
also see Sainsbury, p. 283].
By metaphysical entity Russell meant those things which are supposed to be part of 
tlic ultimate constituents of the world, but not the kind of things that are empirically 
given, such as a chair (physical object).10
From the preceding analysis it is clear that Russell’s main interest in his theory of 
construction was its ontological use. Keeping this in view we will see how Russell 
explained matter and mind as constructs out of neutral entities.
6.2. Matter In Term s of Neutral Entities
In his phenomenalist phase (1°12-1920) Russell explained the construction of material 
objects and matter in terms of appearance mainly to justify that physics is true. He 
said that
"the only justification possible must be one which exhibits matter as 
logical construction from sense-data - unless, indeed there were 
some wholly a priori principle by which unknown entities could be 
inferred from such as are known. It is therefore necessary to find 
some way of bridging the gulf between the world of physics and the 
world o f sense" .... \Our Knowledge o f the Externa! World, p. 106].
10. Sainshury suggested that according to Russell it is 'not ¡hat classes of sense-data are fictions, but 
that sense-data-transcending physical objects are fiction in that they cannot he known to exist’ (p. 238).
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In chapter four I have said that Russell dispenses with the physical object in order to 
have epistemological access to it via sense-data. Physical objects are inference and are 
knowledge by description. But in Russell’s construction we know that there are 
unknown entities which are not physical objects but entities having supposed 
metaphysical status as those of known entities and are therefore substitutional. I have 
discussed why and how Russell arrives at the notion of sensibilia in discussing his 
phenomenalist phase. In this chapter I will be mainly concerned with his construction 
of material objects in terms of appearance or aspects from a neutral monist point of 
view. This is because in 1921 Russell in his The Analysis o f Mind said that he has 
presented his theory of matter in terms of neutral entities in Our Knowledge o f the 
External World (chapter III & IV) and Mysticism and Logic (Essays VII & VIII). |P. 
11, cf., Footnote).
But this theory came under attack especially by Jtace ("Russell’s neutral monism") 
and Ayer (Russell and Moore). They regard his theor, as more of phenomenalism. 
This is rejected by Lockwood. He argued that Stace and Ayer "under-estimate the 
shift in Russell’s thinking which took place between 1914 and 1919" ("What Was 
Russell’s Neutral Monism?", p. 145). This period was simply "constitutive" and 
Russell was a quasi-phenomenalist (see my discussion in chapter four). Russell in his 
"Reply" admitted that he no longer agreed with the view advocated on the above two 
occasions partly for reasons Stace puts forward against them. But in his The Analysis 
o f  Matter "there is a fuller and more careful statement of theories not very different 
from those of The Analysis o f Mind’ (p. 707). In his later analysis as a neutral monist 
he employed a similar method of construction but in terms of "events", accepting a 
more scientific approach. His discussion about the construction of matter is more 
metaphysical than epistemological. For this purpose I will discuss the issue in two 
separate sections." 1
11. In discussing Russell’s theory of matter I will basically follow Fritz. He has v onderfully present 'd 
Russell’s theory of matter in his Bertrand Russell’s Construction o f The External World. Also cf. 
Ahmad, M. Following Fritz he has also developed an account of Russel.'s theory o f matter. But I 
totally disagree with his final conclusion where he considered mind and mattei as emergent. According 
to him mentality and materiality are "emergent properties' belonging to different groups of events, bu* 
not to single events. As we have seen that to Russell as well as James a single "event" or "experience", 
in isolation, can he both mental and physical at the same time. In explaining this I have considered that 
the supposedly neutral entities, both in James and Russell, are covertly dualistic. [See Chaptei Three 
and S.6.]
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6.2.1. Material Objects as ’Collection of Particulars*.
In his explanation of material objects as collection of particulars Russell maintained 
that the data which constitute the external world can be obtained by perception. They 
come *o us through the senses. For instance visual data of different shapes and colours 
can be gathered through the sights we see. Similarly the audible data from the sounds 
we hear and the tactual data from the touch and so on. Russell includes not only one's 
own sensations but also the sensations of other people and sensibilia. These data arc 
immediately given to us and are correlated in various ways by which we know the 
material objects v.f common-sense and of physics.
The sensations or percepts belonging to different senses form a "world" depending on 
each particular sense. For instance the sensations of sight ate given as spatial sight 
space, and those of touch in touch space. At any given moment each individual has a 
set of sensations inrough his different senses. T.iis momentary set of percepts o f each 
individual give him a momentary world view. Thus each individual lives in a private 
world which contains its own spaces from different senses. These spaces of sight, 
touch and so on are correlated with the various spaces of other senses. Such 
correlation, according to Russell, is learned by experience in childhood.12 [Similar 
view has been maintained by Max Bom in his "Reflections of a physicist", p. 123].
According to Russell the momentary set of sensations of each individual is the 
"private world" or a "perceived perspective". A perspective, to which a given 
sensation belongs, is defined as "the set of particulars that are simultaneous with this 
sensation" (The Analysis o f Mind, p. 128; Mysticism, p. 104). Any two particulars 
which are either "successive" or "simultaneous" "is to be understood as a direct 
simple relation, not the derivative constructed relation of physics" (Mysticism, p. 
105). Russell avoided any reference to a perceiving subject in his definition of 
perspective because beside "perceived perspective” there are "perspec'ives which are 
not perceived by any one" [Ibid., p. 104|. The "private world" is the only perceived 
"perspective". Beside there may be number of "unperceived perspectives" quite 
similar to those of perceived perspectives. [Our knowledge, p. 95[. The complete 
collections of all the particulars that are directly simultaneous with a given particular 
an individua1 has through his life will be defined as "biography". "Those biographies 
that are not lived by any one are called "official"." [Mysticism, p. 105).
12 Our Knowledge, p. 118; Mysticism, p. 117, The Analysis o f Matter, p. 252; cf, Fritz, p. 144.
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Unlike unperceived perspective, the private world is the only perspective of which 
one can be certain. Russell also accepted the belief that like one’s own others must 
have a private world of their own and also an unperceived world. But two people at 
the same time can never visualise the same world. This is because no two perspectives 
belonging to the same individual from different places or two individuals from the 
same place will be exactly the same, yet there is sufficient similarity. Two people 
when they perceive a table, for instance, are said to have similar perspectives due to 
which they can use the same words to describe the object. The changes of 
perspectives are also due to a change of positions and different physiological and 
psychological conditions (see 5.7.). The only possibility for them to have the same 
visual data is to be exactly in the same position in space and having identical 
physiological conditions, which is not possible. The similarity of perspectives of two 
individuals can be obtained by "testimony" (Ibid., p. 116; Fritz, p. 145). The belief 
in "the minds of other peop'e" does not belong to the data which are certain but it is a 
natural belief "which systematises a vast body of facts and never leads to any 
consequer.ces which there is any reason to think false.... therefore [there is a]... good 
reason to use it as working hypothesis" (Our Knowledge, p. 103). [We will later see 
that in The Analysis o f Matter, Russell developed this idea in a more sciendfic way 
There he brought in the concept of induction and the causal theory of perception ]
The perspective of an individual will change with the continual changes in his bodily 
state or position. For instance walking around the object, provides him a sequence of 
perspectives of changing shapes and sizes of the table. We can compare the particulars 
of two perspectives to find out the "nearness" and "famess". If the particulars of one 
perspectives are similar to the particulars belonging to other perspective then two 
perspectives are near. If the corresponding particulars are not similar then it is said to 
be intervened by other series of perspectives between the twe series of perspectives 
compared. Hence the two perspectives compared are "far" from one another. The 
correlation of similar particulars of different perspectives provides the basis upon 
which a "material object" can be defined. Russell said:
By the similarity of neighbouring perspectives, many objects in the 
one can be correlated with objects in the other, namely with the 
similar objects. Given an object in one perspective, from the system 
of all the objects correlate^ with it in all the perspectives, that 
system may be identified with the momentary common-sense 
"thing". \Our Knowledge, p. 96; quoted in Fritz, p. 147],
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Thus a particular o f a 'thing" is a member of the system of particulars which is a 
thing at that moment. Applying the similar method of construction Russell as a neutral 
monist said that a piece of matter, known empirically, is not a single existing thing, 
but a system of existing things. For instance in the above example we have come 
across that when a numbu of observers simultaneously see the same table, they all see 
something different. In such a case Russell considers "the" table as the neutral object 
between different observers. But the table is not "real" either though it is the common 
cause of all the appearances the table presents to different observers. Russell casts 
doubt on the notion of "cause" and discards it as unreliable (The Analysis o f Mind, p. 
98). According to Russell the table itself is a construction of particulars and therefore 
cannot be real. The only thing which is real arc the neutral particulars and the table is 
simply a "fiction". We can "secure neutrality" on the basis of equal representation. 
Hence we should take the whole set of these sensations or particulars belonging to 
different individual and correlate them as a single object, the table. Thus the table 
which is neutral as between different observers is the collection of all those particulars 
which is called the "aspect" of the table from different points of view. [Ibid., p. 98]. 
It is in this sense all the aspects of the table are "real" (neutral), whereas the table is a 
merely logical construction. [Cf., Our Knowledge., p. 96].
The set of particulars (perceived and unperceived) which constitute one thing at one 
time makes a "momentary thing". The "particulars" and the "momentary things" are 
guided by separate laws.
Thus a momentary thing is a set of particulars, while a thing (which 
may be identified with the whole history of the thing) is a series of 
such sets of particulars. The particulars in one set are collected 
together by the laws of perspective; the successive sets are collected 
together by the laws of dynamics. [The Analysis o f Mind, p. 126]
From the preceding analysis we know that each individual's percepts or sensations 
determine their own space. Thus the private space of an individual is constructed from 
the correlation between the "spaces" (space of sight, space of touch etc.) o f his 
different senses. Similarly by correlating these private spaces and unperreived 
perspective the public space of physics is constructed. The material object belongs to 
the public space and therefore is not restricted to one individual.13 He explained the 
construction of public or perspective space in the following way.14 For instance we 
can take a penny which appears in a number of different perspectives (see Chapter
13. fhid. , p. 98; Mysticism, p. 119.
14. Ibid. , p. 98; Mysticism, p. 118-9; The Analysis o f Matter, p. 208. Also see chapter four.
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Four). For instance we are seeing what we call "penny", in some perspectives the 
penny appear, say, larger and in some smaller, in some it looks circular and in other 
perspectives it appears elliptical of various shapes and sizes. This will occupy a large 
part o f the field of vision than the corsesponding percept in another perspective. These 
appearances of the penny can be collected in according to shapes and sizes, on the 
basis of similarity and continuity. We can collect all the perspectives which has a 
round percept of the penny. These can be arranged in a straight line, ordering them 
according to the size of the percept of the penny. Similarly we can form another 
straight line of perspective in which the penny appears to be of certain thickness. In 
this way we can collect the appearances of the penny in several straight line. If all 
these lines are prolonged they will meet at a certain place, i.e. in a certain 
perspective. This perspective is a spatial unit or point in perspective space. The point 
of intersection of different lines is defined as "the place (in perspective space) where 
the penny is". |Our Knowledge, p. 98; Mysticism, p. 120; Fritz, p. 150).
One may say that particulars, which constitute a "thing", exist continually only at a 
position from which it is actually observed but ffOk.i other points it would be 
discontinuous. To this Russell’s reply was:
The "thing" o f common sense may in fact be identified with the 
whole class of its appearances - where, however, we must include 
among appearances not only those which are actual sense-data, but 
also those "sensibilri", if any, which, on grounds of continuity and 
resemblance, are to be regarded as belonging to the same system of 
appearances, although there happen to be no observers to whom they 
are data. [.Mysticism, p. 114|.
But the above account brings in some conflict between what common sense regards as 
one thing, and what physics regards an unchanging collection of particles. Two 
questions arise: "By what principles shall we select certain data from the chaos, and 
call them all appearances?" |Our Knowledge, p. 113). Can continuity and 
resemblance explain the thing as consisting of successive appearance?
According to Russell similarity is not a sufficient condition. For two different things 
may present any degree of likeness up to exact similarity. Continuity is also an 
insufficient criterion, i.e. are not necessary but hypothetical. By accepting continuity 
we can sensibly pass from one drop of the sea to another diop. But continuity should 
be a necessary condition if two appearances must be classed as the appearance of the 
same thing. Therefore it is desirable to define a drop, and to distinguish a current 
within the water. A class o f appearance belonging to one thing, according to Russell,
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should fulfil two laws, i.e. the laws of perspective and the laws of dynamics 
respectively.15 In doing so a series of particulars of one thing will behave with regards 
to the laws of physics, "in a way in which series not belonging to one thing would in 
general not behave. If it is to be unambiguous whether two appearances belong to the 
same thing or not, there must be only one way of grouping appearances so that the 
resulting things obey the laws of physics" (Our Knowledge, p. 115). Accordingly 
Russell lays down the following definition: " Things are those series o f  aspects which 
obey the laws o f  physics." | Ibid., pp. 115-6; cf., Fritz, pp. 152-3|.
In the example of the penny we have seen that every particular is associated with two 
places in perspecth e space at the same time.16 In the perspective space first, the place 
where the thing is, and second the place where the perspective is. In his The Analysis 
o f  Mind he called these two places the "active" and the "passive" places respectively 
(p. 301). But he specifically said that these are simply names and have nothing to do 
with the notion of "activity" (p. 130). We can collect all the particulars actively at a 
given place, or the particulars passively at a given place. For instance in the case of 
photograph of a star, the active place is the place where the star is, while the passive 
place where the photographic plate is. |Ibid, cf., Ahmad, M., op. at.]
This is how Russell assigned to a material object a place in the perspective space. 
Similarly different parts of our body acquire positions in perspective space. Therefore 
there is a meaning in saying that percepts or sensations are inside our head, because 
our perspective is located in part ot the place in perspective space that our head 
belongs
Russell said that there is a limit to the closeness we get to an object. The perspectives 
having a large aspects of the penny can be said to be nearer the penny then those 
which have a smaller percept. If we get closer to the penny where the object is 
touching the eye, there will be no particulars, "the eye sees not itself". "As a result 
when the centre is occupied by a percipient, it nevertheless contains no member of tl.e 
group, not even an ideal member .... A group that is to say, is hollow: when we get 
sufficiently near to its centre it ceases to h?ve members."17 To this A.O. Ixivejoy 
remarked "all material things, then, in Mr. Russell’s world, are built around holes". 
| The Revolt Against dualism, p. 245).
15. Our knowledge, p. 115; The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 125-6.
16. Th e Analysis o f Mind, p. '30; Mysticism, p. 120; Our Knowledge, p. 100.
17. The Analysis o f Maller, p. 211-12. A lsocf., Fritz, op.cit., pp. 150-1.
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Russell thus provided the definition of ’physical thing’ as the class of its appearances. 
But, he thought, this can hardly be taken as a definition of matter. Because matter is 
something other than the whole class of appearances of a thing. In his The Analysis o f 
Mind, Russell said that the appearances of a thing changes from different places, 
partly due to laws of perspective and partly due to an intervening medium. |P. 106]. 
The difference between the "material object" and the "matter" does not lie in the 
procedure of construction but in the aspects included in the construction (cf., Fritz, p. 
153). The construction of "things" exhausts all appearances of the object from every 
point of view from varying distances, and through all kinds of intervening media.
But since matter is independent of our sense-organs, and also of the intervening 
medium Russell in his Mysticism and Logic def.ned matter as the group of aspects 
taken at as small distance from the object as possible:
The matter of a thing is the limit o f its appearances as their distance 
from the thing diminishes. [ Ibid., p. 121; cf., The Analysis o f  
Mind, pp. 106-7; cf., Fritz, p. 153],
This definition of matter as logical construction is "invented because it gives a 
convenient way of stating causal laws" (The Analysis o f Mind, p 300). The causal 
laws of physics differ from the causal laws o f psychology. The difference is that in 
physics the causal laws connect a particular with other appearances in the same piece 
of matter, whereas in psychology the connection is made with other appearances in 
the same perspective. In other v ords physics group together particulars having the 
same "active" place and psychology groups together those having the same "passive" 
place. "Some particulars, such as images, have no "active" place, an therefore belong 
to psychology."1*
Now we are in a position to evaluate his theory of construction of material objects. 
Before we proceed further it is necessary to remind ourselves that the main objective 
of Russell’s theory of neutral monism was to abolish dualism of mind and matter. But 
that does not mean that he denied physical objects such as chairs and tables. What he 
denied was that chairs and tables exist as a single permanent object. In his theory 
chairs and tables are simply constructions or logical "fictions" out of more simple 
elements called neutral entities. These neutral entities equally explain mind and 
matter.
18. The Analysis o f Mind, p. 301. See Chapter Five for the discussion on images. Following the 
behaviourist principle Tussell provided a physical basis to images; also cf., Ahmad, M.
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In his explanation of material objects Russell not only intends to stick to neutral 
entities but also to the entities which are "verifiable" in order to establish physics on 
sound epistemology. He was in fact doing two things: (1) entities are metaphysically 
single kind and, (2) epistemologically certain and viable. Russell did it through his 
conception of "construction".
The question that arise is how fai is Russell successful. Did he stick to his promises? 
In his Our Knowledge o f  the External World, he took the opportunity to explain 
physical objects in terms of "hard" data only because the "verification is possible if 
physical objects can be exhibited as functions of sense-data" (My Philosophical 
Development, p. 79). But Russell knew such an attempt would establish "physics upon 
a solipsistic basis". So he gave up the attempt to construct "matter" out of experienced 
data alone. In order to provide a harmonious world picture which fitted physics and 
perception he accepted the sense-data of other people and sensibilia. Thus instead of 
putting forward, as Stace says "phenomenalism" (see Schilpp, p. 369), Russell’s 
theory of this period turned out to be "quasi-phenomenalism". [See Chapter Four],
In his correlation of hard data (only those which are perceived) lie brought in the 
belief of unperceived data through inference. To assert that a given sensation is a 
member of the class o f correlated particulars is an inferred belief and is the result 
"ftorr the evidence of a considerable number of beliefs". [Fritz, p. 155]. This is in a 
way true. Russell’s initial approach has been less sophisticated, i.e. accepting the 
principle of continuity and similarity he arrived at the notion of unperceived entities, 
whose metaphysical basis has been provided without the knowledge of thtir intrinsic 
qualities. Such a claim is questionable. How the unperceived entities have similar 
metaphysical status as those of known and verified entities? Moreover the knowledge 
of unperceived entities are possible through the existence of the physical objects 
which are themselves supposed to be the grounds for the existence of the physical 
objects, thus involving circular arguments.
A similar criticism is made by Stace. He argued that "to construct matter out of 
verifiables only, turns out to be nothing but a fraud" (Schilpp, p. 379). To this 
Russell in his "Reply" said that the term "verifiables" has wider implications. The 
acceptance of causal laws by science allows it to believe in things which cannot be 
observed, as does common sense. An entity "may be said to be "verifiable" when it
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has been inferred in accordance with the recognized canons of scientific method" (p. 
708).
Regarding the qualities, Stace pointed out that Russell's theory was "open to 
Berkeley’s criticism that it is impossible to separate primary and secondary qualities. 
The unperceived aspects has the primary qualities but not the secondary" (p. 369). 
Stace suggested that this objection was remediable. It was not that Berkeley thought 
that primary qualities cannot exist without the secondary qualities but that they cannot 
exist without having some other qualities. To say that a physical object has no 
characters other than shape, size etc. is to make it equivalent to a region of empty 
space. Berkeley thought that in order to make "something" it must have some other 
character like colour, for instance. This can be met by supposing that the unperceived 
particulars not only have primary qualities but also "intrinsic qualities" which, though 
unknowable, correspond to perceived secondary qualities. To this Russell’s reply was 
that not only secondary dualities art subjective so are the primary qualities. "I regard 
both as subjective in the sense that neither can exist except in a region where there is 
an organism with sense-organs and a brain." ("Reply", p. 709|. This subjectivity is 
also present in the photographic plate.
In explaining matter in terms of neutral entities alone Russell thought that he had done 
away with the dualism put forward by Descartes and his followers. In his The 
Analysis o f Mind he said,
"the dualism of mind and matter, ... cannot be allowed as 
metaphysically valid.... we seem to find a certain dualism, perhaps 
not ultimate, within the world as we observe it. The dualism is not 
primarily as to the stuff o f  the world, hut as to causal laws." |p.
137, my italics).
One of Russell’s commentators, Morris Weitz, viewed his theory of neutral monism 
as "causal dualism".IV We know that in order to explain his theory of images, which 
exclusively belong to mind, Russell accepts the notion of "mnemic causation", an 
action at a distance. |See Chapter Five|. But following the behaviourist principle he 
rejected mnemic causation as "too wide", which is not only confined to living 
organisms. So mnemic phenomena are due to the modifications of brain structure.
We know that neutral monism arose against the dualism of substances and not about 
causal laws. Their (the neutral monists) main aim was to show that the primary stuff 19
19. "Analysis And The Unity Of Russell's Philosophy", in Schilpp, p. 78.
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which explains mind and matter is not of two kinds but is of a single kind. When we 
judge neutral monism we have to see whether they have successfully dispensed with 
Cartesian dualism and accepted only a single kind of neutral entities. Russell, as a 
neutral monist, accepted sensations as the only neutral entities which explain both 
mind and matter. But in his explanation of matter he thought that sensations are not 
enough. But there are occurrences "which do not form part of any "experience" 
belong only to the physical world" (The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 25). These other 
occurrences, which are not neutral, are guided by physical laws only. This means that 
these occurrences are physical and cannot explain mind. Thus Russell’s construction 
of matter depends not only on neutral entities but also on physical entities, hence 
making it dualistic in Cartesian style.
6.2.2. Material Objects as "Collection o f Events".
Russell’s failure to stick to a neutral and single kind of entity led him, in 192720, to 
explain the construction of material objects in terms of "events". In order to provide 
an adequate world view he included in his construction perceived entitier , entities 
belong ng to other people and the entities which are not data to any mind. We k.iow 
that he a'so included images in his construction. According to Russell images have a 
physical basis in the brain. The mnemic effect is not only present in the mental 
phenomenon but also present in the physical object. Russell argued that the difference 
between mind and matter is simply a difference of degree. For instance the 
magnetized steel looks just like the steel. The only difference is that in the case of 
matter mnemic phenomena are less frequent than in the case of living organisms. It is 
because the behaviour of the living organisms is bound up with the persistence 
influence of the past. \The Analysis o f Mind, p, 78].
All these enrities he now considered as being neutral. This theory is a modification of 
his early theory where he accepted quasi-phenomenalism. The early theory is 
"constitutive" (cf., Chapter Four). We can also call the present theory a more mature 
and refined version of neutral monism. The early theory he presented in 1914-1921 
turned out to be metaphysically dualistic (physical objects are constructions out of 
sensations and unperceived entities) and epistemologically uncertain (unperceived 
entities are not data to any mind), as far as physics is concerned.
20. The theory is presented in Th- Analysis o f  Matter (1927), An Out line o f  Philosophy (1927), 
Human Knowledge (1948), Portraits From Memory (1956) and My Philosophical Dewlopment (1959)
Russell On Neutral Monism. 2 4 6
In order to make his theory more acceptable Russell’s main aims were:
(1) to make the unperceived events accessible to establish physics on firmer 
ground;
(2) to show that unperceived events are in fact neutral and are both 
epistemologically and me'uphysically same as perceived neutral events;
(3) to bridge the gulf between perception and physics; and
(4) to show that neutral entities can explain both mind and matter.
We will discuss ihese issues together.
Before we proceed further it is important to note that although Russell initiated several 
modificarions in his later theory he used the similar method of construction as 
explained above. Our analysis will show that the similarity between our percepts and 
their external causes is seen as similarity of structure. Russell did not lay much 
emphasis on the use of construction in his later analysis of mind and matter in terms 
of neutral entities.
As a preliminary, Russell in his The Analysis o f  Matter, accepted the ontology of 
"events" as neutral entities. This does not mean that he discarded "sensations" or 
"appearances" in nis new malysis. He accepted them as "percept", the sub-set of 
events. Percepts are more then mere sensations. This I will discuss later. Events now 
designate all particulars including those that are not perceived.
There is another shift from his earlier analysis. Earlier, and also in his later analysis, 
Russell justified his acceptance of the unperceived particulars by enlarging one’s 
experience in terms of the "evidence of testimony" (Mysticism, p. 116; The Analysis 
o f Matter, p. 206). Russell reasoned that if we confine the pieces of matter to human 
brains this becomes phenomenalism, or cne ought to say that this is solipsism. In 
order to avoid Berkeleyan metaphysics Russell accepted non-mental events (events 
which are not data to any mind) in his explanation of physics. \An Outline o f 
Philosophy, p. 301], "If we have once admitted unperceived events, there is no very 
obvious reason for picking and choosing among the events which physics lead us to 
infer." \The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 325].
The departure from the above analysis is due to his fully-fledged acceptance of the 
causal theory of perception. I say this because Russell accepted the causal theory of 
perception as early as 1912 in his The Problems o f  Philosophy. He said that there is a 
"simple hypothesis" i.e. "the common-sense hypothesis that there really are objects
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independent of us, whose action on us causes sensations" (p. 10). M. Bradie pointed 
out that this is "a clear commitment to a causal theory of perception"21. He also said 
that Russell developed this causal theory of perception which he abandoned in his 
"constructivist" phase, hut only to return to it after abandoning the notion of sense- 
data. Russell, in fact, never abandoned the causal theory of perception. Although 
Russell substituted l>e*ief for the inferred entities he accepted the causal theory of 
perception in order to explain the data which can never be present to  any mind. In 
what we call "seeing the sun", we start from "a common-sense acceptance of our 
seeing, physics has been led step by step to the construction of the causal chain in 
which our seeing is the last link...." \Mysticism, p. 101). What we observe in the 
period when he accepted sense-data is a hesitation in his acceptance of the term 
"cause", which has a different implication. "Any set of antecedents from which the 
event can theoretically be inferred by means of correlations might be called a cause of 
the event. But to speak of the cause is to imply a unique-ness which does not exist." 
[Ibid., p. 102).
In 1927 Russell had no doubt whatsoever regarding the acceptance of the caus'd 
theory of perception. He said:
I have been surprised to find the causal theory of perception ueated 
as something that could be questioned. 1 can well unuerstand 
Hume’s questioning of causality in general, but if causality in 
general is admitted, I do not see on what grounds perception should 
be excepted from its scope. |"Reply", p. 702|.
The acceptance of the causal theory of perception provided him with sufficient 
justification not only for accepting the unperceived entities belonging to others but 
also those which cannot be data to any mind. [See Chapter Five]. This theory gave 
him better ground in his understanding of the various correlations of events and a 
metaphysically more probable world view. This theory disproved the idea that there is 
a single cause, i.e. a permanent material substance. The permanent material substance 
«s still a construction of correlated percepts and events which are continuous with 
them.
In his later analysis material objects are constructions of correlated percepts belonging 
to oneself, to others, the unperceivables and the images, which has a position in the 
brain. Russell accepted the scientific approach to make his theory genuinely 
explanatory. |See Chapter Seven]. This time he explained external world in terms of 21
21. "Russell's Scientific Realism", 1988, p. 197.
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"causal lines" and on the basis of "similarity of structure". He laid the foundation in 
1927 (The Analysis o f  Matter) which culminated in 1948 (Human Knowledge)
I am us sec how he explained that percepts and unperceived events are similar. Russell 
argued that the main reason why he accepted the unperceived entities in the 
construction was that the structure of the perceived and unpcrccived entities are 
similar or "semi-similar". |See Chapter Five.|. The assumption that the structural 
properties o f the perceived and unperceived events are similar follows from the 
maxim "same cause, same effect" together from the inverted form "different effects, 
different causes".
Russell explained that the knowledge which physics provide about an event is purely 
abstract. Apart from certain logical characteristics of iLs structure we have no 
knowledge about its intrinsic character. Moreover physics cannot prove that the 
intrinsic character of the physical world differs from that of the mental world. Thus in 
both physics and psychology we find that mental and physical events form one causal 
whole. Therefore we can say that they consist of events having similar structure. |C f., 
An Outline o f  Philosophy, pp. 306-7). Despite this, we can still assume that the 
stimub causing us to hear notes of different pitches form a series depending on the 
character which corresponds causally with pitch.
Thus the similarity is shown in relation between the percepts of the private space 
which correspond to the objects belonging to the public space.22 If a percept is in 
between two other percepts, the corresponding object will have same relation. From 
this we can infer that the properties of the unperceived entities are their logical and 
mathematical properties because "when two relations have the same structure... all 
their logical properties are identical". | The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 2511.
From his previous analysis we are now in a position to say that Russell fulfilled two 
of his aims. First, one can have access to the unperceived events (events belonging to 
other people) if one accepts the causal thec.y of perception. At the same time Russell 
solved the mystery that since events have similar structure the urperceivable events 
which never becomes a data can also he said to have identical logical properties. 
Second, the structural properties of the perceived and unperceived events are similar. 
On the basis of this we can say that they are metaphysically same. The distinction
22. The Analysis of Matter, p. 252; also cf., Fritz, op. cit. (1952), p. 171.
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between the events and the percepts, the subset of events located in the brain, are 
simply epistemological. |Human Knowledge, p. 224; cf., below]. Russell said
We know the intrinsic character of the mental world to some extent, 
hut wc know absolutely nothing of the intrinsic character of the 
physical world. And in view of the nature of the inferences upon 
which our knowledge of physics rests, it seems scarcely possible that 
we should ever know more than abstract laws about matter. \An 
Outline, p. 307],
Since similarity between our percepts and their external causes is seen as a similarity 
of structure, Russell now declared that the world is constituted by a multitude of 
events grouped around "centres". They have "lines or "chains" of events radiating 
outwards from them which intersect with lines from other events. He explained that 
by means of laws of perspectives23, together with the changes in our percepts which 
are connected with the perception of bodily movement, we can form the conception of 
h space in which percipients are situated. In this space all percepts belonging to one 
group can be ordered about a centre. This we can call physical object. One should not 
consider the centre as a point. In Russell's philoviphy scientific objects are still 
constructions. He identified the centre as a volume which can he as sma!l as electron 
or as large as a star. |Cf.. The Analysis oj Matter, pp. 216-7; also Fri'z, "Russell's 
Philosophy o f Science’ , p. 162|.
This interpretation seems some what pu/./.ling. Puzzling because we know that an 
electron is a construction. Russell insisted that physics which deals with such concepts 
as "instants", "points", "electrons" etc. are all complexes because they are analysable 
into percepts which have spatio-temporal position. The neutral entity is simple and are 
not capable of analysis as electron or points can be analysed. |See 5.7.2|.
Russell thus proceeded to provide a more accurate world view which complies with 
modern physics, i.e. in terms of electrons and positions. |In Chaptei Seven I will 
show that Russell’s reliance on science, particularly on physics is to formulate 
theories that are genuinely explanatory. His theory of neutral monism is not based on 
material assumptions but the consequence was ‘his that mat', rial inputs were 
hypothesis. See 6.51 - The electrons have a snnxith mathematical and logical properties
23. In his earlier analysis of matter Russell said that the causal laws of physics differ from those of 
psyeholofy only by the fact that they canned a particular with other appearances in the same piece of 
matter, rather than with other appearances in the same perspective. \TJte Analysis o f Mind, p. 301J. 
Russell's later analysis suggests that the sort of laws which we have called "perspectives" can explain 
physical objects. {The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 3231.
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as their structure. But that does not imply that electrons are the ultimate stud of the 
world. Electrons are constructions out o f neutral events.\lbid., p. 386|. Since causal 
theory of perception locates percepts in our heads it is peculiar on Russell’s part to 
say that our brain consists of electrons. He confined himself to the older theory of the 
electron. | lb id ..p . 3211.
Russell said that "who vver accepLs the caudal theory of perception is compelled to 
conclude that percepts are in our heads, for they come at the end of the causal chain 
of physical events leading, spatially, from the object to the brain of the percipient. 
We cannot suppose that, at the end of this process, the last effect suddenly jumps hack 
to the starting point, like a stretched rope when it snaps" (Ihe Analysis o f Matter, p 
320) Froi i this Russell concluded that w hat the physiologist sees when he examines a 
brain is in die physiologist, not in a brain he is examining. The brain which the 
physiologist examines included among its content, while its owner was alive, the 
owners percepts, though“ and feelings. Since it also consisted of elec*rons (a 
grouping of events), Russell inferred that if an electron is in human brain ' some of 
the events composing it are likely to be some of the "mental states" of the man to 
whom the brain belongs.... Thus a percept is an event or a group of events, each of 
which lickings to one or more o f the groups constituting the electrons in the brain. 
\!bid.\ also quoted in Moore and Russell \
Ayer in his Russell and Moore said that according to Russell "everything that we 
perceive is inside our own head" is a "startling conclusion" which Russell draws (p. 
123). In explaining the above quotation Ayer warned:
Rosscll clarified his inclusion of electron in the construction of matter in the following 
way,
|T|his is not the concession to physicalism that i. might appeal to 
he, since the suggestion is rather that electron have qualities of 
percepts than the percepts have the qualities which are commonly 
attributed to electrons. |Ib id ., p. 123; see 6 .5 .|.
"we must find some reality for the electron, or else the ph 
world will run through our lingers like a jelly-fish." \lhid., p
From Russell s explanation it is clear that since electron is located in the human brain 
it is also composed of "mental stales" such as memory, belief and so on. We know 
that such mental slates are complexes of percepts and images Since hiain consists of
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electrons it includes among its construction both percepts and images. Russell said 
that "mnemic phenomena is exemplified in memory and other kinds of knowledge,
’but we cannot, on this ground, erect an absolute barrier between mind and matter__
inanimate matter ... shows analogous behaviour- e.g. if you unroll a roll of paper, it 
will roll itself up again' (An Outline o f  Philosophy, p. 306). By providing such an 
explanation Russell closed the gap between mind and matter by suggesting that both 
are constituted out of percepts, sensibilia and images. While discussing Russell’s 
theory of mind we shall see that perspective space, which is a view of the world from 
a certain point, includes among its construction not only images and percepts but also 
sensibilia. |See "Minds In Terms of Neutral Entities"].
It is clear "that an electron at an instant is a grouping of events.... Obviously it 
inc'udes all the events that happen where the electron is" (ibid., pp. 320-21). Russell 
distinguished electron from a point. He explained that a point is a group of events and 
has a definite position in space time. A point in one biography has two properties: 
"(1) Any two members of the group are compresent; (2) No event outside the group is 
compresent with eveiy member of the group". [Ibid., p. 295], Two events are 
compresent in the sense that they overlap in time (Ibid., p . ?94).
Following the older theory Russell regarded an electron as not one point but a group 
of points which "will save circumlocution to speak of the electron as a point".24 He 
further said that if we consider an electron to be a point then "it is a material point" 
(The Analysis o f Matter, p. 321). A material point differs from a point in empty 
space-time in that we can recognise a series of earlier and later material points are all 
parts of the history of one electron. With this definition of electrons Russell tried to 
settle the pioblem of "hollow centre", i.e. "that events occur, usually, in gioups 
at ranged about centres" (ibid., p. 322). Now Russell said that "these centres may be 
taken to be the place where there is matter.... The centre is "where the piece of
matter is......  But as to what are the actual events at the centre, we know nothing
except what follows from the fact that our percepts ar.d "mental states" are among the 
events which constitute the matter of our brains" (ibid.,; cf., A.O. Lovejoy, The 
Revolt Against dualism. He has carried out an elaborate discussion on Russell's 
concept of "hollow centre"; also cf., Ahmad M.).
24. The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 321. Russell observed that in Heisenberg’s theory the electron is neither 
a point nor of finite size.
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In his Human Knowledge Russell tried to explain his theory only in terms of one kind 
of entities. We shall see later that he initiated a change in liis theory of perception. As 
a result the epistemological distinction between sensation and image lost their earlier 
significance for which they were introduced. In 1948 percepts became the only neutral 
entities which constitutes both mind and matter. Following James Russell declared 
that the difference between mind and brain is not a difference of quality, but a 
difference of arrangement. \Portraits From Memory, pp. 147-48].
The preceding analysis puts Russell in a stronger position to claim that what the 
physiologist sees when he looks at a brain is part of his own brain and not the part of 
the brain he is examining. Russell said that the percepts in the brain of the 
physiologist are causally connected with the percepts o f the brain he is examining. 
"Seeing the brain" he is examining, consists of the existence, in the region occupied 
by the physiologist’s brain, of softness, of a grey patch causally connected with the 
brain under examination. According to Russell, in the brain the physiologist is seeing 
there are quantum transitions which lead to the emission of photons. These photons 
travel across the intervening space and hit the eye of the physiologist. They cause 
disturbance which travels along the optic nerve to the brain of the physiologist. It is 
then that the physiologist has the experience which is called "seeing the o tb c  man’s 
brain" (Portraits From Memory,, p. 151).
It was in 1948 Russell attempted to explain the construction of material objects in 
terms of percepts alone. The method of construction was similar to that he set in his 
The Analysis o f Matter. The percepts which are situated in a causal line have 
"identical structures".
Russell explained that in a causal sequence the quality o f an event may change but the 
structure remains constant. This change is due to both physical and physiological 
condition. (See Chapter Five]. Since mind and matter are arrangements of events, 
Russell said that it can be explained in terms of "causal lines" (ibid.). "Causal line" is 
a temporal sequence of percepts so related that the knowledge of the one can lead to 
the inference of the others what ever may be happening elsewhere. For instance when 
I see a table there are causal lines from its parts to the eye and the brain wheie die 
"seeing" takes place. What is perceived is the first term in a causal line that 
terminates at a sense-organ. The identity of structure in a causal series of events lead 
to the assumption of a common causal origin. Russell explained that "when a group of 
complex events in more or less the same neighbourhood and ranged about a central
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photons. But later it was found that the equations were the same whether light 
consisted of waves or of particles and that all the verifiable consequences were the 
same Both the claims are equally true and "the reason is that the physical world can 
have the same structure, and the same relation to experience" (Ibid).21'
Russell’s whole attitude towards the construction of material objects and matter out of 
neutral entities pivots around a single consideration: the empirical verifiability o f  
physics. In his Our Knowledge o f the External World Russel! constructed material 
objects out of known entities such as "sense-data" alone (p. 89). Although this solved 
the immediate problem of verifiability of physics "will not carry us very far towards 
the establishment of a whole science" (p. 90). As a result Russell introduced 
unperceived entities in Mysticism and Logic and then elaborated in The Analysis o f  
Matter. He justified the existence of the unperceived entities by accepting the causal 
theory of perception; thus rejecting Berke'eyan metaphysics which eventuates in 
solipsism and fail to produce a picture of reality <n accordance with physics.
Russell argued that there are some who would deny that physics need say anything 
about what cannot be observed. He in fact pointed iiis argument against the 
phenomenalist. But physics demard continuity, where continuity is incompatible with 
phenomenalism. Russell declared:
The essential business of physics is the discovery of "causal
laws",... if true, enable us to :nfer something about a certain region
of space-time from something about some other region or regions.
|"Reply", p. 7011.
This led Russell to say "an honest acceptance of physics demands recognition of 
unobserved occurrences" (ibid.).
But inferences to the knowledge of external world does not only depend on the 
justification of data (events) but also several principles of non-deductive inference. 
Accordingly in Human Knowledge Russell introduced five "postulates" of scientific 
inference from percepts to material objects and unperceived events (also see My 
Philosophical Development, "Non-Demonstrative Inference"]. The first postulate is 
designed to replace Newton's first law of motion and the common sense notion of 
permanence as "quasi-permanence". Given any event at any neighbouring time we 
find that there is at any neighbouring place an event having a similar structure (p.
26. Also cf., Wilson, T.A., "Russell's later theory of perception", p. 28.
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.506). A "thing" is not a something permanent hut a series of events which compose it 
at one moment are not the same but have similar a structure.
Second there is a causal chain of events such that from one or two members of the 
series something can be inferred about U12 structure of all the members. Causal chains 
are "causal lines" as explained above. This postulate, according to Russell, is the most 
important of all five because it enables us, "from partial knowledge, to make a partial 
probable inference" (My Philosophical Development, p. 150). Everything in the 
universe has some effect upon everything else, and since we do not know everything 
for certain we "an at least tell approximately and with probability.
Third the chains of events are spatio-temporally continuous and therefore there is no 
action at a distance. Each member of the causal lines have a sin.ilar structure and are 
causally contiguous. "|W]hen yo j see a given person on a variety of occasions you do 
not doubt that he has had a con‘inuous existence during the time*, when you were no' 
seeing him." [p. 510].
fourthly when a number o f events having a similar structure are giouped together 
around a centre and are contiguous, they all belong to causal lines and have then 
origin in a complex event o f  the same structure at the centre. The " complex central 
event" is the physical object as explained above. These four postulates of events 
which explain the spatio-temporal structure of external world are already found in The 
Analysis o f Matter.21
The fifth postulate is of analogy. According to this when two classes of observed 
events, A and B, occur, there is a reason to say tnat A causes B. But even if one of 
♦hem is not observed then the existence of either A or B can be inferred.
These postulates serve to justify die knowledge of physics as regards unperceived 
events. Russell claimed that the postulates are so designed that they are "intended to 
justify the first steps towards science, and as much of common sense as can be 
justified" (Human Knowledge, p. 513). This I think should be considered as positive 
approach because he ingeniously fuses both common sense and science to produce a 
harmonious world picture acceptable to both scientists and ordinary people. In 
justifying the postulates Russell concluded:
27 Cf., Fritz., op. cit., p. 193.
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I think... that we may he said to "know" what is necessary for 
scientific inference, given that it fulfils the following conditions: (1) 
it is true, (2) we believe it, (3) it leads to no conclusions which 
experience confutes, (4) it is logically necessary if any occurrence or 
set of occurrences is ever to afford evidence in favour of any other 
occurrence. I maintain that these conditions are satisfied. If, 
however, any one chooses to maintain solipsism of the moment, I 
shall admit that he cannot he refuted, hut shall he profoundly 
sceptical of his sincerity. | ¡bid., p. 515).
6.2.3. Conclusion.
From the precedinu discussion it is clear that by declaring events as the ultimate 
constituents of the world in his The Analysis o f  Matter and the Outline o f  Philosophy 
Russell adopted neutral monism. He fulfilled most of the short falls hy "fuller and 
more carefjl statement of theories" not different from The Analysis o f Mind. But this 
adoption was firmly established in his Human Knowledge and brought into alignment 
with tnc James's theory of neutral monism.2* Although Russell did not discuss it as 
"neutral monism" his metaphysics was mainly as that presented in The Analysis o f  
Matter.7'' Events are simple but they are not unanalysable. They are bundles of 
"complex cornprescnt qualities and relations". The qualities and relations forms the 
structure of the events, which have no spatio-temporal existence. Such assertion 
question: Are events neutral? Before we discuss this issue let us see how Russell 
explains the construction of mind and "mental states", such as belief, memory, desire, 
will etc., in terms of neutral entities. 289
28. Cf., William, T.A., op. cit., p. 40. See Chapter Two on James's theory of neutral monism.
29. See Fritz, op. cit., p. 195.
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Section 2 .
6.3 Mind In Terms o f  Neutral Entities.
Introduction.
In discussing Russell's early commitment to neutral monism in chapter four I have 
suggested that in 1912 Russell produced a relative dualism and made a significant 
move to diminish the complete dualism between the mental and the physical. There 
has been a substantial departure from Descartes. Sense-dafc’ are the result of matter 
and sensation (function o f mind) and introspective-data are the result of consciousness 
and introspection (function of mi.tap This left the status of "data" to be both mind 
oriented and relational, hence debarred to be neutral. Russellian data depends heavily 
on nind, and as a result creates Berkcleyan problem. |See Cnapter Four],
The above departure from Cat .esianism is also the result of his acceptance of Moore’s 
dnalism o f act and object in perceptua' experience.30 Russell’s early account of mind 
was a mixture of both Cartesian and Humean analysis of mind. In short, he accepted, 
following Descartes, that the acquaintance with the sense-data reveals the fact that 
there is something called "I" which sees, for instance, that there is a red patch called 
the sense-datum (The Problems pp. 26 ff.). But this "I" is not permanent but "quasi- 
permanent". Introspection or self-consciousness reveals that we are not acquainted 
with a "more or less permanent person" (p. 28' but "we always seem to come upon 
some particular thought or feeling" (p. 27). But on the whole he accepts the notion of 
"consciousness" as the distinguishing feature of mind as against matter.
This view about the analysis of "mir.d" had been maintained through out his 
pheno .ienalistic phase, despite the fact that his views on "matter" underwent 
considerable change in between 1912-1918 (see above). Sense-data are physical and 
are the ultimate constituents of matter. But sense-data could support only the theory of 
matter, and the theory o f  mind remains unsupported during the above period. On the 
basis of such analysis o f  mind Russell undertook to write a critique on neutral monism 
as expounded by Mach, James and tie  new realists (see Chapter Four).
In order to close the gap between his theory of mind and theory of matter Russell has 
to show that there is a single kind of entities which explain both mind and matter and
30. Quinton A., "Russell's Philosophy of Mind" in Pears C ollection, p. 83.
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those entities are neutral in nature. As a result there is no "substantival" distinction 
between the neutral entities but only that of arrangement and of context. We have 
discussed his theory of matter in terms of neutral entities. Now let us see how Russell 
explains the construction of mind in terms of neutral entities
6.3 1 Mind as "Assemblage o f  Sensation and Im ages".
Russell extensively discussed his theory of mind, as a neutral monist, in his The 
Analysis o f  Mind. There are subsequent discussions in several of his later hooks but 
not extensive as 1921. These discussions are spread out in his The Analysis o f  Matter, 
An Outline o f  Philosophy (Part 1 and 3), Human Knowledge (two chapters, "The 
Science of Mind’ and "Mind and Matter"), Portraits from Memory ("Mind and 
Matter"), and My Philosophical Development ("Consciousness and Experience").
In his The Analysis o f Mind Russell un^er took two opposite views in explaining 
mind. His first view was to analyse away consciousness as a knowing subject. In 
doing so he rejected the dualistic criteria of mind. His second view was to explain 
mind in terms of sensations and images together with behavioura1 psychology. Earlier 
he accepted the existence of "consciousness" as a separate entity to explain its relation 
to objects. Now he said that all forms of mental phenomena are simply complexes of 
neutral entities. Let us consider both the views, which ar~ in a sense radical because 
he wanted to adopt James’s theory of "radical empiricism" according to which there is 
no such thing called "consciousness". There is only ore stuff and that is "pure 
experience", and the distinction between the knower and the known is simp’y 
contextual. I will begin as to how Russell discarded consciousness as zsi entity and 
will discuss how he explained mind in terms of neutral entities.
6 .3 .1.1. Refutation of Consciousness as an Entity.
Russell, convinced by James and his American counterparts, rejected the relational 
view, which distinguishes between our "seeing" and the thing "seen", on the ground 
that there is no such thing as "consciousness" (ibid., p. 24). The dualism of the 
existence of two different kinds of entities, material and mental, can be dispensed 
with if one admits that what is sensed can equally belong to both psychology and 
physics (ibid., p. 25) The particulars given in sensation are neither mental nor 
physical but can be grouped in two ways, i.e. according to the laws of physics and 
psychology. Apart from this the acceptance of neutral monism aiso resulted in his
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reading of behaviouristic psychology.31 As a result Russell arrived at the "stuff" 
which is neither mental nor physical but more "primitive than either" (ibid., p. 10). 
That stuff is "sensation". In its entirety the sensations, alone, cannot explain mind and 
matter. B-side they require "images" which are mental and belong exclusively to 
mind and "unperceived entities" which are physical and belong only to the physical 
world, fIbid., p. 25],
In order to bring his theory closer to that of James, Russell rejected dualistic criteria 
of mind (see Chapter Five) by discarding several of the beliefs he had accepted earlier 
about the analysis of mind, which endo up in his acceptance of consciousness as a 
separate entity beside matter. Such criteria are mainly intentionality and subjectivity. 
In short Russell rejected the view that psychical phenomena consists of "acts" directed 
to "objects" as proposed by Brentano. By rejecting the theory of intentionality Russell 
claimed that "act" is unnecessary and fictitious and cannot be discoverable 
empirically. Arguing against the notion of "subjectivity" Russell claimed that it is not 
a peculiarity of mind because it is also discoverable in the photographic plate.
Russell also rejected the view that mental entities are in time and the physical entities 
are in space. Accepting the resuits of the theory o f relativity Russell declared that the 
data o f physics and psychology are spatio-temporal. Russell had this advantage over 
James.
One or the basic aspects upon which Cartesian dualism lies is that mind is non-spatia! 
and matter is spatial. This distinction between the spatiality and non-spatiality arise 
from the consideration that mental states and events have no location and cannot be 
characterized as having shapes and sizes.32 For Descartes mental events are only in 
time. This makes his theory of interactionism difficult, for how can a mental, non- 
spatial, event interact with physical, spatial, event?
But Russell adopted the view that events, whether mental or physical, are spatio- 
temporally located. Accordingly Russell located the percepts in the brain which 
explains both mind and matter. Since time and space are so much less distinct "it has 
become difficult to hold that mental events, though in time, are not in space" (The 
Analysis o f  Matter, p. 384).
31. The Analysis o f Matter, pp. 9-10; cf., tamos, E.R., Bertrand Russell’s theory o f Knowledge, p. 
102.
32. Cf. Feigl, op. cit., p. 406.
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Similar remarks have been made by Robert Weingard in his article "Relativity And 
The Spatiality of Mental Invents" He emphasized,
|M|ental events to he part of the network of temporal relations that 
physical events bear to each other, they must he part of the space 
time network of relations, for it is simply not plausible to suppose 
there is, in addition to space-time, network of purely temporal 
relations for the mental events to belong to. |P . 284|.33
Weingard used a space-time diagram (and the modus ponens argument) to establish 
the spatio-temporality of mental events. Basing his idea on such an assertion 
Lockwood provided a graphic representation of the location of mental events. This he 
did on the basis of identity theory. Gibhins is critical of both Weingard and 
I.ockwood arguments. In his "Are Mental Events In Space-Time?" Gibbins argued 
that the diagram Weingard produced "presupposes that mental events are in space 
time" (p 146). He further argued that there is obvious "circulatory" in the 
I,ockwood Weingard thesis, and then pointed out,
"Or so Bertrand Pussell put it, with uncharacteristic caution in 1926 
(see The Analysis o f  Matter, ... p. 384)." |P . 147. I have quoted the 
passage to which Gibbins refer. See abovej.
The circularity in Russell’s argument is part of bootstrapping, which I shall discuss in 
Chapter Seven. Both Weingard and Ixickwood argued their case keeping in view the 
identity hypothesis of mind body relation.34 But Russell’s aim was to show that 
spatio-temporal location of the events make them neither mental nor physical. It is the 
way of interpretation of the events leads to such distinction as mental and physical. 
Therefore mind and matter are inference out of the known neutral events, such as 
sensations and images, which are located in the brain.
The spatio-temporal location of events which constitute both mind and matter makes 
interaction more plausible. But Russell was not an interactionist. Ir his An Outline o f  
Philosophy, Russell admitted that it will be seen that the view he had been advocating 
there is no difficulty about interaction between mind and matter. He explained:
33. Also cf., Lockwood, 'Einstein And The Identity Theory", p. 25 |footnote|.
34. Lockwood immediately rehutted the charge of eireularity both in his explanation and Wemgard's 
explanation, in his article "Einstein, Gibbins And The Unity Of Time". He argues that instead of 
presupposing they appeal by way of arguing "(PI) that special relativity is correct and (P2) that mental 
events are in time. .. jtheref»re| any event that is in space time is also in space ... Weingard and I take 
this to follow logically, from premises PI and P2 ... Perhaps Gihbins thinks that the argument will not 
go through unless tacit appeal is made to the additional premise that mental events are in space-time; 
hut if so I am at a loss lo see why" (pp. 148-9).
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A sensation is merely one link in a causal of physical causation; 
when we regard the sensation as the end of such a chain, we have 
what would he regarded as an effect of matter on mind; when as the 
beginning, an effect of mind on matter. But mind is merely a cross- 
section in a stream of physical causation, and there is nothing odd 
about its being both an effect and a cause in the physical world. [P.
156].
But the truth is if any Cartesian accepts this then it is easy to cash interactionism on a 
Russellian assertion. For Russell the spatio-temporal location of the events has 
provided him the solid ground for the explanation of the relation of mind and matter 
„s construction of neutral entities. [See Chapter Four],
Thus by rejecting the dualistic criteria of mind and by accepting a behaviouristic 
account Russell dispensed with the consciousness as a specific character of mind. But 
"consciousness" has not been analysed away.3'  Thus it should not be thought that 
Russell re-introduced consciousness as an entity, the entities which constitutes mind 
has nothing "conscious" about them, but "consciousness", as awareness, exists when 
sensations and images are related ;n a certain way and forms a complex.
6.3.1. 2 . Tbe Analysis of Mental States.
In order to explain his theory of mind, in 1921, Russell followed the similar method 
of construction as that of matter (sec above). The mental world which explains the 
awareness of one self and the external world, beside sensations also, requires images 
as a part in its c< nstruction. In introducing the concept of "images" Russell criticised 
the behaviouristic psychology, propounded by Watson, for rejecting introspection as a 
source of knowledge. In a letter he wrote "the Behaviourists... say images are small 
movements of the tongue and throat silently pronouncing words. This is obviously 
ROT”35 6. He said that introspective data is concerned with localization. For instance 
the images of private sensations can be localized where the private sensations would 
be. Similarly the images of words in the mouth is located in the mouth. Since the 
physical world does not include all that we are aware of, we must admit introspection 
as a source of knowledge different from sensation. [See chapter five under "Images as 
Entities"].
35. See Quinton, op. cit., p. 99; Dorward, Bertrand Russell, p. 30.
36. Wood, A., Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic, p. 105.
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Sensations are the basis of our knowledge, but they are non-cognitive in themselves 
and are therefore "non-mnemic elements in a perception". [See Chapter Five]. Images 
not utterly different from sensation by their "intrinsic natures", are in fact "vague 
copies" of sensations (The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 145) and therefore "arc just as truly 
part of the actual world as sensations are" (ibid., p. 148). The only difference lies in 
their causes and effects. Sensations have only "physical causes" but have "both 
physical and mental effects" (ibid., p. 151). Whereas images have "mnemic causes", 
and might have physical cause, from which "all their effects ... follow" (ibid.) 
According to Russell the mnemic causations are action at a distance and are 
responsible for different classes of mnemic phenomena, such as acquired habits, 
associations, memory etc. (ibid., pp. 78-92). FoHowing Semon, Russell gave the 
name of "mnemic phenomena" "to those responses of an organism which ... can only 
be brought under causal laws by including past occurrences in the history of the 
organism as pari o f the causes of the present response" (ibid., p. 78). The mnemic 
causation is the proximate cause and not the ultimate cause of the mnemic 
phenomena.
We know that according to Russell "aspects" or "happenings", which are similar and 
simultaneous, can be collected in two ways. In the first collection all the aspects 
emanating from common centre (say a star) at different places are grouped together. 
This grouping o f particulars is called physical objects. In the second group all the 
happenings (say o f different stars) appear in one place are collected. Russell called 
this "perspective". ¡See Chapters Four, Six; The Analysis o f  Mind, pp. 129-30], A 
perspective is constituted out of both sensation and sensibilia. A perspective is a 
possible, but not yet actual, momentary perceiver. A perspective taken through out a 
period of time is called a biography, and is not a life. A perspective turns into a 
momentary perceiver when it is correlated with images, which has mnemic causation. 
This when considered through out a period of time constitutes a biography of an 
individual. "The particulars forming one perspective are co inected together primarily 
by simultaneity; those forming one biography, primarily by the existence of direct 
time-relations between them." \The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 296]. (We have seen above 
how biography is also an affair of physics]. Accordingly "subjectivity" is the 
characteristics of perspective, the characteristic of giving the view of the world from a 
certain place. He also called the two places of collections as "active" (the place where 
the star is) and "passive" (the place where the perspective is). \Ibid., pp. 130, 301; 
also cf., Chapter Five.] Physics collects aspects actively at a given place, and 
psychology collects aspects passively at a given place. We have seen that Russell later
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said that aspects of both physics and psychology are collected passively and thus 
abolishing the distinction between active and passive places. [See above).
Apart from the above explanation Russell also explained mental life on behaviourist 
lines. He emphasised the importance of animals (comparative psychology) and of the 
insane and hysterical (psycho-analysis).[The Analysis oj MiruJ, p. 1OJ. The 
comparative psychology has revealed that what is true of animals is also true of men. 
For instance lemming involves the acquisition of habits. We can explain this by 
putting a hungry cat inside the cage and placing the fo>/d outside the cage. The door 
of the cage can be opened by lifting the latch. The cat makes various moves to come 
out or the cage. At last, by accident it lifts the latch and reaches >ts food. If the 
experiment is repeated day after day the cat straight away goes to the latch and lifts it 
at once. "It is essentially similar processes that we learn speaking, writing, 
mathematics, or the government of an empire." {ibid., p. 52].
Thus Russell recognized that the mental life can be explained as a complex of 
sensation and images together with introspection and also can r>e interpreted 
behaviouristically. In the light o f the ah'»ve discussion let us see how he analyses 
various mental phenomena.
1. Desire and Feeling.
Russell held that a mental occurrence of any kind, such as desire, feeling and so on 
may be a cause of a series of actions. Such a series of actions is called a "behavioural- 
cycle". This consists of voluntary or reflex movements tending it to cause a certain 
result. The property which causes such a cycle is "discomfort". Russell said that 
desire is a behavioural-cycle caused by discomfort. The stimulus which causes desire 
is an impulsion from behind not an attraction from the future. {The Analysis o f  Mind 
p. 66|. Desires arc "blind tendencies to certain kinds of activity" (An Outline o f 
Philosophy, p. 231)
"The primitive non-cognitive element in desire seems to be a push, noi a pull, an 
impulsion away from the actual, rather than an attraction towards the ideal." {The 
Analysis o f Mind, p. 68|. Certain sensations and other mental occurrences have the 
property of discomfort which causes such bodily movements as are likely to lead to 
their cessation. When discomfort ceases we have sensations possessing a property 
which we call pleasure. For example above we have seen the discomfort caused by
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hunger led the cat to learn the situation and open the door of the cage to reach the 
food and eat it. When the cat reached the food and had eaten it, its discomfort ceased 
and the sensation became pleasurable. Russell said that it was a mistake to think that 
the animals had this situation in mind throughout, when in fact they have been 
continually pushed by discomfort. [Ibid., p. 68]. Similarly in human beings the desire 
is due to discomfort without involving any conscious effort. If the experience is 
repeated one becomes conscious o f the object and the way of realization. In the case 
of the cat the repeated experiment led the cat to reach level of explicit conscious 
desire. Russell held that even in such case we are still pushed from behind. [An 
Outline o f  Philosophy, p. 230].
2. Emotion.
Emotion, Russell said, was essentially complex. It is evident that our problem of the 
anal ..is of the emotion is bound up with the problem of their physiological causation. 
In explaining his v<ews Russell discussed the modem views on the causation of 
emotion called the James-Lange theory, presented by James in his Psychology (vol, ii, 
p. 449), and the experiments of Siie rington and Cannon. [The Analysis o f Mind, pp. 
280-4], James regarded that an emotion consists of a confused perception of the 
viscera. While Cannon and Sherrington argued that an emotion involves a confused 
perception of its external stimulus. [Ibid., p. 283].
Following James and Sherrington Russell declared that "an emotion in its entirety 
contains dynamic elements, such as motor impulses, desires, pleasure and pains.... [It 
is] a certain kind of process, consisting of perceptions and (in general) bodily 
movements" (ibid., p. 284). Desires and pleasures and pains are properties of this, 
not a separate items in the stuff o f which the emotion is composed. Russell declared:
The ingredients of an emotion are only sensations and images and 
bodily movemen.s succeeding each other according to  a certain 
pattern. [Ibid.].
3. Will.
Will, according to Russell, "is a voluntary movement. [Ibid., p. 284], Russell 
explained that according to James only distinctive characteristic of a voluntary act is 
that it involves an idea of the movement to be performed, made up o f  memory-images 
of the kinesthetic sensations. More over no movement can be made voluntarily unless
Russell On Neutral Monism. 2 6 5
it has previously occurred involuntarily. Russell considered this view as correct. 
| /bid., p. 285J. For instance the process in which a child learns control over fingers 
and toes is at first involuntary. After some experience of involuntary movements, the 
child discovers how to think of a movement and then make the movement, which 
becomes pleasurable. Similarly in adult life, a deliberate movement is one which we 
think of before we make. ¡An Outline, p. 231). "Thus will seems to add no new 
irreducible ingredient to the analysis of the mind." \The Analysis o f Mind, p. 286).
4^-Perception.
Before his commitment U) neutral monism Russell used the term "perception" 
synonymously with "sensation". As opposed to "sense-datum" the word "sensation" 
was used either for the art alone or for the complex "act-acquainted-with-object".
In discarding consciousness as an entity Russell declared that neutral entities such as 
percepts or sensations are non-cognitive. Sensation such as a patch of colour is not 
knowledge. But sensation is a source of knowledge which gives rise to knowledge 
through its psychological effects. Accordingly he explained that mnemic phene* nena 
will have to be added to sensation to make up what is called the perception". This 
shows that sensation is simply a theoretical coie in the actual experience; the actual 
experience is the perception. {The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 132).
Following James Russell rejected the view that there is any relational character about 
what occurs in us when we perceive. In order to explain his position Russel1 quoted 
Henery Head who argued ihat "sensation, in strict sense of the term, demands the 
existence of consciousness" (ibid., p. 288). Russell argued that if we accept this we 
are mistaken. "Sensation is the sort of thin;, of which we may be conscious, but not a 
thing of which we must be conscious." {/bid.] There is no such entity called 
"consciousness”. Perception is a complex of sensations and images, both o f which are 
intrinsically same. That means images like sensations are non-cognitive. The question 
is: How do we explain knowledge?
Russell explained his position in the following way. the first thing that we notice is 
that consciousness must be of something. Keeping this in view he admitted that there 
was awareness or consciousness, but that is simply a relation of an image or a word to 
an object. Accordingly he said that when a sensation is followed by an image which is 
a copy of it, it may be said that "the existence of the image constitutes consciousness
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of the sensation , provided it is accompanied by that sort of belief which, when we 
reflect upon it, makes us feel that image is a "sign" of something other than itse lf 
(The Analysis o f Mind, p. 289). Mere imagination does not involve consciousness of 
anything unless some element of belief is added. Russell explained:
If images alone constituted consciousness of their prototypes, such 
imagination-images as in fact have prototypes would involve 
consciousness of them; since this is not the case, an element of 
belief must be added to the images in defining consciousness, the 
belief must be of diat sort that constitutes objective reference, past 
or present. An image, together with a belief of this sort concerning 
it, const«tutes... consciousness of the prototype of the image. | Ibid. , 
p. 289].
But a further addition is required '..'hen we pass from consciousness of sensations to 
consciousness of objects of perception. Accordingly Russell said perception will 
consist of sensation, together with associated imrges, with the belief in the existence 
of an object to which sensation and images are referred. The belief will not in any 
present existence but will be of the nature of an expectation. For instance, when we 
see an object, say a table, we expect certain sensations to result if we proceed to touch 
the table. Russell declared: "Perception, then, will consist of a prcserf sensation to 
together with expectations of future sensations." [¡hid., p. 290].
Sensation itself is not an instance of consciousness, although the immediate memory 
by which it tr> succeeded is. Russell said:
A sensation which is remembered becomes an object of 
consciousness as soon as it begins to be remembered, ... but while it 
exists it is not an object of consciousness.... The essential practical 
function of " consciousness" and "thought" is that they enable us to
act with reference to whet is distant in time or space...... This
reference to absent objects is possible through association and habit. 
Actual sensations, in themselves, are not cases c f consciousness, 
because they do not bring in »his reference to what is absent. |77ie 
Analysis o f  Mind, p. 292],
The above passage clearly reflects that a sensation in its immediacy is not knowledge. 
A sensation is only a knowledge when it begins to be remembered We know that 
against Behaviourism Russell introduced introspection as a source of knowledge. But 
the analysis of the above passage shows that it is only in retrospection that we have 
knowledge of the sensation. Such knowledge or consciousness involves memory, i. e. 
the influence of past experience on present reactions. In his Portraits From Memory 
Russell explained that when we see something we cannot say that it is a knowledge. It
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becomes knowledge when wc say to our self that there it is. [Cf., ibid, p. 143]. This 
is the consequence of his abandonment of the view *Jiat "sensation" or "percept" is a 
relational occurrence in which subject is "aware" of an object. In accepting neutral 
monism Russell became persuaded o f the rightness of James's view. James argued 
that there is no subject-object distinctions in "pure experience", the neutral entity. The 
distinction, within the flux of the experiences, is generated only v'hen one experience 
is coniras‘ed with the next experience. That is to say that it is in appropriation and in 
retrospection we have knowledge. [See Chapter Two].
But in 195C Russell was dissatisfied with James's account of knowledge. He argued 
that when a dog sees a rabbit, for instance, we can hardly suppose that it says tc 
itself, "I am having a visual sensation which probably has an external cause". If we 
accept this view then we can say what occurs in the dog when it "sees a rabbit" has 
only an indirect and causal relation to the rabbit. Russell conside'ed this view as 
"odd". [Cf., My Philosophical Development, p. 104],
In his re-examination of consciousness or knowledge Russell in his My philosophical 
Development argued that new problems arose because of the abandonment of "sense- 
data" (p 101). Before their abandonment sense-data were held to be absolutely 
certain, self-evident and precise. I have discussed this in chapter five under the 
heading " Ibe Analysis of Sensations". In short, the problem in question is that since 
sensations are non-cognitive then what is meant by "empirical evidence". If one has 
no knowledge of one’s sensations one cannot have knowledge of the external world. 
But there is duality in every form of knowledge. As a result he re defined such words 
as "awareness", "acquaintance" and "experience", and replaced "acquaintance" by 
"noticing". The term "noticing" is a matter of degree. A loud noise is sure to 
command attention so is a very faint sound. Following this Russel! said that every 
empirical proposition is based on one or more sensible occurrences that were noticed 
when they occurred. Such occurrences are "known" when they are noticed. By saying 
this he provided a "relative certainty" to sensations. Similarly we have seen that 
James departed from his initial commitment that all experiences are non-cognitive by 
themselves. The "feeling" (or an "experience") is "dumb" and "helpless" and can 
neither name or classify and therefore there is no knowledge. But his departure is 
clearly felt ,vhen he says that from the cognitive point of view a feeling is "most 
positively and definitely qualified inner fact" and therefore it is no "psychically zero".
|See Chapters Two and Three).
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5. Memory and Imagination
Memory, according to Russell introduces us to knowledge in one of its form. It is a 
complex mental phenomenon. He argued:
[E]very thing constituting a memory-belief is happening now, not in 
the past time to which the belief is said to refer. It is not logically 
necessary to the existence of a memory-belief that the event 
remembered should have occurred, or even that the past should have 
existed at all. There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that 
the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, 
with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past. There is 
no logically necessary connection between events at different times; 
therefore nothing that is happening now or will happen in the future 
can disprove the hypothesis that die world began five minutes ago.
Hence the occurrences which are called knowledge of the past are 
logically independent ot the past; they are wholly analysable into 
present contents, which might, theoretically, be just what they are 
even if no past existed. [The analysis o f Mind, pp. 159-60]
In his analysis of memory Russell considered several stages. "True recollection comes 
at the end of a series or stages. “ [An Outline o f  Philosophy, p. 203], The stages are as 
follows:
(i) . Images. Images are vague copies of sensation and are "mnemic phenomena", in 
the sense that their occurrence is a result of past experience according to the law of 
association. But images which copies a past occurrence only constitute a recollection 
when it is felt to be a copy. [ibid.].
(ii) . Fimiliarity. The characteristics by which we distinguish the images and 
perceptions is the feeling of familiarity that accompanies them. This leads us to judge 
that we have remembered the familiar part rightly and the unfamiliar part wrongly.
I Ibid., p. 204; The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 161],
(iii). Habit Memory. Russell rejected this sort of memory because it does not involve 
any recollection of past occurrence. "This sort of memory is mere habit, and is 
essentially like knowing how to walk although you cannot remember learning to 
walk". [An Outline o f  Philosophy, p 204],
(iv). Recognition. This has two senses. In the first sense this involves no knowledge 
about the past, and is only an associative habit. For instance in seeing a dog one may 
say to oneseif "there is a dog" without recalling any case where a dog has been seen.
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Secondly, there is knowledge of the past in the slightest sense. Such recognition 
consists in belief, which may be expressed in the words: "This has existed before." 
\lhid., p. 204; The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 170).
(v) Immediate Memory. The region between sensation and true memory is called 
"immediate memory". When a sense-organ is stimulated, it does not at once return to 
its unstimulated condition. It goes on for a short time. For example, when we sec a 
flash of lightning, our sensation lasts longer than the lightning as a physical 
occurrence. At the beginning of the occurrence we have sensation and then there is a 
process of gradual fading of sensations. Russell, following Semon, called this 
"akoluthic" sensations. *7 When the fading is con.pleted we arrive at the image, the 
copy of sensations. This perioJ between the sensation and the image is the "immediate 
memory", which provides the experience of succession. The short time which is 
present during the process of fading is called the "specious prevent". Everything is 
sensibly present to us at this period. In other words the events that occur throughout 
this short time can be perceived together. For instance v'hcn we move a hand from 
left to right there is a "felt degree" of movement in which we can distinguish earlier 
and later in the specious present. We can have the idea "earlier", and can mean by 
"past" "earlier than this", where "this" is what is actually happening. In the specious 
present the entire process is sensible. Thus immediate memory is important in our 
knowledge of tem,x>ral succession. [The Analysis o f  Mind, pp. 174-5; An Outline o f  
Philosophy, pp. 204-5).
(vi) . True Recollection. In "true" recollection we remember, for instance, what we 
had for breakfast. This occurrence involves two questions: (1) What is the present 
occurrence when we remember? (2) What is the relation of this present occurrence to 
the past event which is remembered? Of these two questions the first concerns the 
psychologist and the second belongs to the theory of knowledge. [The Analysis o f  
Mini'., p. 173; An Outline, p. 205-6|.
Regarding th; first, what is happening is now; the recollection involves either images 
or words, where the worus may be merely imagited. Russell pointed out that 
whatever may be happening now, the event remembered is no* happening. The event 
which occurs when we remember is different from the event remembered. Thus 
images, although accurate copies of the past, are not enough to constitute recollection. 
There must be some feeling which makes us refer the images to a past prototype. 37
37. The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 175; The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 254.
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As to the relation of the present happening to the event remembered, Russell said that 
if we recollect correctly, the several images will have the same kind of resemblance 
of quality which images can have to their prototypes, and their structure and relations 
will be identical with those of their prototypes. It is the similarity of quality and 
identity of structure oetween the complex image and previous perception the 
correctness of memory consists of. \An Outline, p. 207],
Russell concluded that the causation of memory is wholly associative. | Ibid., p. 208], 
Something in the present is in agreement with something in the past, which calls up 
the context of the past occurrence in the shape of images or words. When attention 
falls upon this context, we believe that it occurred iii the past and we have then an act 
of recollection.
This shows that some sort of oelief involves memory. Russell distinguished memory 
from imagination. The essence of imagination is the absence of belief to together with 
a novel combination of known elements. In memory the combination of elements is 
not novel. A proper memory does not involve a re-arrangement of elements derived 
from past experience. On the contrary it restores such elements in the pattern in which 
they occur. This, according to Russell is the vital difference between memory and 
imagination. |Ibid., p 202).
In analysing Russell’s account of memory Ayer pointed out that Russell is right when 
he argued that the occurrences which are called knowledge of the past are logically 
independent of the past. They are wholly analysable into present contents which 
might, theoretically, be just what they are even if no past has existed. [Russell arul 
Moore, pp. 119-20; The Analysis o f  Mind p. 159-60], Ayer concluded:
"that no noncircular justification of memory can be given. We check 
one memory-belief against another, and against historical records, 
our reliance on which itself depends in part on memory-beliefs, but 
it is vain to ask for a general proof that memory is trustworthy. "•**
In his Bertrand Russell Ayer said that Russell’s account resembles induction, and he 
treats it as one form of inductive inference. [P. 90], 38
38. Ibid. , p. 90; Russell and Moote, p. 120.
Russell On Neutral Monism. 271
6. Belief.
Russell considered belief as the "central problem" in the analysis of mind; because it 
is the most "mental" thing we do. Beliefs gives us knowledge and error; they are the 
vehicles of truth and falseh(x>d. | The Analysts o f  Mind, p. 2311.
Similar to the analysis of “act-content-object", Russell said, belief contains three 
elements, namely (a) believing, (h) what is believed and the (c) objective. Russell 
noted that the objections to act are not valid against the believing in the case of belief 
"because the believing is an actual experienced feeling, not something postulated, like 
the act" (ibid. , p. 233).
Russell said that we must distinguish between believing and what is believed. What is 
believed, i.e. the content of the belief, is complex and may consist of words only, or 
of im iges only, or o f a mixture of the two, together with one or more sensations. The 
contents believed may be different in different cases, namely, Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon or that two and two makes four, hut in all cases the believing is the same.
| Ibid., p. 233).
Now the question is: What makes a belief true or false? According to Russell the truth 
or falsehood of a belief depends not upon present thing but upon the actions 
performed. | Ibid., p 232|. In order to explain this Russell said that what makes a 
belief true or false will be called a "fact", and the particulai fact that makes a given 
belief true or false will be called "objective". The relation of the beliefs to its 
objective will he called "objective reference". Thus Caesar’s actual crossing of 
Rubicon is the objective fact and the reference of the belief is the relation between the 
belief anu the actual crossing. It is this objective fact that makes the belief true or 
false. The truth or falsehood of a belief does not depend upon anything intrinsic to the 
belief, but upon the nature of its relation to its objective. The intrinsic nature can be 
treated without reference to what makes it true or false. |Ibid., p. 232).
We have seen above that Russell rejected Meinongian "act" and said that believing is 
an actual experienced feeling. He said that there are at least three kinds of belief, 
namely (i) memory belief, (ii) expectation and (iii) bare assent. [Ibid., p. 250). Rach 
ol these is constituted by a certain feeling or complex of sensations, attached to the
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content believed. Russell illustrated this with an example. For instance, I am 
believing, by means of images, that it will rain. Here we have two interrelated 
elements, namely the content and the expectation. The content consists of images of 
the visual appearance of rain, the feeling of wetness, and so on, interrelated as the 
sensations would be if it were raining. Thus the content is a complex fact composed 
of images. Exactly the same content can enter into memory "it was raining" or the 
assent "rain occurs". Here the difference of these cases from each other and from 
expectation does not lie in the content. The difference lies simply in the nature of the 
belief-feeling.
3ut Russell does not analyse the "belief feeling" but is not prepared to say that they 
cannot be analysed. [The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 250]. Because he left "belief-feeling" 
unanalysed Russell was subjected to criticism.
Tully in his "Russell’s Neutral Monism" argued that despite Russell noted that the 
theory of behaviourism "belongs logically with neutral monism" he preferred to 
analyse the concept of belief in terms of specific belief-feeling, "i think it suggests the 
hold which a certain introspectionist orientations had on Russell’s thinking." [P. 215]. 
Although Russell accepted behaviouristic pnnciples to make his theory plausible, we 
know that he preferred introspection as the valid source of knowledge.
Laird, in his "Concerning The Human Mind", argued that in Russell's threefold 
schema (act-content object, where "feelings" are substituted for "acts") the "act" is 
neither sensation nor an image but an "actual experienced feeling", "I submit that he 
is peopling the "mind" with stowaways whose very existence he began by denying" 
(p. 313). a  Similar criticism is made by Dorward in his "Critical Notices: Bertrand 
Ru-sell, The Analysis o f  Mind". He is of the opinion that the subject is introduced 
under the cover of what Russell called the "belief-feeling" and until this has been 
analysed and turned inside-out "I shall continue to believe that within it is concealed 
something which is neither a sensation nor an image__" (p. 94).
Russell, in his "Reply" to Laird, insisted that h<* rejected the Ego as particular in The 
Analysis o f  Mind. He argued that desire, pleasure-pain and belief did not "involve an 
observable subject". Regarding this he said it is a matter as to which opinions differ, 
and as to wnich it is very difficult to advance any arguments. But Russell said that it 
is necessary to explain the difference between you and me. [P. 699], He said that 
there are a number of causal connections between the mental occurrences which we
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regard as belonging to one person, which do not exist between those belonging to 
different people. To these a relation must be added. This relation will hold between 
any two simultaneous contents of a given mind, and also between any two events 
which overlap in physical space-time. For instance let N be the relation "remembering 
or remembered by". Then "I" means "anything compresent with any member of the 
ancestry of this with respect to N .... In defining "you," I must substitute for this some 
inferred entity.... The inferred entity must not be a member of I |or "me")" (Ibid., 
pp. 699-700).
6.3.2. Conclusion.
In his analysis of mind in terms of neutral entities Russell did two things in 1921. 
Firstly he analysed away the dualistic criteria of mind in order to show that there is no 
separate entity called consciousness. In doing so he criticised the doctrine of 
"intentionality" held by Brentano and his followers. He also showed that subjectivity 
is not a peculiarity which belongs to mind but also to matter. More over mental events 
like physical events are in space and time. Secondly he analysed the mental 
phenomena in quite similar to those of the behaviourists. Russell admitted that he was 
"a trained observer, with an analytic attention, knowing the sort of thing to look for" 
"viewing a man from the outside" (The Analysis o f Mind, pp. 298, 255, respectively). 
It is not his belief, according to him, but his bodily movements, that we observe. But 
this docs not mean that he rejected consciousness in his philosophy. Consciousness is 
a complex notion, involving beliefs as well as mneiric phenomena. Although he 
admires the method, Russell said that the behaviourist philosophy fails to explain the 
introspective data, the images, w hich plays a role in our analysis of knowledge. "1 do 
not myself believe that the analysis of knowledge can be effected entirely by means of 
purely external observation" (ibid., pp. 230, 157).
The main motive of Russell’s theory of neutral monism was to adopt James’s theory 
and explain mind and matter by using a single expression, in which he failed. Instead 
matter and mind are both constructs out of three different entities, namely sensations, 
images and sensihilia. Perhaps Russell never abandoned the basic objection (the non­
relational characteristic of neutral entities) he had raised against the neutral monism c f 
James and Mach.34 Russell’s position, as regards mental phenomena, in The Analysis 
o f Mind has been summarised by E.R. Fames in the following way: 39
39. Cf., Quinton, A., op. cit., p. 96.
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In the case ot memory, arid belief, and truth and falsehood, Russell 
... maintained a realist and relational view in which the referent, the 
remembered, believed about, and asserted object is outside of the 
memory, belief, and assertion.40
Russell's metaphysical dualism resulted because of the uneasiness in explaining the 
relation of the knower a.:d the known exclusively in terms of neutral entities. We 
have seen that he amalgamated sense-data and sensibilia into sensation, the non- 
cognitive element in perception. But sensation alone cannot explain mental 
phenomena in terms o f cognition. Russell had to introduce images, which have 
mnemic causes, that give rise to mnemic phenomena to explain the "awareness", a 
mental function. Though mind and matter may have similar metaphysical elements as 
constituents they differ in their causal laws. In his The Analysis o f  Mind Russell 
introduced physical causal laws and psychological causal laws. This is because there is 
a fundamental differences between physics and psychology. "Physics treats as a unit 
the whole system of appearances of a piece of matter, whereas psychology is 
interested in certain of these appearances themselves." [P. 104], This means that 
psychology is concerned with actual particulars whereas physics is concerned with 
systems of particulars. So physics groups together particulars having the same 
"active" place while psychology groups together those having the same "passive" 
place.
It was in 1927 Russell declared that mind and matter are arrangements of events or 
percepts. Let us see next how his theory of mind has been affected by such an 
assertion.
5.3.3 Mind as "Assemblage of Percepts*.
1 have mentioned above that in his later books Russell undertook very little discussion 
about the philosophy o f mind. The only extensive discussion he undertook was in his 
An Outline o f  Philosophy, and Human Knowledge ("The Science of Mind"). In the 
main he adhered to similar theory of mind as The Analysis o f Mind. In a brief review 
of his theory of mind, contributed to C.W. Morris’ Six Theories o f  Mind, Russell had 
written that "there are things in The Analysis o f  Mind which I no longer care to 
defend" (p. 134). But he did not mention what those things are. He discussed various 
mental phenomena as complexes of sensations and images not different from 1921.
40. Bertrand Russell's Theory o f  Knowledge, p. 103
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There is no entity called consciousness and mind is a complex structure consisting of 
mental phenomena.
In his The Analysis o f  Mind, Russell rejected the relational theory of mind. There is 
no subject and object distinction in perception. He argued that consciousness is not a 
criterion of mind as distinguished from matter. Consciousness is too "complex and 
accidental" and "too narrow' and therefore is not a "universal characteristic of mental 
phenomena"; mind is a matter of degree, chiefly exemplified in number and 
complexity of habits. | The Analysis o f Mind, pp. 292, 295, 308|. As regards mnemic 
causation Russell said that it is "loo wide". [Ibid., p. 295; see Chapter Five). 
Subjectivity is not a distinguishing character of mind because it is equally present in 
matter. |lb id ., Lecture VII, pp. 295-6; see above and also Chapter Five of the thesis). 
As regards these characteristics there is no difference between mind and matter.
Although in 1921 Russell maintained that "physics and psychology are not 
distinguished by their material" (ibid., p. 307) we find that both mind and matter 
differed in two respect: (1) the entities which constitute them, and (2) the causal laws 
which collects particulars into two groups, making one mental and the other physical.
Sensations belonged to the mental and the physical but images, which are action at a 
distance, belonged exclusively to mind, and sensihilia to matter. We have seen above 
that perspectives are constructions not only of images ar/J sensations but also 
sensihdia. Anthony Quinton explained this in the following way:
Mentality, therefore, whether introspective or behavioural, all 
reduces to the three kinds of neutral elements. The introspectahle is 
just sensations and images; the behavioural is reducible to sensations 
and sensihilia. |"Russell’s Philosophy of Mind", p. 96].
In discussing the construction of matter we have also come across the fact that the 
matter of the brain is not only constituted out of sensations and sensihilia but also of 
images. While discussing the construction of menial phenomena Russell, in 1927, 
held that images have a position in the brain and that mnemic phenomena in mental 
events are due to the modification of the body by past events. [An Outline o f  
Philosophy, p. 306; The Analysis o f Matter, p. 320; see Chapter five, "Images as 
F.ntities"|. As a result the constituents of both mind and matter are the same. We 
know that it is the strict programme of the neutral monist is to explain mind and 
matter only in terms of a single kind of neutral entities. Russell’s commitment to three 
types of entities left his theory different from James’ and Mach’s versions. In 1927
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Russell declared that events are the neutral entities and therefore the ultimate stuff of 
the world. |See above and also Chapter Five],
The only distinction between mind and matter lies in causal laws. Earlier we have 
seen how James maintained that in the physical world the neutral entities arc "stably” 
and "stubbornly" connected but in the mind their connections are loose. By this he 
meant that physical laws are stable and the psychological laws arc not rigid. The point 
is James accepted two kinds of laws to distinguish between the mental and the 
physical. (See sections 2.6.2, 2.6.4.2. Compare this with Davidson's 
"anomalousness" of the mental. See below].
Similarly in his The Analysis o f  Mind Russell clearly stated that the dualism is not as 
to the stuff of the world but as to causal laws. |P. 137]. He explained:
A causal law applicable to particulars would count as a laws of 
physics if it could be stated in terms of those fictitious systems of 
regular appearances which are matter; if this were not the case, it 
would count as a law of psychology if one of the particulars were a 
sensation or an image, i.e. were subject to mnemic causation. [P.
306].
Such assertion led Morris Weitz to conclude that "Russell is a causal dualist". |"The 
Unity of Russell’s Philosophy", p. 78]. We know that both Mach and James 
maintained that dualism in the world is not of entities hut of laws. This is generally 
accepted by the nrutral oh mists.
Russell as a neutral monist gave importance to both physical causal laws and 
psychological causal laws. Before wc proceed further it is necessary to point out that 
in 1921 Russell said that causal laws are important because physics groups particulars 
in an "active" place and psychology group particulars in a "passive" place. Sen.>ations 
or percepts are the only part of the physical world that we know otherwise than 
abstractly.
In Russell's later philosophy the distinctions between the two causal laws is motivated 
by his epistemological consideration. Since he gave up the "act-object" distinction it 
became imperative for him to explain knowledge. Russell emphasised the importance 
o f physical laws but argued that "there certainly is knowledge in psychology which 
cannot ever form part of physics" (An Outline o f  Philosophy, p. 300). This difference 
between physics and psychology, according to Russell, is analogous to that between a
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postman’s knowledge of letters, i.e. the movements of many letters, and the 
knowledge of the recipient of letters, i.e. who knows the contents of few. | Ibid., p. 
300).
Following James, Russell accepted the method of introspection as the essential source 
of knowledge. In doing so he explained the importance of psychology as a science in 
his Human Knowledge ("The Science of Mind"). What is empirically verifiable Is not 
"pure physics" in isolation, but also psychology. "Psychology ... is an essential 
ingredient in every part of empirical science." | Ibid., p. 63J.
Russell was critical about certain school of psychologists who maintain that 
"introspection" is not a valid scientific method. He was in fact pointing his argument 
against the behaviounst. Accepting introspection as a valid method Russell 
distinguished between "private" and "public" data. Based on our knowledge Russell 
said that the "publicity" of our world is "inferential" and what we know directly ate 
"mental events", i.e. the private data. [Pp. 67, 245],
Such a distinction should not be thought of as a metaphysical distinction nut rather 
one of degree and is the results of introspection. Metaphysically there is no distinction 
between events which constitute mind and matter. The distinction between private and 
public data is epistemological. Russell warned:
|T |he "mental" and the "physical" are not so disparate as is 
generally thought. I should define a "mental" occurrence as one 
which some knows otherwise than by inference, the distinction 
between the "mental" and "physical" therefore belongs to theory of 
knowledge, not to metaphysics. | Ibid., p. 224|.
This epistemological distinction between "mental" (private) and "physical" (public) 
events remain in his neutral monism. Russell also introduced "unconscious" mental 
events, making a distinction between "conscious" mental events. This suggests that 
Russell introduces entities having different metaphysical status. Such a distinction can 
be rendered untenable by a suggestion that the behaviour could be modified by means 
of sensory stimuli of which the subject is not aware. Experiments have been carried 
out as early as mid century, for instance by Suslowa, 186341, to demonstrate whether 
such changes in behaviour is possible. Normally it is proved that when a sufficient 
stimulus is presented to a subject a visual or auditory sensation is hound to occur. In 
order to have proper response a stimulus must have "sufficient intensity and duration
41. Murch, Gerald, M., Visual And Auditory Perception, p. 319.
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to evoke response" (Visual And Auditory Perception, p. 16). Otherwise it would be 
difficult for the experimenter to elicit the proper response if the subject fails to 
identify the stimulus. So the stimulus could he of two types, according to intensity 
and duration. They are supraliminal and subliminal. If the subject verbally identifies 
the stimulus, it is called supramliminal, and if he fails to do so, it is called subliminal.
Experiments have been carried out by Lazarus and McCleary (ibid., p. 320) to show 
that subliminal stimulus does bring about changes in behaviour. They presented ten 
nonsense syllables to a group of subjects, five accompanied by electric shock and five 
without the shock. After each presentation of each syllable they measured the galvanic 
skin response. Finally subjects showed outstanding reduction in skin resistance when a 
shock syllable was presented and no change occurred when a syllable, without shock, 
was presented. At the next stage they set out to test the subliminal effect. This time 
the subjects were presented with the ten syllables, having low intensity and less 
duration, without ary shock. At this low level although the subject failed to identify 
the stimulus verbally, the results showed that the subject displayed a change in 
galvanic skin response. Lazarus and McCleary concluded that some unconscious 
process allowed the discrimination of the shock syllables, although the conscious 
verbal awareness failed.
Apart from this a test on subliminal perception was carried out by the New York 
advertising firm. They claimed that advertising massages flashed subliminally on the 
screen during a movie in a public theatre, had brought about increase in sales. They 
carried out the experiment by flashing the message on the screen, "Buy Popcorn" or 
"Buy Coca-Cola", for three milliseconds every five seconds. The firm claimed a 56- 
percent increase in Coca-Cola and 18-percent increase in the demand for popcorn. But 
later it was proved that subliminal advertising does not work. | Ibid., p. 321J.
The most successful experiment was carried out by Dunlap (op. cit., , p. 322) in 
1900. Subjects were shown two horizontal lines and were asked which was shorter. 
While they were thinking about the lines, the closed and open end lines of Muller- 
Lyer figure were subliminally shown to the subjects. As a result it was found that 
subjects reacted to the line with inward angles shorter than the line with outward 
angles. This experiment was successfully replicated by Pyle (1907) and Kennet 
(1962). Subliminal perception shows that the difference between conscious and 
unconscious percepts are not surely external causes, as Russell thought. \The Analysis 
o f Matter, p. 385]. Unconscious mental states could be of events compresent with
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certain with both mental and physical events, quite similar to that of conscious mental 
states. Thus, not only conscious mental states are percepts, having causal relations to 
external stimulus, so are unconscious mental states. I think this makes Russell's 
theory to consider all mental states, conscious and unconscious, to be constituted out 
of percepts.
From the above consideration it becomes clear that percepts or sensations constitute 
mind and also constitute the matter of the brain. Russell explained the distinction 
between physics and psychology in the following way. The nerves and brain are 
matter Our visual sensations when we look at them are members of the system 
constituting irregular appearances of this matter, but are not the whole of the system. 
According to Russell:
Psychology is concerned... with our sensations when we see a piece
of matter, as opposed to the matter which we see. | The Analysis o f
Mind, p. 3G1].
He explained that when a sensation is used to verify physics, it is used as a sign of a 
certain material phenomenon, i.e. of a group of particulars of which it is a member. 
But when sensation is studied by psychology, it is taken away from *he group and put 
into a different context, where it causes images or voluntary movements. "It is ... this 
different grouping that is characteristic of psychology as opposed to all the physical 
sciences, including physiology...." \The Analysis o f  Mind, p. 302].
From the metaphysical point of view psychology and physics deal with the same 
neutral entities. Now the question arise what is a mind? We know like matter mind is 
a group o f percepts causally related. In explaining mind Russell spoke about two 
marked characteristics of mind. They are physical and psychological. |An Outline o f 
Philosophy, p. 297). In the physical way a mind is explained "as the group of mental 
events which form part of the history of a certain living body" (ibid., pp. 297-9). In 
the psychological way a mind is explained as that "it consist of all the mental events 
connected with a given mental event by "experience"" (p. 298). Russell said that 
mental events have not only mnemic causes but also mnemic effects. Thus he 
concluded, percepts, the subset of events, are located in the brain, and have certain 
peculiar causal properties, particularly "the) give rise to knowledge-reactions, and 
that they are capable of having mnemic effects which are cognitions" (An Outline o f  
Philosophy, p. 297).
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6.3 4 (Conclusion.
From the above discussion it is clear that not only images hut percepts have mnemic 
effects because they have certain peculiar properties. Images, which have mnemic 
causes, are the subject matter of psychology. Sensations, though subject to both the 
causal laws, physical and psychological, did not have mnemic effects. But by 104K 
the distinction between sensations and images lost its epistemological importance, and 
had been reduced to technical terms.'2 They are analyzed from the point of view of 
psychology and physiology. Instead of three kinds of neutral entities, Russell regarded 
percepts to be the only kind of neutral entities. Thus endorsing a single expression to 
explain material objects perceived and the actual perceiving which make up the 
content of mind Percepts are the neutral entities, which arc metaphysically certain 
and epistemologically justifies both physics and psychology. Russell arrived at this 
position by effecting a change in his theory of perception. I shall discuss this shortly.
We know that at the later stage of neutral monism Russell covertly introduced the 
subject and object distinction by replacing sense data with sensations having different 
properties. |See Chapter Five!. Before their abandonment sense data were absolutely 
certain but after abandonment they were relatively certain. The term "awareness" was 
replaced by "noticing" and "sense data" by "sensational cores". In 1927 Russell 
declared events as the ultimate stuff and in Human Knowledge suggested that an event 
is a bundle of compresent qualities. These qualities, both mental and physical, provide 
a neutral basis to an event It is through the physical characteristics of the percepts 
that we discover the "cause! skeleton oi the world". But when a percept occurs it is 
"noticed" and known. |See chapter five, 'Events as neutral entities!. Since percepts 
have peculiar causal properties Russell maintained:
It is perfectly possible for an event to have both the causal 
characteristic of physics and those of psychology In that case, the 
event is both mental and material at once |Portraits ¡'arm memory, 
p. 152| 42
42. Cl., Wilson, op. cit., p. 41; Morris, Six theories o f  Mitul, p. 137 (there Russell says, sensations 
and imayes are ’merely names' for neutral particulars), Human Know/nitfc, pp. 51-6, 124-5.
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6.4. Russell Declared Allegiance With James
In declaring that "the event is both mental and material at once" Russell brought his 
theory close to that of James. Earlier we have seen how Russell struggled to establish 
neutral monism, and use a single expression to identify the neutral entities. Percepts 
are the neutral entities of Russell's matured philosophy.
Russell closed the gap between his version of neutral monism and that of James’s by 
bringing a change in his theory of perception. For James there is no dualism in 
perception, and he explicitly denied the act and object distinction in perception in his 
article "Does "Consciousness" Exist?". Elizabeth Ramsdon Eames summarised this 
position saying that James,
"raised the question of the reality of an entity which had been 
considered to be one pole of the dualistic relation of knower and 
known, subje< t and object, inner and outer. James’ suggestion was 
to replace these dualisms with a position in which there is one 
experience which, taken one way, can be considered subjective, 
ideational, and inner, but taken another way, it can be considered 
objective and external. This position is monistic in that it eliminates 
the necessity for supposing two kinds of reality, and two different 
kinds of terms in the knowledge relation. The new position is 
neutral in that it is weighted neither toward idealism nor 
materialism" (Bertrand Russell’s theory o f  Knowledge, p. 100).
Thus Ja*res avoided the metaphysical dualism of mind and matter in Cartesian style. 
The inherent tension within the theory could not avoid the epistemological dualism of 
subject and object. Since metaphysically the neutral entities are of a single kind James 
implicitly introduced both mental and physical qualities or elements and internal 
relations within the neutral datum, making the theory covertly dualistic. This issue has 
been discussed in detail in chapter three, with a preliminary discussion in chapter one, 
section 1.2.3
We have seen that Russell’s version of neutral monism differed from James and the 
American New Realists, because he maintained a causal theory of perception, and 
thus distinguished sensations from images in terms of their different causal origins. 
|See above; also E.R. Eames, p. 102). He also admitted sensibilia which come under 
physical causal laws. But by 1948, as we have seen, that distinction between sensation 
and image has lost its epistemological importance and therefore is reduced to technical 
terms. We are thus left with percepts, the neutral entities. Russell’s arrival at this
Russell On Neutral Monism. 2 8 2
position is due to the change in his theory of perception.43 Historically, according to 
Russell, there have been two types of theories of perception: empirical and idealist. In 
empirical theory, some continuous chain of causation leads from the object to the 
percipient, and what is called "perceiving" the object is the last link in this chain. In 
idealist theory, when a percipient happens to be in the neighbourhood of an object a 
divine illumination causes the percipient’s soul to have an experience which is like the 
object. {Human knowledge, p. 211|.
The idealist theory, according to Russell, originates in Plato and culminates in 
Leibniz. This theory rules out any interaction between mind and matter and 
emphasises only the parallel developments thus leaving them asunder and unrelated. 
{Ibid. J
There also lies a difficulty with the empirical theory. By supplementing belief they 
assert that to every- state of the brain there corresponds a certain state of the mind and 
vice versa. If causation is regarded as an invariable sequence or concomitance, as the 
empiricist do, then the correspondence of brain and mind tautologically involves 
causa! interaction. The whole question of dependence is then explained whether mind 
causes brain or brain causes mind. {Ibid., p. 212 |.
The other problem associated with the empirical theory is stated by Russell thus:
livery empiricist holds that our knowledge as to matter« of fact is 
derived from perception, but if physics is true there must be so little 
resemblance between our percepts and their external causes that it is 
difficult to see how, from our percepts, we can acquire knowledge 
of external objects. The problem is further complicated by the fact 
that physics has been inferred from perception. | Ibid., p. 213|.
Russell accepted that physics is true. He intended to prove it by |K>inting to the fact 
that every physical theory which survives the test o f time goes through three stages. 
In the first stage, the theory is a matter of controversy among specialists. In the 
second stage, the specialists agree that it is the theory that best fits the available 
evidence. In the third stage, it is ihe new evidence will ’.'nlikely replace the theory bui 
may modify it. Russell accept« those parts of physics which has reached the third 
stage as probable to be used as arguments for philosophical speculation. {Ibid., p. 
214|. He considered two working hypotheses from the seventeenth century and three 
twentieth century modifications to physics.
43. For the detailed analysis of Russell’s later theory o f perception see T.A. Wilson, op. lit.
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The first hypothesis is that causal laws in the physical world need only take account of 
matter and motion. It was thought that physics should not take into account the 
qualitative difference of the particles, the subject matter of chemistry, but only study 
theii position in space. Russell thought that since the modem theory of atoms has 
reduced chemistry to physics, this has extended the scope of the hypothesis that 
different particles differ only in position, [Ibid., pp. 214-5].
The second working hypothesis of the seventeenth century is the "independence of 
causes". The hypothesis generally states that when a body is subject to several forces, 
the result of their acting at once for a given length o f time is the same as would he the 
result of their all acting by turns, each for a given length of time. Though quantum 
theory of atoms has abandoned it, Russell thought that this hypothesis holds good over 
a wide field, especially as the basis of the mathematical methods employed in 
traditional physics. On this ground he was willing to accept the hypothesis although 
he was not sure whether it holds universally. [Ibid., pp. 215-6].
The present century modifications of physics for Russell are: first, instead of two 
manifolds of space and time we have fcur-dimensional Einsteinian manifold of events; 
second causal laws do not suffice to determine individual events, but only statistical 
distributions; third, change is discontinuous. The second and third, according to 
Russell, appl> to microscopic phenomena, while the physical occurrences, such as 
speaking, associated with mental events are macroscopic. From this he deduces that if 
a human body works in accordance with physical laws then it will be correct to use 
the laws of physics to determine what a man will say and what will be the large-scale 
motions of his body. [Ibid., p. 216].
After asserting his reason for regarding physics to be true, Russell explained what he 
meant by "percept". He takes the common-sense approach and says that a percept is 
what happens when, for instance, I see something or hear something or believe myself 
to become aware of something through senses. By using the example of the sun 
Russell said that the sun is always there but it is only seen sometimes. For instance 
when one shut the eyes or look in a different direction one sees the sun sometimes. 
All the occasions on which one sees the sun have a certain resemblance which enables 
one in infancy to learn to use the word "sun". Some of the resemblances between 
different occasions of seeing the sun are in the person. But there are other 
resemblances, such as brightness, roundness, and heat, which do not depend on the
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person. Common sense considers these to be the properties of the object called the 
"sun*. When there is a relationship between these properties and human beings 
common sense holds that the human being "perceives" the sun. | Ibid., pp. 218-9],
It is at this point that physics intervenes and assures that the sun is not "bright" as the 
common sense considers. According to physics it is a source of light-rays which have 
a certain effect upon eyes and nerves and brains, and if these effects are absent then 
there is nothing that can be called "brightness". Moreover the physical sun inferred 
existed eight minutes ago. Therefore we cannot identify the physical sun with what we 
see, although the sun we see is the reason for believing in the physical sun.
To infer the existence of an object, e.g ., the sun, Russell thought that we must 
determine the location of percepts in the causal chains of physics. He took the 
example of "hearing a noise". A percept such as hearing a noise has a series of 
antecedents which travel in space time from the physical source of the noise through 
the air to the ears and brain. The experience called "hearing the noise" is 
simultaneous with the cerebral term of the physical causal chain. If "hearing of the 
noise is to fit the physical causal chain then it must be connected with the same region 
of spao tim e as that of physical events. This applies both to the hearing of the noise 
and the noise as heard. The only region of space-time with which the noise has any 
direct connection is the hearer’s brain. The same argument applies to all things seen 
or heard equally. In the example of tne sun it applies to both "seeing the sun" and 
"the sun".
Russell arrived at this view following James, who rejected dualism in perception He 
wrote:
The dualistic view of perception, as a relation of a subject to an 
object, is one which, following the leadership of William James, 
empiricists have now for the most part abandoned. The discretion 
between "seeing the sun" as a mental event, and the immediate 
object of my seeing, is now generally rejected as invalid, and in this 
view I concur. [Human Knowledge, pp. 220-1],
We have seen that James’s metaphysical monism was mainly due to his rejection of 
epistemological dualism. Since there is no such thing as consciousness the distinction 
between the knower and the known, the subject and the object are due to retrospection 
and appropriation. ]See Chapter Two]. But he failed to hold to his commitments. I 
have argued that James’s neutral monism is covertly dualistic.
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Russell committed a similar mistake. By rejecting the dualislic view of perception he 
arrived at a theory of neutral monism quite similar to that of James. Percepts are the 
only neutral entities which explain mind and matter. A percept is noncognitive but is 
obviously the source of knowledge. Russell did not stick to this because, he thought, 
that there is duality in every form of knowledge. In his My Philosophical 
Development he re-introduced the duality of the act and object, the knower and the 
known. [See chapter Five under the headings "Sensations as Neutral Entities", 
"Events as Neutral Entities"). A percept is analysable. It is a bundle of qualities and 
relations. The elements within a percept is such that when it occurs it is noticed and 
known. We have seen his earlier dualisn (see Chapter Four) is more or less Cartesian 
in nature. There he distinguished between sensation and sense-data, between act and 
object. By rejecting Brentano’s theory of intentionality he accepted the radical realism 
of James. With this came his rejection of perceptual dualism. But then he re­
introduced the dualism implicitly in his theory making his theoiy covertly dualistic.
Percepts, the neutral entities, are covertly dualistic and are not physical. Their 
position in the brain does not mean that what we call mental events are physical 
events. Anthony Quinton, in his "Russell’s Philosophical Development", in 
considering the neutral monism phase of Russell’s philosophy, said that "Russell is 
fundamentally a materialist" (p. 8). It appeared to be a materialistic theory, but this 
was a misunderstanding. What I say is its a bit of unconscious piece of bootstrapping 
(see Chapter Seven). It was not based on materialist assumptions - the consequence 
was simply that materialist inputs were hypothesis. Neutral entities are not physical 
entities. This I ,;hall discuss next.
Section .3.
6.5. Neutral Monism Vs. Physicalism.
In declaring that mind and matter consist of neutral entities, Russell suggested "that 
the events that make up the living brain are actually identical with those that make the 
corresponding mind" (Portraits From memory, p. 147; Quinton, "Russell’s 
Philosophy of Mind", p. 108).
In explaining the above quotation Quirion argued:
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What Russell has done is to superimpose on the sense-datum theory 
of perception the conclusion that since the proximate causes and 
effects of the immediate objects of perception are in the brain those 
objects must be there too. |P. 108|.
According to Quinton Russell's explanation shows that events are mental if they are 
mnemically related to other events. The mnemically related events occur "only where 
there is brain". Since mentality of an event comes to be defined as its forming the part 
of the history of a living brain, Russell comes close to the identity theory of mind and 
brain propounded J.J.C . Smart (Philosophy and Scientific Realism, Chapter 5), D.M. 
Armstrong (A Materialist Theory o f the Mind). |C f., p. 108;.
I shall ¿rgue against such supposition that Russell was an identity theorist like Smart 
and his followers. In doing so I shall compare with a recent theory proposed by D. 
Davidson in his Essays on Actions And Events. Davidson’s theory differs from the 
physicalists theory in respect of mind. He discussed the "anomalousness" of the 
psychological realm. This I sha'l discuss in the next section.
In order to prove that Russell was not a physicalist I shall oegin my investigation by 
upholding Russell’s analysis as proposed in his Portraits from Memory, in the chapter 
"Mind and Matter".
Russell held that a mind and a piece of matter alike are to be considered as series of 
groups of events. The evenLs that are grouped to make a given mind are the very same 
events that make the corresponding brain. Thus mind and brain do not differ in 
quality but differ only in arrangements.
With an analogy Russel! exemplified that the difference between mind and brain are 
similar to the difference between arranging people in geographical order or in 
alphabetical order, as done in the Post Office directory. Similarly, the context of a 
visual sensation for physics is physical, and outside the brain. But the visual sensation 
for psychology is quite different. For instance the visual sensation is that of a 
telegram saying that you have lost your job. As a result a series of events will take 
place in your mind in accordance with the laws of psychological causation, and it may 
be some time before there is any physical effect, such as throwing arms and legs, or 
scieaming. | Ibid., p. 148|.
Is mind dependent on brain? Russell’s answer to such a question was that 
corresponding to the mental event, for instance memory, there is "some physical
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modifying of the brain, and mental life must be connected with physical properties of 
the brain tissue" (ibid., p. 148). This is because an event has both the "causal 
relations characteristics of physics and those characteristic of psychology", which 
makes it "both mental and material at once". As a result the ancient question of the 
dependence of mind on brain and vice versa is "reduced to linguistic convenience". In 
cases where we have more knowledge about the brain it will be convenient to regard 
that mind is dependent, but in cases where we know more about mind it will be 
convenient to regard the brain as dependent. "In either case, the substantial facts are 
the same, and the difference is only as to the degree of our knowledge." [Ibid., p. 
14V].
This brought him close to the physicalist theory of mind and body identity. 
Physicalism (see Chapter One), popularly known as identity theory, is a form of 
reductive materialism. In its simplest form, the identity theorists claim that mental 
events are identical with brain events. Similar claims have been made by Russell. But 
his interpretation is different from the physicalists. He arrived at it by saying that the 
brain is composed of thoughts because the percepts, the neutral entities, are located in 
the brain. In saying this he has neither abandoned neutral monism nor accented 
physicalisn..44 45As we know, percepts are the neutral entities in Russell’s philosophy, 
they are in space and time. |See Chapter Five, also the discussion on mind|. And 
because they are in space they have a location. Russell’s acceptance of the causal 
theory of perception suitably locates them, both sensibly and spatially, in the brain.4' 
Percepts are the mental events and are not metaphysically different from the physical 
event. The "causal skeleton of the world" is to be sought in physics. "The physical 
world, it seems natural to infer, is destitute of colour." [The Analysis o f  Matter, p. 
133). Percepts, located in the living brain, are the only part of the physical world that 
we can know without the help of any inference. For Russell, "the gulf between 
percepts and physics is not a gulf as regards intrinsic quality, for we know nothing of 
the intrinsic quality of the physical world, and therefore do not know whether it is, or 
is not, very different from that of percepts" (ibid., p 264). The difference between 
the physical and the mental events is simply epistemological, but metaphysically they 
are similar. For instance let us suppose that we are seeing a glowing gas. Since there 
is similarity between percept and the physical event, "the shape of the percept 
corresponds to the shape of the region in which the upheavals are taking place. .. The
44. Cf. Lockwood, op. c i t p. 154.
45. Sec, Chapter 5 "Location of Neutral Entities".
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colour of the percept corresponds to the amount o f energy lost by each atom in an 
upheaval" (ibid., p. 339).
There are certain basic differences between Russell’s theory and the physicalist 
theory. Firstly, for Russell the entities which compose mind and matter are neutral 
and not physical. The entities of the physicalist are material. Secondly, these entities, 
whether in the brain (the "mental") or out side the brain (the "physical") are identical. 
But that does not mean that mental states are identical w.th the physical states as the 
physicalist argues. According to the physicalist, mental states are physical states. For 
instance pain, a mental event is identical with C-fibre a brain event. Russell spoke of 
the identity of events and not brain and mind. Thirdly, for Russell since brain and 
mind are constructs and are composed of identical entities, it is logically possible that 
there could be disembodied mind. In physicalist philosophy mind cannot possibly 
have a separate existence because mental events are the reduction of the physical 
events. More precisely, each type of mental state corresponds and is identical with 
some type of Vain state or central nervous system. What follows is that mentalistic 
and physxalistic terms do not refer to two different things or events. It rather 
describes the same thing or events. But in Russell’s philosophy although an event can 
be mental and physical both at once, it is quite possible for events to be arranged 
either according to laws of physics or laws of psychology. Russell said:
There would be disemUxlied mind if there were groups of event, 
connected according to the laws of psychology, but not according to 
the laws of physics. We readily believe that dead matter consists of 
groups of events arranged according to the laws of physics, but not 
according to the laws of psychology. {Portraits From Memory, p.
149],
Fourthly, the physicalist claim that their argument lies on the scientific world view. 
As a result they regard the explanatory power of neurophysiology and physics as the 
ultimate. Russell clearly distinguished the importance of both psychology and physics.
|See above]. He spoke of two sorts of causal laws, one physical and the other 
psychological. According to him "a piece of matter is a group of events connected by 
. . . th e  causal laws of physics. A mind is ? group of events connected by ... causal 
laws of psychology" (Portraits From Memory, p. 152).
We have noted that Russell’s theory of identity is the identity of "constituents" and 
not the identity of mind and body. As a result Russell’s theory avoids most of the 
objections proposed against the physicalist theory.
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Kripke46 has said that all identities are essentially rigid and necessary. He contrasts 
this with "contingent" by which he means that it is true but not necessary. Let us 
represent symbolically a particular "pain" sensation and corresponding "brain state", 
i.e. the C-fiber stimulation, as P and C respectively. For Kripke pain P is a name; 
and if something is a pain it is essentially so and therefore is a rigid designator. Thus, 
according to Kripke, the identity of pain with the stimulation of C-fiber, if true, must 
be necessary. But according to the identity theorists the identity between mental and 
bodily events are not "meaning identity", i.e. identity between two synonymous 
general nouns. The identity they claim is neither logical and necessary but rather 
contingent and empirical. David Lewis, in his paper "Mad Pain and Martian Pain", 
argued that pain is a matter of contingency because it depends on what causes what. 
Theiefore all our concepts and ordinary names of mental states are "non-rigid" and 
"contingent". As against this Kripke argued that to prove contingency on the basis of 
"causal role" "amounts to the view that the very pain I now have could have existed 
without being a mental state at all." [P. 147],
Russell’s theory is not vulnerable to the above objection. The distinction between the 
mental event and physical event is simply based on how neutral entities are located. 
Since neutral monism is a metaphysical and non-reductionist theory, the entities 
(mental and physical) are necessarily idenrical. The group of entities become mind 
and matter when treated in two differing causal network. In such cases the identity 
between mind and matter are therefore contingent and not necessary.
There is again an objection that on the basis of the physicalist theory how one can 
explain the "raw feel". Against this the physicalist, especially Smart, tried to answer 
by saying that the so called mental concepts like "feels", "sensations" are in fact not 
committed to either mind or body. They are simply "topic-neutral". Such states of 
"feeling pain", "seeing colour" etc. arise within the organism due to a given stimulus 
and are simply a typical kind of behaviour. Therefore there is no "inner" mental 
sensation but simply certain behaviour patterns like peeling, scratching etc.
One may argue that Russell analysed various mental phenomena in terms of 
behaviour. This is true, but at the same time Russell has introduced the method of 
introspection as the true source of knowledge. |See above]. He spoke about the
46. "Naming and Necessity"; Lockwood, op. cit., pp. 154-5; see chapter 1.
Russell On Neutral Monism. 2 9 0
privacy of "introspective data", such as "sensational cores" and "belief feeling", 
rejected by the behaviourist.
One simple argument proposed against identity theory is that if mental events can he 
reduced to physical events then why and how can a subject report about his mental 
occurrence without having the slightest knowledge abc'it the physical occurrences of 
the brain. Russell’s theory or any neutral monistic theory is capable of avoiding this 
difficulty. For the neutral ir.,mists mental states are not brain states therefore there is 
no need to know the corresponding physical occurrence of the brain.
The above discussion illuminates the fact that Russell is a "neutral monist" and not a 
"physical monist". His theory is capable of avoiding most of the difficulties faced by 
the physicalist theory. In this respect Russell’s theory is more preferable than 
physical ism. But before we finally evaluate Russell’s heciy let us consider a mi.id 
and matter theory propounded by Donald Davidson. Davidson who believed in the 
physicalist ontology that mental events are identical with physical event* but admitted:
I have resisted calling my position either materialism or physicalism 
because, unlike most materialists or physicalist*, I do not think 
mental properties (or predicates) are reducible to physical properties 
(or predicates), nor that we could, conceptually or otherwise, get 
along without mental concepts. ["Replies to Essays", in Essays on 
Davidson, 1985, p. 244],
6.5.1 A Comparison With "Anomalous Monism".
On the assert’on and denial about various questions concerning ontology, and identity 
Davidson provided a fourfold classification of theories of the relation ’«tween mental 
and physical events:
On the one hand there are those who assert, and tho*e who deny, the 
existence o f psychophysical laws; on the other hand there are those 
who say mental events are identical with physical and those who 
deny this. Theories are thus divided into four sorts: nomological 
monism, which affirms that there are correlating laws and the events 
correlated are one (materialists belong in this category); nomological 
dualism, which comprises various forms of parallelism, 
interactionism, and epiphenomenalism; ar.omulous dualism, which 
combines ontological dualism with the general failure o f laws 
correlating the mental and the physical (Cartesianism). And finally 
there is anomalous monism, which classifies the position I wish to 
occupy. |"Mental Events", pp. 213-4).
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Davidson did not view himself either as materialist or as physicalist, but did not deny 
that the position he occupies, i.e., anomalous monism, "resembles materialism in its 
claim that all events are physical" (ibid., p. 214). Saying this he argued for a 
materialist monism.47 Davidson held that mental events enters causal relations with 
the physical events. A causal relation instantiates a strict law. To take Davidson’s 
example, for instance, m, a mental event, caused p, a physical event, then m and p 
instantiate lawful regularities. Since there are no psychological or psychophysical laws 
about the mental then m must fall under a physical law. Therefore mental must have a 
physical description; which is to say it is a physical event. "So every mental event 
that is causally related to a physical event is a physical event." ["Mental Events", p. 
224], Although he accepted the basic physicalist claim, he rejected one of their 
essential thesis "that mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations" 
(ibid., p. 214). This is because anomalous monism allows the possibility that not all 
events are -rental, but insisting that all events are physical. Davidson left the 
possibility that there are some events which are mental
He explained why he called his position anomalous monism. "Monism, because it 
holds that psychological event, ar- physical events; anomalous, because it insists that 
events do not fall under strict laws when described in psychological terms." 
["Psychology as Philosophy", p. 231]. Davidson arrived at a version of monism by 
taking three premises together to support his theory.{Ibid., p. 231]. They are first 
premise, that psychological events such as perceivings, rememberings, memory, and 
intentional actions are directly or indirectly caused by, and the causes of, physical 
events. The second premise is that the events are related as cause and effect in a 
closed and deterministic system of laws into which these events fit. The third premise 
is that there are no precise psychophysical laws, for psychological events cannot 
constitute a closed deterministic system. These three premises taken together connotes 
monism. Davidson emphasized that because the laws are not psychophysical, they 
must be purely physical laws. This means that when events are taken one by one the 
psychological events are describable in physical terms, i.e. they are physical events.
Since psychological or mental events are physical events, there are token identities but 
no type identities.48 A type is a set of instances or token events which share some 
properties or descriptions. But in token identity every "instances" or tokens have the 
same properties. It is in this strict sense that Davidson argued for an ontological
47. Jaegwon Kim, "The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism", p. 34.
48. "Menial Events", pp. 212-15; "The Material Mind", pp. 253-4; "Psychology as Philosophy", p. 
230; Smart, "Davidson's Minimal Materialism", p. 174; Simon Evnine, Donald Davidson, p. 61.
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monism. To say that each individual, token mental event is also physical event, for 
instance, Salome’s present belief that she is hungry and Sahir's present belief that he 
is hungry does not entail that there is a single kind of physical event such that the two 
beliefs are identical to a physical even* of that kind. Salome’s belief that she is 
hungry, a physical event, a certain state of her brain, is a different kind of physical 
event from the physical event to which Sahir’s belief that he is hungry is identical
To say that each instance or token mental events are physical events "does not seem to 
merit the term "reductionism"" ("Mental Events", p. 214). Thus his ontological 
monism is non-reductionist, rniike the physicalist. Reductionism, as Jaegwon Kim 
said, impose on us a "kind of cleansed and tidy picture that appeals to those obsessed 
with orderliness and discipline" ("The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism", p. 31). 
For Davidson the mental does not have the orderliness. He argued that there cannot 
be laws linking psychological states with physical sta*es. By this he meant that there 
are no psychophysical laws presupposed by the physicalist, who provide a reductionist 
argument that each mental event are in fact physical. Davidson’s argument depends on 
the view that there is no purely' psychological laws. Thus the mental is nomologically 
irreducible.
Because there are no psychophysical laws and no psychological laws the mental events 
lack the degree of determinateness which must exist between the two events as a 
necessary condition for having a lawlike relation between them. Davidson argued for 
the anomalousness of the mental. He took three interdependent considerations to 
explain the anomalousness. The three considerations are: (i) The holism of the 
mental; (ii> the indeterminacy of belief and desiie; (iii) the indeterminacy of meaning 
and translation.49 50
(i) The holism o f the mental. The holistic nature of the mental is such that it 
prevents die determinatness of psychological states. Psychological states lack stability 
and rigidity for which one cannot intelligibly attribute any propositional attitude to an 
agent. This was because Davidson argued:
There is no assigning beliefs to a person one by one on the basis of 
his verbal behaviour, his choices, or other local signs no matter how 
plain and evident, for we make sense of particular beliefs only as 
they cohere with other beliefs, with preferences with intentions, 
hopes fears, expectations, and the rest. ["Mental Events", p. 221].
49. Cf., Simon Evnine, np. lit., p. 61.
50. "Mental Events", pp. 216-225; Smart, op. cit., pp. 176ff.
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Mental does not constitute a "closed system" therefore, according to Davidson, "too 
much happens to affect the mental that is not itself a systematic part of the mental" 
(ibid., p. 224). There are no "serious" laws, like the statistical laws of physics, to the 
effect that "if a man wants to eat an acorn omelette, then he generally will if 
opportunity exists and no other desire overrides" (Psychology as Philosophy, p. 233).
(ii) The indeterminacy o f  belief and desire. The anomological character of the 
mental also results from the "failure of definitional behaviourism" (ibid., p. 216). 
Definitional reduction, according to Davidson, hinges upon the question of synonymy 
between definiens and definiendum. Such reduction is possible only if we find an 
open sentence couched in behavioural terms and exactly coextensive with some mental 
predicate. But this is not possible. Davidson said:
Beliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified an:’ mediated 
by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without 
limit. | Ibid., p. 217],
In such a case one cannot explain a particular behavioural description because a host 
of other desires and beliefs overrides making it impossible to represent a 
psychological state it was intended to represent. The failure is due to the holistic 
structure to the psychological domain. For example, as Davidson would say, what it 
is for a man to believe there is life on Mars. He produces a sound. This shows he 
believes there is life on Mars only if he understano English. The sound he produced 
was intentional. For every deficiency we add a new proviso, i.e. there is always need 
for an additional condition which is mental in character. ["Mental Events", p. 217). 
An intentional action, which is a basic aspect of a beiief ard desire, is an action 
caused by those psychological states that rationalize it. These are "irreducible aspects 
of reason-explanations" ("Replies to Essays", p. 246). Davidson affirms: "Clearly this 
holism of the mental realm is a clue both to the autonomy and to the anomalous 
character of the mental" (ibid., p. 217). The holistic structure hinders its having a 
nomological connections between the mental and the physical.
Davidson suggested that the predicates, namely "blue", "green", "grue", "bleen", also 
depend upon the criteria of suitability and unsuitability in order to enter nomological 
relations. Nelson Goodman, in his Fact, Fiction and Forecast, has suggested that 
predicates like "blue" or "green" can be supported by their instance or token; but 
predicates like "grue" and "bleen" remain unsupported by their tokens and therefore
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are unsuited to laws. |C f., ibid., p. 59-83; "Mental Events", p. 218]. Following this 
Davidson said:
Nomological ¿¿atements bring together predicates that we know 
apriori are made for each other- know, that is, independently of 
knowing whether the evidence supports a connection between 
them.... The direction in which the discussion seems headed is this: 
mental and physical predicates are not made for one another. In 
point of lawlikeness, psychophysical statements are more like "AH 
emeralds are grue" than like "All emeralds are green". ["Mental 
Events", p. 218].
(iii) The indeterminacy o f  meaning and translation. In order to explain the 
indeterminacy of translation Davidson distinguished between hetronomic 
generalization and homonomic generalization to say that psychophysical generalization 
is hetronomic. A generalization is homonomic if its positive instances can be 
improved by adding funner provisos and conditions stated in die same general 
vocabulary as the generalization itself. A hetronomic generalization is one whose 
instances may give us reason to believe that there is a precise law at work but in a 
different vocabulary than the generalization it'elf. The problem arises that the 
psychological domain is holistic and prevents the determinateness and stability of 
psychological states. The psychological generalization is heteronomous and it is their 
hetronomic'ty that prevents their becoming laws. In the absence of psychological laws 
the psychophysical generalization will lack the determinacy which is essential in 
forming nomological relations. Davidson said:
The hetronomic character of general statements linking the mental 
and the physical traces back to (the] central role of translation in the 
description of all propositional attitudes, and to the indeterminacy of 
translation. There are no strict psychophysical laws because of the 
disparate commitments, of the mental and physical schemes. It is a 
feature of physical reality that physical change can be explained by 
laws that connect it with other changes and conditions physically 
described. It is a feature of the mental that the attribution of mental 
phenomena must be responsible to the background of reasons, 
beliefs, and intentions of the individual. There cannot be tight 
connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its 
proper course of evidence. |"Menial Events", p. 222],
Translation, as Davidson said, depends on "the constitutive ideal of rationality" (ibid., 
p. 223). For a desire and belief to explain an action in an appropriate way, they must 
cause it in an appropriate way, through a process of reasoning that meets standards of 
rationality. But due to the holistic structure of the psychological domain and the 
mediation of the psychological states by a host of further beliefs and desires,
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Davidson argued, "there is no hope of refining the simple pattern o f explanation on 
the basis of reasons into (quantitative] calculus" (Psychology as Philosophy, p. 233).
The above considerations thus explain the anomalism of the mental. So far our 
analysis has shown that, according to Davidson, in the absence of psychological laws 
there cannot be psychophysical laws for the mental and the physical to have 
nomological relation. His argument gained ground from the fact that psychological 
realm is holistic. But Davidson arguments also suggested that the holistic 
interdependence also infest the physical realm.*1 Davidson wrote:
The nomological irreducibility of the mental does not derive merely 
from the seamless nature of the world oi thought, preference, and 
intention, for such interdependence is common to physical theory....
|"Mental Events", p. 222].
For most philosophers, for instance Quine ("Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and World 
and Object), holism is a thesis about the stru'ture of theories in general. On the basis 
of this Klee argues Davidson’s suggestion would lead to the idea that because of the 
internal indeterminacy there can be no physical laws for the same reason.*2 Robert 
Klee tried to disprove the argument for the anomalousness of the psychological realm 
by showing that Davidson "misconstrues the role of cetaris paribus (translates as 
"other things being equal"| Clauses in psychological explanation" ("Anomalous 
M onism....", p. 1). Since there are good laws of nature in the physical universe then 
anomalousness of the mental cannot be valid.
Now the question arises: Is there any relation between the mental and the physical? 
Davidson’s answer is affirmative. Totally committing himself to the idea of "non­
reduction" Davidson injected the notion of "supervenience" to explain the mind-body 
problem. The idea of "supervenience" was first introduced by G.E. Moore in ethics. 
Moral properties, like being good, are not reducible, but are "supervenient" upon 
naturalistic pioperties. Like Moore Davidson argued that mental properties are not 
reducible ;o physical properties. He wrote:
Although the position I described denies there are psychophysical 
laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in 
some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics. 
Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two 
events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental 
respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without 512
51. Klee, R., "Anomalous Monism, Ceteris Paribus and Psychological Explanation", pp. 6-7.
52. Ibid., p. 7.
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altering in some physical respect. Dependence or supervenience of 
this kind does not entail reducibility through law or definition: if it 
did, we could reduce moral properties to descriptive , and this there 
is good reason to believe cannot be done.... Mental Events", p. 
214],
The above quotation reveals that Davidson defined supervenience in two ways. But 
the two definitions suggests that they 'sc  far from equivalent.53 In his "Replies to 
Essays" it is the first definition Davidson chose to explain54:
The notion of supervenience, as I have used it, is best thought of as 
a relation between a predicate ?nd a set of predicates in a language: 
a predicate p  is supervenient on a set of predicates S  if for evety pair 
of objects such that p  ¡s true of one and not of the other there is 
predicate of S that is true of one and not of other. |P . 242).
Then he went on to say:
|S]upervenience as I have defined it here is clearly all I needed for 
the argument in "Mental Events", since what I was arguing for there 
was only identity of mental events with physical events. I wanted to 
emphasise that such ontological reduction docs not imply that mental 
properties are physical properties, nor that there are causal or 
bridging laws relating events classed by me ital properties with 
events classed by physical properties. |P. 243-44|.
Davidson has injected supervenience to fill the twin requirements he set forth.5' They 
are, fiist, the relation must be nonreductive, and second, the relation must be one of 
dependence. Kim argued:
But it has not been easy to find such a relation. The main difficulty 
has been this; if a relation is weak enough to he nonreductive, it 
tends to be too weak to serve as dependence relation; conversely, 
when a relation is strong enough to give us dependence, it tends to 
be too strong-strong enough to imply reducibility.56
Davidson has argued siipervenit.ice to show the anomalousness of the mental. Kim 
found difficult to understand the relation of the mental to the physical, which if 
committed to superveneince mighi prove to be lawlike. He explained: "If M 
supervenes on N, each property in M which is instantiated has a general sufficient
53. Lewis, H.A., "Is the Mental Supervenient on the Physical?", p. 169-170.
54. Simon, E., op. cil., p. 67-68.
55. Kim, op. cil., p. 40.
56. Ibid., p. 40.
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condition in N ... I don’t see how such generalizations could fail to be lawlike" 
("Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables", p. 153).
I-et us now compare this with neutral monism which provides a nonreductive analysis 
of mind-body problem, like that ot anomalous monism. The main point of difference 
between Davidson’s theory of mental events and those of Russell’s theory of mental 
events is that the former is physical and the later is neutral. I have explained above 
that Russell is not a "physicalist monist". But Davidson is basically a physicalist.,7 
Mental events in his philosophy belongs to the same causal net-work as those physical 
events, only that mentality does no causal work. (Kim, "The Myth of Nonreductive 
materialism", p. 35). According to anomalous monism, events a.e causes or effects 
only as they instantiate physical laws. But mental events have neither physical laws 
nor psychophysical laws, and therefore make no causal difference. If mentality is 
causally irrelevant then, Kim argued, "it’s difficult to see what point there is in 
recognising men'ality as a feature of the world. I believe that if we push anomalous 
monism this way, we will find that it is a doctrine virtually indistinguishable from 
outright eliminativism" {ibid. , p. 35). The distinguishable feature of eliminative 
material.sm is its denial of intertheoretic reduction. The reason for this denial is that 
the eliminative materialist’s conviction that folk psychology is primitive and deeply 
confused conception of our internal activities.’1
Neutral monists argument for non-reduction is based on simp’e assertion. According 
to the neutral monist, especially Russell, events are neutral and are spatio-temporally 
located Russell’s commitment to causal theory of perception led him to say that 
events are spatially located in the brain. |See Chapter 5, "Location of Neutial 
Entities"]. But that does not make the events physical as the physicalist would argue. 
Nor does it make mental in Berkeleyan sense. Metaphysically the events are neutral. 
It is the epistemological consideration that distinguishes events as physical and mental.
|See above). The mental events are those that v'e know directly otherwise by 
inference. The difference between mind and matter does not consist in raw material of 
which they are composed, but in the manner of arrangement.
Fcr Davidson non-reduction is due to the anomalousness o f the mental. Simon points 
out that there is no need for the argument for anomalous monism to establish non-
57. His own assertion that mental events have the same description as physical event; and that mental 
events are physical events makes him a physicalist; also sue, Simon, E., op. cit., p. 63; Smart regards 
Davidson's theory as "modest sort of physicalism", "Davidson’s minimal Materialism," p. 174.
58. See for instance, Churchland, P.M., Mailer and Consciousness, pp. 45-9.
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reductive materialism. [Donald Davidson, p. 63). He said that a mental event, being 
an event, must have spatio-temporal location, and therefore must be a physical event. 
Perhaps Simon is right. Davidson is not denying that mental events are physical 
event*:. What he is denying is that we cannot have a correlation between the mental 
and the physical because there are no psychological laws. If there are no laws for the 
mental how there can be psychophysical laws by which reduction can take place. 
There is no doubt that Davidson, being a physicalist, tried to point out that although 
mental and physical event have similar description there is no need to suppose that 
my having pain, e.g.. can be reduced from a particular brain state. We encounter no 
such problem A'ith neutral monism. In Russell’s philosophy neutral events are located 
in space and time, and t’;at their location does not make them mind and matter. These 
events constitute a piece of matter only when they are connected by causal laws of 
physics and a mind when connected by causal laws of psychology. Russell laid 
importance on causal laws o f both psychology and physics. |See above). If Robert 
Klee is right then there are physical laws as well as psychological laws and the 
question of aromalousness o f the mental does no* arise. Psychological laws may not 
be as rigid as the physical laws but that does not necessarily mean dial mental events 
are nomologicaUy independent. This is why James has said, neutral events can have 
both "stubborn" and "fluid" or less stubborn relations. For instance, physical fire, 
according to James, will consume a physical house. But mental fire is what won’t 
bum real sticks or mental water is what won’t necessarily put out even a mental fire.
|See Chapter Two).
Because of the anomalousness of the mental Davidson brought in the concept of 
"supervenience" to show the mind-body relation. Kim has suggested that 
supervenience might prove to be lawlike and the stronger claim would lead to 
reducibility. Neutral monists, especially James and Russell, have accepteu the causal 
laws. Russell accepted that the relations between the mental and the physical events is 
complicated because epistemologically the mental events are prior to physical events, 
which are supreme in the region of causal efficiency. But both physics and 
psychology treats the same event or group of events. Russell wrote:
If what is for physics a bit of my brain is really a group of events, 
my sensations and thoughts and feelings may be members of this 
group. If so, die difference between the physical and the mental will 
be one of logical: the unit for physics will be an assemblage of the 
units for psychology. ( ’Mentalism vs. Materialism", p. 121).
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Russell did not use the word "supervenience", and it is difficult to see how this notion 
is to he analysed in his philosophy. (Sainsbury, Russell, 1979, p. 239], In explaining 
Russell’s theory of construction we have said that according to Russell mind and 
matter are "fictions" rather than entities. They are fiction in the sense that what we 
know directi' are the constituents (the neutral entities) and the constructs (mind and 
matter) are known through inference. Mind and matter are the constructed and 
complex entities and are therefore ontologically dependent on the simple entities of 
Jieir construction. But fictional entities are not entities in the sense neutral entities are 
entities. Whereas "supervenient entities are entities" (ibid., p. 239). Mental entities, 
according tc Davidson, are entities in the same sense as physical entities are entities.
That mental events nre supervenient on physical events means, according to 
Davidson, that there cannot be two events similar in all physical respects but differing 
in some mental resjtect. Davidson seems to commit himself to two types of events, 
bringing a kino of dualism to explain his nonreductive theory. '9 Mental events, 
according to him, are physical events because they belong to the same causal net 
work. But they do not enter into causai transaction because the physical constitute a 
close system. Mental is not a closed system because "too much happens to affect the 
mental", and that there are no strict laws which can predict and explain mental 
phenomena. This anomalousness makes the mental "autonomous" and different from 
the physical domain and thus moves further in the direction of dualism. Kim said that 
"nonreductive materialism is not stable position. There are pressures of various sorts 
that push it either in the direction of outright eliminativism or in the direction of an 
explicit form of d’jalism" (The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism", p. 47). Because 
the physical domain is causally closed and the mental is causally open, and because 
there are no laws connecting the two domain, Davidson espouses explicit dualism.
6 .6 . Conclusion.
Neutral monism, as I have argued, although it may have certain inherent tension, is 
more plausible then anomalous monism in explaining mind and matter in terms of 
neutral entities. Both James and Russell argued for only one single kind of stuff, 
which is neither physical nor menial, but neutral. There are a plurality of neutral 
entities which enter into causal relations. There are both psychological laws and 
physical laws It is through physics that we can establish the truth of the entities but it
59. Cf. Kim, "Psychophysical laws" and also "The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism", p. 36. Kim 
says that Davidson's views of the mental contain some "distinctly dualistic elements".
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is through psychology that we justify their existence. It is due to the neutrality o f the 
entities that we can say that an entity is in some senses both mental and phys'cal at 
once. The epistemological consideration, (i.e. how do we know) left the entities 
having certain implicit qualities (both mental and physical) and relations. This I call 
covert dualism.™ This dualism is not an explicit form of dualism, as suggested by 
Descartes, but is such that it paves the ground for Loth physical and psychological 
laws to act upon without any reservation* The neutral entities are spatio-temporally 
located and the possible problem of interaction can be easily dealt with, which is one 
of the arduous questions faced by the mentalist, the physicalist, the anomalous monist 
and the Cartesian dualist.
60. See sections 1.2.3.,3.2, 3.4, 5.1, 5.6.
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Chapter 7.
Neutral Monism. Realism and Bootsti aping
’to have a good reason for holding a theory is ipso facto  to have good 
ieason for holding that the entities postulated by the theory exist.’
fWilfried Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, 1963, p. 
91].
7.1 introduction .
The purpose of philosophy is to formulate theories that are genuinely explanatory. 
Theories consists of hypotheses, which are hacked up hy evidence. The concept of 
"evidence" is central to the empirical investigation and observation. A theory of 
evidence will indicate what relationship has to exist between the observations reports 
and the hypotheses for the former to constitute evidence for the latter.1 R<r a theory 
tc be genuinely explanatory, according to W.C. Salmon, its hypotheses must be 
testable independently not only of »he arguments and evidence which were employed 
in their formulation, but also of those arguments or events that the hypotheses are 
currently being used to explain.2
But philosophers are bound to face difficulties if the hypotheses that make up their 
theories are not supported by enough evidence. These difficulties become apparent 
when we attempt to go beyond direct observation and draw conclusions about the 
nature of the world beyond our perceptions.
In order to avoid the apparent difficulties we need to discover if there are any 
strategies that will allow us to make justifiable and testable inferences from the realm 
of experiences to the existence of those structures and objects that bo»h lie beyond and 
cause our experiences. On this Raymond Tallis said,
’je|mpirical observation may generate laws that correlate one type 
of experience with another; but can they take us "beneath 
experience" to its basis? It seems unlikely that experience can take 
us outside of the closed circle of experience to reveal that upon
1. Achinslein, Peter, ed., The Concept o f  Evidence, ’ Introduction ’ , p. 1.
2. Four decades o f  Scientific explanation.
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which experience in general, rather than particular experience - is 
based".3
An attempt has been made by Clark Glymour to provide zv. epistemological 
explanation to solve the difficulties. Glymour wrote that
"whether the foundation of all empirical belief was thought to rest 
on beliefs about phenomenal appearances or on beliefs about 
observable properties of observable things, the structure of the 
problem was the same: what relations between statements about 
phenomena, or observation statements, on the one hand, and 
statements about material objects or, respectively, about 
unobservable things or unobservable properties, on the other hand, 
permit statements of the former kird to confirm statements of the 
latter kind?"4
Glymour attempted to solve this problem by employing the bootstrap strategy to 
ground both our knowledge of the general anJ specific facts ujion the same evidence. 
I shall discuss this shortly.
7.2 Neutral monism and circular arguments.
Neutral monism, a theory of mind and matter, owes its origin to Mach, who believed 
in the scientific investigation of the phenomena. His aim was to produce a genuinely 
explanatory theory of sensations. This challenge was taken against Descartes, who 
believed in two kinds of substances only known by their attributes. The neutral 
monists argued that the "stuff" which explain:: mind and matter is not a kind of hidden 
unperceivable Ding-an-sich. To arrive at a more plausible theory neutral monists had 
to test their hypothesis hacked up by evidence.
Mach, James, Russell, the main exponents of the theory, tried to test the hypotheses 
that make up their theories with independent evidence. Mach, being a physicist, 
believed in the "economy o f thought" and that the aim of science is to provide 
economical descriptions of phenomena. It is through scientific evidence, he argued, 
one can conclude that nature is composed of sensations as its elements. These
3. "A Critique of Neuromythology", p. 93 |pp. 86-109).
4. Glymour, C., Theory and Evidence, pp. 10-11.
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sensations and their relations is studied in every branch of science. In his attempt to 
provide a conception of unified science Mach was led to the theory of neutral 
monism. |For detail see Chapter One],
James’s thesis wps supported by the scientific theories of his time. The principle of 
natural selection, the conservation of energy and the concept of "entropy" heightened 
the plausibility of his theory. James’s mam concern was to demonstrate the 
"spontaneous variation" of life and mind. "He extended the notion of spontaneous 
variation to the whole of nature, and proclaimed the view that the physical order was 
itself an effect of progressive relection."5 His reading of Mach’s thesis of inti- 
atomism (see Chapter One) led him to believe that pure experiences are not "chopped 
up in bits". In nature there is no gaps and experiences are externally related having a 
stream like flow. For James atoms, the ether, and similar scientific entities are not to 
be thought of as perceptual realities. "They are fictions o r metaphors whose purpose it 
is to enable us to describe the perceptual realities in terms of "functional variations". 
They arc tools of thought ... the proof of which lies in their satisfying certain 
theoretical demands such as prediction, elegance, and simplicity."6
In science James saw the economical and useful description of fact. This method of 
science pushed him in the direction of empiricism. As a lesult James embarked in a 
world where "sensations" and "sensible objects" are described as homogeneous and 
continuous. There is no subject-object distinction in our perception, and that there is 
no such entity ca'led consciousness. He rejected the dualism of substances and 
declared that reality is plural where pure experience forms a single basis to explain 
this plurality.
The "nightmare of entropy" .vhich troubled the nineteenth century mind led James to 
say that materialism offers us no promise for the future. The physicist Clausius 
introduced the word "entropy" to refer to the fac* that all thermal changes there is a 
certain loss of available energy.7 Thus matter cannot be the ultimate stuff to explain 
reality. "The universe continually grows in quantity by new experiences that graft 
themselves upon the older mass."8
5. Perry. Thought and Character o f  William James, vol. I, p. 490.
6. Ibid., p. 492.
7. Passmore, A Hundred Years o f  philosophy, p. 113.
8. Essays in Radical empiricism, p. 43.
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James was interested in laboratory experiments and was aware of the physiological 
breakthrough during his time. He was under the influence of naturalistic school but 
did not rely on a particular science. Mach’s influence on him and his knowledge of 
the scientific breakthrough of his time provided a better chance for his theory to be 
more explanatory. As Perry pointed out, a scientific theory was for James essentially 
a hypothesis, owing for its cognitive merit and its ultimate verification in «¿rms of 
perceptual experience. Thus the method of science inclined him in the direction of 
empiricism.
This led James to accept an experiential theory of reality. According to this theory 
existence reveals its native quality in certain peculiarity authentic modes of 
apprehension, such as perception. It is with a positive experiential context James tried 
to fill the mind-body chasm.
Russell, exposed to the twentieth century scientific breakthrough, particularly in the 
fielu of physics, exploited science to justify his theory. His view of the world, as a 
neutral monist, resulted "from a synthesis of four sciences- namely, physics, 
physiology, psychology and mathematical logic" (My Philosophical Development, p. 
12). Russell wrote:
Science is at no moment quite right, but it is seldom quite wrong, 
and has, as a rule, a better chance of being right than the theories of 
the unscientific. Ii is, therefore, rational to accept it.... [/h i d p . .
13].
By grounding both our knowledge of the specific and general facts on same evidence 
the neutral monis*s, in general, produced various arguments which has been regarded 
as circular. |See 2.6.2., 5.6., 5.6.1., 6.1, 6 .4 ., and Chapters Five a.id Six] I will 
argue that this apparent circularity of James’ and Russell’s analysis is really part of a 
sophisticated programme, now known as Bootstrapping.
The problem of the relationship between evidence and hypothesis raises the entire 
issue of realism, because it is important to determine whai attitude philosophers 
should take to the hypothesis that there is a world beyond our perceptions, and what 
role they think such a hypothesis should play in the formulation of their theories.
Bootstrapping
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7.3. Two Kinds of Realisms
7.3.1 Metaphysical Realism.
The exponents of metaphysical realism take it for granted that the world exists more 
or less as we perceive it. They presuppose a correspondence theory of truth and 
accordingly hold that our perceptions are true and accurate as far as they represent the 
way that die world really is. But the relationship between what exists in perception 
and the external world cannot be independently tested. This is because our knowledge 
of the external world is derived from our perceptions, "nd this begs the question of 
the accuracy of Jiese perceptions. Therefore metaphysical realism avoids the very 
possibility of there being any direct empirical evidence for the existence of such a 
world.
On the basis of this it is considered that theories based upon metaphysical realism 
cannot be regarded as satisfactory explanations. Ellis9 10 pointed out:
[T)he postulated of causes of the phenomena must be supposed to 
exist if the theory is to accepted as doing what it purports to do; and 
normally we should expect to be able to find independent 
confirmation o f their existence from various sources, [p. 57|
The metaphysical realists would face the sceptical challenge even if we could grant 
that such a transcendental world existed. They would still have difficulty in satisfying 
us that our perceptions and representations of this world are accurate. According to 
Ellis:
We can investigate nature and develop a theoretical understanding of 
the world, bu* we cannot compare what we think we know with the 
truth to see how well we are doing. We cannot be assured that 
science has made progress toward its goal of discovering the true 
nature of reality. Ip. 69.]
9. Cf. Laura J. Bennet, 'Realism And Evidence In The Philosophy of Mind".
10. Ellis, B., "What Science aims to Do", pp. 48-74.
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Ellis pointed out that this was not a merely contingent, state-of-the-art difficulty, but a 
necessary consequence of the metaphysical relationship between the world and our 
scientific theories aoout it. He said:
If even the perfection o f human knowledge by human standards does 
not necessarily lead to truth, then the truth is essentially 
unknowable, ....[pp. 71-72.]
The way in which metaphysical realists frame their questions about the world prevents 
discoverable empirical data from constituting independent evidence in favour of their 
theory.
7.3.2. Scientific Realism.
Like metaphysical realists the scientific realists believe in the existence o f the external 
world. The difference is that they do not seek to justify the existence o f an external 
world by reference to a co.respondence theory of truth.
But this does not imply that scientific realists do not think that they have grounds for 
the existence of an external world. It is simply that the way the scientific realists set 
up the problem both allows for and demands confirmation that is not available to the 
adherents of the metaphysical realism. Scientific realists just.fy their acceptance of the 
external world using arguments from the possible best explanation. This argument is 
in itself a scientific hypothesis which states that the best explanation of why scientific 
theories are successful is that the world really is as they postulate it. Hence the 
scientific realists derive increased support for the hypothesis that the world exists 
through the existence ol successful scientific hypotheses. If a theory fails to make 
successful predictions or to explain, then the theory should be abandoned, or at least 
revised. This is the basis of the bootstrapping methodology. Here the scientific realists 
put forward the relatively unconfirmed hypothesis that the world exists beyond our 
perceptions (together v. ith some tentative pieces of evidence) as a foundation upon 
which to build other, more specific scientific hypothesis. If these hypotheses are then 
well supported by independently ootained evidence, then they in turn, provide further 
confirmation of the original hypothesis that the world exists beyond our perceptions.
Scientific realists regard their individual theories and the relationship of these theories 
with the world as empirically testable. Yet it is sometimes argued that all scientific
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theories are empirically undetermined, since no matter how many of their 
consequences we examine, it will always he possible to construct rival theories which 
contradict them and yet succeed in explaining exactly the same phenomena.
Scientific realists claim to have a reply to the argument from empirical 
underdetermination. They maintain that such an argument can never he justified, since 
it is impossible to  predict future theoretical developments which may yet enable us to 
distinguish between two theories that are currently empirically equivalent. Such 
evidence may not come from any direct consequences of either theory. In support of 
this claim Ellis pointeJ out that:
The point is a Duttemia.i one. Theories do not normally occur in 
isolation, and evidence for or against a theory can come from 
unexpected quarters. |p. 65.]
Evidence for or against the buth of a theory may include
"Values such as ontological simplicity, coherence, and explanatory 
power."'*
Churchland was right to point out that these criteria are values and not 
straightforwardly observable kinds of evidence. Nor are the criteria mentioned here an 
exhaustive list o f the values which could be used to assess a theory.
Hence, the scientific realists criterion for the truth is more than one of correspondence 
to a transcendental world, and a rather more pragmatic one at that. Moreover they 
would refrain to claim that the true theory is simply equivalent to the best theory we 
have. The scientific realists do not insist upon the separation of truth from epistemic 
values, such as rationality, as the metaphysical realists do. However, this is simply 
one’s own theoretical preferences. One should not generalise that what is rational for 
one person to believe is also rational to another.
However, the success of the scientific realist in escaping the difficulties of 
metaphysical realism is debatable since evaluative criteria like ontological simplicity 
and coherence may themselves incorporate implicit and untestahle metaphysical 
assumptions. 1
11. Churchland, P .M ., "The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical 
Virtues", in Images o f  Science, p. 42.
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7.3.3. Thg Bootstrapping Device.
The bootstrapping methodology has been regarded by scientific realists as a tool for 
deriving both s|iecific and general views from the same initial evidence. This option is 
not open to the metaphysical realist, who assumes that the external world exists, but 
who cannot test his hypothesis because it takes the status of an a priori assumption.
The notion of "bootstrapping" is developed by Clark Glymour in his book Theory and 
Evidence. It is essential to note from the outset that bootstrapping is very complex 
methodology that can appeal in a variety of different guises. Since it is itself merely a 
suggestion or model of how it may be possible to obtain support for genera1 and 
specific hypotheses from the same initial evidence, it is hardly surprising that 
individual accounts and uses of the methodology will emphasize different aspects of 
the strategy and a variety of ways in which it is employed
Moreover, since the strategy is a device for acquiring new knowledge on the basis of 
sound evidence, it blurs the traditional distinction between discovery and justi.lcation.
Glymour regarded his own variation of the bootstrap as deriving from theories of 
Reichenbach and Carnap. Both Reichenbach and Carnap sought a way of using 
evidence derived from our observations to confirm the individual hypotheses of a 
theory. Glymour writes that the Camapian legacy within Glymourian theory is
"a stratagem for making the connection between evidence and 
theory: use some of the hypotheses to deduce from the evidence 
statements, instances of other hypothesis" |p. 62]
The Glymourian bootstrap strategy.
The following passage from Glymour’s book will explain the substance of the 
bootstrap strategy.
"Hypotheses are tested and confirmed by producing instance of 
them; to produce instances of theoretical hypotheses one must use 
other theoretical relations to determine values for theoretical 
qualities; these other theoretical relations are tested in turn in the 
same way. Ideally, one night hope for bodies o f evidence that 
permit each hypotheses to be tested independently." | /hid., p. 52.|
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For Glymour, evidence diJ not confirm a hypothesis absolutely but only by 
comparison to an alternative theory. We begin, in the first instance, by using a 
hypothesis H j to confirm a hypothesis H2 relatively to a theory T (where T is simply 
a set of hypotheses Hj+H2 +H3 f . Hn, together with their supporting bodies of 
evidence, E j, E2 , etc.). Thus far, there is nothing distinctive about Glymour’s 
method, except the emphasis upon the fact that Ej is only evidence for Ho relative to 
T. Nor must it be possible for any evidence whatsoever to confirm H2 . What is 
unique about Glymour’s bootstrap method is that it can theo be inverted so that H2 
and a fresh se* 01' evidence E2 can be used to confirm Hj relative to T.
The interesting aspect o f Glymour’s method is that it enables us to pull ourselves up 
by the bootstraps simply by using relatively unconfirmed hypotheses to generate fresh 
information in the form of future hypotheses, which may then in turn be combined 
with new evidence to confirm the original hypotheses. In more general terms an 
overall world view may be combined with observational evidence to confirm a more 
narrow hypothesis, which can then be used in conjunction with further evidence to 
confirm the general hypothesis, again relative to  the theory.
In two separate examples we will show how the Glymour bootstrap methodology may 
be used. The first is informal treatment of the use of method in the formulation of a 
theory about genius in composers. The second is more formal which consists of a 
justification o f induction based upon the bootstrap strategy.
Example 1.
l^ t T be the whole theory of the nature of genius in classical composers.
l et H] be the unconfirmed hypothesis that all musical genii come Irom main'anu 
Europe and Ej be knowledge of the ages at, which those mainland European 
composers musical promise. So Ej might consist of:
Bach - showed early promise
Mozart - gave public performances aged 6
Chopin - played in public aged 8
Liszt - played in public aged 9
Strauss(Richard) - composed at the age of 8
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Given this, we may deduce the hypothesis H2 , that musical genius often begins at an 
early age. If we then use this hypothesis H2 together with the details of the 
birthplaces of these composers familiar to us (E2), we can try to confirm the first 
hypothesis H] that all musical genius comes from mainland Europe. For example F.2 
may consist of the following data:
Strauss was born in Germany 
Liszt was bom in Germany 
Chopin was bom in Poland 
Mozart was bom in Austria 
Handel was bom in Germany
Given that E2 does contain this information, then it would appear that H] is 
confirmed relative to the theory T. However, for the bootstrap strategy to avoid 
circularity, we must be able to say what sort of evidence would count against H j . For 
example, if Purceil were to be included in F.2 , then Hj would then need to be 
weakened to the hypothesis that "many musical gerii come from mainland Europe". 
Similarly, we must be able to say what evidence F.j would nave to include for it to 
falsify hypothesis H2 — in this case, had we included Beethoven, who did not show 
much musical promise in his youth (despite his father's attempts to make it seem 
otherwise), H2 would also need revision.
From the above information we could go on to use H2 to formulate either another 
general hypothesis, H3 , such as all musical genii played piano, or a more specific 
hypothesis H4, such as, if Purcell was a musical genius, then it is likely that he 
composed pieces at an early age. (H4 is confirmed by further evidence E4 — Purcell 
did begin to compose when still a young boy). In this fashion, our initial hypothesis 
H | and evidence E] permit inference of both specific and general facts.
Example 2.
A formal example o f the use of the bootstrap strategy in science is given in Hunt’s 
examination of the question of induction. 12
Hunt argued that the fact that only the existence of regularity can provide evidence for 
the view that there are necessary connections within our universe does not entitle
12. "Laws: Projectibility and Uniformity", pp. 241-246.
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Hume to infer that there can he no empirical evidence for necessity. The problem of 
necessity simply reduces to the problem of induction. If we can empirically justify 
induction, then necessity exists, even if we cannot know the precise nature of this 
necessity. This is where the bootstrap method comes in.
Even though Hume can argue that inductive argument c»n least support the existence 
o f a uniform world, it is not open to hir.i to deny the very possibility that such a 
world exists. Let us consider this possibility our theory T. We can nominate this 
possibility a finite positive probability. This probability need not be very high. It 
therefore follows that we can assign all the hypotheses included in T (H j, H2 , H3 ... 
Hn) an equal probability of >G .
If induction is valid (call this hypothesis H j), then it will provide true hypotheses on 
the basis of the evidence available. 1 herefoie if the probability o f T being true is also 
> 0 ,  then the probability of induction being valid is also > 0 .  If  evidence E] is 
available which builds the probability of a second hypothesis H2 being true, given 
that the probability of induction being valid is > 0 , then this in turn increases the 
possibility that nature is uniform ana that induction is valid.
Once more , we are pulling ourselves up by our bootstraps since we are accepting that 
nature may be uniform and that induction may be valid in order to demonstrate these 
very conclusions. However, Hunt s argument avoids circularity because
"even though an inductive rule appears both as a rule o f inference 
and as a conclusion, it is nowhere assumed as true but only, 
initially, as minimally probable" (Hunt, p. 243).
Berides, we can say what evidence would count against it. Hunt commented that
"|t]he emergence of evidence supporting induction is an empirical 
matter and if contrary evidence appears the probability of [induction 
being valid) will become low" [ibid., p. 243).
Hunt’s example signifies how just how profound and useful the bootstrap strategy 
may be if it can withstand the criticisms that have been levelled at the metaphysical 
iealist with respect to the testability of the premises of his theories.
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Keeping in view the above discussion I will consider how neutral monists apply the 
bootstrap strategy inorder to avoid circularity in their arguments.
7.4 Neutral Monism and Bootstrapping.
Earlier we have seen how both James and Russell began their analysis of neutral 
monism by rejecting the traditional notion of "substance". They took the empiricist’s 
starting point to press the point that observation reveals that the world consists o f 
"sense-data". The decomposition of the perception of the world into sense-data in its 
crude form has happened to us in childhood. As James argued (See 2.6.1.]. that 
experiences, the neutral entities, do not come to us "aboriginally stamped", rather 
"the baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all as one 
great blooming buzzing confusion". Russell argued that the data which constitute the 
external world come to us through various senses. The sensations belonging to 
different sense form a world peculiar to that sense with certain spatial relations 
determined by those sensations. Thus each individual 'ives in a private world which 
contains its own spaces from different sense. These spaces of sight are correlated with 
the various spaces of other senses. Such correlation, according to Russell, is learned 
by experience in childhood. [See 6.1.1.].
Neutral monism rejects naive realism that the things are what they seem. It claims that 
what we are aware of in immediate perception are "sensations" or percepts" or "pure 
experiences". Based on this neutral monist hypothesis we can see how observation 
supports scientific theories. Russell wrote:
We all start from "naive realism", i.e ., the doctrine that things are 
what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, 
and the snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of 
grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of the snow, are not 
greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know in our experience, 
but something very different. The observer, when he seems to 
himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be 
believed, observing the effects of the stone upon himself. Thus 
science seems to be af war with itself: when it most means to be 
objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will. 
Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that 
naive realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false; 
therefore it is false. |An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 13],
Following the above discussion let us say that the following are the neutral monist 
hypotheses, where i l  stands for hypothesis: H j, "observation reveals that we are 
aware of sense-data", H2 , "things are not what they seem", and H3 , "naive realism is
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false". If neutral monist hypotheses are true then we can see how observation supports 
scientific theories. So we are justified in believing science and science supports 
neutral monism. Therefore by bootstrapping neutral monism is iendered more 
believable.
The bootstrap strategy is the recent development in the philosophy of science. This 
strategy was not known to Russell and James. Their implementation of it was 
unconscious. N r:t I will consider how Russell and James applied this strategy to 
make their theories genuinely explanatory.
7.4.1. James and Bootstrappitig .
In formulating neutral monist hypotheses James depended on the evidence of 
physiology, psychology and physics, especially of Mach. He also exploited the 
findings of the laboratory experiments during his time to support his theory.
James argued that there is no distinction between the mental and the physical and that 
what we call mental and physical are simply neutral experiences. The difference is 
simply contextual. In explaining the difference between the mental objects and 
pnysical objects James says that in mind extensions can be indefinitely located and 
that motion obeys no Newton’s laws. It has been alleged that by appealing to other 
conceptions James initiated circular arguments. ¡See 2.6.2).
Observation reveals that physical objects determined by strict physical laws behave in 
a certain way. Mental objects also behave in a charac.’.eristic way. The difference is 
that the laws that determine mental objects are not as rigid as the physical laws. Thus 
physical fire will consume a physical house but one can play witn mental fire without 
any effect. There is no uiff.culty in pure experience (neutral entity) entering into two 
sorts of relation. Therefore the difference between the mental objects and the physical 
objects are not between entities which compose the objects but between two kinds of 
laws. James claims to know the rigidity of physical laws by observation and claims 
the fluidity of psychological laws by introspection. This is also backed by more 
profound scientific evidence which helped James to arrive at definite conclusions.
A particular example of this alleged apparent circularity is his theory that there is no 
gap in pure experience and that it has a flow like a stream. This knowledge is derived 
from physiology. |See 3.2.3.]. In his psychology James argued against the theory
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which considered consciousness as an epiphenomeuon. He pointed out that the 
problem with the epiphenomenalism is treat the concept of "causality" as a one way 
traffic. Accepting Darwinism and the findings of physiology James argued that 
consciousness is active and selective. In order to provide the theory of consciousness 
James exploited the runction ot central nervous system and the brain. The activity of 
the sensory nerve and the motor nerve shows tJiat the message to and from the brain is 
carried with out any spatial gap. The transmission to and from the brain is like a flow 
without any break. This led James to argue that consciousness is simply continuous 
without any gap. There may be interruptions or time gaps, but such break has no 
connection between what happens earlier or followed later. Consciousness is sensibly 
c mtinuous and has a flow like a stream. |See 2.3.1.].
In his philosophy .'ames rejected the theory of consciousness as an entity. Instead, he 
argued that there is no such thing as consciousness other then "pure experiences", the 
neutral entities. In a similar tone James concluded that fiere are only neutral pure 
experiences which explain mind and matter and has a flow like a stream. To test h>s 
hypothesis Juntos considered the evidence E j , that the function of both the efferent 
and the afferent nerves shows the flow of activity with out any break between the 
brain and the nervous system, to support the specific hypothesis (in his psychology) 
H j, that there is no gap in conscious experience. But observation reveals that there is 
no such thing called consciousness. What we call consciousness is simply a function 
and that function is knowing. James argued that one cannot deny that there a function 
in experience which thought performs. This is the evidence E2 - Accordingly he 
formulated the second hypothesis H2 that there is no subject and object distinction in 
the stream o f pure experience. The distinction which generates in the process of 
knowing is simply by appropriation or retrospection. Here James used Ej as only 
evidence for H2 . The uniqueness about bootstrap method is that it can be inverted so 
that M2 and a fresh set of evidence E 2 can be ’ised to confirm Hj that there is no gap 
in conscious experience.
Now James could go on to use H2 to  formulate the general hypothesis H3 that pure 
experiences are neither mental nor physical but neutral entities and that the subject- 
object distinction is only contextual, or more specific hypothesis H4 , such as, the 
relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relation and 
therefore external. ( H4 is confirmed by further evidence E4-  the message carried by 
the sensory nerves to the brain is continuous. That is to say that when a later moment 
o f one’s experience succeeds an earlier one, the transition from the one to the other is
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continuous. In other words in passing from one of my own moments to another the 
sameness of object and interest is unbroken.
» 3  is neutral mcnism through which E] is seen as evidence for H j, H2 and H4 are 
intermediaries which make the example complicated. In this way our initial hypothesis 
Hj and evidence E] allow inference of both specific and general facts. For fie  
bootstrap to avoid circularity, we must indicate what sort of evidence woulo count 
against H ], and also what evidence E] would have to include for it to falsify 
hypothesis Ify-
The above discussion shows how Gly.nour’s strategy helped James to pull himself up 
by the booi ¡traps by using relatively unconfirmed hypothesis to provide fresh 
information in the form of future hypotheses. This in turn combines with new 
evidence to confirm the original hypotheses relative to the theory
7.4.2. Russell and Bootstrapping.
Ayer alleged:
This whole theory [neutral monism]... is very ingenious, but it is 
open to serious objections on the ground o f  circularity. [Russell and 
Moore, p. 62],
We have seen in Chapters Five and Six how Russell committed himself to circular 
arguments in making his theory of neutral entities more viable. For instance he argued 
that the world is composed of simple entities which are causally connected. Accepting 
this fac*. he justified physics by arguing that physical analogies to perception show that 
in most places at most times a vast assemblage of overlapping events is taking place, 
and that many of these events, at given place and time, are connected by causal chains 
with an original event which has produced offspring more or less similar to itself in a 
vast number of different places. [My Philosophical Development, pp. 14-15]. This led 
him to formulate the specific hypothesis Hj that the events occurring in any given 
small region of space-time are not unconnected with events occurring elsewhere. As a 
next step Russell takes an approximation to perception and depends on the evidence 
E j— a photographic plate exposed to a portion of the night sky takes photographs of 
separate stars (see Chapters Four, Five and Six for the same example). That 
observation shows that no minds are involved for we do not suppose that photographic- 
plates have minds. Based on this piece of information Russell formulated the
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hypothesis H2 that the happening from the various stars to the various photographic 
plates does not consist of waves hut o f "little bundles of energy" called photons (ibid., 
p. 13). Then he used H2 together with the evidence E2 that each star gets itself 
photographed, and can he photographed anywhere on a clear night to confirm the 
hypothesis H | that the events occurring in any given small region of space-time are 
not unconnected with events occurring elsewhere. Russell came to the conclusion that 
there must be something happening, at each place where it can be photographed, thai 
is specially connected with it. From the above information Russell further deduced the 
specific hypothesis H3 that events occupy a finite amount of space and time. This 
generated further evidence that the theory of relativity has abolished one cosmic time 
and one persistent space. Grounding the facts on specific hypotheses Russell 
confirmed the neutral monist hypothesis H4 that there are single kind of entities which 
occupies a certain amount of space-time and is neither mental nor physical. Neutral 
monism begins as an approximation to perception w.iich is supported by scientific 
discovery. Thus neutral monism justified physics and physics confirmed neutral 
monistic hypothesis as true making it more probable. By bootstrapping Russell 
rendered his theory more acceptable.
Consider a more specific example. The implementation of bootstrap strategy leads 
Russell to formulate the hypothesis Hj that both physical and mental events are in 
space-time. |See Chapter Five). By employing the method of construction Russell 
showed how physical and perceptual spaces are constructed. [See 6.1.1.]. The 
evidence Ej  is- the data which constitute the external world can be obtained by 
perception. They come to us through the senses. The sensations of sight are given as 
spatial sight space, and those of tactile in tactual space. These sensations from 
different senses, at any given moment, are correlated in such a way that they provide 
a momentary world view, which according to Russell is the "private world", i.e. a 
momentary mind. Similarly a "momentary thing" is constructed out of se  ^ of 
sensations both perceived and unperceived. Given this Russell deduced the hypothesis 
H2 , that both mental states and physical objects are in space and time. These 
constructions follow different laws. The physical laws explains the consiiuction of 
momentary thing and the psychological laws explain mind. It is the way of 
arrangements that distinguish the mental and the physical. Thus the mind and matter 
are constructed out of sensations or percepts that spatially located and are in time. 
With the evidence E2 that the theory of relativity places events in space and time, 
Russell confirmed Hj that since time and space are so much less distinct it has 
become difficult to hold that mental events, though in time, are not in space. [See
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6.2.1.1.]. Based on E2 and Hj Russell further deduced the hypothesis H3 - that there 
is "neighbourhood" of events which consist of all events that are very near the given 
event. This generates further evidence E3 - that events in the physical world have 
relations 10 each other which are th : sort that have led to the notions of space and 
time. These relations are of order. This lead us to say that one event is nearer to a 
second than to the third. 'Hius the nearer two events are to each othei, the more 
nearly they have certain relation. Baseu on this piece of information Russell 
formulated hypothesis H4- that the neighbouring events have certain relations. So 
evidence E4 consists o f neighbouring events have this relation with out limit as they 
are taken nearer and nearer together. By using the hypothesis H4 and the evident.; E4 
Russel! pulled the hypothesis H3 by its bootstrap.
Thus Russell lifted his theory by bootstraps in order to confirm the unconfirmed 
hypothesis by grounding in both special and general facts.
7.5 Conclusion.
The above discussion shows whv James and Russell appealed to produce fatally 
circular arguments in explaining their versions of neutral monism. These arguments 
though circular are non-viscious. We have already seen how Hunt’s argument avoids 
circularity. This he does by assumirg that nature may be uniform and that induction 
may be valid in order to demonstrate the conclusions to be reached. Similar view has 
neen held by Abner Shimony. The circularity is non-viscious, as he states, in the 
following sense:
"theory as a whole is open to critical evaluation in the light of 
experience, for the reciprocal support of a methodology and a 
scientific picture does not render it impregnable to criticism." 13
In his "Braithwaite On Scientific Method" Shimony argued that the circularity need 
not be vicious if we properly choose the contingent proposition which serve the 
"suppressed major premise" (p. 657.). He pointed out that there are general 
propositions which we accept partly because experience somehow confirm their truth 
and partly because of instinct. For instance we can consider such vague proposition 
that the nature is uniform, and the proposition that othei' human beings have faculties 
like our own. Now if F is such a proposition, with the further property that the
13. Shimony, Abner, "Scientific Inference", pp. 159-60.
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addition of it to the evidence gathered in experimentation helps in certain degree in 
confirming scientifically and practically important hypotheses. Thus based on the 
assumption F  it is possible to use systematically gathered empirical evidence to build a 
body of well-confirmed scientific propositions. Among these scientific propositions 
some will concern fundamental physical facts about the world, and other will concern 
the psychological and physiological nature of human beings, and some will oncern 
about the degree of accuracy of the instincts and jnsystematic inferences of human 
beinps. these results throw light upon the proportion F, which was instrumental in 
reaching them. If these results confirm F, then the foundations of induction will be 
inductively justified. This justification wil’ not be considered as trivial petitio principii 
because the conclusions ot the major sciences will not only depend or. the initial 
assumption of F, but also upon empirical data which nature forces upon us. In case 
scientific results disconfirm F then alternatives has to be sought to rectify the method 
of inquiry The fact that there is a possibility o f disconfirmation shows that we have 
not "blocked the road to inquiry" by holding on to F unnecessarily. The circle not 
only shows to be non-visci ju s , but rather to be a natural consequence o f the fact that 
being the products of nature human beings try to investigate nature as a whole. [Ibid., 
pp. 657-8.|.
The above discussion shows how one can avoid circularity by not holding on to 
certain premisses which need revision. James and Russell based their arguments on 
observation and well-confirmed scientific findings. They tried to pull themselves up 
by their bootstraps by using relatively unconfirmed hypothesis to generate fresh 
information in the form of future hypotheses. The later hypotheses in turn be 
combined with new evidence to confirm die original hypotheses.
For instance Russell accepted that physics is true. He intended to prove it by pointing 
to the fact that every physical theory which survives the test of time goes through 
three stages. In the first stage, the theory is a matter of controversy among specialists. 
In the second stage, the specialist agree that it is the theory best fits the available 
evidence. In the third stage, it is the new evidence is unlikely to replace the theory but 
may modify it. Russell accepted those parts of physics which has reached the third 
stage as acceptable as arguments for the philosophical speculation. |See 6 .4 .].
For James14 experience is the legitimate source of information about the world. But its 
limits are very strict. It is not possible, according to Van Frassen, to guarantee about
14. Frassen, Bas C. van, "Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science', in Images o f Science, pp. 252-53.
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the future on the basis of our experience. Experience only discloses to us no more 
than what has actually happened to us so far. But we have seen that it is science that 
led James to commit to experience. In his "A World of Pure Experience" James 
argued that the world is uniform hut its unity is not fully experienced as yet. This is 
because Jie universe continually grows in quantity lv new experiences that graft upon 
the older mass bv helping the mass to a more consolidated form. The unconfirmed 
future hypotheses together with the new evidence are used to confirm the original 
hypothesis. By allowing flexibility and rejecting the concept of "blocked universe" 
James in fact committed himself to a more profound epistemology which science 
renders more believab'»*.
As a result we have seen that both Russell’s and James’ arguments apparently gave 
rise to circularity. But in consequence it had been shown that James and Russel! are 
more sophisticated than their critics for much of thei. argumentation is not fataliy 
circular as had been supposed.
In the light of the above discussion James and Russell can be seen as early pioneer of 
scientific epistemology. This does not make their theory perfect, for I have argued (in 
Chapters Three, Five and Six) that they are covertly dualistic. However, this 
represents not only a major step in the philosophy of mind and matter but a major 
innovation in the method of philosophy.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion-
Neutral Monism or Covert Dualism? Some Final Reflections.
8.1. Introduction.
This concluding chapter will he comparatively brief. I shall summarise the aims 
and findings of my argument.
8.2. Summary and Conclusions.
8.2.1. Aims of the Thesis.
As I have remarked in my general introduction to this thesis, my discussion of 
William James’s and Bertrand Russell’s theory of neutral monism had four central 
objectives. Tb: first and the most fundamental of these was the examination of 
James’s and Russell’s versions of neutral monism. It was James’s theory to which 
Russell reacted and finally adapted into his own philosophical programme.
This primary objective could only be achieved once a n  appropriate criterion for 
the examination of the versions of neutral monism had been selected. This means 
that any theory of neutral entities must consist of three parts. (1) A theory of 
neutral stuff must tell us the nature of neutral entities. That is, a neutial entity 
must not be either physical or mental or have any elements belonging to both. (2) 
A theory of matter must tell us what kind of relations which, when hold between a 
bundle of neutral entities, constitute that bundie as a set of a material object. (3) 
Similarly a theory o f mind must tell ns what kind of relations are those which, 
when they hold between a bundle of neutral entities, constitute that bundle as a 
mind or mental phenomena. There may be different versions of neutral monism 
depending on the distinctive answers they provide to these parts.
My remaining objectives related to the methodology employed by both James and 
Russell are discussed in chapters 2, 4 and S. I argued that James and Russell 
accepted a limited form of dualism before their final commitment to neutral 
monism. This helped them to abolish epistemological dualism to a certain extent
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and accept a metaphysical monism of neutral entities. I went on to render explicit 
their arguments in rejecting psychophysical dualism.
Phenomenalism as a methodology rather than a theory was adopted by the neutral 
monists. I have argued »hat neither James and Russe'l were phenomenalists.
Further I hoped to sh.»w that alleged circularity involved in James’s and Russell’s 
argument was part of much more a recently expounded methodology called 
bootstrapping which makes the circularities non-vicious. I argued that they tried to 
pull themselves up by tueir bootstraps by using relatively unconfirmed hypothesis 
to generate fresh information in the forms of future hypotheses. The later 
hypotheses in turn be combined with new evidence to confirm the original 
hypotheses.
8.2.2. Structure of my Arguments.
It would have been unwise to attempt an evaluation of neutral monism without a 
preliminary discussion of some of the major alternative theories along with their 
inadequacies. I therefore began chapter 1 with the key question "What there is?" 
in order to outline the fundamental aim of neutral monism that is to provide an 
empirical sub-stratum to underpin physics and psychology. Keeping this argument 
in view I have discussed the development of the theories in James and Russell. In 
chapters 2, 4 and 5 I have discussed the earlier versions of neutral monism, both 
o f Janies and Russell, and argued that the epistemological distinction between the 
knower and the known, subject and object had not been totally got ridden of. This 
is because of inherent tension within the theories.
In chapters 3 and 6 I have argued that though James and Russell avoided dualism 
in Cartesian style they have implicitly introduced a dualism which I call covert 
dualism. For this purpose I have isolated several arguments to render that neutral 
monism is a clear case of covert dualism. The alleged circularity, which I 
discussed in chapter 7, in Russell’s and James’ argument may be due to more 
profound scientific epistemological commitment but this does not make their 
theory perfect. A summary of my main conclusions is given below.
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8.3. Conclusions.
I contend that I succeeded in reaching all four of my primary objectives. It will be 
convenient to discuss my main conclusions in the oruer that they appear in die 
body.
I was able to show that James’s early commitment to "phenomenism" has 
influenced both his psychology anu metaphysics. James partly succeeded in 
discarding epistemological dualism by rejecting a relation of a subject to object. 
Although he accepted the hypothesis of "phenomena" as a neutral name (which 
can be viewed either as "feeling" or as "objective feet") to explain away the 
existence of the so called "Ego" in terms o f stream like continuity of 
consciousness, it d'd not afford a proper foundation for his psychological 
discourse. Instead "phenomenism" anu "commonsensism" brought much 
ambiguity in his philosophy and therefore led him to allocate different merits to 
the terms "thought" and the "thought’s object". |See Chapter TwoJ.
Further I showed that before his ultimate commitment to neutrai monism James, 
in his "phenomenism", argued that the entire world, objective and subjective, at 
any actual time is a datum, and only, within that datum there are two parts, the 
objective and subjective parts. I therefore argued that James, in his radical 
empiricism, could not disentangle himself from this hypothesis and therefore 
argued for a theory which could be called covertly dualistic. Moreover his theory 
of knowledge inadvertently supported this. [Chapter Three|.
Russell was familiar with James’s thesis of neutral monism which led him in 1912 
to close the gap between physics and perception. I argued that Russell’s 
commitment to the relational theory of sensation left his theory "barely d’lalistic" 
as against psycho-physical dualism as his critics claimed. I have considered this 
move of Russell important as it led him to accept neutral monism.
Although Russell rejected the Brentano-Meinongian distinction between the act 
(the subject) and the object of the act, he was not satisfied with James’s 
explanation that, for instance, what occurs in the dog when it "sees a rabbit" has 
only an indirect causal relation to the rabbit. As a result when he officially 
declared himself a neutral monist Russell proposed three distinctive types of 
neutral entities. They are sensation, a neutral entity, image, a subjective entity and
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unperceived, a physical entity. My analysis had shown that his early theory is a 
sort of Cartesian dualism. |See Chapters Five and Six|.
I have further claimed that one of Russell’s motive was to bring his theory close to 
that of James. Russell, following James, rejected the dualistic theory of 
perception. In his later version he employed the inductive method and became less 
interested in the importance of epistemology for a metaphysical theory. I have 
however shown that Russell could not but had to re-introduced epistemological 
dualism in order to answer questions as to what is meant by "empirical evidence". 
I argued that like James’s, Russell’s theory also collapses into covert dualism, by 
admitting internal elements within the datum.
I have defended my claim that neutral monism is a case of covert dualism from 
such claims as phenomenalism and physicalism. I have argued that neither James 
nor Russell was a phenomenalist, although Russell’s early version was a type of 
phenomenalism called "quasi-phenomenalism". In support of my argument I have 
distinguished between three types of factual phene me.ialism in order to show that 
if Russell had accepted hyper-phenomenalism, i.e. only one’s own sense-data 
exists, then his theory would have been degenerated into solipsism. If he had 
accepted pure phenomenalism then it would have been difficult to explain physics, 
since physics demands continuity. Moreover it was not in Russell’s interest to 
develop a theory of phenomenalism. Since his motive was to develop neutral 
monism he accepted phenomenalism purely as a method. James was not a 
phenomenalist either. His views on objective reference and his regarding nature as 
a pattern rather than construction is a proof that his motive was purely to make the 
neutral entities accessible. (See Chapter Four].
The introduction of the identity hypothesis by Russell does not make his theory a 
physicalist. I have argued that Russell’s identity is identity of "constituents" and 
not of the identity of mind and matter as the physicalist claim. As a result his 
theory avoids most c f  the objections proposed against the physicalist theory. 
[Section 6.4],
Since neutral monism is a non-reductionist theory I have compared with one 
recent non-reductionist materialism called anomalous monism. 1 have argued that 
while neutral monism may have inherent tensions, it is more plausible than 
anomalous monism in explaining mind and matter. Moreover I have shown that
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for James mental laws are flexible but they are certainly not anomalous as 
Davidson claimed.
I conclude that bootstrapping strategy may have he'iped both James and Russell to 
lift the theory by its bootstraps in order to confirm the unconfirmed hypothesis by 
grounding in both general and specific facts. As 1 have shown, this has not made 
their theory perfect. Bu. it has made the theory eminently plausible. Whether, 
ultimately, neutral monism can be developed into a wholly successful theory is a 
question beyond the scope of this thesis. What I have shown is that its 
development was a magnificent, complex but flawed effort. But its flaws are no 
more final than the difficulties faced by the other, more traditional theories of 
mind.
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